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Problems, Questions, and Methods  
<in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become 
accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it 
possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever 
becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1970: 53) 
Self-Emancipation and Division of Labor 
The central problematic of this dissertation is the contradiction between the 
principle of self-emancipation and the historical division of labor. Isolated from a 
long, personal history of experience, contemplation, research, and soul searching, 
this sentence appears as a rather pompous declaration to begin a PhD with. Yet, 
when I look back at the development of both my political activism and my 
academic research in the past decade, I realize that most of my writings already 
implicitly dealt with this question; as a way of understanding the role I myself 
possibly could and ethically ought to play as a fledgling scholar-activist in 
processes of emancipation.  
 In his critique of the Gotha Program, Marx emphasized that: ‚The emancipation 
of the working class must be the act of the workers themselves.‛1 At the time, this 
constituted a revolutionary principle that rejected previous paternalist traditions 
whereby an enlightened elite, Blanquist vanguard, or ‚Savior-Ruler‛ acted as the 
emancipator of a subaltern2 group. In the same spirit, Alan Johnson defined self-
emancipation as: ‚<a political process in which the oppressed author their own 
liberation though popular struggles which are educational, producing a cognitive 
liberation, and instrumental, enabling the defeat of their oppressors.‛ 3  Real 
emancipation entails the development of the capacity of a group to emancipate 
itself.4 
                                                          
1 Marx 2008: 28. 
2 Term used by Gramsci to denote groups that are the object of domination and hegemony.  
3 Johnson 2001: 98. 
4 Note that this did not preclude the need for a ‚leadership‛ within the workers’ movement, as 
Johnson explained: ‚The idea of self-emancipation, in liberating people from the need for liberators, can 
seem to deny the need for leaders at all. It certainly denies the necessity for a Power From Above to deliver 
liberation to the poor benighted subjects below. Yet there are two reasons why we can’t get rid of leadership 
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 Yet, Marx and Engels also drew attention to a fundamental predicament of 
human emancipation: the historical separation between theory and practice, 5 
mental and material labor: i.e. the social division of labor constitutive of class 
society. 
From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is 
something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents 
something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a 
position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of 
‘pure’ theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc<6  
The growing social division of labor has created a distinction between practice 
and thought by separating a category of professional ‚ideologists‛ from the rest 
of society. The social separation between theory and practice brought Karl 
Kautsky, the leading theoretician of the Second International, to the conclusion 
that the idea of socialism had to be brought to the workers from without: 
<socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other; 
each arises under different conditions. Modern socialist consciousness can arise 
only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic 
science is as much a condition for socialist production as, say, modern technology, 
and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other, no matter how much it 
may desire to do so; both arise out of the modern social process. The vehicle of 
science is not the proletariat, but the bourgeois intelligentsia [emphasis by 
Kautsky]: it was in the minds of individual members of this stratum that modern 
socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more 
intellectually developed proletarians... Thus, socialist consciousness is something 
introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something that 
arose within it spontaneously.7  
Even though other Marxists rejected Kautsky’s paternalist view of workers as the 
passive receivers of ‚theory‛ from bourgeois intellectuals, most of them did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
so easily: unevenness in the consciousness of the emancipatory subject, and the organised opposition of the 
adversary.‛ (Johnson 2001: 113) 
5 Obviously there is no ‚pure‛ historical dichotomization between theory and practice; Marx 
rather drew attention to the emergence of ‚pure‛ theory. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3 
Learning and Instruction. 
6 Marx and Engels 1970: 52. 
7 Kautsky in Lenin 1973: 47. 
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investigate critically their own role as non-proletarian 8  actors within the 
development of the workers’ movement. As the great ‚thinkers‛ and ‚leaders‛ of 
the socialist movement emerged from the ranks of the (petty) bourgeoisie,9 how 
could and should they assist the development of the workers’ movement without 
appropriating it for their own benefit? From the perspective of the self-
emancipation of the working class, what forms of instruction and assistance were 
necessary, possible, and ethical?  
 This problematic did not only reflect a theoretical and historical discussion: it 
also articulated my own experience and activity in both the political and 
academic fields. At the age of fifteen I pledged myself a Marxist and became 
involved in fringe politics. As I slowly came to understand (various 
interpretations of) Marxism and as I experienced the often nefarious practices of 
leftist politics, I was struck by, on the one hand, the distance between 
revolutionary thought and the everyday working class ‚lifeworld‛, and, on the 
other, the implicit or explicit, willing or unwilling forms of substitutionalism10  – 
despite the emphasis of Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto that 
communists ‚<do no set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape 
and mould the proletarian movement.‛11 
 My first Master thesis implicitly touched upon this issue, as it dealt with the 
historical dynamics of political sectarianism in the Belgian Trotskyist organization 
‚Vonk‛ (Spark) of which I was a member at that time. My second Master thesis 
aimed to understand the reciprocal relation between political thought and activity 
through the figure of the Iranian Islamist Ali Shariati.  
 Yet, it was my fieldwork in Egypt from 2008 onwards that, for the first time, 
saliently posed the problem in practice, allowing me to develop my intuitions on 
the subject matter. Whereas my original doctoral research proposal was focused 
                                                          
8 Throughout most of the text, I use ‚proletarians‛ in its broadest sense of modern wage laborers 
who, as a category, are the product of the historical process of proletarianization: i.e. the 
separation of producers from their means of production. From this historical class point of view, 
a Western worker who owns a house and earns a decent wage is equally ‚proletarian‛ as an 
Egyptian public sector worker who struggles to secure his or her means of existence. Obviously, 
this does not mean that both workers share the same consciousness – I discuss this further in the 
text. 
9 See, e.g., Sassoon 1997. 
10 Substituting the agency of the working class with that of the vanguard party, the State, the 
leadership, the Leader, et cetera.  
11Marx and Engels 1998: 50. 
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on the discursive production and reproduction of Islamic intellectuals in Egypt, 
my experiences in the field swiftly reoriented my investigations towards the 
relation between intellectuals and activists, especially leftists12, and the workers’ 
movement. I was impressed by the extent to which the Mahalla strikes between 
2006 and 2008 had called many leftists ‚back to class‛. After the disintegration of 
the civil-democratic Kefaya movement, the workers’ movement seemed on its way 
to becoming the core of opposition to the Mubarak regime13. Leftist actors were 
confronted with the question of how they could assist in politicizing the workers’ 
movement without ‚hijacking‛ it for their own goals.  
 In this dissertation I reveal the different modes and types of assistance that the 
workers’ movement received from ‚external‛, i.e. non-proletarian, forces. In 
order to conceptualize the ethico-pedagogical relation between non-worker and 
worker actors, I have developed a methodology that draws upon various 
‚disciplines‛ within the broad Marxist tradition,14 and that voluntarily subjugates 
itself to Andy Blunden’s call to and project for an interdisciplinary emancipatory 
science.15 My methodological approach takes the agency and development of the 
workers’ movement as both its scientific subject matter and ethico-political 
principle. It does not conceive of ‚populations‛ as passive objects of descriptive 
research and politics of control, but as actors in their own right.  
 This approach is also inscribed in the ‚heterodox‛ tradition of Middle Eastern 
Studies,16 which opposes the main academic and political narratives that frames 
                                                          
12 Instead of defining from the start the category of ‚leftists‛ according to a set of fixed attributes, 
I prefer to use the notion for all those who consider themselves ‚leftists‛ in the Egyptian context. 
Among these leftists can be found the different ideological strands of Marxism, Stalinism, 
Maoism, Trotskyism, reformism, Nasserism, popular nationalism; various organizations and 
organizational forms; new and old generations; armchair intellectuals and street activists; et 
cetera. My primary interest is not an analysis of the ‚real‛ leftists as opposed to ‚rightists‛, but a 
conception of the variety of ways in which ‚intellectuals‛ – in the Gramscian sense – assist the 
development of a worker Subject. In my experience, most of these intellectuals, from socialists to 
human rights activists, will agree with the common, vague denominator of ‚leftist‛. 
13 I do not often employ the term ‚regime‛ in the text. Instead I prefer to use the Gramscian 
concepts of ‚State‛ – either in its ‚integral‛ sense or as ‚political society‛ – ‚historical bloc‛, and 
‚hegemony‛ to denote certain complexes of actors, activities, and material and ideational forms. 
These concepts are explained in Part I Methodology. 
14 Especially those interpretations which focus on the development of human agency as the core 
of a critical emancipatory praxis (e.g. the ‚young‛ Marx; Luk{cs; the Lenin of the Philosophical 
Notebooks; Gramsci; Ilyenkov; Blunden). 
15 Blunden 2010. 
16 See, e.g., the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP). 
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the region’s populations as passive objects of religion, tradition, and 
authoritarianism. The Iraqi poet and novelist Sinan Antoon mused that in the 
eyes of the world the Middle East had become ‚<a place where the burden of the 
past weighed so heavily and the cultural DNA somehow preconditioned those who carried 
it to feel more at home with tyrants and terror.‛17 The roots of this defeatist discourse 
stretched back to the era of Western colonialism, which presented the Arab 
masses as uneducated, backward and thus incapable of self-emancipation. At the 
end of the nineteenth century Lord Cromer emphatically ruled out the possibility 
of self-determination of the Egyptian people:  
Can any sane man believe that a country which has for centuries past been exposed 
to the worst forms of misgovernment at the hands of its rulers, from Pharaohs to 
Pashas, and in which, but ten years ago, only 9.5 percent of the men and 0.3 
percent of the women could read and write, is capable of suddenly springing into a 
position which will enable it to exercise full rights of autonomy with advantage to 
itself and to others interested in its welfare? The idea is absurd.18 
More than a century later, on the first day of the 25 January Revolution, an article 
appeared on the BBC website, echoing Cromer: ‚Egypt has many of the same social 
and political problems that brought about the unrest in Tunisia - rising food prices, high 
unemployment and anger at official corruption.‛19  Yet, it immediately downplayed 
the possibility of a revolutionary Tunisian scenario in Egypt by pointing out that: 
‚However, the population of Egypt has a much lower level of education than Tunisia. 
Illiteracy is high and internet penetration is low.‛20 The colonialist premise of Lord 
Cromer that despotism and a lack of formal education constituted absolute 
obstacles to the self-determination of a people was still shared by political 
commentators and scholars of the region today.21  
 The ‚Arab Spring‛22 saliently re-introduced the notions of revolution and self-
emancipation to the dominant perceptions of the region. According to Joel Beinin 
and Frederic Vairel, the popular democratic revolt and the (re)appearance of ‚the 
                                                          
17 Antoon 2011a. 
18 In Seikaly andGhazaleh 2011. 
19 BBC News 2011. 
20 Ibid. 
21 In Seikaly and Ghazaleh 2011. 
22 I am not particularly fond of the term, because it introduces many doubtful connotations to the 
study of the revolts (e.g. sudden renewal after a long ‚winter‛; cyclical nature of the process; et 
cetera). 
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masses‛ as a societal agent revealed the inadequacy of a discipline that studied 
the region through the lens of enduring political authoritarianism, religious 
fundamentalism, and economic backwardness.23Antoon sarcastically remarked 
that: ‚Too many trees were killed theorizing about the region’s inhospitability to 
democracy.‛24 Sherene Seikaly and Pascale Ghazaleh criticized those who claim 
that the populations of the Middle East are too ignorant to emancipate 
themselves: ‚Democratic participation, in these stubborn lexicons, is not a right but 
something earned and learned.‛25 While I agree with their sentiment, I would argue 
that democratic participation is not an abstract right, but a concrete capacity that is 
definitely earned and learned; because genuine emancipation is not granted by an 
authoritarian regime or taught by a paternalist pedagogy, but organically 
conquered through the process of collective struggle. 
The Reconstruction of the Subject 
The Arab Spring came as a shock, not only for Western ‚colonial‛ observers, but 
also for Arab activists and intellectuals, as Seikaly and Ghazaleh pointed out: 
It is not simply colonial overlords, authoritarian regimes, and Western arms 
dealers that attempt to produce the Arab people as children to be herded. Arab 
elitist discourse has played one of the most crucial and sustaining roles in 
producing the people as passive, easily manipulated children. Arab intellectuals 
reproduce a pervasive and ongoing divide between the ‚educated‛ and the 
‚uneducated‛< Elites are reproducing the very infantilization of the people that 
has buttressed colonial, authoritarian, and neo-colonial domination.26 
A majority of Arab intellectuals were not able to imagine the ‚people‛ – al-sha’b – 
let alone the working class, as a self-determining agent. Although most of them 
acknowledged the ‚masses‛ as a formidable social force, they saw them as a 
power that could be mobilized by a third party, rather than as self-conscious actor 
in their own right. In the end, al-sha’b was just a category from which ‚Savior-
Rulers‛ such as Gamal Abd al-Nasser drew their legitimacy. However, the 
paternalist pedagogy of many Arab intellectuals did not reflect a regional history 
without mass movements. Eliott Colla reminded us that:  
                                                          
23 Beinin and Vairel 2011: 1. 
24 Antoon 2011a. 
25 Seikaly and Ghazaleh 2011. 
26 Ibid. 
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<making revolution is not something new for Egyptians—having had no less 
than three ‚official‛ revolutions in the modern era: the 1881 Urabi Revolution 
which overthrew a corrupt and comprador royalty; the 1919 Revolution, which 
nearly brought down British military rule; and the 1952 Revolution which 
inaugurated 60 years of military dictatorships under Nasser, Sadat and 
Mubarak< In other words, despite what commentators might say, modern 
Egyptians have never passively accepted the failed colonial or postcolonial states 
that fate has dealt them.27 
The contemporary Arab revolts did not wake the region from an eternal slumber 
of Oriental Despotism,28 but the salient display of mass agency did stimulate and 
reinforce the conception of the popular masses as a collective actor. People were 
not only conscious agents, they became conscious of their agency as a people. For 
example, Muhammad Salah, an elderly leftist leader, claimed that: 
The Egyptian revolution transformed the science of revolution in the whole 
world< What happened in this revolution proved that so-called Egyptian culture 
and our religious background are not the determinants of the Egyptian society. The 
revolution showed this. The historical Egyptian culture is not the one that was 
built since the pharaohs< it was the one we saw in Tahrir Square. The revolution 
destroyed the mystification of our culture and showed that this perceived culture 
was untrue – the relation between man and woman, between religion and politics, 
and so on.29 
The Arab revolts, renewed forms of militant trade union activism, 30  and 
movements such as the Indignados and Occupy Wall Street, might be the 
harbingers of a ‚resurgence of the Subject‛ – in its ‚grand‛ sense of people 
collectively shaping their destinies by transforming their societies.  
 However, are the ‚subaltern‛ groups today sufficiently equipped with critical 
theories that enable the development of a concept of themselves as a coherent, 
collective and revolutionary actor? Since the last four decades, critical thought has 
shunned away from the construction of ‚grand‛ Subjects, which have been 
tainted with the ‚modernist‛ legacy of authoritarianism, eschatologism, 
                                                          
27 Colla 2011a. 
28 Interview with Alaa al-Aswany, Cairo, 26 November 2011. 
29 Interview with Muhammad Salah, Cairo, 7 March 2011. 
30 See, e.g., Mathers 2007; Moore 2011. 
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determinism, and/or ‚monologism‛ 31 . The subaltern was intellectually 
emancipated from its subsumption under ‚unitary Subjects‛ and motors of 
history, and emerged as a multi-vocal complex of identities.32 But how did the 
conceptual fragmentation of domination and subalternity emancipate the 
subaltern groups from their economic and political predicaments?33 How did the 
recognition of the decentralized and dispersed character of ‚capillary power‛ 34 
and ‚everyday‛, ‚molecular‛ or ‚invisible‛ forms of resistance35  develop the 
means for these groups to overcome the conditions of capitalism? 36  Post-
structuralist, deconstructivist, 37  and post-modernist schools of thought have 
presented themselves as the defeat of the grand Hegelian and Marxist narratives, 
but were they not grand narratives of defeat themselves?38  
 Rather than an emancipatory breakthrough, the embrace of localized micro-
strategies of resistance by activists and engaged social scientists alike appears as a 
practical and theoretical retreat from the triumph of neoliberal capitalism.39 The 
essentialism of the universal was replaced by the fragmentation of the 
particular, 40  and the critique of social forms by the genealogies and the 
deconstructions of their concepts.41 
                                                          
31 ‚Monologism‛ encourages one ‚voice‛ to speak, thus generating homogeneity and claims for 
an ‚ultimate truth‛. Conversely, ‚dialogism‛ offers a platform to many ‚voices‛, thereby 
stimulating difference, variation, and a relative conception of truth. See Bakhtin 1985. 
32 See Mouffe 1993. 
33 Harman 2002. 
34 See Foucault 1972. The notion of ‚capillary power‛ was hardly original or anti-Marxist: For 
example, Gramsci had already elaborated such forms of ‚self-domination‛ through his concept of 
hegemony. (Morton 2007: 93) 
35 See Scott 1985. 
36 Moore 2011: 8. 
37 The alternation of binary, hierarchical oppositions in the text/contexts. See Derrida 1978. 
38 ‚The location of identity in culture or ideology rather than in material relations of political struggle 
reflects, not only the defeat and decline of the labour movement, but also of social movements based upon 
gender and race, to which they are historically and politically connected.‛ (Moore 2011: 20). 
39  ‚Local actors, knowledge and interventions are key features in both ‘new’ Right and ‘new’ Left 
conceptualisations of development.‛ (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 249)  
40 See, e.g., the replacement of the term ‚classes‛ by ‚social actors‛ in the second edition of 
Richards’ and Waterbury’s A Political Economy of the Middle East: ‚’Social actors’ is an amorphous 
term< Its main task in this context is to avoid asking: Are there structural contradictions in capitalist 
economies, and in whose interests are such economies most likely to operate?‛ (Beinin 1999: 22) 
41 Moore 2011: 14-5. 
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 I argue that ‚grand‛ obstacles for human emancipation, such as global 
capitalism, require ‚grand‛ solutions: i.e. the (re)construction of coherent42 and 
multidimensional mass Subjects. The intellectual challenge of the 21st century 
consists of a theoretical negation of the negation: how to preserve the post-
structural, deconstructivist, and post-modernist dismantlement of the grand 
narratives, 43  and, at the same time, engage in the construction of new, 
emancipatory conceptions of the Subject?44  
 This dissertation aims to be a modest contribution to the re-construction of 
such a theory of the Subject. It is not an ambitious attempt to build a new, grand 
narrative ex nihilo, but it constitutes one of the many participations in a historical 
and still ongoing ‚collaborative Project‛ that reaches back to the first defenders of 
the principle of self-emancipation. 
Research Questions 
The central problematic of this dissertation – the contradiction between the 
principle of self-determination and the historical division of labor, or, in other 
words, the separation between ‚masses‛ and ‚intellectuals‛ – is not a wholly 
personal and ‚external‛ frame imposed on my object of research, but it expresses 
a real, living, and pertinent discussion among Egyptian social and political actors. 
First the Mahalla movement, then the mass strikes of the 25 January Revolution, 
saliently (re)introduced the working class as a social force and collective actor in 
contemporary Egyptian politics. These events directed my attention to Egypt as a 
case study of the role of non-proletarian actors in the development of the 
workers’ movement. Since 2008 I began to develop a theory of the Subject that 
                                                          
42 Note that coherence is not the same as homogeneity: coherence denotes the internal consistency, 
unity, and systematicity of a phenomenon, whereas homogeneity emphasizes ‚sameness‛ and 
‚identity‛. Coherence is the opposite of fragmentation, whereas the opposite of homogeneity is 
heterogeneity. For example, a group can be fairly homogeneous, but fragmented, or 
heterogeneous yet coherent. Furthermore, coherence is not an a priori quality of social Subjects, 
but has to be actively constructed. 
43 Some of which had been already anticipated by Marx and other ‚modernist‛ critical thinkers: 
‚What is called historical evolution depends in general on the fact that the latest form regards earlier ones 
as stages in the development of itself and conceives them always in a one-sided manner, since only rarely 
and under quite special conditions is a society able to adopt a critical attitude towards itself.‛ (Marx 1971 
[MIA])   
44 In fact, this proposal is hardly original, as, for example, the masses in Egypt themselves have 
already initiated such a project ‚from below‛ via the spontaneous and everyday concept of al-
sha’b – ‚the people‛. 
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allowed me to investigate and conceptualize this intervention. I explain this 
Subject-centered methodology in detail in the first part of the dissertation.  
 Specific research questions were developed alongside my methodological 
framework. In fact, when I browse through my fieldwork notebooks, I can retrace 
the gradual accumulation of reciprocal fieldwork-induced theoretical 
contemplation and theory-induced fieldwork. A step by step elaboration of this 
practico-theoretical trajectory would probably constitute a thesis – and an exercise 
in autobiographical narcissism – in itself. Here it suffices to say that, after some 
time of engagement with the subject matter, the following research questions 
emerged: 
 In what ways do non-proletarian actors support the struggles of workers? 
What are the types of assistance? 
 In what ways do non-proletarian actors support the development of the 
workers’ movement? Which forms of assistance actually develop the 
workers as a social Subject? I.e. what are the modes of assistance? 
 How are non-proletarian actors drawn to the workers’ movement? What is 
the position of the ‚Left‛? 
 In what ways does assistance create shared systems of activity? Does the 
workers’ movement reciprocally transform its ‚assistants‛? (How) Are the 
educators educated? 
 What are the ethico-political motivations and consequences of assistance?  
 What is the position and role of the workers’ movement within a broader 
subaltern counter-hegemonic bloc? How does the workers’ movement 
assist subaltern groups to emancipate themselves? Should workers assist 
non-proletarian activists in ‚their‛ political revolution, or should political 
activists support workers in ‚their‛ social revolution? How can a 
collaborative subaltern Project be established? 
 What is the history of the worker Subject and the ‚Left‛ in Egypt? What are 
the historical types and modes of assistance towards the workers’ 
movement? 
 What is the relation between the particular (Egyptian) and general (global) 
development of capitalism, and the formation of an Egyptian working 
class? How did the struggles of the ‚Prince‛ constitute the ‚Pharaoh‛, and 
vice versa? 
In the text, these research questions are developed in three broad phases, which, 
in my opinion, reflect the three conceptual moments of a critical political science. 
Firstly, in Part I Methodology, I elaborate a general theory of the worker Subject that 
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allows me to understand the particular trajectory of the Egyptian workers’ 
movement. This part is an exercise in political philosophy and as such it 
mobilizes philosophers (in the broad sense) rather than social scientists (in the 
narrow sense). Each methodology has its own vocabulary, and in order to 
differentiate my specific methodological concepts – Subject, Project, State, et 
cetera – from their common, everyday usage, I have chosen to capitalize these 
terms. Perhaps, to some readers, this capitalization conjures the ominous specter 
of the grand old Subjects, which have been put to the grave a long time ago. I 
stress, however, that the content of these concepts has been systematically re-
appropriated as tools for collective emancipation. The workers’ movement is not 
a mystical motor of history, but a potentially emancipatory Project that has to be 
constructed through human agency. 
 Secondly, in Part II Development of the Workers’ Movement, I narrate the historical 
development of capitalism and a modern working class in Egypt. Colonialism, 
the uneven and combined development of capitalism, Nasserism, the emergence 
of a rentier economy, et cetera, created a peculiar trajectory for the Egyptian 
working class and the Left. This historical narrative is mostly based on the 
existing historical literature. It does not aspire to reinvent the history of the 
Egyptian workers’ movement, nor to discuss in detail its various academic 
interpretations, 45  but it aims to construct an emancipatory narrative from the 
perspective of the development of the working class as a Subject, based on the specific 
methodological framework that I advanced in the previous part.  
 In Part III Against the Pharaoh, I enter the twilight zone between history and 
actuality. The voices of my fieldwork become stronger, and primary and 
secondary sources are more or less in balance. Historians slowly make way for 
political scientists. Whereas Part II Development of the Workers’ Movement sets the 
stage for the general-historical predicament of the Egyptian workers’ movement 
and the Left, Part III Against the Pharaoh discusses the recent transformations of 
both the ‚Pharaoh‛ and the ‚Prince‛ – anticipating the two case studies at hand. 
This ends the historical moment of the dissertation. 
                                                          
45 Obviously some of the crucial discussions are present – but mostly in the ‚humble‛ form of 
footnotes, which do not burden the main thrust of the narrative.    
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 Thirdly, I engage with two case studies, predominantly drawing upon primary 
sources, especially interviews,46 which are completed with recent academic and 
journalistic publications. My original case study was the workers’ movement of 
Mahalla al-Kubra – elaborated in Part IV The Mahalla Strike Movement – and this 
remained the focus of my research until the 25 January Revolution of 2011. The 
revolution saliently imposed an expansion of my research. (Many times my 
respondents grinned and said that after their revolution, I had to write a whole 
new chapter in my dissertation – and right they were, seeing that the 25 January 
Revolution takes up more than one fifth of the total page count of the text) As the 
revolutionary process is all but finished at the moment of writing, Part V The 25 
January Revolution part is inevitably incomplete as well. 
 Lastly, the dissertation is concluded with an Epilogue, which contains three 
brief chapters: The Prince and the Pharaoh constitutes a summary of my research 
findings; A CHAT with Gramsci contemplates the theoretical implications of my 
study; and A Self-Reflecting Note reflects the central problematic of my thesis back 
towards myself – what kind of assistance did I, as a researcher, offer the Egyptian 
Left and workers’ movement? 
Practicalities 
Language 
The dissertation is written in American English. Citations and quotes are always 
rendered as they originally appeared in the sources.  
 I have chosen for a popularizing transcription of Arab names, places, and 
terms, as this seems the habit within most political sciences and area studies 
journals of the region. Preference is given to the Egyptian colloquial forms of 
names and organizations (e.g. gama’a instead of jama’a). The definite article ‚al‛ is 
always written ‚al‛ and never ‚el‛; this applies to the bibliography as well, in 
order to preserve systematicity and prevent confusion. Arab and other non-
English words are written in italics. 
 Numbers up until twenty are written in full, from 21 on they are written 
numerically (e.g. three workers vs. 300 workers – but 3.3 percent of the workers). 
Dates are written 25 January 2011 (never January 25, or January 25th).  
                                                          
46 I discuss my interview methodology in the introduction to the Appendix. 
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 I often use the active voice – e.g. ‚As I discussed before‛ instead of ‚As 
discussed before‛ – because I dislike the grammatical ‚trick‛ of eliding the formal 
presence of the author from the text in order to create a semblance of ‚objectivity‛ 
in content. The text does not become more truthful or critical by pretending that it 
has written itself, on the contrary: it is vital to remind you, the reader, that it is not 
the voice of objective reality, but my particular, subjective voice that speaks 
through the text. 
References 
With regard to references, I opted for an author–date system in footnotes. This 
has the advantage of presenting a quick shortcut to the full bibliographical 
address, while it does not obstruct a fluid reading of the text. I have also used the 
author-date system for internet sources. The annotation [MIA] refers to the 
Marxist Internet Archive (www.marxists.org) Citations and quotes are directly 
inserted in the text, unless they count 50 or more words; then they are rendered as 
a separate paragraph. 
 
 
  
30 
 
  
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I  
Methodology 
 
32 
 
  
 
33 
 
Introduction 
The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia invite us to consider the question of the relationship between 
subjectivities, on one hand, and political agency and collective action, on the other. In both revolutions 
the people formed a sa collective agent asserting a collective will and putting forward demands for 
radical transformation. The people, as a collective actor, engaged in sustained protests, formulated 
unified demands, and developed a shared discourse that affirmed the will to bring about specific 
changes. How did this collectivity come about? 
Salwa Ismail (2011: 990) 
A Methodology of Emancipation 
The sudden appearance of forms of mass, collective, and popular agency during 
and after the so-called Arab Spring revealed the partiality and inadequacy of a 
dominant Middle East Studies paradigm that sought to explain the ‚persistent‛ 
reproduction of authoritarianism and backwardness in the region in terms of the 
political passivity or cultural predisposition of the population.47 To a large extent 
this is the logical outcome of a methodology that conceives of the population 
primarily as the Object of regime policies or deeply rooted cultural patterns. I 
argue that to understand the development and mobilization of mass agency the 
researcher of the ‚Arab Spring‛ needs a concept of populations as potentially 
coherent ensembles – as Subjects.  
 However, as I pointed out in the Prologue – apart from (or because of?) 
lingering Marxist narratives – the theory of the collective Subject has been largely 
discredited by post-structuralist, deconstructivist, and post-modernist critical 
thought. Meanwhile, from the 1970s onwards, there has been a revival of liberal 
‚bourgeois‛ perspectives on social Subjects in the form of Social Movement 
Theory (SMT). Within the social sciences there has been a tradition that takes 
‚social movements‛ as its subject matter since the 1930s. Ironically, the interest 
within Western academia for mass agency largely grew out of fear of the threat 
that socialist and fascist street mobilization posed to bourgeois democracy. Social 
movements were negatively perceived as forms of non-institutionalized, 
irrational, and spontaneous collective behavior, in which agency was largely 
                                                          
47 Beinin and Vairel 2011: 1 ; also see the mea culpa of Tarek Masoud (2011) and Jeremy Kinsman 
(2011). 
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absent.48 The emergence of the ‚new social movements‛ in the 1960s necessitated 
novel perspectives on the formative causes and developmental dynamics of 
collective action. Contemporary SMT took form around the ‚resource 
mobilization‛ model, which studies the effectiveness whereby organizations use 
resources and opportunities to accomplish their goals. Political process theory 
(PPT) became the dominant paradigm within SMT. Yet, Ron Eyerman and 
Andrew Jamison claimed that: ‚There is something fundamental missing from the 
sociology of social movements, something that falls between the categories of the various 
schools and is left out of their various conceptualizations.‛49  
 SMT and the PPT model in particular have been increasingly criticized because 
of their rigid categories, their reliance on (variations of) rational choice theory, 
and their lack of appreciation for the role of culture,50 learning, and consciousness 
in shaping social movements.51 Since the 1980s, the ‚concession‛ of SMT scholars 
towards the role of the ‚cultural‛, the ‚ideological‛, and the ‚pedagogical‛ in 
shaping social movements has been its engagement with symbolic interactionism 
and frame theory.52 Authors such as Charles Tilly, Alain Touraine, and Alberto 
Melucci expanded the classic model of resource mobilization with attention to the 
role of socialization, inter-personal networks, tactical decision-making, and 
historical and cultural context in the formation of social movements. 
 However, frame theory has been criticized for being an apolitical, fragmentary, 
and superficial conception of how thoughts and artifacts mediate collective 
agency. It is a ‚<marketing approach to movement mobilization<‛53 that ‚<arises 
precisely when marketing processes have come to dominate social movements<‛ 54 
Especially the development of self-conscious, coherent practices of collective 
activity – i.e. the subjective component of social movements – remained a black 
box. With regard to the worker protests as social movements, Paul Johnston 
argued that: 
                                                          
48 Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 10-11. 
49 Ibid. 45. 
50 ‚The recognition that culture plays a central role in generating and sustaining movements was slow to 
develop and remains the model’s least developed concept.‛ (Morris 2000: 446) 
51 See Goodwin and Jasper 2004. 
52 Johnston 2009: 3. 
53 Oliver and Johnston 2000: 47. 
54 Ibid. 
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No social movement can thrive without a shared self-understanding: a common 
vocabulary of meaning and action; shared questions; a collective learning process; 
and clear, common, and useful ideas that resonate among our ranks about what is 
wrong, what we want to do about it, and what part our movement has played and 
can play in making history< To the extent that we are engaged in an open and 
tolerant dialogue that explores answers to these questions, the new labor movement 
can become not only a movement in itself, but also a movement for itself. This is an 
old agenda, to be sure, but it is time to try again.55 
Johnston’s reflections represented an attempt to conceptualize the workers’ 
movement as an immanent Subject: as a collective actor who develops self-
determination and self-consciousness from the process of its own struggles 
against domination and exploitation.56   
 In general, SMT lacks a critical and political understanding of the position of its 
methodology and its research project within the intellectual reproduction of the 
capitalist social formation. Its crystallization as a coherent school of thought from 
the 1970s onwards coincided with the collapse of the traditional social 
movements – especially the workers’ movement – and the consolidation of 
neoliberal global capitalism.57 It is a theory from the perspective of ‚society‛ 
towards social movements as objects of study, instead of a theory that places itself 
within the perspective of the Subject towards ‚society‛. 58  In his research on 
European protest waves against neoliberalism, Andy Mathers asserted that: 
‚<what is required is a ‘theory against society’ which analyzes the resistance to these 
forms of domination through a critical process so as to produce critical knowledge and 
liberationary theory which can assist in bringing about social change.‛59  
 In order to understand the workers’ movement as an actor able ‚to bring about 
social change‛, a methodology is needed that elaborates a critical conception of: 
(1) collective agency; (2) development; (3) modes and types of assistance; (4) the 
relation between theory and practice; (5) the relation between the researcher and 
his object of study. In this part of the text I construct the outlines of such a 
methodology, which is rooted in cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT), Andy 
                                                          
55 Johnston 2001: 27. 
56 I explore this line of thought in detail in the following chapters. 
57 Mathers 2007. 
58 ‚Social movements are rather comprehensible as dynamic social forms that arise and develop with the 
process of crisis and restructuring of the capital relation.‛  (Ibid. 26) 
59 Ibid. 38. 
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Blunden’s concept of ‚collaborative Project‛, and the writings of ‚traditional‛ 
authors such as Marx, Lukács, Gramsci, and Luxemburg. 
A Need to CHAT 
Operating within the SMT tradition, Eyerman and Jamison tentatively explored 
social movements as ‚processes in formation‛ and ‚forms of activity‛ with a 
‚cognitive praxis‛.60 These three notions point towards a specific perspective on 
social movements. Firstly, as ‚movements‛, they not only imply a quantitative 
‚crossing of distance‛ or ‚being in motion‛, but also an internal development 
from a certain phase, level or state towards another one. Through a struggle to 
change the status quo, social movements (and their participants) are themselves 
transformed. Secondly, they are specific forms of social activity, of people 
‚coming together‛ and ‚doing things‛. Thirdly, social movements are sites of 
learning, of the formation of consciousness and the production of knowledge.  
 The concepts of ‚activity‛ and ‚learning‛ have been thoroughly developed 
outside SMT by scholars operating in the tradition of cultural-historical activity 
theory (CHAT), an interdisciplinary school of thought that combines insights 
from Vygotsky’s cultural psychology and Leontyev’s activity theory. Despite its 
interdisciplinary ambitions and potential applicability to the study of social 
movements, its historical roots in the domains of psychology, pedagogy and 
cultural anthropology have prevented CHAT from being used extensively in 
studies of collective forms of protest. Nevertheless, CHAT holds great promise for 
an understanding of the organization and mobilization of political and social 
protests and the workers’ movement in particular.61  
 In his 2010 book An Interdisciplinary Theory of Activity, Andy Blunden offered a 
concrete framework for an emancipatory social science based on the 
interdisciplinary concept of human activity. His work was a friendly critique of 
CHAT, and it reconstructed the historical antecedents, the philosophical 
premises, and the scientific frames of a scientific methodology that is not 
committed to the description, prediction and control of the behavior of 
populations, but to an understanding and reinforcement of processes of self-
emancipation. Blunden’s methodology is rooted in the tradition of ‚Romantic 
                                                          
60 Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 2-3. 
61 See De Smet 2012. 
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Science‛ – pioneered by figures such as Goethe and Herder – in Hegel’s and 
Marx’s dialectic, in the Vygotsky school of Soviet cultural psychology, and in 
contemporary Activity Theory. As a methodology of human agency it treats its 
subject matter not as a passive Object, from which knowledge is unilaterally 
derived, but as an active Subject. Blunden’s writings have had a great influence 
on the formation of my methodology as they offer a lucid framework that puts 
collective agency at the heart of scientific analysis. Especially by pairing the 
insights I derived from his discussions of Hegel and Vygotsky to my personal 
understanding of Marx’s and Gramsci’s ideas,62 I have been able to develop, 
enrich and push forward some of the theoretical intuitions I gained during the 
past years. 
Overview 
In Development, I engage with the notions of development, subject matter, unit of 
analysis, and Project. In order to tackle the methodological problem of scientific 
                                                          
62 I have been reading Marx since I was a teenager. As most youthful enthusiasts I started with 
the Communist Manifesto, which appeared alien in its use of arcane language and obscure 
categories. I was only able to comprehend the text on a basic linguistic level and not conceptually. 
I remember, for example, how I rebuked its call to ‚confiscate the property of all immigrants‛ as 
this seemed to agree with the discourse of the emerging extreme right in Flanders at the time. My 
attempt to read Capital for the first time failed utterly, as I had not developed in the slightest a 
framework of even bourgeois economics to understand Marx’s critique. However, throughout 
the years I endured my readings – not only via the vulgarizations of Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and 
their interpretations, which acted as forms of textual mediation, but also by continuously re-
engaging with Marx’s texts themselves, discovering new meanings and developing deeper levels 
of understanding. Taking the advice of Lenin in his Philosophical Notebooks to heart, my latest 
readings of Marx have been strongly mediated by Hegel, whose concept of the dialectic I am 
finally beginning to understand on a level that transcends the platitudes of ‚relationality‛, 
‚holism‛, and ‚everything flows‛. 
My reading of Gramsci started in my second year of university and took as its intuitive 
framework my developing understanding of the Marxist ‚classics‛.  As such, it was – unlike the 
readings by most of my fellow students – neither a pristine encounter, nor a perspective 
overdetermined by the reformist, Eurocommunist, and bourgeois interpretations of the Italian 
Marxist’s legacy. For me, Gramsci had always been first and foremost a revolutionary Marxist, 
whose writings constituted an immanent critique of the theory and practice of ‚Second 
Internationalism‛ and the traditions of Italian Marxism. The fragmented, non-linear and ‚thick‛ 
character of Gramsci’s main corpus – the notebooks he wrote in prison – has turned the 
interpretation of his ideas into a work of scholarly historical-textual analysis. Therefore I have 
grounded my own reading in the critical frameworks offered by authors such as Adam D. 
Morton (2007) and especially Peter D. Thomas (2010). 
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categorization, I follow an intellectual thread beginning from ‚Romantic Science‛, 
over Hegel and Marx, to Vygotsky and Blunden.  
 The second chapter, Activity and Subjectivity, advances an understanding of the 
nature of the ‚domain‛ of the social sciences as human activity (praxis) and 
Subjectivity. The dichotomy between methodological individualism and 
collectivism is sublated within the concept of ‚Subject‛. Human agency is broken 
down as a developmental process: as the acquisition of Subjectness. ‚Everyday 
resistance‛ and ‚mass protests‛ are integrated as moments within trajectories of 
struggle. 
 Learning and Instruction discusses the ‚pedagogical‛ mechanisms of Subject 
development through the Vygotskian concepts of interiorization and zone of 
proximal development. I augment these ontogenetic notions with Gramsci’s 
sociogenetic insights of the role of intellectuals in the process of class formation. 
Subsequently, I explore different modes of assistance in the development of class 
sociogenesis via Blunden’s appropriation of Hegel’s ‚theory of recognition‛. This 
brings me to a discussion of Gramsci’s concepts of ‚dialectical pedagogy‛ and 
‚philosophy of praxis‛, which is cross-fertilized with Vygotsky’s understanding 
of ‚true concepts‛.  
 Armed with the methodological categories from the previous three chapters, in 
Proletarian Sociogenesis I give an archetypical outline of the development of the 
workers’ movement. Firstly, I defend an emergentist conception of class 
formation. Secondly, I move that ‚the Strike‛ is the unit of analysis of the 
workers’ movement. I connect the trajectory to Marx’s understanding of 
emancipation, Gramsci’s political theory, and Luxemburg’s notion of the Mass 
Strike. 
 After completing this ‚logical‛ trajectory, I turn my attention to the ‚historical‛ 
development of the Egyptian workers’ movement in the second part of the 
dissertation. 
 
 
  
39 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Development 
<all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their 
essence< 
Karl Marx, Capital. Volume 3 (1991: 956) 
Romantic Science 
Andy Blunden argued that Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was the pioneer of 
‚Romantic Science‛, a trend of thought rather than a discipline, which criticized 
the methodology of positivism.63 Goethe saw science as a dynamic practice rather 
than a static body of knowledge. He formulated a critique of both inductive 
empiricism and deductive rationalism by emphasizing the organic connection 
between the ‚whole‛ and its ‚parts‛, investigating ‚<how to form a concept of a 
complex process in such a way as to allow you to understand it as a whole, from which all 
the parts can be understood.‛64 Characterizing a process by means of a common 
attribute, or as a collection of phenomena sharing some feature offers only a 
descriptive ‚pseudoconcept‛ of the whole. 65  The Romantic scientist aimed to 
conceive of a phenomenon as a Gestalt or coherent whole of shapes. Yet, the 
Gestalt was always but a moment in a developmental process. A full 
understanding of the phenomenon required an investigation or reconstruction in 
thought of its Bildung: the maturation or development towards its current form. 
Really knowing something not only involved an insight in its current shape, but 
in its whole developmental process.  
 Because, as a dynamic whole of interwoven parts, a Gestalt was a complex 
thing, the Romantic scientist had to discern a suitable and relevant unit from 
where to begin the process of reconstruction: the Urphänomen or the archetype of 
the phenomenon. Blunden explained that the Urphänomen is ‚<itself a 
                                                          
63 Blunden 2010. I only summarize those main outlines of Goethe’s theoretical outlook which are 
relevant for this presentation. 
64 Blunden 2012. I am grateful of Andy Blunden for letting me get hold of his new book on 
Concepts before it went to print. 
65 For example, one can describe all features of a house – roof, walls, furniture, et cetera – but then 
‚house‛ remains a collection of phenomena; a real concept of a house is, e.g., ‚a place for people 
to live in‛. 
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phenomenon, but it had to be the most easily understood, simplest, or archetypal form of 
the thing, a form which allowed the nature of the whole phenomenon to be understood.‛66 
Instead of imposing an external and arbitrary category upon the object of 
investigation, the Romantic Scientist started his analysis from the phenomenon 
itself, but in its logically – as opposed to genetically or historically – most primitive 
form. This methodology brought Goethe to speculate about the existence of the 
biological cell as the Urphänomen of organic life, which carried in itself the Gestalt 
of the developed being in an embryonic form – an intuition that was later 
vindicated by the actual discovery of the cell through microscopic research. 
Goethe’s methodological intuitions were further developed by Hegel, Marx and 
Vygotsky, who were directly influenced by his notions of Romantic Science.67 
Immanent Critique 
Hegel developed Goethe’s intuitions into a complete system.68 Unlike Goethe, 
Hegel was little interested in matters of natural history, but he aspired to 
understand the development of human society. Hegel set out to criticize the four 
Western historical forms of human cognition: metaphysical; empirical; critical 
(Kantian); and intuitive. Hegel developed Kant’s resurrection of the Greek 
philosophical tradition of ‚dialectical logic‛69 as a tool to overcome the dichotomy 
between Subject and Object.70  
 Like Goethe, Hegel did not start from society’s ‚parts‛, the individuals, but 
from the ‚whole‛, as a Gestalt or a ‚formation of consciousness‛. Even though 
human beings created societies, from the perspective of a particular person, 
shared forms of life precede and constitute his or her own individual existence. 
Hegel’s notion of a Gestalt was: ‚<a dissonant unity of a way of thought, a way of 
life and a certain constellation of material culture.‛71 This is simply how people 
                                                          
66 Blunden 2010: 28. 
67 Ibid. 31. 
68 Hegel’s philosophy has been the object of much scholarly debate and spawned a variety of 
interpretations. I do not wish to burden the presentation of my research with these exegetic 
discussions; instead I only highlight those insights and interpretations that I personally find 
useful and relevant for an understanding of the subject matter at hand. 
69 For example, in the shape of Socrates’ dialogue, which differed from a ‚debate‛ in the sense 
that its participants did not try to fix their particular opinion as the ‚true‛ or ‚right‛ one, but by 
the continuous mutual negation of their arguments they developed a higher level of thought. 
70 Levine 2006: 162. Also see Chapter 2 Activity and Subjectivity. 
71 Blunden 2010: 47. Emphasis in original. 
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shape themselves into a whole: as a complex of thought-forms, practical activities, 
and material artifacts. Understanding a formation of consciousness was 
accomplished by an immanent 72  critique: a skeptical investigation of the 
phenomenon from ‚within‛ and in/on its own terms. Like Goethe, Hegel 
suggested that the philosopher could discern one element within a specific 
formation of consciousness, which allowed him or her to understand the whole 
Gestalt, and which objectively constituted the process as a Gestalt. Hegel’s 
interpretation of the Urphänomen was the Concept.73 A formation of consciousness 
could be comprehended through a logical, immanent critique of a simple, 
undeveloped ‚abstract‛ concept into a complex, multisided ‚concrete‛ notion. 
With ‚concreteness‛ Hegel did not mean ‚real‛ or ‚material‛, but ‚<mature, 
developed, having many nuances and connections with other concepts, rich in content.‛74 
Marxist Dialectic 
Demystification 
In his later works, Hegel fully embraced philosophical idealism.75 The Young 
Hegelians turned their master’s idealism to political purposes, but whereas 
Feuerbach’s materialism rejected Hegel’s dialectic altogether, Marx developed 
an immanent critique of his philosophy, working out its contradictions 
according to a ‚<consistent naturalism or humanism<‛76  
 For Hegel, alienation did not take place in the sensuous world by inhuman 
practices such as exploitation and domination, but was due to the fact that 
humanity ‚<objectifies itself in distinction from and in opposition to abstract 
thought.‛ 77  Alienation in the social world was only an appearance of the 
estrangement of man from pure thought. Hegel reduced the substance of 
humanity to thought and turned human sensuousness, labor and artifacts into 
attributes of the abstract mind and self-consciousness. Marx re-appropriated 
                                                          
72 ‚Immanent‛ means belonging or inherent to the phenomenon itself. The term ‚immanent 
critique‛ was in fact coined by Luk{cs, a century later than Hegel’s use of ‚critique‛, but it 
describes his method more accurately. (Ibid. 120) 
73 Ibid. 69. 
74 Ibid. 62. 
75 Marx 1992: 385. 
76 Ibid. 389. 
77 Ibid. 384. Emphasis in original. 
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self-consciousness and the mind as forms of an integral humanity whose 
nature comprised both ‚ideal‛ and ‚material‛ dimensions. He inverted 
Hegel’s understanding of alienation, and claimed that alienation in thought 
was but the appearance of estrangement in social reality. Idealist reductionism 
had mystified and concealed the potential for an emancipatory criticism of 
Hegel’s philosophy. Marx then concluded that there were two forms of the 
dialectic, a mystified and a rational one: 
In its mystified form, the dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it 
seemed to transfigure and to glorify what exists. In its rational form it is a scandal 
and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it 
includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of 
its negation, its inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically 
developed form as being in fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient 
nature as well; and because it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in 
its very essence critical and revolutionary.78 
Marx’s method was not Hegel’s dialectic minus its mystical form, but precisely 
the process of demystification via immanent critique: ‚Hegel’s dialectic is the basic form 
of all dialectics, but only after being stripped of its mystical form, and it is precisely this 
which distinguishes my method.‛79 The ‚young‛ Marx reconnected Hegel’s method 
to social reality, and formulated a criticism of the ‚autonomous‛ discipline of 
philosophy from the standpoint of society.  
 Marx emphasized that, whereas thought appropriates its object logically or 
conceptually, the object itself is produced historically, i.e. as the product of human 
activity.80 The movement of the world is not a derivative of the development of 
thought, springing from the head of the philosopher as the goddess Athena, and 
neither is the real, historical production of the subject matter mechanistically and 
directly ‚reflected‛ in the thought process. Rather, the apprehension of a 
phenomenon in thought is always conceptually mediated.81  
                                                          
78 Marx 1990: 103. 
79 Marx and Engels 1982: 187. Emphasis in original. 
80 Blunden 2010: 105-6; Levine 2006: 47-8; Lukács 2000: 110. 
81 In a way, the difference between the movement of the subject matter and the development of 
understanding of the object reminded me of the Russian formalists’ distinction in the literary 
field between plot (or narrative, fabula) and story (or syuzhet). If a film or novel, the chain of 
events and scenes which the audience or reader experiences, i.e. the story, does not directly 
correspond to the logical pattern of the whole, i.e. the plot. A story may entail a flashback 
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The Cell-Form 
In the Afterword to the Second Edition of the first volume of Capital, Marx 
distinguished between the mode of presentation or exposition and that of inquiry 
or investigation: 
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The 
latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of 
development and to track down their inner connection. Only after this work has 
been done can the real movement be appropriately presented. If this is done 
successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is now reflected back in the ideas, then 
it may appear as if we had before us an a priori construction.82 
When Marx wrote Capital, he aimed to apprehend in thought the ensemble of 
capitalist relations that historically emerged in his time. Capital was Marx’s mode 
of presentation: a logical sequence of conceptual categories and their negations.83 
This exposition was the outcome of an extended process of investigation – a 
longue durée of contemplation of the concepts of political economy. This inquiry 
led him to start his exposition not from the complex capital relation, but from the 
most simple political-economic concept: the commodity relation: 84  Similar to 
Goethe’s Urphänomen, and Hegel’s Concept, Marx argued that a social formation 
or ensemble of relations could be best understood through a conceptual 
development of its cell-form. For the Philosophy of Right, the concept of private 
property had been the cell-form, for Capital, this became the commodity relation:85 
‚The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 
‘immense collection of commodities’; the individual commodity appears as its elementary 
form. Our investigation therefore begins with the analysis of the commodity.‛86  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(analepsis) or a flashforward (prolepsis) as dramatic devices, whereas the plot presents the events 
in their logico-chronological order. In the film Memento (2000), for example, the plot even 
represents the opposite movement of the story. The question is not whether the story or the plot 
is the ‚true‛ shape of the movie. The viewer needs a concept of the story – which is mediated by 
a reconstruction of the plot – to make sense of and appreciate the movement of the story. Even 
films or novels which present themselves as a dream-like sequence or a free association of 
thoughts, will encourage their interpreters  to grasp for a plot or ‚meaning‛ if they do not want 
to merely passively experience the story, but actively understand it.  
82 Marx 1990: 192. Emphasis in original. 
83 Levine 2006: 48. 
84 Bakhurst 2007: 58. 
85 Blunden 2010: 66; 108-12. 
86 Marx 1990: 125. 
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 Marx had already elaborated upon his method in the Grundrisse. Firstly, the 
social scientist starts from ‚<a chaotic conception of the whole<‛87, i.e. the direct 
appearance of the subject matter, which is already concrete in social reality but 
still abstract in thought. Marx gave the example of the ‚population‛, which: 
‚<appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, 
not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence 
also the point of departure for observation and conception.‛88  Subsequently, the object 
should be studied in detail; the phenomenon is disassembled ‚<by means of 
further determination, [moving] analytically towards ever more simple concepts, from the 
imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until [arriving] at the simplest 
determinations<‛89. The phase of investigation entails the process of gathering 
empirical data and of abstraction (generalization). The end point of the 
‚descending movement‛ of abstraction was the cell-form of a phenomenon.90  
 Once the cell-form had been established, the ascending movement began, in 
which the subject matter was conceptually ‚reconstructed‛, moving from the 
abstract to the concrete: ‚From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had 
finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a 
whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations.‚91 The ‚ascending 
movement‛ ends in a conception of the Gestalt, the ‚totality‛, or ‚multi-
determinateness‛ of a phenomenon.92 Whereas the mode of enquiry produces the 
cell-form of a phenomenon, the mode of presentation rebuilds a concrete 
understanding of the phenomenon from the Concept. Again, the conceptual 
development of the concrete social formation out of the cell-form did not 
(necessarily)93 reflect a historical movement. Instead, the more complex forms 
                                                          
87 Marx 1973: 101. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Levine 2006: 45. 
91 Marx 1973: 101. 
92 Levine 2006: 45. 
93  However, in the Grundrisse, Marx noted that: ‚<the simple categories are the expressions of 
relations within which the less developed concrete may have already realized itself before having posited the 
more many-sided connection or relation which is mentally expressed in the more concrete category; while 
the more developed concrete preserves the same category as a subordinate relation. Money may exist, and 
did exist historically, before capital existed, before banks existed, before wage labour existed, etc. Thus in 
this respect it may be said that the simpler category can express the dominant relations of a less developed 
whole, or else those subordinate relations of a more developed whole which already had a historic existence 
before this whole developed in the direction expressed by a more concrete category. To that extent the 
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such as money, labor, rent, capital, production, distribution, et cetera, were 
developed logically from the simple commodity relation – evidently supported by 
the historical data that Marx’s economic investigations had produced: ‚We 
perceive straight away the insufficiency of the simple form of value: it is an embryonic 
form which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it can ripen into the 
price-form.‛94 Through the exposition of the Bildung or conceptual development of 
the commodity relation, i.e. the process of commodification, the originally 
amorphous appearance of bourgeois society was rendered concrete as the 
capitalist social formation.  
 Marx never elaborated his methodology in a systematic way. His notions of 
social formation and cell-form, for example, are deployed without much ado. 
Moreover, after he was done criticizing Hegel, he mobilized his methods 
principally for a critique of political economy, and not for an analysis of class 
struggle. However, his methodology was appropriated and enriched by the 
Vygotsky school of cultural psychology, which, despite its focus on ontogenesis,95 
produced new methodological tools to investigate the working class in a 
dialectical way. 
Soviet Cultural Psychology 
Social Situation of Development 
Soviet Cultural Psychology grew out of Lev Vygotsky’s immanent critique of 
behaviorism and reflexology, which were at that time the dominant psychological 
disciplines in Russia and which rejected consciousness as a valid object of 
research. Even though evidence that Vygotsky was directly influenced by Hegel 
is, at best, tenuous, his methodology was formed through a profound 
engagement with Marx’s ‚early‛ writings, Capital, Engels’s popularizations, and 
Lenin’s philosophical notebooks, which, for their part, constituted a materialist 
critique of Hegelianism.96  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
path of abstract thought, rising from the simple to the combined, would correspond to the real 
historical process.‛ (Marx 1973: 101-2. My emphasis.) 
94 Marx 1990: 154. My emphasis. 
95 The development of a human as a singular biological and psychological organism. 
96 Blunden 2010: 122-6. 
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 Vygotsky’s object of study was human behavior and consciousness, which he 
approached as a Gestalt, a whole of interconnected parts. 97  Human speech, 
memory, perception, et cetera, do not develop independently from each other, 
but their formation is intertwined. Their individual function can only be 
understood through their connection to each other and to the whole of which 
they are a part.98 Moreover, human ontogenesis could only be comprehended as 
the outcome of a development process, as Bildung, which necessitated: ‚<a 
reconstruction of each stage in the development of the process: the process must be turned 
back to its initial stages.‛99  
 Like other and non-Marxist psychologists such as Piaget, Vygotsky argued that 
the formation of the child’s mind moves through a number of stages and takes 
place in relation to a particular social context. Vygotsky’s novel approach was his 
conception of the relation between the child and its social situation of 
development (SSoD) as a predicament from which the child has to emancipate 
itself. The child can only liberate itself from the restraints of its SSoD by making a 
development: ‚<by a qualitative transformation of their own psychological structure 
and the structure of their relationship with those who are providing for their needs<‛100  
 The social environment does not offer new psychological structures and forms 
of mediation on a plate; on the contrary, the child has to create those mental 
functions, neoformations, which allow it to make a qualitative development that 
overcomes its restrictive condition. The child’s SSoD is not an absolute category, 
but a cultural-historical product; the whole field of expectations that parents and 
society at large develop vis-à-vis a child of a certain biological age. Through these 
expectations a child perceives the limits of its actual developmental phase. The 
conflict between, on the one hand, the child’s desire and will to overcome its 
current SSoD, and, on the other, the constraints of its condition, is the motor 
behind the creation of new psychological functions and mental development as a 
whole. Vygotsky conceptualized this contradiction as a situation of crisis, 
induced by the need for a certain neoformation while this function has not yet 
been developed. Major transition points are defined in terms of a revolution in 
                                                          
97 Vygotsky’s cultural psychology should, however, not be confused with Gestalt psychology, in 
which ‚the mind‛ – rather than culturally mediated action – remains the primary unit of analysis. 
98 Blunden 2010: 153. 
99 Vygotsky 1978: 62. 
100 Blunden 2010: 154. 
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the forms of mediation of the child, which enable new modes of interaction 
between the child and its social environment.101 Vygotsky observed that for each 
stage of development, one neoformation and ‚line of development‛ play a central 
part in developing the entire mental structure. Central or leading neoformations 
and lines of development of a previous phase continue to exist in the current 
stage, but lose their decisive role in the maturation of the whole.102 Development 
then appears as a series of succeeding Gestalten that render the child as a person 
more and more ‚concrete‛ – in the Hegelian sense. 
 To be clear: my appraisal of Vygotsky’s system of thought is not an invitation 
to simply transpose an ontogenetic developmental scheme onto the process of 
proletarian sociogenesis 103 . Obviously the maturation of the psychological 
functions of a child is of a different order than the development of a workers’ 
movement. My methodological proposal is not a reduction of ‚the social‛ to the 
‚psychological‛. On the contrary: what is interesting about Vygotsky’s approach 
is his negation of traditional psychology; how he appropriated the Marxist 
dialectic – which was originally ‚developed‛ for a conceptual understanding of 
social forms – for the study of ontogenesis; how he connected ontogenesis to 
processes of sociogenesis; and how concepts such as ‚social situation of 
development‛ and ‚neoformation‛ can be re-appropriated by social scientists to 
investigate the formation of social forms. For example, in my research, the notion 
of the SSoD of the working class as a predicament, instead of merely an amalgam 
of ‚objective conditions‛ or ‚context‛, has been key in developing Gramsci’s 
concept of the economic-corporate condition, which I explain further in the text. It 
allowed me to conceive of the era of offensive neoliberal reform that began in the 
1990s, as a predicament for the Egyptian workers’ movement, from which it only 
could liberate itself by developing itself: i.e. creating the necessary neoformations 
that enabled it to overcome its condition.  
Unit of Analysis 
In order to study and understand the formation of human consciousness, 
Vygotsky followed the methodology of Romantic Science against the positivism 
                                                          
101 Wertsch 1985: 19. 
102 See Blunden 2011. 
103  ‚Sociogenesis‛ is a term for the formation and development of social Subjects: groups, 
institutions, families, nations, classes, et cetera. 
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and reductionism of Pavlov’s reflexology and the natural sciences. What Goethe 
called the Urphänomen, Hegel the Concept, and Marx the cell-form of a 
phenomenon, Vygotsky designated as the unit of analysis. 
In our view, an entirely different form of analysis is fundamental to further 
development of theories of thinking and speech. This form of analysis relies on the 
partitioning of the complex whole into units. In contrast to the term ‘element’, the 
term ‘unit’ designates a product of analysis that possesses all the basic 
characteristics of the whole. The unit is a vital and irreducible part of the 
whole. The key to the explanation of the characteristics of water lies not in the 
investigation of its chemical formula but in the investigation of its molecular 
movements. In precisely the same sense, the living cell is the real unit of biological 
analysis because it preserves the basic characteristics of life that are inherent in the 
living organism.104 
Vygotsky realized that human consciousness and behavior could never be 
studied directly, but that its knowledge was always mediated by sources, traces 
and indices. Instead of trying to minimize the subjectivity of the researcher in his 
passive observation of his or her test subjects, the Russian psychologist embraced 
this interaction as a collaborative, reciprocal process that actively constructed 
human behavior. As a unit of analysis for human behavior he took the simplest 
determination of this relation: joint artifact-mediated action, in which ‚artifact‛ 
entailed both material (tools) and ideal (signs) forms of mediation.105 Deploying a 
unit of analysis is not an exercise in reductionism. The biological study of the cell 
does not replace or render unnecessary the study of organs and the functioning of 
the body as a whole. Instead, it is the conceptual starting point of analysis. 
 Vygotsky distinguished between the notion of a unit of analysis and that of a 
microcosm. 
When our Marxists explain the Hegelian principle in Marxist methodology they 
rightly claim that each thing can be examined as a microcosm, as a universal 
measure in which the whole big world is reflected. On this basis they say that to 
study one single thing, one subject, one phenomenon until the end, exhaustively, 
means to know the world in all its connections. In this sense it can be said that 
                                                          
104 Vygotsky 1987: 46. 
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each person is to some degree a measure of the society, or rather class, to which he 
belongs, for the whole totality of relationships is reflected in him.106  
Vygotsky, alongside the Soviet linguist Valentin Voloshinov, called the word a 
microcosm of consciousness, as it refracted the full spectrum of human meanings 
and thought-forms.107 Whereas a unit of analysis is the logical starting point for 
the unfolding of a phenomenon in thought, a microcosm represents the opposite 
movement: the recognition of the developed Gestalt, the concrete universal, in one 
of its individual parts.  
Project 
Summarizing the characteristics of a scientific unit of analysis, Blunden listed 
three requirements. Firstly, ‚It is the conception of a singular, indivisible thing.‛108 
The unit of analysis is the most primitive and simple appearance or form of a 
particular phenomenon. Apples may differ in taste, color, and size, but in contrast 
to a fruit basket they constitute a concrete particularization of ‚fruit‛. Secondly, 
‚It exhibits the essential properties of a class of more developed phenomena‛. 109  The 
primitive concept, the simplest determination, displays a capacity to be 
developed into a mature and concrete form of thought. The apple contains the 
seed, which, when planted, grows into an apple tree. Thirdly, ‚It is itself an 
existent phenomenon (not a principle or axiom or hypothetical force or such like non-
observable).‛110 An apple is not only an abstract concept of ‚appleness‛ as evoked 
in this sentence, it is also a real thing that can be consumed or thrown at someone. 
This last requirement interestingly connects the unfolding of a phenomenon in 
thought, its conceptual Bildung, to its development in reality. A unit of analysis 
should be ‚both a concept and an existent reality‛ that ‚<must be conceived and 
chosen so as to provide the building block for conception as well as actuality.‛111 
 Even though the movement of a phenomenon in thought does not replicate its 
real, historical trajectory, its unit of analysis is the starting point of both its actual 
and comprehended development. In the spirit of Romantic Science, Blunden 
                                                          
106 Vygotsy in Blunden 2010: 143. Emphasis in original. 
107 See Voloshinov 1973. 
108 Blunden 2010: 190. 
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stressed that the discovery of a unit of analysis that is appropriate for a certain 
subject matter was not a question of the rigorous application of scientific rules 
and categories, but required ‚<a transition from reflection and being-with the object, 
until a certain aperçu makes possible the leap to an abstract representation of the complex 
whole in the form of an archetype.‛ 112  Rather than a process of deduction or 
induction, the unit of analysis emerges from the activity of the researcher in his 
field, when his intuitions about his object of research mature into scientific 
concepts. Many social scientists engaged in field work recognize such a moment 
of ‚aperçu‛ or Aha-Erlebnis, when they find a road into the complex problematic 
they are investigating.113  
 What is the unit of analysis for an emancipatory science? Blunden proposed 
‚collaborative Project‛ as the cell-form of such an interdisciplinary social science. 
A collaborative project is a shared system of human activities and mediating 
artifacts, which projects itself forward to a certain goal or ideal.114 Simply put, a 
collaborative Project is a gathering of people involved in a shared activity around 
a specific goal. This can be a formation as humble as a knitting group or as grand 
as a nation state. I discuss the notion of Project in more detail in the next chapters.  
Preliminary Conclusions 
Looking back at my own appropriation of my research object, it more or less 
followed Marx’s ‚descending‛ and ‚ascending‛ movements. Firstly, the subject 
matter presented itself to me as an amorphous collection of phenomena, 
seemingly impossible to grasp in its entirety. The conception I had of the relation 
between intellectuals and the Egyptian workers’ movement was sketchy and 
blurry and held the promise of many different avenues for investigation. The 
benefit of studying a phenomenon over five years – and having enjoyed an 
education as a historian – is that the subject matter saliently presents itself as a 
changing thing, as a process. It forces the researcher to acknowledge its current 
shape as but an element in a temporally chain of formations. An understanding of 
the phenomenon entails not only an investigation into its actual being, but also 
                                                          
112 Blunden 2012. Emphasis in original. 
113 Personally, I only realized the central importance of the Mahalla strikes for the developing 
workers’ movement after two field trips in 2008 and 2009, and it took me another full year to 
develop this intuition into a concept. 
114 Blunden 2010: 313. 
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into its becoming and a conception of its full developmental process. However, it 
was impossible for me to grasp the subject matter and all its manifold 
determinations in thought all at once. Traditionally, at this point, the researcher is 
confronted with two options. Firstly, a ‚nomothetic‛ or ‚generalizing‛ approach 
would lead me to an abstraction of the subject matter. Through a study of many 
individual ‚instances‛ of a phenomenon I abstract properties and attributes that I 
deem relevant, and I derive from them laws and explanatory principles, which in 
turn ‚govern‛ the phenomenon. However, the understanding of a phenomenon 
becomes a ‚flattened‛ aggregation of data, and fails to be a coherent 
representation of the subject matter in thought.115 Alternatively, an ‚idiographic‛ 
or ‚particularizing‛ method focuses on one specific case, which is taken as an 
archetype of the broader phenomenon. But how do I know if a particular case 
study is representative? What nomothetical techniques gain in generalizing 
power, they lose in concreteness. The idiographic approach, for its part, may offer 
a detailed and multifaceted understanding of a specific case, but often falls short 
in its capacity to offer an explanation for the whole phenomenon. 
 The concepts of ‚unit of analysis‛, ‚cell-form‛, or ‚collaborative Project‛, and 
‚microcosm‛, offer practical methodological solutions to this conundrum. The 
notion of ‚microcosm‛ appears as an implicit argument in favor of the 
idiographic approach, as a whole phenomenon can be understood through one of 
its instances. With regard to my research, the Mahalla strike movement could be 
understood as a microcosm of the development of the Egyptian workers’ 
movement at large. All elements of worker emancipation, although most of them 
embryonic, were present in this instance of struggle. Still, in order to make sense 
of the movement of the workers – their trajectory – it was insufficient to give just a 
description of the Mahalla microcosm. I had to make an abstraction of the 
amorphous and chaotic way in which the case study presented itself to me to get 
to the ‚heart of the matter‛. This core aspect of the phenomenon was not to be an 
arbitrary element or category imposed from ‚outside‛ the subject matter. From 
the experience of my field work emerged the notion of the ‚Strike‛ 116, concretely 
embodied in the phenomenon of the Mahalla strikes of 2006-2008, as the 
‚simplest determination‛ from which a conceptual understanding of my research 
                                                          
115 Fantasia 1995: 274. 
116 I capitalize ‚Strike‛ when I mean the logical and archetypical development of workers’ protest 
in the space of the workplace. See Chapter 4 Proletarian Sociogenesis. 
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could be build. The Strike is the collaborative Project of the workers’ struggle: 
starting from simple workplace protests, and developing into more complex 
forms of action, organization, and thought. The Strike fulfills the role of both a 
conceptual starting point – i.e. the activity that enables workers to overcome their 
economic-corporate predicament and pushes forward their whole development 
as a class – and a historical beginning, as the Mahalla strikes put in motion the 
particular trajectory that led to the current ensemble of mass strikes and 
independent trade unions. I develop the concept of the Strike in more detail in 
Proletarian Sociogenesis. Before I arrive at the archetypical developmental 
trajectory of the workers’ movement, I first discuss the methodological 
implications of the notions of activity, Subjectivity, learning, and instruction in 
the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Activity and Subjectivity 
O body swayed to music, 
O brightening glance. 
How can we know the dancer 
From the dance? 
William Butler Yeats, Among School Children (1928) 
Activity as Substance 
The first philosopher to consider human consciousness as a valid object of 
scientific research was probably Réne Descartes.117 He could doubt the input of 
his senses, but not the fact that he doubted, i.e. the consciousness of doubting. 
The simple fact of consciousness was the starting point of his philosophy. Yet, 
Descartes also pointed out that the movement of his consciousness was not of his 
own volition, that it reacted against and upon stimuli from ‚outside‛. He posited 
being and thought as two opposite, independent and self-containing Substances.118 
The concept of a curve is of an entirely different type of existence than an actual 
curve. But how then can ‚things outside thought‛ and ‚thought‛ correspond if 
there is nothing ‚common‛ to both Substances, if there is no ‚third‛ Substance in 
which both categories could be expressed and mediated? This became the 
fundamental Cartesian problematic of the duality of thought and being. The 
Catholic Descartes introduced God as a metaphysical ‚third‛, to solve the 
contradiction and mediate between the movement of material bodies and 
spiritual thought forms.119  
 A fundamental step to overcome Cartesian dualism was made by Spinoza. 
Instead of trying to answer the question of how thought and being, as two 
different spheres of existence, interacted, he claimed that ‚the problem is insoluble 
only because it has been wrongly posed‛120. Spinoza argued that there was but one 
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object of investigation: the human, thinking body. Thought is not a Substance in 
itself, but a mode of existence of the human body. Thought and ‚extension‛ are 
opposite and independent attributes of one and the same Substance, which 
Spinoza called Nature and identified with God. Thinking and being coincide, one 
is not the cause or effect of the other. The body itself becomes the object of its own 
activity. A human as a ‚thinking body‛ is able to actively and creatively shape its 
own movement in relation to other thinking and non-thinking bodies – other 
humans and ‚things‛. Knowledge of the world ‚outside thought‛ is derived from 
the consciousness of the interaction between the ‚thinking body‛ and the world. 
Thus, the key contradiction of epistemology was not between ‚immaterial 
thought‛ and the ‚material world‛, mind and body, but between Subject and 
Object. 
 Johann Fichte further humanized Spinoza’s monism by taking activity as the 
Substance of existence. Subject and Object, the Self and the World, were both 
attributes and even products of the Substance of activity and did not exist 
separately. However, because he tried to deduce the nature of society from the 
perspective of the individual person, Fichte perceived activity as an individual 
rather than a social phenomenon.121 It would take Hegel to ‚socialize‛ Fichte’s 
notion of Subject, and Marx to combine Hegel’s Subject with Fichte’s emphasis on 
activity as the Substance of human existence. 
Subject 
Ironically, the term ‚subject‛ has come to denote both the agent and object of an 
activity. The ‚subject matter‛ is the ‚object‛ of research, and Kings rule their 
‚subjects‛, while, in the philosophical and grammatical tradition, the ‚Subject‛ is 
an actor. For Immanuel Kant the Subject was the coincidence of the cogito – the 
knowledge-processing unit – the agent – the moral actor – and the ego – self-
consciousness – in an individual human being. Hegel accepted this triadic nature 
of the Subject, but argued against Kant and Fichte that these attributes did not 
constitute an individual but a social unit; and that they were never immediately 
‚present‛ at the same time.122 In Hegel’s view a Subject was a combination of the 
‚moments‛ of the Individual, the Particular and the Universal. Offering a 
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materialist reading of Hegel, Blunden explained that: ‚<the subject entails an all-
sided relation between the consciousness of finite, mortal individuals, the particular forms 
of on-going activity and relations entailed in the relevant social practice, and the 
universal products through which the Subject is represented‛. 123  Throughout any 
human activity, these moments mediate each other. Verbal communication, for 
example, is constituted by speech (Particular) between speakers (Individual) 
using language (Universal). Likewise, the concept of ‚wage labor‛ is mediated by 
the existence of wage laborers (Individual), the practice of working for a wage 
(Particular) and the commodities valorized on the market (Universal). 
 Hegel sublated the Cartesian dualism between being and thinking, and the 
Kantian dichotomy between things-as-they-appear and things-in-themselves by 
stressing the interpenetration of Subject and Object. In Hegel’s philosophy, the 
relation between Subject and Object was not a relation between Man and Nature 
or the ideal and the material, but of humanity to itself. Firstly, an Object was 
understood as that which is ‚external‛ from the perspective of a particular Subject. 
This meant that from the viewpoint of one Subject, another Subject can be an 
Object, and Subjects are continuously objectified by other Subjects. Secondly, a 
Subject can only exist as a Subject by objectifying itself ‚into‛ the world. 124 
Thought is objectified into speech, sorrow into tears, protests into committees, 
and these objectifications in turn shape and objectify the Subject. In the human 
world, an Object is always an Object for a Subject, and a Subject is always 
objectively present. In other words, a Subject’s agency and presence in the world 
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movement‛, claimed that ‚The subject is the labour through which an individual transforms him or 
herself into an actor<‛ (Touraine 1995: 374) Likewise, in her article on revolutionary subjectivities, 
Salwai Ismail posited that: ‚< we need to consider the individual selves that formed the collective< a 
process through which intersubjective understandings of individual experiences become constitutive of a 
social imaginary and translate into shared sentiments and agreed ideas and aspirations.‛ (Ismail 2011: 
990) The ‚individual experiences‛, however, are already mediated by the participation of 
individual bodies in the material and ideal realities of social Subjects. There is no a priori 
‚individual‛ person who becomes a member of a collective when he interacts with other 
individual persons. Individuality – the ‚Self‛ – is rather constituted through joint artifact-
mediated activities, i.e. ‚social interaction‛. It is not a coincidence that in the age of neoliberalism: 
‚< theorizing on subjectivity assumes the prevalence of discourses on individualism<‛ (Moore 2011: 20) 
124 For Hegel, objectification was always alienation as it separated Man from abstract thought. 
Marx distinguished between objectification, which was a neutral process inherent to the human 
condition, and alienation which was an inhuman form of objectification. See ‚Critique of Hegel’s 
Dialectic and General Philosophy‛ in Marx 1992. Also see Chapter 1 Development. 
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is constantly mediated by the ideal/material artifacts that it produces or 
appropriates.  
Praxis 
Marx recognized the mediated unity between the Universal, Individual and 
Particular as the ‚real premises‛ of social reality:125 ‚<the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find 
already existing and those produced by their activity.‛126 Whereas the (later) Hegel 
shifted towards an idealist interpretation of the Subject by setting up Thought as 
the Substance of existence, Marx explicitly posited ‚activity‛ as the Substance of 
humanity in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and in his Theses on 
Feuerbach: ‚All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to 
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this 
practice.‛127 Knowledge is the product not of passive contemplation, but of active 
and self-conscious experience: i.e. ‚practical-critical‛ activity or praxis128. Both 
Subject and Object are the outcomes of human activity, as human activity 
mediates the relation between Subject and Object. Activity is an objectification of 
the Subject, and, vice versa, the Subject is constructed through objectified 
activity.129 In his later writings, Marx focused on labor as the defining human 
activity: ‚Labour< is a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of 
society; it is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and 
nature, and therefore human life itself.‛130 Gramsci, on the other hand, continued to 
use praxis as the unity of the different yet commensurable activities of 
philosophy–politics–economics.131  
 Both by its activity and by its appropriation and use of socially produced 
utterances and tools the individual body cannot escape being a social creature. Its 
participation in a Subject is incorporated, embodied as a Subjectivity. Moreover, 
as an individual body is part of different Subjects, it is also, in Gramsci’s words, a 
                                                          
125 Blunden 2010: 99. 
126 Marx and Engels 1970: 42. 
127 Marx 1992: 423. 
128 Gramsci 1971: 402-3. 
129 Marx 1992: 389. 
130 Marx 1990: 133. 
131 Gramsci 1971: 403. 
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‚composite body‛: a temporally-fragmented ensemble of social relations. 132 
Likewise, Voloshinov distinguished between an individual’s natural body, and 
his or her ‚individuality‛. 133  An individuality is the crystallization and 
combination of different Subjectivities in a human body. Conversely, a Subject 
always consists of individual bodies participating in a particular activity. In order 
to analytically separate the ‚dancer‛ from the ‚dance‛, I distinguish between a 
‚social‛ and an ‚individual‛ Subject, which, respectively, emphasize the 
collective gathering of bodies in joint activity, or the individual person in whom 
different Subjects are refracted. In terms derived from the previous chapter: 
whereas the social Subject is a Gestalt, the individual Subject is a ‚microcosm‛ of 
various Gestalten. 
 By combining individual actors, their particular activity and universal cultural 
artifacts into one coherent, yet differentiated, ‚unit‛, the Hegelian-Marxist 
concept of the Subject overcomes the classic dichotomy between ‚individual‛ and 
‚society‛, and offers a solution to bridge methodological individualist and 
collectivist notions of ‚class‛. As a social Subject, the working class is composed 
of individual workers, their activity, and ideal and material artifacts. Likewise, 
‚worker‛, is a Subjectivity, a participation in and sharing of the ideal and material 
practices of a social Subject, which exists in a human body in combination with 
other Subjectivities – the total of which make up the ‚identity‛ of a person.134   
Activity Theory 
Marx’s theses on Feuerbach would become ‚<the founding document of Activity 
Theory<‛135 As I discussed before, Vygotsky saw joint-artifact mediated action as 
the unit of analysis of human activity. Aleksei Nikolaevich Leontyev136, a student 
of Vygotsky’s, aimed to expand the insights of Soviet cultural psychology to other 
dimensions and disciplines of the social sciences through Activity Theory. 
Leontyev posited that, historically, human beings engaged in activities to satisfy a 
                                                          
132 Thomas 2009: 393; 398. 
133 ‚To avoid misunderstandings, a rigorous distinction must always be made between the concept of the 
individual as natural specimen without reference to the social world< and the concept of individuality 
which has the status of an ideological-semiotic superstructure over the natural individual and which, 
therefore, is a social concept.‛ (Voloshinov 1973: 34) 
134 I develop a concept of the working class in Chapter 4 Proletarian Sociogenesis. 
135 Blunden 2010: 94. 
136 See Leontyev 1978. 
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certain need. The development of complex activities entailed the disarticulation of 
activities into a chain of actions – i.e. a social division of labor – of which the 
direct object differed from the object of the activity as a whole. The routine 
execution of some actions internalized these as subliminal operations.137 Thus 
Leontyev differentiated between activities, actions, and operations. Activities are a 
societally produced series of conscious, object-oriented and artifact-mediated 
individual actions, which, in turn, consist of unconscious, ‚incorporated‛ routine 
operations. Activity mediates the relation between Subject and Object, and 
artifacts, in turn, mediate the relation between Subjects and their activity.138  
 Yrjö Engeström139 expanded Leontiev’s theory with the notion of system of 
activity. An activity does not only involve humans and their object-oriented 
actions, mediated by material tools and conceptual signs; it also constitutes a 
coherent but often contradictory system comprising rules, relations, and divisions 
of labor, which organize the subjects’ actions and relations towards (1) their 
object, (2) co-participants in the activity, and (3) other agents who are engaged in 
separate and distinct activities that are oriented towards the same object. The 
importance of Engeström’s concept of activity is that it draws attention to the 
internal systematicity and coherence of a more or less stable pattern of human 
activity. 
 Positing collaborative Project as the unit of analysis of human activity, Andy 
Blunden emphasized that the object or goal of a system of activity is not only an 
‚external‛ aim to which the social Subject is directed; but that it is (also) 
immanently projected from the ‚internal‛ activity of its participants. This is a 
critique of Leontyev’s teleological and functionalist view, which conceives of 
activity as an object-oriented process of gratification. In traditional Soviet Activity 
Theory the Object over-determines the Subject’s activity, which stands in clear 
opposition to the ethics of an emancipatory science where agency and immanence 
are at the core of the Project. Goals not only constitute activities, they are also 
their products. The object of an activity-system emerges from the process of 
collaboration of its participants and entails both cooperation and conflict. 
                                                          
137 Ibid. 205-6. 
138 Ibid. 174-8. 
139 See Engeström 1987, 1990, 1992. 
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Whereas the initial goal – that might interpellate 140  ‚from without‛ the 
construction of a social Subject – logically and historically predates the activity-
system, the concretization of the goal of activity is a living process ‚from within‛, 
which appropriates and internalizes the Object. This means that the telos of an 
activity-system is never given in advance, but the ‚negotiated‛ outcome of an 
immanent and contingent development.141 
 Blunden’s concept of Project points towards the immanent and developmental 
character of the Subject. If I conceive of the ‚worker Subject‛ as composed of 
individual wage laborers, their labor activity, and the tools and signs they use 
when laboring, then I have only conceptualized a passive workforce, which is 
rather an Object of the capitalist mode of production than a social Subject with its 
own volition. The goal of the workers’ activity as workers does not belong to 
themselves, but to their patron. Rather, their lack of means of production and 
their need to reproduce the means of their existence forces them into the activity 
of wage labor. A concept of workers as a social Subject emphasizes above all their 
agency. Even though the notion of a ‚working class‛ presumes a certain 
structural position within the ensemble of the relations of production, it is far 
from identical to it. The workforce is a Subject-in-itself, an undifferentiated 
collection of wage laborers that has the potential to develop into a social Subject. 
The ‚working class‛ is not a sociological label to categorize a specific layer of the 
population according to a fixed set of rules and parameters; it is the process of the 
becoming of a proletarian social Subject; the movement of workers towards 
Subjectness.142 
Subjectness 
Marx famously commented that:  
History does nothing, it ‘possesses no immense wealth’, it ‘wages no battles’. It is 
man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not, 
                                                          
140 The term ‚interpellation‛ refers to Althusser’s concept of Subjectivity constitution in which a 
Subjectivity is ‚called into being‛ by addressing or hailing an individual as a specific Subject. 
(Althusser 2001: 115) I use the term in a slightly different and broader framework, in the sense 
that a certain Object or Subject, because of its saliency in the social world, can ‚invite itself‛ to be 
appropriated by another individual or social Subject. In other words, ‚interpellation‛ is ‚forced‛ 
recognition. 
141 Blunden 2010: 208-10; 255-7. 
142 I develop this line of thought in detail in Chapter 4 Proletarian Sociogenesis. 
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as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is 
nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.143 
As a moral actor, a Subject requires self-consciousness and intentionality. 
Otherwise a person or collectivity would be merely a passive being, swept and 
pushed along the trajectory of its life process by external forces. Human beings 
are ‚teleological‛; not in the sense that they are mechanistically determined by an 
external final cause – be it history or God – but meaning that they create finalities 
for themselves. Self-consciousness, however, is not immediately there; it is not 
taken for granted; it is something that has to develop from mere ‚being‛ to 
‚conscious being‛ to ‚being self-conscious‛. In Hegel’s dialectic, it is the 
immanent movement from a Subject-in-itself to a Subject-for-itself, from: 
‚<consciousness in general, which has an object as such<‛ through ‚<self-
consciousness, for which the self is the object<‛ to ‚<the unity of consciousness and 
self-consciousness, where the spirit sees itself as the content of the object and as in and 
for itself determinate<‛144  
 The development of workers as a social Subject requires a process of Bildung: a 
maturation of its ideal and material objectifications and neoformations. The 
historical emergence of the term ‚workers‛, designating a certain group of 
proletarianized wage laborers, is equally significant as the rise of strike 
committees and trade unions.145 The working class only exists as an amorphous 
workforce as long as it has not developed a concept of itself as a class: ‚<people 
who have been kicked off their land and have found a living by selling their labor by the 
hour, but they still think of themselves as farmers who have fallen on hard times, and have 
no concept of themselves as proletarians, for example.‛146 
 This is not a question of ‚false‛ consciousness – an unfortunate term never 
used by either Hegel or Marx – because the contradiction is not between a form of 
consciousness and the external truth of a reality lying beyond the phenomenon, 
but between the actual position of the Subject within its developmental trajectory 
and its current Subjectness; or, put differently, between the current Gestalt of a 
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Chapter 5 The Precapitalist Formation. 
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phenomenon and its proper position within the chain of Gestalten of which it is 
but a moment.  
 For example, the concept of ‚everyday‛, ‚molecular‛, or ‚hidden‛ resistance 
expresses worker actions which are only implicit forms of resistance.147 Asef Bayat 
justly observed that: ‚Under repressive conditions, labor resistance may take the form of 
absenteeism, sabotage, disturbances, theft, religious practice, and poor quality production. 
Labor activism of this nature is not necessarily unplanned or purely ‘spontaneous’<‛148 
Researchers are quick to point out that these activities often do not represent 
coherent and self-conscious acts of social or political contestation. But then the 
question arises when and how these actions stop from being simple survival 
strategies and transform into subaltern forms of resistance. If ‚everyday‛ or 
‚hidden‛ resistance is acknowledged as but a survival strategy, then it conceives 
of the subaltern not as a Subject, but as a passive Object of poverty, class war, or 
State policies. Sabotage, theft, et cetera, do not represent any real agency, only a 
kind of social reflexology. On the other hand, if ‚everyday‛ or ‚hidden‛ 
resistance is recognized by the researcher as an ‚objective‛ form of struggle 
against the status quo – even though the resisting actors have not developed a 
concept of their actions as ‚resistance‛ – in that case a consciousness and 
intentionality, i.e. Subjectness, is externally imputed to the subaltern Subject.149  
 Both approaches colonize the Subject because they do not appreciate these 
forms of resistance as actualities of a process with more ‚advanced‛ potentialities. 
Robin Cohen contemplated that: ‚The hidden forms are at a lower level of 
consciousness but can be seen as part of an incremental chain of consciousness leading 
towards a ‘higher’, more politicized, form of consciousness. This seems a somewhat more 
plausible position, though any incremental process cannot be viewed deterministically.‛150 
 A grassroots workers’ movement does not start with high-profile and explicit 
actions and discourses. Strikes always start from everyday conditions. They do, 
however, contain the potentiality of a critique of capitalist property relations, 
union bureaucracy, alienation, representative democracy, et cetera. A means of 
survival can develop into a conscious form of resistance, thereby developing a 
subaltern Subject-in-itself towards a Subject-for-itself.  
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149 See Abbink and van Walraven 2003: 1-10. 
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 How can the survival of a subaltern group become conscious resistance, 
resistance turn into overt protest, and protest transform into emancipation? From 
the perspective of an emancipatory science, the task of a critical scientist is not 
only to describe the current state of affairs, but also to reveal those potential roads 
of development that are immanent within the current Gestalt of the movement. A 
social scientist should not only investigate a Subject from the perspective of its 
current ‚state‛ – nor even from the perspective of the sum of its current plus 
previous moments in its development – but he or she should also dare to imagine 
potential future trajectories of the Subject in order to form an integral concept of 
the phenomenon. Rational speculation is the logical mirror of historical or genetic 
investigation.151 Or, as Gramsci voiced it: ‚No one can be expected to imagine new 
things; but one can expect people< to exercise fantasy so as to round out the full living 
reality on the basis of what they know.‛152 
  
                                                          
151  With Bernstein’s caveat in mind that: ‚< actual development is forever bringing forth new 
arrangements and forces, forever new facts, in the light of which that exposition< seems inadequate and, to 
a corresponding extent, loses the ability to serve as a sketch of the development to come.‛ (Bernstein in 
Townshend 2007: 51) However, pace Bernstein, one could argue that speculation is not isolated 
from ‚actual development‛, because it also may act as proleptic instruction, becoming one of the 
‚facts‛ in the ‚arrangements of forces‛. 
152 Gramsci in Morton 2007: 171. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Learning and Instruction 
<emancipation is not a form of graduation ceremony< but rather it is a process of struggle by people 
who are not yet ’ready’ for emancipation, and who can become ready for emancipation only by 
launching the struggle themselves, before anyone considers them ready for it. 
Hal Draper, Self-Emancipation in Marx and Engels (1971: 95) 
Interiorization 
When considering the activity of learning it seems logical to put competence 
before performance. For how can one perform a task before knowing how to do 
it? Pace the nativist argument, Vygotsky, however, claimed that it is not capacity 
that determines performance, but performance that constructs capacities. 153 
Simply put, a child develops speech by trying to speak. A capacity or 
neoformation is matured as the result of overcoming the current social situation of 
development (SSoD). How do ‚external‛ performances create ‚internal‛ 
competences? Vygotsky observed that: ‚An operation that initially represents an 
external activity is reconstructed and begins to occur internally.‛ 154  The notion of 
interiorization or ‚ingrowth‛ is key to Vygotsky’s ‚general genetic law of cultural 
development‛, which claims that every neoformation appears twice: first ‚inter-
mentally‛, then ‚intra-mentally‛.155 The activity or performance is not simply 
‚copied‛ into an existing plane of consciousness as a competence, but the inward 
transference of neoformations is the process that develops such a mental plane.156 
The practice is transformed during its interiorization, becoming similar yet 
different to its original objectification.157 For example, Vygotsky and Voloshinov 
explained that a child who learns to speak also interiorizes this objectification as 
‚inner speech‛: ‚<consciousness could have developed only by having at its disposal 
material that was pliable and expressible by bodily means.‛ 158  The participation in 
shared systems of activity stimulates the formation of Subjectivities and 
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Subjectness: ‚<learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes that are 
able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in 
cooperation with his peers. Once these processes are internalized, they become part of the 
child’s independent developmental achievement.‛159 
 Extrapolating this insight to the development of the workers’ movement, I 
suggest that the performance and objectifications of the Strike activity-system – 
organic intellectuals, strike committees, elected representatives, slogans, 
discourses, et cetera – are originally produced as new forms of mediation with 
factory management and the State, but these neoformations then turn ‚inward‛, 
creating a worker Subjectivity and embryonic forms of Subjectness. Proletarian 
hegemony160 – the ability of workers as a social Subject to lead society – is not 
some kind of metaphysical quality inherent in the abstract position of the wage 
laborers within the ensemble of production relations, but a whole of capacities 
that are constructed by the very concrete performance and experience of struggle.  
Zone of Proximal Development 
Vygotsky emphasized the importance of instruction as a motor of ontogenesis. 
There is a difference between the degree to which a child can solve a problem on 
its own, and its capacity to accomplish a task in collaboration with others. 
Vygotsky described this tension as the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD): 
‚<the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent 
problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem 
solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration with more capable peers.‛161 The role of 
instruction in the learning process is to stimulate development, i.e. to assist the 
Subject in creating those neoformations that allow it to overcome its SSoD. 
Vygotsky also emphasized that instruction is only effective when it is ‚proleptic‛; 
when it anticipates or ‚imagines‛ competence through the representation of a 
future act or development as already existing.162 An analysis of the developmental 
process of a proletarian activity-system should therefore look beyond the mere 
                                                          
159 Vygotsky in Del Rio and Alvarez 2007: 279. 
160 The concept of hegemony is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 Proletarian Sociogenesis. 
161 Vygotsky 1978: 86. Emphasis in original. Similarly, Lukács observed that: ‚There is a distance 
between the consciousness of their *the workers’+ situation that they actually posses and the consciousness 
that they could have – given their class position.‛(Lukács 2000: 65-6) 
162 Cole, 2003: 183; Daniels, 2007: 322; Meshcheryakov, 2007: 166. 
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‚actual level of development‛ of a strike and investigate which developments lie 
within the current ZPD of the movement, and which forms of prolepsis stimulate 
these developments.163  
 Meshcheryakov distinguished between two forms of proleptic instruction: 
autoprolepsis and heterolepsis. Autoprolepsis is a form of self-instruction, 
whereby a Subject casts itself in the role of a future Self in a more developed 
phase of its formation. A classic example from ontogenesis is that of a child 
playing adult roles, projecting itself in a more advanced stage of its own 
trajectory.164 In the domain of proletarian sociogenesis, the actions and structures 
of the ‚actually existing‛ worker Subject anticipate a future moment within its 
potential development. 165  Wildcat strikes and their illicit committees imagine 
(grassroots and independent) trade unions; workers’ control over factories 
establish their potential of running the economy without capitalists; and practices 
of participation, election and discussion within the movement foreshadow forms 
of participative democracy. The process of autoprolepsis affirms the maxim of 
Marx and Engels that the emancipation of the proletariat must and can be the 
activity of the working class itself. 
 In contradistinction, heterolepsis is the interpellation of a potential capacity of 
a Subject by another Subject. A classic example from ontogenesis is that of a 
parent speaking to her young child as if it were a developed conversation partner, 
even though it has not yet matured the capacity to engage in such a dialogue.166 
The potential development of the child is called into being by the proleptic 
instruction of the parent. With regard to proletarian sociogenesis, heterolepsis 
offers a means to imagine the instructive relation between worker and non-
worker actors. However, transferring the ontogenetic notion of heterolepsis to the 
domain of proletarian sociogenesis is a delicate exercise, as it should avoid 
paternalist and elitist interpretations of emancipation. Obviously, workers are not 
children and a political ‚pedagogy‛ is qualitatively different from the typical 
teacher-student relation. How can the heteroleptic role of ‚teachers‛ be reconciled 
with the principle of self-emancipation? I argue that Gramsci’s notions of 
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‚intellectuals‛ and ‚dialectical pedagogy‛ offer a concrete solution to understand 
instruction as a reciprocal process of ‚educating the educator.‛ 
Intellectuals 
As I explained in the Prologue, the central problematic of this doctoral dissertation 
is the contradiction between the principle of self-emancipation and the historical 
division of labor. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels argued that the 
historical division of labor liberated knowledge from its immediate context and 
stimulated abstract thinking, but at the price of a growing separation between 
practice and thought via the differentiation and consolidation of a category of 
professional ‚ideologists‛, who became the bearers of ‚advanced‛ thought.167  
After the Dreyfus affair at the end of the nineteenth century, this social group was 
increasingly denoted as ‚intellectuals‛ in political discourse.168  
 The societal separation between ‚theory‛ and ‚practice‛ was also reflected 
within the development of the workers’ movement. Socialist theories were largely 
constructed by intellectuals who were sympathetic to the plight of the workers, 
but who stood, in general, outside the ‚lifeworld‛ of the class.169 When Karl 
Kautsky, as chief theoretician of the Second International, claimed that the idea of 
socialism developed separately – in bourgeois circles – and had to be introduced 
to the workers from without the movement, he expressed a certain reality on the 
ground. 170  With some critical reservations, Lenin 171  and Lukács agreed that 
political consciousness had to be largely imported to the workers from without: 
‚For the social being of the proletariat places it immediately only in a relationship of 
struggle with the capitalists, while proletarian class consciousness becomes class 
                                                          
167 Marx and Engels 1970: 52; Ratner 1991: 98. Also see Problems, Questions, Methods. 
168 Thomas 2009: 407. 
169 Lukács 2000: 82-3. 
170 See Prologue. 
171 In 1904 both Trotsky and Luxemburg attacked Lenin’s general ‚division of labor‛ between 
workers and revolutionaries (see Thatcher 2007). Draper (1990) and Shandro (2007) stressed that 
Lenin’s argument in What is to be Done? (1903) was developed against the particular liquidationist 
or ‚economist‛ trends within Russian Marxism. Whereas Lenin, in a ‚Russian context‛; defended 
the crucial role of socialist theory and organization against ‚spontaneism‛; Luxemburg, in a 
‚German context‛, emphasized the fundamental role of workers’ spontaneity and self-
development against bureaucratism. 
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consciousness proper when it incorporates a knowledge of the totality of bourgeois 
society.‛172  
 The argument is that workers cannot come to a concrete understanding of 
capitalism and bourgeois society – and thus of themselves as workers – without 
the assistance of actors who participate in societal spheres other than the 
economic instance of the workplace. Yet this characterization of the role of 
intellectuals and ‚scientific thought‛ in the development of the workers’ 
movement encouraged paternalist and elitist conceptions of emancipation and 
heterolepsis. A new understanding of the pedagogical relation between 
intellectuals and workers was needed, which grasped both the predicament of the 
division of labor and the ways to overcome it. 
 Antonio Gramsci offered the most compelling solution by his typology of 
organic and traditional intellectuals, and his notion of dialectical pedagogy.173 
First of all, Gramsci stressed that every human activity requires a degree of 
intellect, and that pure practice or theory do not exist. In that sense, every human 
is an intellectual and a philosopher.174 However, just as the division of labor made 
some men into farmers, it consolidated others as intellectuals. Elaborating Marx’s 
and Engels’s vague reflections on the ‚ideologists‛ in The German Ideology, 
Gramsci posited that intellectuals did not constitute an autonomous social group 
of their own, but that each class produces specialists who fulfill a function in the 
realm of production, culture or politics: i.e. in the social formation. Gramsci 
distinguished between organic and traditional intellectuals. Organic intellectuals 
are those ideologists and leaders whose sociogenesis is interwoven with the 
historical formation of the class they represent:  
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an 
                                                          
172 Lukács 2000 : 83. 
173 Other approaches conceptualized intellectuals as a separate ‚class‛ (e.g. Julien Benda) or class 
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awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and 
political fields.175 
Conversely, those specialists whom a rising class finds already existing, as relics 
from a previous social form, are traditional intellectuals:  
...every ‚essential‛ social group which emerges into history out of the preceding 
economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, has 
found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already 
in existence and which seemed indeed to represent an historical continuity 
uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and 
social form.176  
Traditional intellectuals often perceive themselves as autonomous and 
independent from the current ruling classes because they survived the social form 
from which they emerged.  
 In these two brief paragraphs, Gramsci offered (1) the working class a means to 
develop autonomously, via the production of its own organic intellectuals; and 
(2) non-worker actors a possibility to support the development of the workers’ 
movement as traditional intellectuals joining the proletarian cause.177  
 Organic intellectuals of the proletarian Subject emerge from the ranks of the 
workers themselves. Directive intellectuals are the leaders of the movement. They 
have authority and their arguments are persuasive. 178  Cultural intellectuals 
articulate the worldview and aesthetics of the movement. They infuse the Project 
with meanings and self-concepts through the elaboration of texts and signs. 
Technical intellectuals are involved in the procedural and organizational 
production and reproduction of the workers’ activity as a coherent system. They 
know the labor laws, how to set up a strike fund or edit a paper.179  
                                                          
175 Ibid. 5. 
176 Ibid. 6-7. 
177 Note that the terms ‚organic‛ and ‚traditional‛ are not used in an absolute but in a relative 
sense, in accordance with the perspective of a specific class. From the point of view of the 
working class, the organic intellectuals of the bourgeois are traditional intellectuals. Throughout 
the text, the terms are used from the proletarian perspective. 
178 Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette 2001: 10. 
179 These three types of intellectuals are of course archetypes; they are Subjectivities themselves 
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 The Project of organic intellectuals is facilitated by the assistance of traditional 
intellectuals. Due to their position and activity within civil and political society, 
non-proletarian intellectuals – politicians, journalists, lawyers, artists, academics, 
et cetera – have developed directive, cultural and technical capacities to assist the 
developing worker Subject. Through the media, progressive journalists share 
particular class experiences with the whole workers’ community and other 
subaltern groups. Labor lawyers defend specific cases, which become precedents 
for the struggle of other workers. Artists, cartoonists and writers universalize 
class Subjectivities in an aesthetic form. Philosophers and academics combine 
disjointed stories of worker protests into a coherent narrative of class struggle. 
Modes of Assistance 
Different class projects require different modes of assistance to organize and 
secure their technical, cultural and political hegemony 180  and domination. 
Hegemony and domination are not neutral, class-independent concepts that are 
applicable in the same way to bourgeois or proletarian modes of governance.181 
Drawing on Hegel’s ‚theory of recognition‛, Blunden distinguished between 
three archetypical modes of assistance: colonization, commodification, and 
solidarity.182  The individual ‚Self‛ is the interpenetration of the relation between 
the ‚Self‛ and the ‚Other‛. Marx commented that:  
<a man first sees and recognizes himself in another man. Peter only relates to 
himself as a man through his relation to another man, Paul, in whom he recognizes 
his likeness. With this, however, Paul also becomes from head to toe, in his physical 
form as Paul, the form of appearance of the species man for Peter.183  
However, in order to recognize an individual as oneself – and recognize oneself 
as another human being – something must be shared to express the equivalence: 
‚If there is no international law, no shared ethos, no language or anything mediating the 
interaction, then how is any relationship possible?‛ 184  A real encounter between 
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individual bodies presupposes that they do something together; that they 
participate in a shared system of activity. If unmediated, neither Subject 
recognizes the other as a Subject: inevitably the result of such an unmediated 
interaction is war and destruction of the Other (in a physical and/or cultural 
sense), or withdrawal from the interaction, whereupon both Subjects continue 
their separate ways.  
 Mediated contact between two Subjects creates a shared system of activity and 
produces forms of Subjectivity. Domination, enslavement, or colonization 
describes an asymmetrical relation between a dominant and submissive Subject, 
wherein the objectifications of the servant-Subject (language, customs, practices, 
cultural artifacts, property rights, et cetera) are destroyed and replaced by those 
of the Master-Subject. The Subjectivity that develops from the interaction between 
master and servant is polarized by the division between theory and practice. The 
servant can only recognize himself through the objectifications of the master. The 
colonizer directs and determines the objectifications of the servant, enforcing his 
own self-consciousness on the Other. However, the master can only externalize 
and realize himself and his culture in a roundabout way: through the controlled 
activity and objectifications of his servant. While the servant is subjectively 
dependent on the master, the colonizer is objectively dependent on the activity of 
the colonized for his existence as a Subject. Both Subjects find the means of 
mediation in each other, and are able to recognize themselves as Subjects – be it in 
a distorted way. The Hegelian master-servant dialectic is not only appropriate for 
the grand archetypical examples of historical slavery or colonization, but can also 
be found in more trivial and benign encounters between Subjects, such as patron-
client relations and charity – as I explain below. 
 Commodification, exchange, or trade, happens when two Subjects meet and 
one is not able to subjugate the other, and both of them have something that the 
other Subject needs or desires. Gratification is realized through exchange and this 
interaction creates its own types of Subjectivity. Trade acts as a form of mediation 
through which both Subjects recognize each other and themselves as Subjects. 
The relation between two exchanging Subjects is relatively symmetrical, based on 
mutual respect for the Other; they recognize each other as a Subject and this 
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recognition is expressed as ‚rights‛. Through their trade the two Subjects 
constitute a new, shared system of activity, while, at the same time, remaining 
separate Subjects. However, the Other is but a means to an end, and its worth is 
only calculated according to its capacity to satisfy the needs of the Self. For 
example, in the capitalist economy only the circulation of commodities is of 
interest to its participating Subjects, not the life activities and humanity of the 
Other. The Other is treated as a means to the end of the Self, instead of an end-in-
itself; the Other is objectified and commodified. The dominance of the commodity 
relation has a tendency to ‚reify‛ all human relations.185 
 The third mode of interaction between two Subjects is solidarity. Blunden 
defines solidarity as a single system of activity between different Subjects that 
strengthens the Subjectness of the whole system and of each participant. 
Solidarity is offering assistance in the development of the Subjectness of another 
Subject ‚<by voluntarily lending one’s own labor to the support of the other’s project 
according to their direction.‛186 Solidarity entails the freely chosen submission of the 
provider of assistance to the beneficiary, in order to increase the agency of the 
Other. Solidarity stands in sharp contrast to charity, which is a ‚benign‛ form of 
colonization. Whereas charity may alleviate the direct suffering or plight of the 
Other, it increases at the same time the dependency of the recipient and only 
strengthens the agency and autonomy of the donor. Conversely, solidarity is 
oriented towards the self-emancipation of the Other, as the benefactor assists in 
developing the means within the Other to emancipate itself: ‚Solidarity is the 
opposite of philanthropic colonization, because in assisting someone, the other remains the 
owner of the project and is thereby assisted in achieving self-determination.‛187  
 Finally, solidarity can become genuine collaboration, in the sense that two 
Subjects meld into a single Project, becoming both a mutual means to their single, 
shared end and constructing an immanent goal from their collaborative activity.  
 I argue that the notion of solidarity and collaboration open up a 
conceptualization of the instructive relation between intellectuals and workers, 
which imagines a role for non-proletarian actors in the development of the 
worker Subject without trampling the principle of the self-emancipation of the 
working class underfoot – i.e. what Gramsci called a ‚dialectical pedagogy‛. 
                                                          
185 Lukács 2000. 
186 Blunden 2010: 284. 
187 Ibid. 284. 
72 
 
Dialectical Pedagogy 
Gramsci proposed that the workers’ hegemony, i.e. class leadership, was realized 
through a dialectical pedagogy: a reciprocal process of learning and instruction 
between the workers’ movement, intellectuals, and subaltern allies. Gramsci’s 
notion of a dialectical pedagogy was influenced by Marx’s third Thesis on 
Feuerbach:188 ‚The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and 
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to 
educate the educator himself.‛189   
 Within a healthy and genuine development of the workers’ movement there is 
no unilateral top-down relation between ‚teacher‛ and ‚student‛. Rather, there is 
a continuous reciprocity and mutual heterolepsis between participants in a 
shared activity-system such as the Strike. For example, referring to learning 
processes within a South-African strike movement, Linda Cooper noted that: 
‚During the strike< the boundary between educators and learners shifts markedly: 
ordinary workers play a collective, educational role, and their ‘learners’ are management, 
other workers and the general public outside the union.‛190  
 In my analysis of the Mahalla strike movement and the 25 January Revolution I 
argue that solidarity is the mode of assistance that enables this kind of dialectical 
pedagogy. Solidarity also paves the way for a collaborative Project between 
workers and non-worker actors, giving rise to a new type of intellectual who is 
the fusion of the proletarian organic intellectual and the ‚fellow traveler‛. 
Gramsci called this archetypical intellectual a democratic philosopher: ‚<a 
philosopher convinced that his personality is not limited to himself as a physical 
individual but is an active social relationship of modification of the cultural 
environment.‛191  
 Through a dialectical pedagogy, the societal separation between ‚theory‛ and 
‚practice‛, the historical burden of the social division of labor, can be overcome.192 
A dialectical pedagogy stimulates the elaboration of a living Welt-und-
Selbstanschauung of the working class: a ‚philosophy of praxis‛. In reality, of 
course, the separation between ‚theory‛ and ‚practice‛ is not absolute, as every 
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human action requires a degree of thinking, and every form of thinking requires a 
form of activity to become material: ‚<in any physical work, even the most degraded 
and mechanical, there exists a minimum of technical qualification, that is, a minimum of 
creative intellectual activity,‛193 Gramsci observed. The historical differentiation is 
rather between two, archetypical developmental lines of thought, which are 
rooted in two different types of activity. A proletarian philosophy of praxis 
entails the sublation of these two modes of thinking in the collaborative activity of 
the worker Subject and the development of a critical self-concept. 
Philosophy of Praxis 
Everyday and Scientific Concepts 
Vygotsky differentiated between an ‚everyday‛ line of development, in which 
concepts are embedded within the direct experience and lifeworld of the child, 
and a ‚scientific‛194 line of development, in which concepts are ‚emancipated‛ 
from the ‚<unique spatiotemporal context in which they are used<‛195 A child first 
acquires everyday concepts within the setting of personal experience ‚ <which is 
immediate, social, practical activity as against a context of instruction in a formal system 
of knowledge.‛ 196  There is an organic and experimental connection between 
thinking and activity. Conversely, scientific forms of knowledge are acquired 
through explicit instruction; they are culturally transmitted and consolidated 
‚everyday‛ concepts. There is no hierarchy in value between the two forms of 
knowledge:  
The strength of the scientific concepts lies in the higher characteristics of concepts, 
in the consciousness awareness and volition. In contrast this is the weakness in the 
child’s everyday concepts. The strength of everyday concepts lies in spontaneous, 
situationally meaningful concrete applications, that is, in the sphere of experience 
and the empirical.197 
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The dichotomy between ‚everyday‛ and ‚scientific‛ forms of knowledge is not 
uncommon in developmental psychology. For example, Basil Bernstein198 made a 
distinction between ‚horizontal‛ and ‚vertical‛ discourse. Horizontal discourses 
arise from everyday experiences. They are fluid, amorphous, and prone to 
change. Vertical discourses, on the other hand, are produced by explicit 
instruction and are (more) coherent, systematic and stable. As a Marxist, 
however, Vygotsky emphasized the interpenetration of everyday and scientific 
lines of conceptual development: 
The development of scientific concepts begins in the domain of conscious awareness 
and volition. It grows downwards into the domain of the concrete, into the domain 
of personal experience. In contrast, the development of spontaneous concepts 
begins in the domain of the concrete and empirical. It moves toward the higher 
characteristics of concepts, toward conscious awareness and volition.199  
Likewise, the Marxist linguist Valentin Voloshinov distinguished between the 
spheres of ‚behavioral ideology‛ and ‚ideology proper‛. Behavioral ideology is 
‚<the whole aggregate of life experiences and the outward expressions directly connected 
with it.‛200 It is ‚unsystematized‛ and ‚unfixed‛, whereas ideology proper is a 
coherent system. Just as Vygotsky, Voloshinov stressed the reciprocal 
‚sustenance‛ of the two spheres of knowledge: 
The established ideological systems of social ethics, science, art, and religion are 
crystallizations of behavioral ideology, and these crystallizations, in turn exert a 
powerful influence back upon behavioral ideology, normally setting its tone. At the 
same time, however, these already formalized ideological products constantly 
maintain the most vital organic contact with behavioral ideology and draw 
sustenance from it; otherwise, without that contact, they would be dead, just as 
any literary work or cognitive idea is dead without living, evaluative perception of 
it.201 
The interpenetration of everyday and scientific concepts stimulates the 
development of true concepts. 202  In ontogenesis, true concepts develop in 
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adolescence, through social practice, formal instruction, and participation in 
society. Everyday concepts can become true concepts when confronted with those 
learned at school or another instructive environment, and, vice versa, scientific 
concepts gain substance when confronted with everyday concepts.203  
 Why is all this relevant for the development of a philosophy of praxis? Because 
true concepts reinforce the agency of a Subject: ‚The appropriation of concepts within 
a system of knowledge gives the child a possibility to use them consciously and 
intentionally.‛204  Below I argue that Gramsci provided a means of extending and 
translating Vygotsky’s ‚neutral‛ notion of ontogenetic concept development to 
the ‚ideological‛ domain of class sociogenesis. 
Common Sense and Philosophy 
Gramsci claimed that: ‚<all men are philosophers<‛ 205  Everybody engages in 
spontaneous philosophy, a mode of thought which is comprised of: 
1. language itself, which is a totality of determined notions and concepts and not 
just of words grammatically devoid of content; 2. ‚common sense‛ and ‚good 
sense‛; 3. popular religion and, therefore, also in the entire system of beliefs, 
superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things and of acting, which are collectively 
bundled together under the name of ‚folklore‛.206 
‚Spontaneous philosophy‛ is Gramsci’s way to investigate that sphere of human 
consciousness that Plekhanov called ‚social psychology‛ 207 , Voloshinov 
‚behavioral ideology‛, and Vygotsky ‚everyday knowledge‛. It is the real, living, 
organic base from which advanced modes of consciousness are developed. Every 
thought already contains a conception of the world, but in spontaneous 
philosophy this is a ‚<disjointed and episodic<‛208 awareness. Neither within a 
social Subject or the composite body of an individual Subject do the everyday 
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204 Hedegaard 2007: 248. 
205 Gramsci 1971: 323. 
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modes of thought attain coherence and unity. 209  In other words, a Subject’s 
spontaneous philosophy is the gelatinous and ever changing collection of 
everyday conceptions of social reality by that actor. ‚One’s conception of the world 
is a response to certain specific problems posed by reality, which are quite specific and 
‚original‛ in their immediate relevance.‛210 Spontaneous philosophy is an uncritical 
consciousness, but it is not a ‚false‛ consciousness or ‚self-deception‛.211 Even 
Lukács, perhaps the theoretician par excellence of ‚false consciousness‛, 
explained that: ‚The direct forms of appearance of social being are not, however, 
subjective fantasies of the brain, but moments of the real forms of existence, the conditions 
of existence, of capitalist society.‛212  
 In opposition to the forms of ‚spontaneous philosophy‛ stands philosophy 
proper. Philosophy is the ‚criticism and the superseding‛213 of everyday modes of 
consciousness: ‚To criticize one’s own conception of the world means therefore to make 
it a coherent unity and to raise it to the level reached by the most advanced thought in the 
world.‛214 The key qualities of philosophy are ‚homogeneity‛, ‚coherence‛, and 
‚logicality‛.215 Analogous to Voloshinov and Vygotsky, Gramsci emphasized the 
continuous exchange between forms of spontaneous philosophy and philosophy 
proper: ‚Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continuously 
transforming itself, enriching it with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions 
which have entered ordinary life.‛216  
 Because in class society the different class systems of activity are refracted in 
consciousness, 217  ‚philosophy in general does not in fact exist.‛ 218  The process of 
organic mutual and reciprocal appropriation between everyday and scientific 
forms of consciousness is distorted within the subaltern Subject, which ‚<has, for 
reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not 
its own but is borrowed from another group<‛219 The worker has: 
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<two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which 
is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-
workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially 
explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed.220 
The ‚falseness‛ – or rather contradictoriness – of the consciousness of the 
subaltern thus consists in the lack of organicity between its everyday and 
philosophical consciousness: 
Which therefore would be the real conception of the world: that logically affirmed 
as an intellectual choice? Or that which emerges from the real activity of each man, 
which is implicit in his mode of action? And since all action is political, can one 
not say that the real philosophy of each man is contained in its entirety in his 
political action?221 
Despite his experience of the failure of Italian council communism, the rise of 
Fascism and his personal imprisonment, Gramsci, was not a pessimist. 
Subjectivities are not only interpellated by ideological state apparatuses as in 
Althusser’s determinist tale.222 Within the common sense of the subaltern there is 
a ‚healthy nucleus‛223 of good sense or ‚<a form of practical activity or will in which 
the philosophy is contained as an implicit theoretical ‘premiss’.‛224 For Gramsci, good 
sense is the seed of a philosophy of praxis. The philosophy of praxis is an 
immanent critique of good sense:  
<it is consciousness full of contradictions, in which the philosopher himself, 
understood both individually and as an entire social group, not only grasps the 
contradictions, but posits himself as an element of the contradiction and elevates 
this element to a principle of knowledge and therefore of action.225  
It has to be a complete and thorough criticism of common sense, while, at the 
same moment, it has to connect with the existing forms of spontaneous 
philosophy ‚<in order to demonstrate that ‘everyone’ is a philosopher and that it is not 
a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone’s 
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individual life, but of renovating and making ‘critical’ an already existing activity.‛226 
Just as Vygotsky’s ‚true‛ concept is scientific thought grounded in social, 
everyday practice, the philosophy of praxis is the ‚true‛ coherent conception of a 
class of the world and of itself, rooted in its own forms of activity as a social 
Subject. True proletarian consciousness grasps its social being in its concreteness: 
as a movement with many determinations from the perspective of the working 
class: ‚The knowledge of mediations, that is those real forms of mediation, through which 
the immediate forms of appearance of society are produced, presupposes a practical-
critical, a dialectical-critical standpoint vis-à-vis social actuality: the practical-critical 
standpoint of the revolutionary proletariat.‛227 
 The creation of a philosophy of praxis requires the formation of organic 
intellectuals and a dialectical pedagogy between masses and intellectuals to 
secure the organic and democratic exchange between the everyday and scientific 
consciousness of the class. For the proletariat, the development of a philosophy of 
praxis provides the practical-critical instrument to sublate the division of labor: 
the subsumption of society’s historically differentiated and separated self-
consciousness back into humanity. It is an integral aspect of the hegemonic 
struggle and the formation of a proletarian hegemony. 
 For Gramsci, Marxists have to ‚discover‛ the reality of their emancipatory 
theories in the class activity of the workers, and, conversely, workers have to be 
able to recognize their own Subjectness in the systematic philosophies of the Left. 
For example, in her study of processes of collective learning in a South-African 
trade union, Linda Cooper elucidated how an embryonic philosophy of praxis 
developed in the activity-system of a strike: 
Although much knowledge drawn on in the strike was action-oriented, practical 
and deeply contextualized, at the same time it was also abstract, theoretical and 
general. During the strike, the ‘languaged’ discourse of union workshops and 
meetings gave way to the more universal ‘language of the body’, a form which was 
concrete as well as very abstract, specific to immediate context as well as highly 
generalized. For example, the messages conveyed by the slogans on placards during 
the march were deeply contextualized in the experiences of the strikes, but also 
operated at a high level of generality and abstraction, making links between the 
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state’s economic policies, the emergence of a new, black elite, poverty and ‘class 
war’.228 
As I argue in the next chapter, it is exactly the immanent dynamic of the Strike 
activity that creates the possibility of a development of workers into a social 
Subject, and of good sense into a philosophy of praxis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Proletarian Sociogenesis 
The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making. 
E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1963: 8) 
Workers and Class 
Class Happens 
The historical process of capital accumulation and proletarianization on a world 
scale has created forms of wage labor and exploitation that constructed the 
modern working class as a passive Object of history. Persons who can freely 
dispose of their labor power, but who do not possess their own (sufficient) means 
of production are forced into the activity-system of modern wage labor.229 Their 
activity of wage labor is born out of necessity, and oriented towards the goal of 
reproducing their natural and social life. By providing the tools for the actions 
that encompass the labor process, the capitalist – whose goal is profit realization – 
organizes, disciplines, and mediates the activity of the workers. Conversely, for 
him, workers are a means that mediate his activity of capital accumulation. The 
State also intervenes in the activity through forms of institutionalized coercion 
and consent. Through his domination and commodification of the activity of 
labor, the capitalist prevents workers from appropriating their labor as their own 
activity and immanent Project. 
 Robert Cox claimed that: ‚<if the production process creates the potentiality for 
classes, it does not make classes.‛230 From an ‚immanent‛ point of view, this means 
that the formal and real subsumption of labor under capital231 is in itself not the 
basis of working class formation, because it does not offer workers the means to 
develop themselves as a social Subject; on the contrary, capitalist wage labor is 
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the objective predicament of exploitation and alienation – the social situation of 
development in which the activity of struggle of the workers unfolds. The 
subjective mirror of this condition is the being-in-itself of the working class, its 
social and ideological fragmentation and dissolution – what Gramsci called the 
economic-corporate condition of a class. As Georg Lukács232 argued, the workers’ 
subaltern position within the relations of production is not automatically and 
mysteriously ‚reflected‛ in consciousness as a proletarian Subjectness. The logical 
and real starting point of the working class as a developing Subject is not the 
activity of capitalist wage labor, but the concrete class struggle over the buying 
and selling of labor power. This was also Marx’s brief conception of class in the 
Poverty of Philosophy: 
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country 
into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common 
situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, 
but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, 
this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself.233  
The Marxist historian E.P. Thompson agreed with such an ‚emergentist theory of 
class struggle‛234:  
Class happens when some men, as a result of common experience (inherited or 
shared) feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and 
as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) 
theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations in 
which men are born – or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is the way in 
which those experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, 
value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms.235 
People find themselves in a society structured in determined ways (crucially, but 
not exclusively, in productive relations), they experience exploitation (or the need 
to maintain power over those whom they exploit), they identify points of 
antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues and in the 
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process of struggling they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this 
discovery as class-consciousness.236 
This echoes Marx’s ‚negative‛ class description of the small peasantry in The 
Eighteenth Brumaire: 
Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that 
separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other 
classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. 
Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding 
peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond 
and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class.237 
Class does not simply ‚exist‛, but it ‚happens‛: it comes into being; it is a 
movement from  a ‚mode of life‛ through struggle and ‚inherited or shared 
common experience‛ to a self-consciousness.238 The working class can be equally 
conceived as a system of activity, a social Subject, a movement, and a 
collaborative Project. All these conceptions are ‚true‛, in the sense that they 
highlight a different determination of the subject matter: coherence; agency; 
development; and immanence. Moreover, they all accentuate that, without 
collaborative struggle, there is no coherent working class, only an amorphous 
collection of wage laborers. Mario Tronti stressed that:  
We begin with struggle< It is not that before the mass labor struggle there was no 
working class. There was a different working class, in a lower level of development, 
with undoubtedly a lower degree of intensity of its internal composition, and with 
a shallower and less complex network of possible organization< As we have 
already indicated, we go from the struggle to the class: from the mass struggle to 
the massification of the class...239 
The shared experience, the community, and the joint activity of wage laborers do 
not themselves constitute a working class, but they are the foundations or 
promise of class formation. It is the potential generalization and organization of 
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this shared experience, struggle and activity, and the identification of interests 
that forms the real base of the working class as a concrete universal. 
Mission or Project? 
Zachary Lockman observed that: ‚Workers and working classes have< been made to 
play a set role within a narrative of historical process whereby capitalist development 
produces a growing and ever more conscious working class, which is ultimately destined 
to achieve the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a postcapitalist social 
order.‛240 Teleological accounts of the formation of the working class assumed that 
wage laborers automatically and mechanically developed class consciousness 
because of a certain ‚historic mission‛.  
 While I agree with the sentiment of the anti-teleological critique, there is a 
danger of mixing up the notion of ‚teleology‛ with ‚immanence‛. A teleological 
method perceives the development of a process from the perspective of its 
supposed end point, while an immanent method develops (or speculates) the 
potential end point(s) of a process from its actuality. This is what Marx meant 
when he said that: ‚Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the 
real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this 
movement result from the premises now in existence.‛ 241  And, in the Communist 
Manifesto: 
The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or 
principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be 
universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations 
springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on 
under our very eyes.242 
The debate about the ‚truth‛ of the imagination of workers as a potential, 
universal class is not something that can be resolved ‚objectively‛ by the 
researcher acting as Laplace’s demon, because this intellectual discussion is itself 
historically entwined with the development of workers as a social actor. Gramsci 
mused that: ‚It might seem that there can exist an extra-historical and extra-human 
objectivity. But who is the judge of such objectivity? Who is able to put himself in this 
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kind of ‘standpoint of the cosmos in itself’ and what could such a standpoint mean?‛243 
Philosophers and social scientists have been discussing the nature of the workers’ 
class consciousness and their capacity to act collectively for the last two centuries, 
because something real and salient was happening that interpellated their 
intellectual activity. Conversely, workers have been able to develop forms of 
consciousness exactly because of theories that were organically connected to their 
struggles.244 Donald Sassoon explained that: ‚Class consciousness was constructed by 
political activists< *but+ For the activists to be successful, they must build on real 
foundations, not on thin air. The appeal must be recognized and interiorized.‛245  
 Evidently an immanent methodology contains an ethico-political dimension as 
the social scientist chooses which ‚imaginations‛ are to be explored as lines of 
development. But this proleptic quality is appropriate for a practical-critical 
activity that does not see itself as external to its object of research, but chooses to 
be in collaboration with its development. 
The Object of Study 
With regard to the study of the Egyptian working class, Joel Beinin engaged in 
self-criticism, claiming that in past writings246 he ‚<tended to homogenize and reify 
the working class as a historical subject and regard only those who engaged in collective 
struggle as real workers, despite our presentation of evidence that the historical experience 
of workers was diverse<‛ 247  Beinin also posited that his focus on interviewing 
worker and leftist leaders ‚<led me even further away from understanding the 
experience, consciousness, and structural position of those workers who were not engaged 
in economic or political struggles in an organized framework over a protracted period of 
time.‛248 Beinin’s mea culpa reflected a ‚revisionist‛ trend within the study of 
working classes, which, since the 1970s, began to shift the object of research from 
workers on the factory floor (the sphere of production) to their lives and 
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Subjectivities outside the workplace (the realm of reproduction).249 Workers were 
discovered as participants in wider Subjects such as the household, community, 
gender, cultural group, ‚ethnicity‛, religion, et cetera. Attention was diverted 
away from grand actions such as mass strikes and demonstrations, and 
reoriented towards ‚everyday‛, ‚invisible‛, or ‚molecular‛ forms of resistance. 
 I concur with some of the ‚revisionist‛ criticisms, but with the qualification 
that, if one analyzes class formation, the object of research must remain< class 
formation! Bayat argued that if ‚<class is perceived only in terms of an identity 
resting on a set of differentiations, then ‚class‛ can easily be confused with and subsumed 
into other forms of identity, such as gender, nation, ethnicity, and so on.‛ 250  For 
example, women play an important role in the formation of a workers’ 
movement, but when investigating class, the object of study is women as workers 
and not workers as women.251 Likewise, studying workers without studying their 
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251  Koptiuch for example lamented that: ‚<the dominant labor history narrative is decidedly 
masculinist in that it privileges< explosive, virile forms of struggle (strikes, organized political parties) 
over ‚feminine‛ subtler forms of resistance embedded in the practices of everyday life.‛ (Koptiuch 1996: 
64) I am very skeptical towards such a distinction between ‚masculine‛ and ‚feminine‛ forms of 
struggle. Without engaging in a profound debate about this dichotomous gender approach, I 
suggest it may be more productive to see an activity such as a strike as something which can 
‚genderized‛ rather than it having a fixed gender character – e.g., as a system of activity, a strike 
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collective struggles from which they emerge as a social Subject, can produce 
valuable insights about workers as Objects of capitalism, as members of their 
community, as religious believers, et cetera, but it is not an analysis of class 
formation. Indeed, ‚worker‛ is but one Subjectivity within a modern wage 
laborer’s composite person. Any person is a microcosm of Subjectivities. Yet, even 
though the researcher of class formation should pay attention to these other 
Subjectivities and how they interact with a person’s Subjectivity as a worker, his 
object of study remains the development of worker Subjectness. 
 Although it is incorrect to project an external ‚essence‛ onto a developing 
Subject, it is equally erroneous to ignore the coherent identities that are 
immanently projected from a system of class activity: ‚<we must remember that in 
specific conjectures people< often do define themselves in terms of some essence< and 
act collectively as relatively coherent historical subjects.‛252 With regard to class as a 
contemporary Subjectivity, Sam Moore argued that: ‚There is no clear evidence that 
work has been marginalised as a source of identification and collectivity. Social identities 
are materially rooted in changing capitalist relations of production, as manifested in the 
workplace<‛253 Let us then conclude with Zachary Lockman that: ‚With all this in 
mind, I would suggest that to the question of whether Middle Eastern working classes 
constitute coherent historical subjects and legitimate objects of inquiry we can respond 
with a properly nuanced and contingent ‘yes’.‛254 
The Strike 
Returning to Andy Blunden’s conception of ‚unit of analysis‛, in order to make 
sense of the Gestalt that is the working class at a certain point in its trajectory the 
researcher has to arrive at its simplest determination, from which the movement 
of the subject matter can be constructed in thought and reality. What is the cell-
form of the worker Subject that possesses in embryonic form its fully developed 
telos or immanent Project of self-emancipation and self-determination? Rick 
Fantasia claimed that: ‚...the two kinds of social ‘action’ most relevant to the problem of 
class formation have tended to be (a) ‘strategic encounters’ between classes, or strategic 
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industrial conflicts or collective actions that occur outside of the normal round of 
everyday life; and (b) processes of ‘organizational mobilization (and demobilization).’‛255 
These activities elucidate the concept of ‚class struggle‛, containing the various 
explicit and implicit fights between workers and their adversaries. However, 
‚class struggle‛ is rather the Substance of a science of the workers’ movement than 
its Concept. It is too broad and too vague a notion to serve as the starting point of 
analysis.  
 I propose the Strike as a unit of analysis of/for the development of the workers’ 
movement.256 The Strike is not only an abstract concept, it ‚<is itself an existent 
phenomenon...‛257 Strikes are observable things. They can be joined, supported 
and repressed. People may have an opinion about the Strike as a form of struggle 
in general and about a particular strike. As a concept, the Strike ‚<is the 
conception of a singular, indivisible thing< typically a particular genus of some 
universal<‛258 A work-stoppage is a particular form of protest appropriate to the 
social situation of wage labor. Workers may wear a silly hat on the floor to protest 
labor conditions, but in itself this activity of resistance, regardless of its success, 
does not practically confront their predicament as wage laborers. As a system of 
activity a strike ‚<exhibits the essential properties of a class of more developed 
phenomena‛.259 Through the developmental logic of the Strike the proletarian 
Subject objectifies itself externally in work-stoppages, factory occupations, 
demonstrations, pamphlets, and slogans, but also interiorizes these mediations 
‚back into itself‛ via the formation of institutions, aims and demands, and 
articulations of class consciousness. Lukács remarked that: ‚The organisational 
forms of the proletariat< are real forms of mediation, in which and through which 
develops and is developed the consciousness that corresponds to the social being of the 
proletariat.‛260 Trade unionism, workers’ control, and workers’ democracy are but 
developed forms of the dynamics present in any strike: ‚In this struggle – a 
veritable civil war – all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop.‛261 
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 Linda Cooper remarked that workplaces function as a microcosm of capitalist 
relations. 262  Even though each instance of the Strike is a very particular 
phenomenon, tied to discrete workplaces, the relations of exploitation and 
domination within the workplace are also concrete expressions of the universal 
logic of capital accumulation. The Strike then acts as a very practical, immanent 
critique of capitalist relations that has the ability to overcome the workers’ 
fragmented existence and ‚totalize‛263 them into a social Subject.  
 In summary, the Strike is the unit of analysis of the workers’ movement, which 
practically and conceptually unfolds the concrete determinations of capitalist 
exploitation present within the microcosm of the workplace. 
Emancipation 
The Economic-Corporate Condition 
The social situation of development (SSoD) of the workers’ movement is both 
objective and subjective. Whereas capitalist exploitation, domination and 
alienation constitute objective predicaments for the reproduction and 
development of workers as human beings, Gramsci explained that the working 
class also faces the subjective predicament of its economic-corporate condition. 
The workers’ movement historically and logically started from: 
<the economic-corporate level: a tradesman feels obliged to stand by another 
tradesman, a manufacturer264 by another manufacturer, etc., but the tradesman 
does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the members of 
the professional group are conscious of its unity and homogeneity, and of the need 
to organize it, but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so.265  
 
The economic-corporate moment constitutes a predicament for the developing 
working class, as it fragmentizes the workforce in different workplaces and 
atomizes proletarian forms of activity and consciousness, enabling the capitalist 
class to exploit and dominate the workers, and to embed them in its own political 
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project. 266  Within the economic-corporate SSoD the Strike is extremely 
particularist and remains underdeveloped. Solidarity only occurs within the 
workplace itself and between workers who share the same, direct interests. 
Wildcat strikes, luddite actions, and ‚spontaneity‛ are the basic forms of 
mediation between the worker Subject and its antagonists: factory management 
and the capitalist State.267  
 However, throughout particular struggles to overcome their SSoD workers 
establish their own neoformations, which, in turn, initiate a process of unification 
and transformation of the different spatio-temporal proletarian activity-systems. 
The Strike becomes universalized through solidarity between different sections of 
the working class. The activity-system of a particular company expands to the 
sector, or even the economy at large. Workers recognize their own interests and 
volition in the actions and demands of their comrades. They gain a concept of 
their Strike activity and of themselves as a social Subject.  
 As I discussed before, Vygotsky observed that for each stage of development, 
one neoformation plays a central part in developing the entire mental structure. 
The maturation of this specific psychological function (e.g. memory) pushes 
forward the development of the whole mental structure, and opens up a new 
SSoD. After this phase, another neoformation takes over the leading 
developmental role (e.g. calculus).268 Gramsci would point out that the leading 
neoformation of the economic-corporate SSoD is the development of organic 
trade unionism.269 Trade unionism organizes the workers for the first time as a 
class, and opens up a new developmental phase: ‚<that in which consciousness is 
reached of the solidarity of interests among all the members of a social class – but still in 
the purely economic field.‛270At this point, the working class is developing itself as a 
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national trade unionist force, both in the domain of organization and 
consciousness. Sam Moore remarked that: ‚<the fundamentally conflictual relations 
between capital and labour within the workplace provide the social basis for an opposition 
impulse. What is important is the role of the union in translating such impulses into 
collective activity and a trade union consciousness.‛271 
 As both Gramsci and Luxemburg emphasized, the trade union is a structure 
that defends the workers’ interests within the framework of capitalism, and not a 
transitional form to socialism.272 The trade union’s division of the working class 
by industrial branch and economic sector reflects capitalism’s organization of 
society.273 In fact, at a certain point in the trajectory of the developing worker 
Subject, trade unions become themselves obstacles that have to be overcome.274 
For example, with regard to the trade unions that emerged after the 25 January 
Revolution, Hossam al-Hamalawy observed that: ‚Unions, at the end of the day, are 
built to ‘improve’ the conditions of exploitation, not ‘abolish’ exploitation once and for all 
– here is the task of the political party.‛275  
 As a budding social Subject the trade union movement demands political 
recognition from the capitalist State: ‚Already at this juncture the problem of the State 
is posed – but only in terms of winning politico-juridical equality with the ruling groups: 
the right is claimed to participate in legislation and administration, even to reform these – 
but within the existing fundamental structures.‛276 In other words, the working class 
seeks political emancipation for itself. 
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Political Emancipation 
While it tries to impose itself on civil and political society through its trade 
unionist forms of organization and consciousness, the working class recognizes 
itself only as a political Subject through mediation of the bourgeois State. In The 
Jewish Question, Marx explained the incompleteness of the project of political 
emancipation as opposed to human emancipation.277 The emancipation of Western 
society from feudalism was a political, but not a human emancipation. It 
eliminated the political character of civil society and abolished the particularist 
nature of politics, by separating the sphere of civil society from political society, 
and Man as a private individual with particular interests from Man as a citizen of 
the universal community.278 The abolishment of distinctions between humans on 
the basis of ‚<birth, rank, education, and occupation<‛279 only took place in the 
political sphere – in fact, the necessity of their legal eradication acknowledged 
their continued existence in the civil sphere: ‚Far from abolishing these factual 
distinctions, the state presupposes them in order to exist, it only experiences itself as a 
political state and asserts its universality in opposition to these elements.‛280 
 Gramsci developed Marx’s concept of bourgeois society. He called the 
contradictory totality of a historically matured differentiation of civil and political 
society the integral State. Instead of mere ‚armed bodies of men‛ the bourgeois 
State represented a balance between coercion and consent, political and civil 
society. Against reifying conceptions of the State, he posited the integral State as: 
‚<a form of social relations within which methodological distinctions can be made 
between the ensemble of ‘private’ organisms in civil society and that of the state or 
‘political’ society.‛281 
 Marx argued that political emancipation, i.e. the realization of politico-juridical 
equality between members of society within the State, was ‚<certainly a big step 
forward<‛ even though it was not ‚<the last form of general human 
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emancipation<‛282 Even ‚human rights‛, as opposed to civil rights, which seemed 
to supersede the distinction between civil and political society, were still 
dependent on the political community to be enacted.283 How then could real, 
human emancipation be accomplished? Marx answered:  
Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as 
an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual 
work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and 
organized his forces propres as social forces so that social force is no longer 
separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human 
emancipation be completed.284 
What does this mean? Firstly, a private individual should ‚resume the abstract 
citizen into himself‛ and ‚become a species-being‛. Individuals should become 
political beings in their everyday civil life as integral parts of a politicized 
activity-system. Secondly, an individual should recognize his own forces as 
socially constituted forces and acknowledge his participation in a social Subject 
with the capacity to act politically. 
 In the past, the political emancipation of a particular class or part of civil 
society had resulted in its universal domination over society. The bourgeoisie had 
emancipated the whole feudal formation, but from its particular perspective as a 
bourgeois class. Its particular condition – for example as a possessor of wealth but 
not of noble birth or privilege – was raised as the universal measure for all 
classes. Nevertheless, in its era of ascent, the bourgeoisie was able to present itself 
as a progressive force, which advanced the common good of all society. 
No class of civil society can play this role without awakening a moment of 
enthusiasm in itself and in the masses; a moment in which this class fraternizes 
and fuses with society in general, becomes identified with it and is experienced and 
acknowledged as its universal representative; a moment in which its claims and 
rights are truly the rights and claims of society itself and in which it is in reality 
the heart and head of society. Only in the name of the universal rights of society 
can a particular class lay claim to universal domination. 
If the revolution of a people and the emancipation of a particular class of 
civil society are to coincide, if one class is to stand for the whole of society, then all 
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the deficiencies of society must be concentrated in another class, one particular 
class must be the class which gives universal offence, the embodiment of a general 
limitation; one particular sphere of society must appear as the notorious crime of 
the whole of society, so that the liberation of this sphere appears as universal self-
liberation.285 
Marx’s analysis anticipated Gramsci’s concept of hegemony,286 the capacity of a 
class to lead other factions of civil society and to represent its domination as the 
general good. However, if the political emancipation of any group of civil society 
systematically leads to its particularist domination under a universalist guise, is 
real, universal, human emancipation possible? And if so, why did Marx hail the 
proletariat as the ‚chosen‛ actor to accomplish this feat?  
Human Emancipation 
In the Ancien Régime, the bourgeoisie emerged as the class most capable of 
defeating the universal dominance of the aristocracy, and the need for its own 
emancipation coincided with that of society at large. In a social formation where 
classes no longer act as political idealists – i.e. where no class is able to offer an 
ethico-political dimension to its project – the solution lies: 
In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not 
a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere which 
has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to 
no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but 
wrong in general; a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a 
historical title, but merely to a human one< and finally a sphere which cannot 
emancipate itself without emancipating itself from – and thereby emancipating – 
all other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and 
which can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of 
humanity. This dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat.287  
For all Marx’s criticisms of Hegel’s mystifications, his early concept of the 
proletariat as emancipator in the epoch288  of bourgeois society appears to be 
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expressed in rather schematic and abstract terms. Through his engagement with 
the historical analysis of real classes, for example in The Eighteenth Brumaire or 
the Civil War in France, he rendered this notion more concrete.289 
 In the capitalist mode of production the class of wage laborers holds a unique 
position. On the one hand, in capitalism, labor power is treated as a commodity, 
as an object, as a means to produce surplus-value and realize profits on the 
market. The whole edifice of bourgeois society is based on the exploitation and 
commodification of labor power. Lukács290 famously argued that the dominance 
of the commodity relation in the economic domain led to a tendency of 
‚reification‛ of all social relations and forms in capitalist society. On the other 
hand, labor power is inseparable from its human bodies. ‚Of all the instruments of 
production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself,‛ 291  Marx 
commented. The process itself of the development of bodies of labor power, i.e. 
wage laborers, into an autonomous, self-directing and self-governing social 
Subject negates not only the subjugation of workers to capitalists and processes of 
commodification, but overthrows the whole system of ‚wage slavery‛. Alex 
Callinicos commented that: 
Wage-labour is demanding more and more from people, whether they are 
privileged software designers or ultra-exploited migrant workers. If anything, the 
relationship between capital and wage-labour is becoming more pervasive 
economically and socially than it was in the past. Consequently the power that 
workers gain because capital depends on their exploitation remains of central 
strategic significance to anyone who wants to change the world.292 
The human emancipation of wage laborers necessitates the abolition of the selling 
and buying of labor power: of wage labor tout court. As wage labor constitutes the 
kernel of the capitalist mode of production and surplus-extraction, proletarian 
emancipation abolishes capitalism. 293  In this sense, the particular position and 
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bearer of real transformations. (Gramsci in Thomas 2009: 153) 
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suffering of the working class is the germ of the universal liberation of humanity 
from reification. 
 However, this is a logical and speculative argument – nonetheless derived 
from the real, historical movement of capital accumulation and proletarianization 
– which imagines the differentiation of pure bourgeois society in two classes: the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In actuality, both the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat find themselves in the company of other – pre-capitalist and ‚modern‛ 
– social forms and their Subjectivities. Feudal lords start producing for the world 
market; through a mobilization of the state apparatus Ancien Régime actors 
transform their social formation without class intervention of the bourgeoisie; a 
transnational corporate elite challenges the nationally organized capitalist 
fractions; et cetera. Conversely, wage laborers are confronted with other subaltern 
actors in the ‚economic sphere‛, such as peasants, slum dwellers, impoverished 
‚middle classes‛ and the petty bourgeoisie; in the ‚gender sphere‛, such as 
women and LGTB movements; in the sphere of the national and ‚racial‛ 
question, such as black and national liberation movements; and in the cultural 
sphere, such as repressed communities. In his contemporary study of trade union 
Subjectivities Sam Moore claimed that: ‚<in arguing for a reassertation of theories of 
class consciousness< such  theories must be able to capture the expression of interests 
generated not only by race, gender and class, but also by sexuality, disability, ethnicity 
and age, all, to varying degrees, central to the continual restructuring of capitalism.‛294 
Even though it could be said that these other subaltern Subjectivities are 
secondary forms – because, under pressure of the universal processes of 
reification and exploitation within the framework of global capitalism,295 they 
cannot but refract class positions in their many colored rays 296  – for an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
million ‚members‛ of the modern working class. Whereas in European countries the number of 
‚traditional‛ industrial workers decreased, in the USA – often labeled the ‚motor‛ of the world 
economy – their number increased from 26 million in 1971 to 31 million in 1998. Regardless, a 
wage laborer does not have to produce commodities in order to be indispensable for production, 
profit, and the whole process of capital accumulation. (Harman 2002) 
294 Moore 2011: 9. 
295 See Morton 2007: 172. 
296 ‚The life histories of activists suggest that an emergent consciousness of changing class relations has not 
necessarily been superseded by identities based upon other social categories, yet they are inextricably bound 
and refracted through these categories. In this Marxist theories of consciousness have not been eclipsed by 
post-modernist notions of identity and remain relevant to any understanding of activism and essential as a 
basis for change<‛ (Moore 2011: 171) 
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emancipatory strategy of the working class this argument is irrelevant, as their 
existence as particular subalterns in capitalism is real and salient.  
 In other words, the emancipatory project and development of the working 
class cannot be but a collaboration between subaltern actors. Although Lenin 
advanced the notion of the alliance between workers and the peasantry in the 
context of the Russian Revolution, and Trotsky of the united front in the post-
revolutionary era, the concept of subaltern collaboration was most concretely 
developed by Gramsci in the shape of the historic(al) bloc, which grasps the 
collaborative Project of two or more classes in all of its economic, political, and 
cultural determinations. 
The Modern Prince 
Adam D. Morton lucidly explained that Gramsci’s concept of historical bloc 
entails two dimensions. Firstly, it points to a certain ‚vertical‛ coherent ensemble, 
a Gestalt of infrastructural and superstructural elements. The historical bloc 
represents the ‚<necessary reciprocity’ between the social relations of production and 
ideas within the realm of state-civil society relations<‛297 For example, ‚Fordism‛ 
could be conceived of as a historical bloc as it expressed a capitalist accumulation 
strategy,298 the totality of economic relations in the workplace and its ideological, 
legal and political expressions. 
 Secondly, the concept of historical bloc represented a ‚horizontal‛ process of 
forging a collaborative activity-system or Project between classes: ‚<various 
social-class forces with competing and heterogeneous interests had to be fused to bring 
about at least some kind of unity in aims and beliefs. A historical bloc therefore indicates 
the integration of a variety of different class interests and forms of identity within a 
‘national-popular’ alliance.‛299 The formation of a historical bloc, is not an optional 
branch in the development of the worker Subject, but a necessary moment 
wherein: ‚<one becomes aware that one’s own corporate interests, in their present and 
future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can 
and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too.‛300  
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 Gramsci conceptualized the ‚mode of collaboration‛ between classes in a 
historical bloc as relations of hegemony. Class alliances do not construct an 
amorphous ‚multitude‛ of actors, but a coherent whole in which one social 
Subject plays a directive role.301 The Italian Marxist expanded Lenin’s concept of 
hegemony, which had defined the relation between the proletariat and the 
peasantry in their collaborative Project against Czarism as one where workers, 
because of their capacities as a social Subject, played a directive role.302 Whereas 
for Lenin the notion of hegemony served as a category in the analysis of 
proletarian strategy, for Gramsci it became a key concept in the theory of the 
State. 
 As discussed above, the development of modern, bourgeois society contained 
the differentiation of civil and political society – i.e. the constitution of the integral 
State – as the playfield of a historical bloc. Within civil and political society, the 
class rule of the bourgeoisie was based on both domination and hegemony. Whereas 
domination is ‚naked‛ and ‚top-down‛ class rule, whereby the ruled is the 
passive Object of the integral State, hegemony is the active acceptance of the 
bourgeoisie’s class leadership by other social groups because of its prestige, its 
directive capacities, its cultural aura, its ability to ‚manage‛ society and resolve 
societal problems, et cetera. Even though ‚domination‛ and ‚hegemony‛ stand in 
opposition to each other, rather than excluding each other these concepts are 
complementary. For the working class, domination is the objective and hegemony 
the subjective moment of its condition of subalternity in bourgeois society. 
Bourgeois law, for example, subjugates the subaltern Subjects as well as offering 
them a means to recognize their own Subjectivity in a colonizing way. For the 
bourgeoisie, hegemony is its capacity to present itself as a progressive and 
leading force in society and to represent its own particular interests as the general 
good. The actors who organize the hegemony of a class are its organic 
intellectuals and fellow travelers.303  
 Hegemony is secured through the development of a hegemonic apparatus: 
‚<the wide-ranging series of articulated institutions (understood in the broadest sense) 
and practices – from newspapers to educational organizations to political parties – by 
means of which a class and its allies engage their opponents in a struggle for political 
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power.‛304 This hegemonic apparatus is the material glue which keeps a historical 
bloc together. 
 As a concept, hegemony can be applied both to bourgeois and proletarian class 
rule, but, even though the nature of their leadership shares the same form, their 
content differs qualitatively. Just as in the case of the bourgeoisie, the self-
emancipation of the working class does not only require the realization of its 
domination over the previously ruling classes by a conquest of political society – 
i.e. the classic notion of the ‚dictatorship of the proletariat‛ or the Trotskyite 
concept of ‚workers’ democracy‛ – but also the formation of a subaltern 
‚counter-bloc‛305 and its hegemony in civil and political society:  
The metal worker, the carpenter, the builder, etc., must not only think as 
proletarians and no longer as metal worker, carpenter, builder, etc., but they have 
to take one more step forward: they have to think like workers who are members of 
a class that aims to lead the peasants and intellectuals. They have to think like a 
class which can win and build socialism only if it is helped and followed by the 
large majority of these social strata. If this is not achieved, the proletariat does not 
become the leading class<306  
Yet, whereas bourgeois hegemony is exercised ‚from above‛ through 
technocratic and bureaucratic methods and ‚coercive consent‛, proletarian 
hegemony should be based on a dialectical pedagogy ‚from below‛: a continuous 
organic exchange between intellectuals and the masses; between revolutionary 
theory and good sense; and between workers and their subaltern allies.307 For 
Gramsci, the archetype of this dialectical pedagogy had been the praxis of the 
Factory Councils during the biennio rosso – the two years of intense class struggle 
in Italy after the First World War. Against the top-down bureaucratism of the 
trade unions, the intellectuals around L’Ordine Nuovo developed a concept of 
grassroots and democratic worker participation, which emerged organically from 
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their solidary assistance to the ‚spontaneous‛ Factory Councils. The dissipation 
of the revolutionary movement in Italy, on the one hand, and the Stalinist 
Thermidor308  on the other, convinced Gramsci that the immanent democratic 
dynamic of the workers’ movement needed a directive center in order to be 
successful, and, conversely, that this directive center needed a continuous organic 
connection to the worker activity-system.309  
 With a nod to Machiavelli, Gramsci called this reciprocal relation between 
proletarian authority and democracy, organization and spontaneity, the Modern 
Prince: ‚<the fusion of a new type of political party and oppositional culture that would 
gather together intellectuals (organizers) and the masses in a new political and 
intellectual practice<‛ 310  The Modern Prince is much more than the 
institutionalization and concentration of the workers’ movement in a 
‚parliamentary‛ party or ‚vanguard‛ organization. It is the formation of a 
directive ‚collective intellectual‛, a hegemonic apparatus, a critical and 
emancipatory practice, and a system of activity, governed by a dialectic 
pedagogy. In this sense, proletarian hegemony offers its subaltern allies rather a 
means of emancipatory mediation than traditional class rule. If ‚trade unionism‛ 
is the Gestalt of neoformations that liberate the workers’ movement from its 
economic-corporate condition, the constitution of the Modern Prince in turn 
overcomes the objective and subjective predicament of the trade unionist SSoD. 
Gramsci called this human emancipation a ‚catharsis‛:  
<the passage from the purely economic (or egoistic-passional) to the ethico-
political moment< Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, 
assimilates him to itself and makes him passive; and is transformed into a means of 
freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new 
initiatives.311 
  
                                                          
308 Thermidor was the eleventh month of the revolutionary French calendar. As Robespierre was 
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Lines of Development 
Movement and Position 
Gramsci did not conceive of his conceptual development of the worker Subject as 
a straightforward, linear, and historical ‚scheme‛:  
In real history these moments imply each other reciprocally – horizontally and 
vertically, so to speak – i.e. according to socio-economic activity (horizontally) and 
to country (vertically), combining and diverging in various ways< international 
relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, 
unique and historically concrete combinations.312  
Furthermore, the tempo and form of the class struggle may vary depending on 
the SSoD in which the nascent proletariat finds itself. Gramsci distinguished 
between ‚war of position‛, ‚war of maneuver‛ and ‚underground warfare‛.313 
Depending on the strength of bourgeois hegemony and the coherence of the 
integral State the battle for proletarian hegemony takes on different shapes. 
Gramsci observed that: 
<in the case of the most advanced States< ‘civil society’ has become a very 
complex structure and one which is resistant to the catastrophic ‘incursions’ of the 
immediate economic element (crises, depressions, etc.)< 314 
The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State [=political society] 
organizations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the 
art of politics as it were the ‚trenches‛ and the permanent fortifications of the front 
in the war of position: they render merely ‚partial‛ the element of movement 
which before use to be ‚the whole‛ of war, etc.315  
This was a slight, yet critical, nod of appreciation towards the ‚reformist‛ 
strategy of Western European socialist parties such as the SPD, and its ‚battle of 
democracy‛. Conversely, Gramsci argued that in countries where the integral 
State – i.e. the totality of civil and political society – is less coherent, both in its 
ideal and material objectifications, and the State apparatus appears to be 
‚everything‛ – such as in Russia at the eve of the 1917 Revolution,316 or in the 
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colonial nations317 – a war of movement or ‚frontal attack‛ on State power is both 
possible and necessary. In nations where the integral State is fully matured, it is 
much more difficult to conquer State power in one ‚moment‛ of mobilization. 
Still, even in developed bourgeois formations the art of politics requires a critical 
and creative appreciation of the ‚moment‛, as Luk{cs explained: 
What is a ‘moment’? A situation whose duration may be longer of shorter, but 
which is distinguished from the process that leads up to it in that it forces together 
the essential tendencies of that process, and demands that a decision be taken over 
the future direction of the process. That is to say the tendencies reach a sort of 
zenith, and depending on how the situation concerned is handled, the process takes 
on a different direction after the ‘moment’. Development does not occur, then, as a 
continuous intensification, in which development is favourable to the proletariat, 
and the day after tomorrow the situation must be even more favourable than it is 
tomorrow, and so on. It means rather that at a particular point, the situation 
demands that a decision be taken and the day after tomorrow might be too late to 
make that decision.318 
There is a parallel between Vygotsky’s understanding of the impact of the SSoD 
on the tempo and form of ontogenesis and Gramsci’s and Luk{cs’s appreciation 
of the rhythm of proletarian sociogenesis. According to Vygotsky, during ‚stable‛ 
periods of development, the capacities of the Subject gradually mature, slowly 
opening up a new SSoD. However, situations of ontogenetic ‚crisis‛ signify a 
rupture with the existing social condition, calling into being ‚transitional 
neoformations‛, and abruptly creating a new SSoD.319 Transferring this insight to 
the process of sociogenesis, it becomes clear that the gradual development of the 
workers’ movement – characterized by the leading neoformations of trade 
unions, cooperatives, electoral parties, et cetera, which flowed from the 
maturation of the Strike – was alternated by moments of revolutionary crisis, in 
which the line of development became the ‚Mass Strike‛, and in which 
neoformations such as workers’ councils and committees took on a central role. 
Revolution and the Mass Strike 
In her 1906 booklet ‚The Mass Strike‛, Rosa Luxemburg explained the 
developmental logic of the mass strike within the context of revolution. 
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Luxemburg argued that a revolution was a process, rather than an event, dictated 
by the ebb and flow of mass political and economic protests. The clash with the 
armed bodies of the State and the conquest of State power was ‚<in the revolution 
today only the culminating point, only a moment on the process of the proletarian mass 
struggle.‛320 Within this process of mass mobilization, the mass Strike is ‚...the 
method of motion of the proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the proletarian struggle 
in the revolution.‛321 The mass Strike is an expanded shape of the Strike, called into 
existence when the broad activity of the class struggle takes the form of a ‚war of 
movement‛: ‚Only in the sultry air of the period of revolution can any partial little 
conflict between labor and capital grow into a general explosion.‛322 Luxemburg also 
conceived of the mass Strike as an instructive process that stimulates: ‚<the 
intellectual, cultural growth of the proletariat, which proceeds by fits and starts, and 
which offers an inviolable guarantee of their further irresistible progress in the economic 
as in the political struggle.‛323 To this Mario Tronti added that: 
<the Massenstreik always ends up as an event for the movement not directly 
connected with the class. It takes on a class character only when the labor struggle 
assumes mass dimensions and the concrete Concept of laboring masses in struggle 
is born in real social relations rather than merely in the sacred texts of the ideology. 
Here the concept of mass is not in the quantitative accumulation of many 
individual units under the same condition of the so-called exploitation... Here it is 
a matter of a process of massification of the working class. It is a process of class 
growth of the workers and of internal homogenization of industrial labor power< 
There is no possible process of class other massification without first having 
reached a mass level of struggle. In words, there is no true class growth of the 
workers without mass labor struggle.324 
Luxemburg would have agreed with Gramsci that absolutist states such as czarist 
Russia were more prone to the ‚war of movement‛: in absolutist Russia: ‚<in 
which every form and expression of the labor movement is forbidden, in which the 
simplest strike is a political crime, it must logically follow that every economic struggle 
will become a political one.‛325 Even though the Mass Strike ‚<is rather the indication, 
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the rallying idea, of a whole period of the class struggle lasting for years, perhaps for 
decades,‛326 within this epoch there is no slow and gradual development of trade 
unionism and the Modern Prince. The Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 
prompted the creation of soviets – workers’ and soldiers’ councils – as sudden 
neoformations of the workers’ movement, which at once combined the ‚trade 
unionist‛ and ‚hegemonic‛ moments.327  The struggle is: 
...directed as much against the old state power as against capitalist exploitation, [in 
which] the mass strike appears as the natural means of recruiting the widest 
proletarian layers for the struggle, as well as being at the same time a means to 
undermining and overthrowing the old state power, and of stemming capitalist 
exploitation.328 
In a word: the economic struggle is the transmitter from one political 
center to another; the political struggle is the periodic fertilization of the 
soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change 
places…329 
Adam Hanieh implicitly acknowledged the validity of the mass Strike as a 
concept to understand the Egyptian workers’ ‚war of movement‛ vis-à-vis the 
Mubarak regime: 
These questions are neither solely ‘political’ nor ‘economic’ but revolve primarily 
around which class rules Egypt and in whose interest the Egyptian state 
functions.  The nature of Mubarak's rule cannot be separated from these questions, 
which is why the struggle against political despotism is inevitably intertwined 
with the dynamic of class struggle.330  
Further in the text, I argue that the neoliberal transformation of Egypt’s 
accumulation strategy in the 1990s led to a disintegration of hegemony and the 
existing historical bloc, setting the scene for a revolutionary period. The organic 
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crisis of the Egyptian system constituted a predicament for the workers, and the 
developing activity-system of mass strikes, anticipated by the Mahalla movement, 
and continuously expanding since the fall of Mubarak, was their attempt to 
‚solve‛ their problems by overcoming their economic-corporate condition. 
However, on the trajectory of the Strike, moving from the ‚economic‛ to the 
‚political‛ moment, workers do not only transform their SSoD, but also develop 
themselves as a social Subject.331 By organizing strikes, establishing committees, 
chanting slogans, creating songs, cartoons, and poems of revolt, et cetera, the 
workers’ movement acquires Subjectness: organizational coherence; a concept 
and theory of itself as a collective agent; and an immanent rationale and goal that 
are likely different from its original objectives (for example a defense of basic 
livelihoods). 
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Introduction 
The thing is: The way I see it, these days there's a war on, right? And, ages ago, there wasn't a war 
on, right? So, there must have been a moment when there not being a war on went away, right? and 
there being a war on came along. So, what I want to know is: How did we get from the one case of 
affairs to the other case of affairs?  
‚Baldrick‛ in Blackadder Goes Forth (1989) 
The Concept of Transition 
Gramsci explained that the study of the formation of subaltern classes in general, 
and the proletariat in particular, required two dimensions. Firstly, the 
transformations in the objective and subjective predicament of the working class 
‚in-itself‛ should be investigated, i.e. both the changing position of workers 
within the economic structure and the movement of their mentalities towards and 
consent to the rule of the capitalist classes. Secondly, the neoformations that 
emerge from the working class itself, should be studied in their capacity as 
movements towards self-determination.332  
 A concept of the development of the workers’ movement thus requires a 
concept of capitalism as a historical process. As a premise, we could probably 
agree upon the simple observation that ‚capitalism‛ hasn’t always been around, 
and that society, on a global scale, has been transformed in rapid and qualitative 
ways since, at least, the last two centuries.333 History is not a smooth and linear 
process, as Gramsci, who wrote about the particular case of the Italian 
Risorgimento,334 all too well understood. The asynchronous historical-geographical 
development of the capitalist mode of production and the world market poses the 
conceptual problem of how capitalism ‚came into being‛, and how, from that 
moment on, pre-capitalist societies and modes of production related to their 
capitalist counterparts and to the emerging world economy as a whole. The 
question of ‚how did we get from the one case of affairs to the other case of affairs‛ has 
spawned an expansive field of literature and debates, which I won’t review here. 
Instead, I discuss three broad approaches to an understanding of the concept of 
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capitalist transition within Marxist and heterodox thought: stage theory; 
dependency theory; and the theory of uneven and combined development.  
 In general, Marxists of the Second and Third International considered the 
nation state as the primary frame of economic analysis. As non-Western countries 
lacked the necessary material and social conditions for socialism, they first had to 
develop their forces of production. A slavish reading of Marx led to the belief that 
capitalism as an economic ‚stage‛ could not be skipped: ‚The country that is more 
developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future< 
One nation can and should learn from others< society< can neither leap over the 
natural phases of its development nor remove them by decree.‛ 335  Non-capitalist 
countries should experience a transition identical to the West, consisting of a 
national-democratic revolution that would destroy feudalism, establish a 
parliamentary democracy, promote free trade and markets, defend private 
property and civil rights, and protect the nation’s sovereignty. The historical 
agent of the national-democratic revolution was the industrial bourgeoisie. 
Consequently, in pre-capitalist social formations, subaltern classes had to support 
‚their‛ nascent ruling class against imperialism, colonialism, and feudalism.  
 Stage theory became the dominant transitology model for the Second 
International and the Comintern. 336  Ironically this view echoed capitalist 
modernization theory, which, especially through the works of Walt Rostow337 and 
Samuel Huntington 338 , conceived of ‚development‛ as a gradual and linear 
transition from a ‚traditional‛ to a ‚modern‛ society. Backward states had to 
emulate the historical development of capitalism in Western European countries 
in order to develop their economies. Some authors such as Bill Warren339 even 
claimed that imperialism and colonialism were progressive forces that 
emancipated the so-called Third World countries from their pre-capitalist and 
traditional social formations. 
 Against the backdrop of the decolonization movements in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, Marxist scholars discussed the nature of development – or rather the lack 
thereof – in colonial and postcolonial states. Roughly two explanations were 
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offered. A first trend of thought moved that Third World countries suffered a 
‚blocked transition‛ towards (full) capitalism because of the dominance of 
domestic elites, such as merchant capitalists and landlords, who were unwilling 
and/or unable to industrialize their economies. This was in opposition to 
Friedrich Engels’ notion of ‚<the passive survival of antiquated modes of 
production<‛ 340  The concept of ‚blocked transition‛ enabled a critique of 
colonialism and imperialism – which supported domestic pre-capitalist forces – 
while, at the same time, it reinforced the ‚stagist‛ idea that the fundamental 
problem of underdevelopment was ‚too little‛ capitalism.  
 The dependency school initiated a paradigm-shift by conceiving of the world 
capitalist system, and not the nation state, as the primary frame of analysis. One 
should not look for the causes of underdevelopment and backwardness at the 
level of the nation state, but by analyzing the structural position of 
underdeveloped nations in the world capitalist system. Raul Prebisch and Hans 
Singer laid the foundations of ‚dependency theory‛, which was elaborated upon 
by authors such as Paul Baran341. Samir Amin342 saw the distorted development of 
the Third World as a form of capitalism in its own right: a peripheral capitalism 
that differed fundamentally from the capitalism found in the core countries. 
Andre Gunder Frank 343  rejected the notion of one type of capitalism in the 
periphery and another in the core; according to him there was only one capitalist 
system, which dominated the globe and which determined all social forms and 
modes of production as ‚capitalist‛. Immanuel Wallerstein344 developed Frank’s 
concept of a single system determining the nature of its parts into world-system 
analysis.  
 While dependency theory and world-system analysis paid attention to the 
dynamics of capitalism as a totality, this tradition suffered from functionalism 
and reductionism, neglecting the role of class struggle, modes of production, 
labor exploitation, and pre-capitalist structures in defining capitalist reality.345 In 
their paradigm, the self-motion of capitalism structures the totality according to 
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its own needs. 346  Pace Frank and Wallerstein, Ernesto Laclau 347  argued that 
capitalism is not a homogenous system, but a differentiated totality, comprising 
pre-capitalist modes of production that are embedded within the larger capitalist 
structure.348  
 The chief methodological problem of both the ‚nation state‛ and ‚world-
system‛ approaches was that they reduced the development of the whole to the 
movement of the particular parts, or vice versa.349 Trotsky’s concept of uneven 
and combined development (U&CD), 350  critically appropriated by Gramsci, 351 
elaborated upon by Mandel352 and more recently by authors such as Rosenberg,353 
might be the key to an understanding of (under)development based on the 
dialectic between totality and locality, and between capitalist and pre-capitalist 
forms. 
Uneven and Combined Development 
Although some elements of U&CD had already been expressed by Marx, 
Hilferding, and Pannekoek,354 it was Trotsky who elaborated the theory in the 
introductory chapter of the History of the Russian Revolution.355 In his view, 
history is a progressive sequence of modes of production, but with the arrival of 
capitalism the development of productive forces acquires a systemic uneven and 
combined character. The qualitative difference between the productive forces that 
capitalism unleashes and their pre-capitalist counterparts creates a deep 
dichotomy – ‚unevenness‛ – between ‚advanced‛ and ‚backward‛ forms. 
However, nations, institutions, people, et cetera, do not exist in isolation from 
each other; on the contrary, through the world market capitalism universalizes 
itself, connecting different national, regional, and local activity systems with each 
other. Advanced and backward social forms and modes of production are found 
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‚in combination‛; they become part of the same totality without losing their 
separate identity. At this point ‚stagism‛ becomes irrelevant because 
development is perceived as an organic process of both the whole – the world 
market, the internationalization of capital, imperialism, et cetera – and its parts – 
states, regions, specific modes of production, et cetera. Through their relation 
with the world market, backward nations can directly appropriate advanced 
forms without going through all the historical steps that the advanced country 
experienced to get there. This ‚privilege of backwardness‛ is only a potentiality; 
sometimes more advanced forms are debased when they are embedded in a 
backward context, which paradoxically leads to a strengthening of these 
backwards conditions instead of revolutionizing them.356  
 In some specific historical cases – for example the development of Germany 
and the USA – backwardness proved indeed to be an advantage. Most non-
industrialized societies, however, missed the advent of the capitalist mode of 
production and were confronted with strong capitalist nations. Mandel argued 
that the rise of imperialism and the expansion of the world market blocked the 
possibility for non-industrialized countries to develop along the same lines and at 
the same tempo as the first industrial nations.357 To them the capitalist mode of 
production was introduced through exchange (world market) and force 
(colonialism and imperialism) and it confronted, assimilated, appropriated, and 
destroyed pre-capitalist structures. Whilst the integration of non-capitalist spaces 
into the capitalist totality furthered the development of the whole – the 
accumulation of capital on a world level – it did not automatically develop the 
parts evenly. In opposition to dependency theory, one could argue that the 
economic trajectories of the periphery are not merely ‚blocked‛ by its structural 
relations with the core capitalist countries. Instead, ‚transition‛ and 
‚development‛ in capitalism encompass the interpenetration of global relations 
of production and exchange with national social formations, resulting in specific 
‚domestic‛ combinations of modes of production.  
 The framework of U&CD takes as its methodological ‚nodal point‛ 358  the 
‚national‛ social formation, which is a crystallization of the interpenetration of 
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intra-national, inter-national, and trans-national social forms and forces. 
Unevenness determined the combined nature of the social formation in the Third 
World countries, and this combination in turn often frustrated ‚indigenous‛ 
attempts at capital accumulation and development. The historical blocs that 
emerged in the Third World – in the sense of both the articulations between 
infrastructures and superstructures, and the shapes of the class alliances – also 
refracted the uneven and combined development of global capitalism. ‚Hybrid‛ 
pre-capitalist cum colonial social forms were not aberrations of the trajectory of 
modern development, nor ‚pure‛ capitalist forms in themselves, but the concrete 
spatio-temporal expressions of the encounter between domestic, foreign, and 
global social and material forces. 
The Egyptian Social Formation 
In the following chapters, I develop an image of the trajectory of the modern 
Egyptian social formation. My aim is not to rewrite the history of the Egyptian 
workers’ movement, 359 but to sketch in broad lines the trajectory of the worker 
Subject and its interaction with the Left and other ‚assisting‛ forces. 360  This 
excursus elucidates the position and importance of the 2000s civil-democratic and 
class movements as moments within a historical chain of emancipatory processes. 
Moreover, certain contemporary forms of Subjectivity, political Projects, and 
modes of assistance are firmly rooted in the past – in the shape of organizations, 
memories, texts, and other forms of objectification, which continue to mediate 
thoughts and activities in the present.  
 The chapter on The Pre-Capitalist Formation sets the scene for the violent 
introduction of the capitalist mode of production by the British colonial 
intervention. In the first phase of integration of Egypt in the capitalist world 
market, which lasted from the second half of the eighteenth century until the first 
half of the nineteenth century, Western advanced production methods and 
relations were absorbed by the absolutist state without qualitatively affecting the 
                                                          
359 Apart from a few interview excerpts, I have used secondary sources for this historical exposé. 
Much of the ‚economic‛ narrative is derived from a joint paper I have written with Jelle 
Versieren on the historical contradictions of accumulation and development in Egypt. 
360  Although, from time to time, I highlight the international and global dimensions of the 
development of the Egyptian social formation, my focus is primarily on domestic dynamics. 
115 
 
existing social formation. At this point there was no development towards a 
modern working class.  
 In Colonialism, I argue that the colonial State both introduced and blocked the 
capitalist mode of production. Whereas its reliance on feudalistic landlords 
continued Egypt’s uneven development vis-à-vis the European powers, its 
introduction of modern services, communication, industries, et cetera, also 
‚combined‛ the pre-capitalist social forms in the urban centers with advanced 
capitalist relations and techniques. The three colonial decades saw the emergence 
of a historical bloc between, chiefly, British capitalists and Egyptian landlords – 
dominated by the former. The colonial mode of production also organically 
created new layers of modern wage laborers and intellectuals, which, however, 
did not automatically replace the traditional ‚artisanat‛ and intellectuals. 
Capitalist exploitation and colonial dependence interpellated the formation of an 
anti-colonial bloc, which gathered subaltern actors such as fledgling trade unions, 
as well as landlords and domestic industrialists – united in their resistance 
against foreign domination. The 1919 Revolution did not resolve Egypt’s 
fundamental political and economic problems. 
 The chapter Neo-Colonialism discusses the differentiation of the anti-colonial 
bloc. After the 1919 Revolution, domestic ruling classes somewhat redressed the 
balance of power between them and foreign capital in the existing bloc. The 
Egyptian State was formally emancipated from colonialism, but British capital 
continued to dominate the formation directly through its military presence in 
Suez, and indirectly through the Palace. Domestic capitalists tried to initiate 
projects of ‚independent‛ or ‚national capitalist‛ development, but they could 
not fundamentally separate their class interests from those of landed and foreign 
capital. Meanwhile, the subsumption of the working class under the nationalist 
counter-bloc was challenged by an increasingly independent trade union 
movement. However, from a political perspective, the worker Subject continued 
to be ‚colonized‛ by nationalist, Islamist, and communist forces. After the Second 
World War, neither the ruling bloc or its anti-colonial contenders were able to 
assert themselves as a hegemonic force, thereby creating the moment for 
Nasserism. 
 The nature of the Free Officers’ coup and the subsequent societal 
transformations are dealt with in Nasserism. I deploy Gramsci’s concept of 
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‚Caesarism‛ to understand the Nasserist intervention as a qualitative and 
progressive form of Bonapartism. Whilst Nasserism improved the social and 
economic conditions of the working class, from the perspective of ‚proletarian 
sociogenesis‛, Caesarist ‚colonization‛ refragmented the workers back into an 
economic-corporate state. Moreover, the contingent development of Nasserist 
state capitalism did not eradicate, but merely suppressed the rule of domestic and 
foreign ruling classes. Landlords were not fully expropriated, and private 
capitalists were able to extend their ‚life form‛ through commercial and 
subcontracting activities. Conversely, state elites increasingly behaved as a 
private ruling class in its own right. 
 The resurgence of these groups and their capture of State power are the subject 
matter of Sadat’s Passive Revolution. The crisis of Nasserism, especially after the Six 
Day War of 1967, necessitated a reorientation of the strategies for accumulation 
and hegemony. I advance an understanding of Sadat’s political and economic 
transformations from above as a ‚passive revolution‛, in the Gramscian sense. 
Sadat created a new, neoliberal ruling bloc that expressed the interests of 
domestic and foreign capitalist actors. Sadat’s Infitah coincided with a global 
passive revolution of capital in which the Fordist historical bloc was transformed. 
The neoliberal bloc was contested by workers and other subaltern groups such as 
students. Even though these groups did not succeed in creating a coherent 
counter-hegemonic bloc, the spontaneous uprising of 1977 temporarily froze the 
neoliberal passive revolution. The consolidation of a ‚rentier economy‛ offered 
the State sufficient economic oxygen to postpone its debt crisis, and to continue 
its redistributive and clientelist practices. 
 I explain in Mubarak’s Détente how the new President domesticated the Left by 
a superficial ‚democratization from above‛, and how the workers’ movement, 
despite some militant strikes, remained entangled in its economic-corporate 
condition. The collapse of the rentier economy imposed a return to the aggressive 
neoliberal strategy for accumulation, which, in turn, forced a reconfiguration of 
the ruling bloc and an increasingly violent coercion of subaltern groups and their 
exclusion from civil and political society. The passive revolution returned to its 
‚offensive‛ moment, interpellating civil-democratic and class movements from 
below. The transformations of the 1990s and 2000s are discussed in Part III 
Against the Pharaoh. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Pre-Capitalist Formation 
<instead of a working class advancing rights, we find loyal subjects seeking order and government 
regulation. 
John T. Chalcraft (2001: 122) 
What Came Before 
Before I investigate Egypt’s historical rendezvous with capitalism, I sketch, in 
broad lines, its pre-capitalist social formation, revealing the terrain of the societal 
transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Egypt, as a part of the 
Ottoman Empire, is represented in Marx’s and Engels’s writings as part of ‚Asia‛ 
or the ‚East‛: a cultural-geographic entity with distinct politico-economic 
features. Ecological and geographical aspects of the region necessitated State-led 
and centralized irrigation, which, in collaboration with the predominance of a 
bureaucratic state vis-à-vis small, autarchic village communities, led to ‚oriental 
despotism‛; there was no private property as the State, personified by the despot, 
was the only legal property owner. The fusion of agriculture and handicraft in the 
villages rendered these units economically autonomous, impeding mobility and 
communication between rural units. Surplus extraction was realized centrally, by 
the despotic State, through forced labor or tribute.  
 Marx’s and Engels’s conception of pre-capitalist societies was schematic at best, 
and, to a large extent, informed by the Orientalist worldviews of the scholars of 
their time: Adam Smith, François Bernier, Herder, Leopold von Ranke, John 
Stuart Mill, and of course Hegel. The ideological concept of a static, homogeneous 
‚East‛ and its specific mode of production did not conform to the diversity of 
social forms found in the lands labeled as ‚Asiatic‛.361  
 However, the notion of centrally organized surplus-extraction gave birth to the 
less Orientalist concept of ‚tributary mode of production‛, which accentuated the 
character and the role of the State in the mode of surplus-extraction of pre-
capitalist political economies.362 The social formation in the Ottoman Empire until 
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the nineteenth century can be roughly defined as a tributary system with 
feudalistic trends.363 Agricultural production was, in general, organized by the 
çift-hane system: a peasant household gained the usufruct of state lands and 
surplus appropriation was enforced by a land tax as a percentage of the crops.364 
Surpluses were not reinvested in agricultural production, but flowed directly to 
the cities, which became rich centers of trade, guild handicrafts, and state 
administration.365  
 By the eighteenth century the establishment of large farms and the weakening 
of Ottoman state power reinforced the power of landlords and regional governors 
in Egypt. 366  Mamluk households dominated Egypt’s agrarian production. 
Although the Mamluks were tax farmers, they enjoyed a relative fiscal and 
political independence from the Ottoman state. In Egypt the agricultural surplus 
was much higher than subsistence levels because of favorable natural and 
geographical conditions, which stimulated production for regional and 
international markets. Farmers worked their own plots for subsistence, whereas 
the surplus product was extracted through taxation and extra labor was 
expropriated through sharecropping, corvée and wage labor.367 The increase of 
large landholdings, low agricultural prices, and the expansion of European 
markets between the 1740s and 1815 intensified trade relations between the 
Ottoman Empire and the West, incorporating Egypt in the developing world 
capitalist market. The blossoming world trade realized large profits for the rural 
elites, stimulating a new urban financial sphere of credit, loans and banking 
around landed property, often exploited by religious minorities that could ignore 
Islamic sensitivities towards usury and interest. This new commercial domain 
gave rise to a merchant-capitalist class in the cities.368  
                                                          
363  ‚< the Egyptian social formation of the early nineteenth century when the tributary mode of 
production was dominant<‛ (Chaichian 1988: 25) 
364 Beinin 2001: 13. 
365 Richards and Waterbury 2008: 39. 
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 The urban workforce was classified and organized according to the specific 
handicraft, commercial activity, service, or trade in which the laborers were 
employed. Their organization was the ta’ifa (tawa’if), which ‚vertically‛ gathered 
the productive forces relevant to a particular profession. 369  Alongside these 
professional groups existed a ‚<stratum of more or less unskilled, propertyless 
workers who took whatever short-term jobs were available and were not identified with 
any specific craft.‛370 However, these subproletarians were subsumed as a social 
group under the category of the ‚poor‛ or the ‚needy‛.371  
Muhammad Ali 
Aside from the expansion of the world market, modern geopolitics stimulated the 
penetration of capitalist forms in non-capitalist countries. Military confrontations 
with the rising European powers forced the Ottoman Empire and its provincial 
rulers to raise revenues in order to modernize and expand their armies. At the 
end of the eighteenth century the Mamluk chief Murad Bey imposed a state 
monopoly on customs collection and the government purchased and resold a 
large part of the wheat crop to pay for its military expenditures. This move 
anticipated the policies of Muhammad Ali who defeated the French – who 
occupied Egypt between 1798-1801 – the Ottomans, and the old Mamluk elite.  
 As the new Pasha was beleaguered by both the West and his former Ottoman 
suzerain, he continued Bey’s attempt at building a modern army, whilst pursuing 
a mercantilist policy. In order to gain fiscal autonomy from the landed elite, he 
partially adopted the reform program of the French who had seized tax farms, 
nationalized agricultural lands, and supervised guilds. In 1814 tax farming was 
abolished. The reassertion of central state power temporarily blocked the 
development of tax farmers into private landholders.372 Peasants kept the usufruct 
of their lands, but were obliged to sell their crops directly to the state at low, set 
prices. This monopsony allowed the government to trade agricultural produce 
with a large profit margin on both local and international markets. Protectionist 
measures safeguarded the weak Egyptian industries – primarily textile and 
weapon manufacturing – against competition with Western capitalist countries. 
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Attempts were made at substituting Western commodities with Egyptian 
products, anticipating the import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) policies of 
the later neo-colonial and post-colonial State. Through forced conscription wage 
laborers were recruited among the peasants and guild artisans.373  
 Muhammad Ali’s centralized fiscal, mercantilist, and industrial policies were 
primarily oriented towards the needs of the military and the bureaucracy, 
curtailing the power of urban guilds and merchant capital. Rather than a 
development towards ‚indigenous capitalism‛, Ali’s policies closely resembled 
the political economy of European absolutism. 374 Although there was a 
development of manufacturing, no significant industrialization emerged. The 
Egyptian manufactures lacked mechanization, social division of labor, and new 
energy resources.375 There was neither a formal nor a real subsumption of labor 
under capital: 376 laborers were drawn into the production process by means of 
extra-economic corvée and not through a contract; and the new production 
methods did not transform pre-capitalist relations of production and exploitation 
into capitalist ones. These indications negate the concept of an ‚indigenous‛ 
transition towards capitalism during the reign of Muhammad Ali.377  
Imperialism and Feudalization 
Muhammad Ali’s military expansionism and economic protectionism brought 
him into a showdown with the European powers – especially Great Britain – 
which sought to stabilize the Ottoman Empire. Through the Anglo-Ottoman 
Commercial Convention (1838) and the Treaties of London (1840, 1841) the 
military power and economic sovereignty of Ali’s Egypt was curtailed. The 
reduction of Egypt’s domestic and regional markets and the imposition of a free 
trade regime created, until the 1930s, external obstacles for an indigenous road to 
industrial and capitalist development.378 Between 1850 and 1880, Egypt was fully 
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integrated into the capitalist world market on the basis of raw cotton  
production.379 
 European imperialism 380  ended the absolutism of Muhammad Ali. The 
Egyptian state now found itself scraping for financial resources. Foreign 
intervention strengthened the resistance of pre-capitalist structures and social 
forces against political centralization and economic modernization. 381  Peasant 
struggles against conscription and heavy taxation led to a shortage of labor and a 
decline of state revenue. In exchange for an advance payment of taxes the Pasha 
granted his family, military officers, and other clients state lands. By 1844-48 53 
percent of lands (often the most fertile ones) were in private hands. 382 
Concentration of lands was stimulated by the cultivation of long-staple cotton – 
introduced in 1821 – which was capital and labor-intensive, required new 
production methods, and was best cultivated on large plots. The original goal of 
this ‚privatization‛ process was to reassert State control over the villages through 
the authority of an official who placed villagers in debt bondage until they paid 
their taxes. 383  However, tax farming, the delegation of state power to local 
landlords, and the debt bondage system reinforced feudalistic relations in the 
countryside.384   
 During the reign of Muhammad Ali’s successors, the ‚feudal turn‛ 385 was 
reinforced. The building of the Suez Canal (1854-63) generated more debts than 
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revenues for the Egyptian state. This was compensated, at first, by the American 
Civil War (1861-1865), which heightened the demand for Egyptian cotton. The 
bulk of new revenue was used for the modernization of the military, urban 
prestige projects, and as a guarantee for further loans. When the Civil War ended, 
American cotton hit the world market and global cotton prices dropped, causing 
a fiscal crisis in Egypt. Between 1865 and 1868 taxes were raised 70 percent, which 
indebted many peasants and led to a further concentration of agricultural lands.386 
In 1871 new tax reforms made small landholders lose their lands and become an 
‚unpaid, bonded workforce‛387. Peasants were converted into laborers who received 
a small plot of land for themselves or who were paid in kind.388  
 The economic depression of 1873-96 led to a global decline of prices for 
agricultural produce, which caused the bankruptcy of several Ottoman provinces. 
Their inability to pay debts instigated European intervention in their internal 
financial affairs. In 1876 the Caisse de la Dette Publique was established to 
oversee Egypt’s treasury. In order to secure its financial grip, Great Britain had to 
intervene directly in Egypt’s politics. In 1882 British troops occupied Egypt to 
quell the revolt of Colonel Urabi against foreign domination.389 This marked the 
beginning of the colonial era. 
Workers before Class 
Muhammad Ali’s push for ‚manufacturization‛ was based on extra-economic 
corvée labor and did not initiate a process of proletarianization.390 Farmers and 
artisans who had constituted the workforce of the manufactures moved 
effortlessly back to their original occupations.391 The port, railway, urban, and 
canal construction during the reign of the Pashas in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was also based on corvée and did not constitute a collection of 
wage laborers that could develop into a modern working class.392  
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The British occupation and the beginning of the colonial era coincided with the 
legal and actual abandonment of corvée labor and the formal recognition of 
private property in land.393 As advanced irrigation techniques had removed the 
dead season, landlords wanted full control over the labor of their farmers. The 
process of feudalization and dispossession bereft many peasants from their lands 
and drove them to Egypt’s first industries: ‚<they could now be recruited not by 
physical coercion through the bureaucratic and repressive mechanisms of the state< but 
rather through the less obviously coercive mechanism of the market, which just as 
effectively kept wages low and working conditions inhuman.‛394 
 In the 1880s, the Egyptian industrial workforce stood at the threshold of a 
transformation in the direction of a modern working class. The Port Said coal 
heavers’ strike of April 1882 revealed a fledgling worker Subjectivity within an 
ensemble of predominating pre-capitalist Subjectivities. The coal heavers were 
peasants-turned-laborers from Upper Egypt and were paid by piece rate. When 
their demand for a higher rate was not met, they went on strike, blocking coal 
operations on the canal. The Urabi government intervened on behalf of the 
laborers and put the British coaling companies under pressure to accede to the 
strikers’ demands. However, when the British occupied Egypt, they restored the 
previous piece rate.395  
 This episode of the Strike entailed two forms of struggle that expressed the 
dual nature of the Port Said workforce. Firstly, the coal heavers ‚<can thus be 
understood as wage workers subject to an essentially capitalist system of labor 
contracting, hence comprehensible within a narrative of modern labor activism.‛396 Their 
struggle was oriented against the exploitation of a foreign, capitalist industrial 
company. As such it was both the first stirring of a nascent modern workers’ 
movement, and the earliest shape of an alliance between workers and the national 
liberation movement. Secondly, at the moment of the strike the organization of 
‚coal heaver laborers‛ was still much a pre-capitalist formation; a unity of 
‚<exploitative labor contractors against< exploited contracted wage workers.‛397 From 
this perspective, the coal heaver strike was also representative of the final pangs 
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of the pre-capitalist ‚guild‛ organization that, by then, acted primarily as a labor 
contracting instrument.398 Even though throughout the nineteenth century the 
organic tawa’if were slowly replaced by State institutions: ‚<the discourse of 
occupational identity still remained powerful.‛399  
 The transformation from a pre-capitalist ‚estate‛ Subjectivity to a modern 
‚class‛ Subjectivity reached a next phase in 1896, when the coal heaver laborers 
presented a petition to Lord Cromer, demanding fair treatment from their ‚own‛ 
shuyukh. 400  This episode reflected a horizontal class cleavage in the vertical 
structure of the coal heavers’ organization. Nevertheless, the systematic use of the 
word ‘amil (‘ummal) to denote a modern wage worker emerged in Egypt only at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.401 At that point, however, the Egyptian 
social formation was already being reconstructed by colonialism. 
- 
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CHAPTER 6 
Colonialism 
It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the working class must organize itself at 
home as a class and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle — insofar as its class 
struggle is national, not in substance, but, as the Communist Manifesto  
says, ‘in form’. 
Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (2008: 30)  
A Colonial Historical Bloc 
British colonialism encouraged the uneven and combined development of Egypt’s 
economy. Cultivating cotton required large estates and stimulated ‚bimodalism‛ 
in the countryside: ‚a land-tenure system that combines a small number of owners 
holding very large estates with a large number of owners holding very small farms.‛402 
Agriculture was politically and economically controlled by domestic large-scale 
landowners with connections to urban centers of trade and petty commodity 
production.403 The colonial State did not abolish feudalism in the countryside 
because ‚farming out‛ the production of cotton to domestic landlords was more 
profitable for foreign capital. In this manner, the colonial state reinforced the 
unevenness and ‚backwardness‛ of Egypt’s economy vis-à-vis the European 
powers.  
 On the other hand, through the instrument of the colonial State, foreign 
industrial and finance capital forcefully introduced the capitalist mode of 
production in Egypt.404 In the early 1870s Khedive405 Ismail had implemented a 
modest industrialization program, establishing some 40 state owned enterprises. 
The state bankruptcy of 1876 led to either their destruction or sale to foreign 
firms. From then onwards the initiative of industrialization shifted to foreign 
corporations and the mutamassirun: foreign capitalists living in Egypt.406 Egypt 
under colonialism was not only the product of an uneven development, but its 
social formation also combined pre-capitalist social and economic structures with 
                                                          
402 Richards and Waterbury 2008: 177. 
403 Bush 2007: 1601. 
404 Clawson 1978. 
405 Viceroy. 
406 Beinin 2001: 68. 
126 
 
modern industries and capitalist relations of production. Foreign capital 
introduced the capitalist mode of production, but de-industrialized most of the 
indigenous manufacturers, preparing the Egyptian markets for an influx of 
European commodities. 407  The industrializing role of the colonial State was 
restricted to the creation of large-scale transport, communication, service and 
(some) manufacturing enterprises.  
 Rural landlords, urban merchants, and colonial capitalists had identical 
interests: the provision of agricultural goods to international markets. Hence, 
merchant capitalists and landlords allied to foreign capital kept their positions as 
local and national elites in the Egyptian social formation. 408  The colonial 
intervention had created the first modern historical bloc in Egypt, which was a 
combination of pre-capitalist and capitalist social forms, presided by an alliance 
between foreign capital and domestic landed and commercial forces. 
 During the economic crisis of 1906-08, global prices of cotton dropped. Some 
large landowners realized that monoculture production posed risks and that the 
base of their wealth should be diversified with other economic activities. 
Merchant capitalists regained their former socio-economic position and partially 
became commercial capitalists engaged in loan activities, real estate speculation, 
and intermediary trade. Landowners, attracted by the large profit margin, 
invested in these activities. Both classes became aware that foreign capital 
appropriated a large part of the surplus value and this became the focus of a 
conflict of interests. Domestic commercial and landed elites aimed to renegotiate 
their position within the colonial historical bloc. Their struggle led to a 
confrontation with the colonial State and to the formation of a nationalist 
movement, led by large landlords and supported by the emerging modern 
middle classes and the urban proletariat.409 
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Colonial Proletarians 
At the end of the nineteenth century, an estimated 37 percent of the rural 
workforce had become wage laborers. 410 Apart from the process of 
proletarianization in the countryside, the colonial industries generated a modern 
urban working class that existed side by side with the traditional tawa’if 
craftsmen.411 The strengthening of landed property drove farmers to the cities 
where they engaged in petty commodity production, as there were few jobs to be 
found in the modern colonial industries:412 ‚There were only 15 modern European 
style factories employing 30-35,000 workers in Egypt in 1916.‛413 Urban wage laborers 
ended up chiefly in the transport, communication, and services sector of the 
colonial State. 
 Although there were many strikes throughout the 1880s and 1890s, most of 
them expressed a dual, transitory character, as I discussed via the example of the 
Port Said strike in the previous chapter. The first ‚modern‛ strike that initiated a 
process of development of the Egyptian worker Subject was probably the 
collective action of the cigarette rollers between December 1899 and February 
1900. Lockman summarized its significance as follows: ‚It involved several thousand 
skilled workers from many different workplaces, some of them quite large, who went on 
strike simultaneously and remained out for two months, suggesting a strong sense of 
solidarity and a capacity for effective organization.‛414 The strike of the cigarette rollers 
spawned a short-lived trade union formation, and was followed by many other 
collective actions of Egyptian workers, who, in turn, constituted their own trade 
unionist neoformations. Just as the English ‚trade‛ union (1831) suggested a 
gathering of people on the basis of their ‚trade‛ or occupation, the first Egyptian 
trade union – the Manual Trades Workers’ Union (MTWU) established in 1909 – 
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was called niqaba, which referred to the position of the naqib (custodian) in the 
pre-capitalist ta’ifa.415 
 However, the colonial historical bloc constituted a peculiar predicament for the 
development of the working class as a coherent social Subject. Many workers 
who were employed in the colonial industries were foreigners, living in their 
own, separate communities. For example, most cigarette rollers were Greek 
laborers, employed by Greek capitalists. Therefore, the strike of the cigarette 
rollers could be framed as a particular, intra-communal conflict instead of an 
exponent of the general struggle between labor and capital. Furthermore, the 
colonial economic structure reinforced a divide between: (1) the large-scale, 
capitalist companies that employed averagely skilled (and mostly foreign) wage 
workers; (2) an industrial periphery of unskilled Egyptian laborers employed in 
such activities as coal heaving; and (3) pre-capitalistic centers of petty commodity 
production and services that often employed highly skilled workers.416 From the 
perspective of an emerging national worker Subject, each of these sections was 
further differentiated by ‚vertical‛ interests and Subjectivities.  
 Modern corporatism emerged in the Egyptian workers’ movement as the 
organic answer to the combined nature of the colonial economic structure. Trade 
unions such as the MTWU still embodied many pre-capitalist characteristics, such 
as the inclusion of non-wage laborers, property owners, and employers.417 Some 
trade unions refused members on the basis of their religion, nationality, or 
specific position within the occupational hierarchy. Other worker organizations, 
such as the Cairo Tramway Workers’ Union (CTWU) established in 1909, were 
more ‚universally proletarian‛ and accepted all employees of the company as 
members on the basis that they were all wage laborers working for the same 
employer. 
Colonial Intellectuals 
The colonial mode of production and its State produced their own layer of 
organic intellectuals: the effendiyya, a group of modern middle class professionals, 
engineers, journalists, lawyers, teachers, and bureaucrats with a nationalist and 
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Western outlook.418 Many effendiyya became fellow travelers of the emerging anti-
colonial or nationalist counter-bloc. They played a key role in the formation of the 
first counter-hegemonic apparatuses, such as the National Party and the Wafd.419 
The nationalist counter-bloc counted among its ranks such diverse forces as 
social-conservative landlords and peasants, radicalized layers of the effendiyya 
and, also, modern wage laborers. The development of the Strike in Egypt 
increasingly showed the capacity of workers to mobilize and organize themselves 
collectively. For nationalists, the emerging worker Subject constituted a powerful 
potential constituency for their own Project.420 The National Party helped to set 
up trade unions such as the MTWU and the Cairo tramway workers’ union.421  
 However, in general, the assistance of the nationalists to the workers’ 
movement had a strongly colonizing character. The nationalists sought to 
emancipate themselves from political and economic domination through the 
activity of the workers, and aimed to overwrite the emerging class consciousness 
with a nationalist narrative of anti-colonialism. This colonization of emerging 
class Subjectivities was not a one-way street: the main antagonist of the Egyptian 
workers was Western capital in the shape of the colonial State and foreign-owned 
factories; and, as a result, the workers’ struggles against exploitation were easily 
subsumed under a nationalist and anti-imperialist Subject. In general, the 
emergent trade unions recognized themselves economically and politically 
through the mediation of non-proletarian class forces such as bourgeois 
nationalists. 
The 1919 Revolution 
Like in other colonial countries such as India and China, the First World War 
enabled the Egyptian nationalist counter-hegemonic forces to rally popular 
dissatisfaction for the cause of independence. 422  After the war, an Egyptian 
delegation (wafd) led by the nationalist Saad Zaghlul, supported by a popular 
campaign of civil disobedience and petitions, demanded independence for the 
country. British repression of the movement in 1919 provoked a mass revolution, 
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which forced the colonial masters to grant Egypt conditional independence in 
1922. Whereas the revolution expressed the slumbering agency of the subaltern 
Subjects involved, its trajectory also reflected their mutual separation. First, in 
March 1919, the peasantry rose in a rural insurrection, which was violently 
quelled by British military intervention. In the end, however, the Wafdist 
national-popular counter-bloc was unable to rally the peasants behind its 
nationalist Project, because their primary predicament was feudalism rather than 
imperialism.423  
 Then, from April on, began ‚<the protracted phase< that was less violent and 
more urban, with the large-scale participation of students, workers, lawyers, and other 
professionals.‛ 424  Women participated as women nationalists in the emerging 
activity-system of the revolution – not only liberal, feminist women, but: ‚All 
types of women< upper, middle, popular, workers, peasants< because at the time the 
authorities of the British occupations arrested thousands of men, those who participated in 
the revolution, so women replaced them. Women played all the roles during the 
movement.‛ 425  The political system was transformed into a constitutional 
monarchy based on the Belgian model, but, reflecting the revolution in general, it 
fell short of fully transforming Egypt into a civil democracy. Instead of 
overthrowing the colonial historical bloc, the 1919 revolution fortified the position 
of domestic actors vis-à-vis foreign forces in the existing power configuration. 
British capital relinquished its grip over the colonial State, but remained in 
control over the Suez canal, Egypt’s defense, foreign affairs, and minority 
policies. Imperialism was not defeated, but its partial retreat opened up 
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opportunities for domestic capitalists to embark on a project of ‚indigenous‛ 
industrialization. Their strategy of accumulation, however, was blocked by the 
powerful feudal lords and the British-supported King Fuad, who appeared as the 
most powerful political actor. The colonial historical bloc was thus reconstituted as 
a neo-colonial historical bloc, in which the colonial relations of power were 
renegotiated but not abolished. From the perspective of the national-popular 
‚counter‛-bloc, with the 1919 revolution, the project of Egypt’s national liberation 
had just began.  
 The rise of nationalist politics also coincided with the emergence of a strong 
trade unionist movement. The war caused food shortages and rising inflation, 
which decreased real wages between 1917-18. Cigarette workers in Alexandria 
and Cairo organized the first war-time strikes, demanding higher wages. In their 
wake other groups of workers began to protest declining wages and worsening 
working conditions. With the help of the National Party, the MTWU was revived, 
and other, new trade unions emerged from the struggle. 426  Workers took 
advantage of the nationalist revolution as a space for the Mass Strike:427 ‚The 
popular uprising, spontaneous and massive, incorporated and sustained this new social 
movement, and made possible its rapid growth and quick victories.‛ 428  Conversely, 
economic strikes were often perceived by non-proletarian actors as a form of 
support for the nationalist activity-system of resistance – principally because most 
striking workers were employed by the colonial industries and its State.429  
 The workers’ ‚war of movement‛ and their partisan participation in the anti-
colonial bloc forged new links between their own organic intellectuals and the 
nationalist effendiyya. The effendiyya assisted workers to set up new trade unions, 
consolidating the mass strikes into more or less stable proletarian neoformations. 
However, the mode of assistance was largely colonial, as workers were subsumed 
under the nationalist Project. This expressed: ‚<the relative weakness and dependent 
status of the young working class and labor movement.‛430 From the perspective of the 
effendiyya, workers were just another force in the struggle against foreign 
domination.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Neo-Colonialism 
The Wafd is the people’s party and represents an important and natural step in our development. The 
National Party is Turkish, religious, and reactionary. The Wafd Party has crystallized and purified 
Egyptian nationalism. It has also been a school for nationalism and democracy. But the point is that 
the nation is not and must not be content with this school. We want a further stage of development. 
We desire a school for socialism. Indepedence is not the ultimate goal. It’s a way to obtain the people’s 
constitutional, economic, and human rights. 
‚Adli Karim‛ in Naguib Mahfouz’s Sugar Street (2001: 80) 
Dependent Development 
In 1920 nationalist landowners provided the capital for the establishment of an 
independent Egyptian bank with the explicit goal of creating an indigenous 
industrial sector.431 Industry would diversify the landholders’ sources of income 
and break the domination of foreign finance capital.432 Bank Misr concentrated its 
funds on low value-added cotton production, establishing industries such as the 
Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla al-Kubra, which became the 
largest industrial complex of the Middle East at the end of the Second World War. 
Political developments such as the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the abolition 
of capitulations in 1937 allowed the Egyptian state to implement protectionist 
measures to protect its budding national industry. The crisis of the 1930s reduced 
European commodity exports to the Middle East and expanded the market for 
domestic firms. 433  At the same time, it increased Western capital exports, as 
British and French capitalists were more inclined to invest outside Europe 
because of falling profits at their domestic markets.434 
 At this juncture, it seemed as if Egypt’s ‚privilege of backwardness‛ could 
have catapulted the country’s economy into the era of advanced capitalism. 
However, Misr Industries was unable to transform the Egyptian economy. Firstly, 
the ‚privilege of backwardness‛ only applies when a society is able to use the 
most advanced forms available in order to skip the intermediate stages of 
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development. In Egypt the imported machines were outdated, which rendered its 
industry less productive and more labor intensive than its international 
competitors. Moreover, low labor costs did not raise incentives to increase 
efficiency.435 Secondly, Bank Misr was not strong enough to compete with foreign 
capital. Even though ‚indigenous‛ Egyptian capitalists played an important role 
in the industrialization process of the 1930s and 1940s, foreign and mutamassir 
capital remained the chief protagonists of capitalist development. Their industries 
were better established and they often controlled monopolies and semi-
monopolies. Misr Industries was not profitable enough and declined sharply. In 
the late 1930s Bank Misr entered into joint ventures with British enterprises, as 
they possessed the keys to the world market. 436  Consequently, Bank Misr’s 
‚national character‛ was subordinated to foreign capital.437 The largest share of 
Egyptian capital was still controlled by feudal landlords and directed towards the 
foreign and mutamassir-dominated cotton market.438 Thirdly, the Second World 
War stimulated industrial production while it re-oriented industries towards the 
needs and demands of foreign markets. The end of the war lowered foreign 
demand and plunged Egyptian industries into crisis causing high rates of 
unemployment and raising the cost of living. The crisis increased the 
centralization of land ownership.439 Landlords were even more inclined to invest 
in their profitable landholdings than industrial production.  
 The Egyptian neo-colonial historical bloc continued to be composed of 
landowners, mutamassirun, ‚indigeneous‛ capitalists, the Palace, foreign capital, 
and the British State. Domestic capitalists began to consolidate their own 
hegemonic Project in a contradictory relationship of both competition and alliance 
with international capital. However, the path to the formation of an Egyptian 
modern integral State was obstructed by the stubborn remains of pre-capitalist 
social forms and the dependency on foreign capital. Civil society remained 
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underdeveloped and the constant use of coercive State power was the gambit of a 
weak indigenous ruling class wishing to superimpose itself on the subaltern 
classes.  
The Road to Trade Unionism 
Between 1920 and 1924 economic conditions worsened for the working class as 
unemployment was on the rise and real wages remained low. However, the 
workers’ movement had emerged stronger out of the revolutionary year of 1919, 
encompassing 89 formal trade unions in Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal 
Zone. Whereas the MTWU was on the decline, public services unions in tramway, 
gas, electric, and water companies became the leading neoformations of the 
struggle.440  
 Before and during the First World War socialist ideas and methods of struggle 
had seeped into Egypt,441 but only in 1921 was the Egyptian Socialist Party (ESP) 
formally established. The leaders of the ESP were Egyptian and foreign 
intellectuals who were strongly influenced by both the spirit of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 and the reformist strategy of European social-democracy. 
Within a year the party moved to the left, embraced Bolshevism, and, reborn as 
the Communist Party of Egypt (CPE), became a member of the Comintern.442  
 Between 1918 and 1924 the young socialist movement entered the trade unions 
and even though its directive role was limited, it played an important instructive 
part: ‚It projected conceptions of Egyptian society and of working class identity that 
challenged those of the Wafd whose bourgeois nationalism the left criticized.‛443 Initially 
the CPE was principally anti-capitalist, and rejected an alliance with bourgeois 
nationalist forces such as the Wafd,444 but at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern 
in 1923 communist parties in colonial countries were encouraged to participate in 
the national liberation movements – even if they were dominated by bourgeois 
class fractions. For Egypt, this marked the embrace of the two-stage theory of 
socialism by the communist movement: communists had to cooperate with 
nationalists in order to get rid of foreign domination first, and only then could 
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they fight for socialism.445 Nevertheless, the first communists were able to give the 
workers a self-concept as a class ‚<independent of other class forces and oriented 
toward social transformation through political and industrial power<‛446 
 Despite the presence of leftist activists in some of the trade unions, the Wafd 
maintained a strong influence over the workers’ movement. Moreover, the first 
‚wave of communism‛ was short lived. In 1924 a spontaneous strike movement 
in Alexandria, supported but not organized by the fading National Party and the 
young CPE, was crushed by the Wafd government. CPE leaders were arrested and 
the communist movement collapsed. Attempts were made to revive the 
communist movement, but due to the liquidation of its vanguard and the 
continued repression of its activists by the neo-colonial State communism as a 
political force only resurfaced during the Second World War.447 
 When the Wafd won the parliamentary elections in 1924, it aimed to subsume 
the existing movements under its direct, paternalistic control in a General 
Federation of Labor Unions (GFLU).448 Workers accepted the Wafd’s hegemony as 
long as the party would be able to solve their problems in its corporatist ways. 
Moreover, they principally accepted the Wafd’s claim that Britain’s continued 
domination was the nation’s priority, as it was mostly British troops who quelled 
strikes and labor protests.449 The Wafd appeared as the uncontested hegemonic 
leader of the popular anti-colonial counter-bloc. 
 From the perspective of the development of the Strike, Egyptian trade 
unionism in the Interbellum was a ‚pathological‛ corporatist neoformation. The 
GFLU overcame the economic-corporate predicament of the workers in an 
artificial and colonizing way: the workers’ suffering was decreased by the 
external intervention of a ‚higher‛ power, which, at the same time, denied the 
workers the means to develop self-determination and self-governance. The Wafd 
appropriated the protest activities of the workers, and subsumed them under the 
battle of the ‚nation‛ against ‚foreign domination‛. The nationalists’ concept of 
the ‚worker‛ and ‚capitalism‛ was amorphous and undeveloped, reflecting the 
still gelatinous composition of the Egyptian working class and the lack of large-
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scale private industries owned by Egyptians. ‚Workers‛ were still conceived of as 
a collection of pre-capitalist and capitalist manual laborers, instead of a coherent 
class of wage laborers.450 Not the social position within the ensemble of production 
relations, but the material method of production determined if a person was 
considered a worker or not. Likewise, a critique of capitalism was reduced to a 
critique of foreign domination, because the nationalists had themselves little 
experience with the capitalist mode of production and its far-reaching social 
transformations.451  The corporatist ambitions of the Wafd anticipated Nasser’s 
hegemonic politics, which successfully integrated the workers’ movement into 
the State. 
 Between 1930 and 1935 the Wafd was replaced as the ‚Savior-Ruler‛ of the 
workers’ movement by Prince Abbas Ibrahim Halim, who was a great-grandson 
of Muhammad Ali and a cousin of the King. Halim sided with the Wafd against 
the King and gained the patronage over the trade unions, which were now 
gathered in the National Federation of Trade Unions in Egypt (NFTUE). To 
counterbalance the influence of the Wafd and secure the NFTUE as a personal 
base of power, the Prince encouraged workers instead of non-proletarian 
elements to lead the movement, and sponsored the structure with his own 
money. Even though the concept of a workers’ movement governed by workers 
themselves was a step in the direction of self-determination, in reality the NFTUE 
remained under strict control of its princely patron.452 In 1935 the Wafd aimed to 
retake direct control over the trade unions. Because of a rise in political protests in 
1936 and the Wafd’s leadership of the national-popular anti-colonial bloc, Halim’s 
federation lost prestige and disintegrated. However, the unions that had 
constituted the NFTUE remained in existence and continued to struggle without 
the patronage of their Prince. For them, Abbas Halim’s rule had been a transition 
towards autonomy from the Wafd.453  
 In 1936 King Fouad died and was succeeded by his son Faruq. The Wafd 
returned to power and negotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which granted 
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Egypt increased independence – except for a continued presence of British troops 
in the Suez Canal Zone. This episode was both the high point and the beginning 
of the end for the Wafd as a counter-hegemonic force. Not only did Britain and the 
King systematically undermine its rule, from 1936 onwards its leadership over the 
national-popular counter-bloc was eroded from within by the emergence of an 
independent workers’ movement.454 Workers could and would no longer wait to 
address their economic problems until the colonial question was resolved. 
Inspired by mass strikes in Europe, they began to strike themselves.455 No longer 
able to simply colonize the workers’ movement, the Wafd tried to commodify it, 
promising workers concessions if they went back to work. There was a shift in the 
discourse of the Wafd vis-à-vis the workers: its hegemony ‚<was based not on 
patriotism or the need for national unity but on purely pragmatic grounds.‛ 456 
According to the Wafd, workers did not have the political capacity to solve 
society’s problems, so they should support the Wafd in this task, and in return the 
Wafd would, step by step, concede to their economic demands. The position of 
workers within the national-popular bloc was reconfigured as they now appeared 
as a more or less independent ally of the bourgeois leading class. 
 From 1937 onwards, autonomous trade unions aimed to create a new, legal, 
and independent federation. They established the General Federation of Labor 
Unions in the Kingdom of Egypt (GFLUKE), which was the first fully 
independent trade union federation in Egyptian history. Trade unionism finally 
began to overcome the economic-corporate condition of the Egyptian working 
class. From the spontaneous activity of the workers’ struggle a self-concept of 
wage laborers as a class emerged – even though many of its members were still 
artisans and petty producers. Ironically, at this point trade unionism already 
showed signs of becoming a future obstacle for the further development of the 
worker Subject. Governed by pragmatism, trade union leaders were not 
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interested in politics as such, and were ready to strike a deal with any party as 
long as it suited their short-term goals. The GFLUKE was never legalized. The 
outbreak of the Second World War granted the neo-colonial State the opportunity 
to repress the federation.457  
The Muslim Brotherhood 
In 1928 Hassan al-Banna, a young teacher, established the Society of Muslim 
Brothers or al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. At this historical stage, the rise and success of 
the Brotherhood can be seen as both an expression of and a reaction against 
Egypt’s uneven and combined development. The class base of the Society 
consisted of ‚traditional‛, pre-capitalist, urban artisans and petty merchants, as 
well as ‚modern‛ white collar workers, civil servants, teachers, and other layers 
of effendiyya that had been produced by colonialism.458 The hybridity of its social 
constituency revealed itself in the ideological mobilization of modern notions of 
corporatism, organicism, 459  and paternalism, 460  which expressed the combined 
nature of the Egyptian social form. 
 The activity-system of the Ikhwan structured and totalized a whole range of 
activities in which these groups participated: education; charity; the building of 
mosques; sports; the organization of healthcare and welfare; media; and politics. 
The primary object of Islamic ‚pillarization‛ was the prevention of the 
disintegration of Egypt’s pre-capitalist social forms by neo-colonial capitalism. 
For the Muslim Brothers, cultural and religious ‚foreignness‛, rather than the 
political economy of dependent capitalism, constituted Egypt’s predicament. A 
utopian vision of the Islamic past, rather than Western modernity was the 
analeptic ideal to which the Brotherhood aspired.461 
 Yet, despite its pre-capitalist ideological appearance and rigid master-disciple 
relations, the Society’s activity-system was organized and structured along 
‚modern‛ lines with elections, debate, membership and meritocracy. 462  In 
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addition, its political practice was less oriented towards a utopian notion of the 
past than a modernist view of the future. The militancy of its anti-colonial 
discourse surpassed that of the secular Wafd, which was held back by its 
leadership of neo-colonial landowners.  
 Although the Brotherhood advanced social demands that aimed to alleviate 
modern forms of exploitation, domination, and alienation, it did not assist in the 
development of the self-determination of new subaltern social Subjects, such as 
the working class, which had arisen due to the penetration of the capitalist mode 
of production. The Ikhwan rejected the autonomy of the workers’ movement and 
only supported its strikes in foreign-owned companies. Like the nationalists, the 
Brothers assisted the workers’ movement in a colonizing way, blocking its 
development as an immanent Project. The workers’ predicament had to be solved 
through the tripartite corporatism of State, employers, and employees.463 This 
stance on organized labor combined both a traditional ‚guild‛ outlook of vertical 
integration of the interests of ‚masters‛ and ‚craftsmen‛, and a modern notion of 
the defense of the ‚national good‛.  
 As a political force, the Ikhwan articulated some of the classic ‚tasks‛ of the 
national-democratic revolution. The political program of the Brotherhood 
demanded a State-led economy, nationalization of key industries, an ‚Islamic‛ 
financial system – which would guarantee interest-free loans for Egypt’s budding 
industrial development – and social reforms, such as a minimum wage for civil 
servants and unemployment benefits.464.  
 However, the Brotherhood was all but a revolutionary Islamic force bent on the 
conquest and transformation of State power. Not the establishment of an Islamic 
State, but ‚change and reform‛ – the Islamization of society and the expansion of 
Sharia law – was the priority of the movement. 465  A practice of incremental 
reform and compromise with the current rulers characterized Ikhwan politics. As 
such, the Society seemed to be caught in a perpetual ‚war of position‛ strategy, 
which advanced the movement in periods of relative societal stability, but 
challenged its political premises in periods of crisis. For example, even though al-
Banna participated in the elections of 1942 and 1945, parliamentary agitation was 
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rather seen as a means to expand influence and achieve certain concrete demands, 
than a strategy of conquering State power.466  
The Second Wave of Communism 
The Second World War stimulated industrial production in Egypt to sustain the 
British war effort. In 1942 British troops intervened against King Faruq,467 and, 
ironically, brought a Wafd government to power. As the war economy needed a 
stable and docile workforce, Britain favored a (temporary) politics of cooptation 
and concession towards ‚its‛ colonial and neocolonial workers’ movements.468 In 
1942, for the first time in Egyptian history, trade unions were legalized. Trade 
union federations, however, remained outlawed, crippling the capacity of workers 
to overcome their fragmentation into different workplaces and industrial 
sectors. 469  Circumventing the law, the Wafd organized its own ‚Clubs‛ and 
‚Fronts‛, which gathered unions from various companies. However, after the 
Wafd left power in 1944, its direct directive and technical role in the workers’ 
movement ended for good.470 Trade unionists began to experiment with their own 
political neoformations, such as the Workers’ Committee for National Liberation 
(WCNL) in 1945.471 
 The emergence of a fully independent workers’ movement coincided with the 
rebirth of communism in Egypt. In fact, there was a reciprocal assistance between 
workers and communists in building their respective neoformations: ‚Communist 
influence was partly the result of, and in turn accelerated, the decline of patron-client 
association and corporatist ideology in the workers’ movement.‛472In the second half of 
the 1930s, communist ideas were reintroduced by Italian and Greek migrants and 
Jewish intellectuals. 473  From the 1940s onwards, the ‚second wave of 
communism‛ gave the proletarian struggle a political perspective and bridged 
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the gap between a layer of radicalized effendiyya and workers. It also interpellated 
a leftist wing in the Wafd around the ‚Wafdist Vanguard‛ tendency.474 
 The potential proletarian ‚Prince‛, however, was from its inception strongly 
divided. Between 1942 and 1952, Egyptian communism was represented by 
various organizations, of which the most influential were: the Communist Party 
of Egypt, the People’s Liberation Group, Iskra,475 the Egyptian Movement for 
National Liberation (EMNL), and New Dawn. 476  Apart from personal and 
sectarian infighting, there were important organizational, tactical and strategic 
differences with regard to the degree of centralization of the movement, the role 
of students and intellectuals, and the nature of the Egyptian working class and 
bourgeoisie. 477  
Organic Crisis 
By 1948, more than half a million workers were employed in the new 
industries.478 However, after the Second World War, industrial unemployment 
decreased, not only due to the end of war-time demand, but also because of the 
increased mechanization of industries and the concentration of the workforce in a 
few large factories. The industries could not absorb the exodus of rural laborers, 
who ended up in the service and petty trading sectors. 479  The uneven and 
combined character of Egypt’s economy was expressed in the composition of the 
working class: 
The working class of the postwar period therefore included, at one end of the 
spectrum, a large number of workers employed in very small enterprises producing 
in labor-intensive and capital-poor conditions where the distinction between 
employer and employee was often not very sharp, and at the other end, a large, and 
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what is more important, growing number of workers in large-scale mass 
production industries.480 
The salient rise of industrial capitalism and ‚its‛ worker reinforced the concept of 
the worker as an industrial wage laborer vis-à-vis pre-capitalist notions of the 
‚artisan‛. The industrial worker was a proletarian, not only in the historical-
conceptual sense of belonging to a category of working people bereft of their 
means of production, but also in its hyperbolic moral meaning of having nothing 
to lose except for his or her chains. Just as their European counterparts in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the Egyptian proletariat suffered 
malnutrition, disease, overcrowded housing, unhygienic living conditions, 
illiteracy, et cetera. As Joel Beinin rightly stressed, these ‚<material conditions of 
the working class were both a motive force and a constraint on the struggles which they 
waged.‛481 For the industrial proletariat, capitalism was a predicament that did not 
offer them any means of liberation. They had to find the means of overcoming 
their conditions in themselves: in the development of the Strike. Textile workers 
replaced workers in public services sectors such as communication and transport 
as the vanguard of the Egyptian workers’ movement.482  
 The failure of domestic capitalists to independently industrialize and develop 
the economy, and the rise of landed, money-lending, and merchant capital 
revealed that Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century was not a social 
formation in gradual transition to ‚full‛ capitalism, but a society in crisis.483 First 
imperialism, then colonialism, and, lastly, neo-colonialism had continuously 
reinforced the position of feudalistic landowners and commercial capitalists vis-à-
vis fledgling domestic industrial capitalists. Instead of simply ‚dissolving‛ feudal 
relations, capitalism added a new layer of social contradictions to Egyptian 
society. Up until the early 1950s, powerful feudalistic landlords were still able to 
block any attempt at land distribution among the small peasants. In general, 
landlords were reluctant to free capital from agriculture, especially the profitable 
production of cotton, and channel it into risky industrial initiatives that could not 
compete with Western manufacturing. Some of them did engage, hesitantly, in 
the building of an Egyptian industrial base, and could be perceived as a kind of 
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‚native‛ bourgeoisie, but, in the end, there was no fundamental differentiation 
between landed, financial, commercial, and industrial interests, nor was there a 
clear break with foreign and mutamassir capital. 484  The Egyptian ‚industrial 
bourgeoisie‛ had not developed itself as a class, but remained a fragmented, 
amorphous collection of economic actors, subjugated to domestic landlords and 
international capital groups, and thus incapable of leading a national hegemonic 
bloc.485 
 The effendiyya, for their part, longed for national sovereignty and economic 
modernization486, but they did not constitute a social force of their own. Because 
of the economic-corporate condition of the Egyptian bourgeoisie,487 they turned 
increasingly to other social Subjects, such as the emerging workers’ movement, as 
a means to emancipate themselves from colonialism. Especially after the Second 
World War, workers, supported by communists, left-nationalists, and Muslim 
Brothers engaged in a series of economic and political strikes and protests, which 
induced nationwide class organizations and forms of consciousness such as the 
National Committee for Workers and Students (NCWS) and the Congress of 
Egyptian Trade Unions (CETU).488 The coalescence of the workers’ and nationalist 
movement constructed a new national-popular counter-bloc with the trade 
unions, the communist and left-nationalist effendiyya, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood as its ‚hard core‛. 
 The pragmatic stance of the Brotherhood leadership towards the neo-colonial 
State led to a growing dissatisfaction among its younger and more radical 
members who engaged in ‚guerrilla warfare‛ as opposed to the movement’s 
official ‚war of position‛. 489  Ikhwan members organized attacks on British 
administrators, military personnel, Egyptian police stations, and, after 1948, 
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Jewish targets. Even though Hassan al-Banna openly condemned these acts of 
terrorism, the Brotherhood leader was assassinated by government agents in 
1949. The Society was declared illegal and four thousand of its members were 
arrested and detained. With the election of Hassan al-Hudaybi as the new 
Supreme Guide of the organization, the divisions between reformists and radicals 
within the movement escalated. Al-Hudaybi supported the pro-British King and 
denounced the idea of a revolutionary overthrow of the neo-colonial State, while 
rank-and-file Brothers joined the ‚war of movement‛ of the newly emerging 
national-popular counter-bloc.490  
 However, the counter-bloc was not able to defeat the neo-colonial State. Even 
in the 1950s, the Egyptian working class in general – despite the emergence of 
independent trade unionism since the 1940s – was still relatively inexperienced 
and unorganized in comparison with its vanguard of textile workers. Workers 
were not able to develop a unitary, coherent, and centralized trade union 
movement, let alone a political hegemonic apparatus in less than a decade. 
Moreover, the workers’ movement remained isolated from the peasantry491 and 
lacked a unified leadership with a clear class point of view.492 Furthermore, the 
vacillating support of the Muslim Brotherhood for the emancipation of the 
subaltern classes;493 undermined the coherence and unity of the national-popular 
counter-bloc.494 Lastly, the Egyptian communist movement failed to constitute a 
genuine and systematic dialectical pedagogy between workers and other 
subaltern forces – such as farmers – and between organic and traditional 
intellectuals. Because of Stalinist dogmatism there was a tendency to subjugate 
the class struggle to the national liberation movement, as Joel Beinin explained: 
                                                          
490 Beinin and Lockman 1987: 389-94; Lia 1998: 270-1; Mitchell 1993: 34-90. 
491 In the context of Italy – with its dichotomy between an industrial North and an agricultural 
South – Gramsci had emphasized that the only way of overcoming both the capitalist exploitation 
and pre-capitalist ‚backwardness‛ of the Italian social formation was through the constitution of 
a united front between Northern workers and Southern peasants. (Gramsci 2005: 28) Despite 
many important differences, there are some striking similarities between Italy’s uneven and 
combined character in the early twentieth century, and the nature of the Egyptian social 
formation after the Second World War. As a hegemonic strategy, the construction of a counter-
bloc which incorporated the peasant masses seemed imperative in both cases. 
492 Beinin and Lockman 1987: 455. 
493 Ibid. 349-62. 
494 Ibid. 455. 
146 
 
Although historically the Marxist intelligentsia encouraged the formation of trade 
unions and other forms of working class organization and struggle, it also imposed 
its own agenda on the working class and consistently subordinated class struggle 
to the anti-imperialist national struggle< the immediate significance of the 
working class as a historical and political subject was considered to be its potential 
contribution as the vanguard of a national united front whose objective was to free 
Egypt from military occupation by Great Britain and economic domination by 
Europe and its local ‚feudalist‛ allies.495 
The counter-bloc that the communist movement imagined was based on an 
alliance between workers and the ‚progressive national bourgeoisie‛, a leftist-
nationalist hegemony, the domination of foreign and landed capital, and a 
strategy of accumulation based on ‚productive‛, ‚national‛ capitalism. Just as the 
nationalists before them, the communist intelligentsia assisted the emerging 
worker Subject in a colonizing way, appropriating its particular forms of activity, 
organization, and mobilization for its own purpose of national liberation. Beinin 
argued that by bereaving the workers’ movement of its own immanent Project: 
‚<the Marxist Left inadvertently contributed to the disorganization and disorientation of 
the labor movement during the regime of Abdel Nasser.‛496  
 Up to 1952 strikes, protests, riots and insurrections destabilized the neo-
colonial historical bloc. It disorganized the State, but it was not able to offer an 
alternative of its own. As the counter-bloc was not able to achieve civil and 
political hegemony, let alone conquer State power, the societal stalemate was 
forcefully resolved by mediation of a third force: the ‚Free Officers‛. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Nasserism 
The problem is to see whether in the dialectic ‚revolution/restoration‛ it is revolution or restoration 
which predominates; for it is certain that in the movement of history there is never anyturning back, 
and that restorations in toto do not exist. 
Gramsci on Caesarism, Prison Notebooks (1971: 219-220) 
The Nasserist Intervention 
A spontaneous popular insurrection on 25 January 1952 in Cairo led to a mass 
repression of trade union and communist leaders. Whereas the State’s violent 
coercion successfully weakened the proletarian vanguard of the national-popular 
bloc, it also revealed its own feeble grasp over Egypt’s ‚gelatinous‛ civil society. 
Lacking any significant ethico-political dimension to their rule, the dominant 
classes had to rely increasingly on coercion to control the population. However, 
sections of the Egyptian police and armed forces had also joined the counter-
hegemonic mobilization, weakening the domination by the neo-colonial bloc. 
After the 25 January insurrection, the rule of the neo-colonial classes had, for all 
purposes, ended, but their adversaries of the national-popular bloc were not able 
to fill the power vacuum. Central State power was disorganized, but not replaced. 
The political void lasted for six months until the so-called Free Officers of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
organized a coup on 23 July 1952.  
 The Free Officers appeared on the political scene as a deus ex machina, 
promising to forcefully solve Egypt’s Gordian knot. Most members of the RCC 
came from a petty-bourgeois background,497and their demands expressed the 
goals of the national-popular bloc.498 They formulated a ‚classic‛ program of 
national-democratic demands: democracy; social justice; abolishment of 
feudalism; establishment of a strong, national army; and full independence and 
sovereignty for Egypt.499 The main predicament for the nation’s development was 
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grasped as the twin evils of imperialism and feudalism, and the military clique 
around Nasser sought to create a new historical bloc that subjugated these social 
and political forces to their rule. 
 After the coup, a power struggle within the military clique ensued, which was 
expressed in terms of the character of the new national-popular bloc. Whereas 
Nasser dominated the RCC and the army, General Muhammad Naguib enjoyed 
the support of the Ikhwan, the Left, and the Wafd. Naguib aimed to reduce the 
military intervention to a minimum and advocated a return to civil rule. Nasser, 
however, claimed that this withdrawal represented a return to the societal 
stalemate. Only a strong, homogeneous, and centralized national-popular Project 
could overcome Egypt’s predicaments. Against pro-Naguib popular mass 
demonstrations, Nasser mobilized loyal trade union leaders, whom he integrated 
in the new State machine.500 The strike of the Cairo transport workers on 27-28 
March ‚<was a decisive contribution to the RCC’s ability to turn back the tide of 
popular opinion, consolidate the power of ‘Abd al-Nasir, and confirm the continuation of 
military rule.‛501 By 1954 Nasser emerged victorious and consolidated his rule.502 
National Sovereignty 
The ideology of the Nasserist bloc was to a large extent a continuation and 
expansion of the theory of the grassroots national-popular counter-bloc. The twin 
problems of imperialism and feudalism were understood as the consequences of 
geopolitical subordination and economic underdevelopment. In order to 
overcome feudalism, Egypt had to be industrialized. In order to industrialize, the 
nation had to be able to overcome its subaltern position within the world 
economy. Full national sovereignty was the key to overcoming Egypt’s 
predicament. 
 Although an agreement in 1954 between Egypt and Britain, to demilitarize and 
evacuate the Suez Canal region and revert control of the canal to the Egyptian 
State, stipulated a phased and conditional withdrawal of troops and personnel, 
Nasser had to achieve national sovereignty much quicker, if he wanted to 
consolidate his prestige as leader of the national-popular bloc. In addition, the 
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creation of Israel in 1948 and its consolidation as a nation state were perceived as 
a direct threat against Egyptian and Arab sovereignty. As a directive force, the 
Free Officers had to prove that they were able to defend the country against 
British and Israeli imperialist forces. The emerging bipolar world order offered 
Nasser a road to achieve these goals.  Both the USA and the USSR sought strong 
allies in the region against each other. Nasser aimed to balance between the two 
super powers, creating the necessary geopolitical space for national 
sovereignty.503 
 Concerning the ‚problem‛ of Israel, Nasser hoped to buy arms from the USA. 
However, his strong anti-Zionist stance blocked any possibility of USA Congress 
approving a sell of military material to Egypt. Nasser then turned to the USSR, 
which sold him weapons through the Czech arms deal in 1955. The following 
year the USA retaliated by withdrawing its financial support for the Aswan Dam 
project. Nasser immediately reacted with the nationalization of the Suez Canal. A 
tripartite of British, French and Israeli forces invaded Egypt in October 1956 to 
neutralize what they had come to perceive as a fundamental danger to their 
interests in the region. However, diplomatic and financial pressure by the USA, 
along with military threats by the Soviet Union, forced the tripartite to withdraw 
their forces.504  Even though the Egyptian military had been defeated, Nasser 
emerged victorious from the conflict, strengthening national sovereignty, the 
prestige of Egypt in the Arab world, and his own position within the new 
historical bloc. 
Politics of Development 
The Nasserist bloc aimed to overcome ‚feudalism‛ by industrial development 
and agricultural reforms. As early as September 1952 the new regime undertook a 
number of important rural reforms in its war against feudalism. Land size was 
capped to 200 feddans505 per owner and 300 per family. Subsequent land reforms 
in 1961, 1963, and 1969 redistributed some twelve percent of cultivable lands 
among landless and near landless fellahin.506 Rents were limited to seven times the 
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land tax.507 An agricultural minimum wage was implemented. Peasants gained 
the right of perpetual tenancy at controlled rents, which severely restricted the 
ownership rights of the feudal landlords. 508  The position of landlords in the 
agricultural credit cooperatives – which supervised ‚<cropping patters, input 
supplies, credit provision and marketing<‛509 – was replaced by State employees. 
This measure restricted the political influence of the landlords and formally 
excluded them as participants in the newly emerging Nasserist historical bloc.510 
 For the Free Officers, expropriation, land reform, and rent control served three 
interconnected goals: (1) weakening the economic power base of the monarchy 
and the feudal landlords;511 (2) increasing productivity in agriculture and freeing 
capital for industrial development;512 (3) gathering support from peasants for its 
own political project. 513  The land reforms did not eradicate the political and 
economic role of landlords in the Egyptian social formation, however: 
‚Dispossessed landowners received compensation, private property persisted, large 
landowners found ways of retaining their land: there was ultimately very little 
fundamental shift in the balance of political and economic power.‛514  
 In the Nasserist bloc, the rationale of industrial development was purely 
political and served to strengthen national sovereignty – an economic means to 
‚catch up‛ with the Western nations.515 At first, the State merely acted as the 
midwife of ‚spontaneous‛ industrial development by private actors.516 Roughly 
from 1954 until 1960 the State diligently defended the interests of the Egyptian 
industrial bourgeoisie.517The government encouraged both domestic and foreign 
industrial investments by lowering corporate taxes and relaxing protectionist 
measures. By establishing public-private committees – such as the Permanent 
Council for the Development of National Production – to steer national 
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development the State cast itself in the role of impartial facilitator.518 However, 
neither domestic nor foreign capitalists were interested in industrialization. 
Between 1950 and 1956 private investments dropped by 300 percent.519 Step by 
step the State itself was forced to take the economic initiative: ‚In 1952-1953, 72 
percent of gross capital formation took place in the private sector. By 1959-1960, the state 
was responsible for 74 percent of gross capital formation.‛520 
 Geopolitically-motivated foreign aid and economic assistance on the one hand, 
and the contingent sequestration of private assets on the other, allocated capital 
and expertise necessary for industrialization to the State, which became the 
primary economic actor. The building of the Aswan High Dam illustrated the 
logic of expanding State intervention in the economy. At first, the Free Officers 
aimed to encourage domestic private actors to invest in the project through the 
public-private committees mentioned above. The reluctance of the ‚indigenous‛ 
industrial capitalists to invest in a long-term project with a low rate of profit 
forced the State to turn to foreign capital. When a World Bank loan was blocked 
by the USA because of the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal in 1955, the State 
looked for other sources of revenue and expertise, which eventually led to the 
Suez Crisis of 1956-1957 and a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The 
sequestration of foreign assets after the Suez Crisis enabled the state to embark on 
an industrial plan that aimed to build a basic industry. In 1957 and 1958 Egypt 
received loans and technical know-how from the Soviet Union to build the High 
Dam.521  
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 In 1959 the First Five-Year Plan for the whole economy was formulated. The 
Plan acknowledged an already existing reality as it established the public sector 
as the dominant industrial producer and investor. The Egyptian textile sector 
spearheaded a project of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), which was 
expected to create a domestic demand for spinning and weaving machinery, 
which, in turn, needed locally produced iron and steel. Between 1952 and 1960 
the number of wage laborers working in manufacture increased with 23.5 percent 
– more than half of which were employed in the textile industry.522 
 An anti-Nasserist bourgeois revolt in Syria and the disinclination of the private 
sector to support the Five-Year Plan led to the Socialist Decrees of 1961, through 
which, at once, large-scale industry, banking, insurance, foreign trade, utilities, 
marine transport, airlines, many hotels and department stores were 
nationalized.523 Rather than a preconceived plan, the increasing role of the State 
and the expansion of the public sector was an unintended, but logical outcome of, 
on the one hand, the reluctance of domestic capital groups to support Nasser’s 
industrialization project and, on the other, the restructuring of geopolitics after 
the Second World War. The ‚Socialist‛ Decrees qualitatively deepened the 
intervention and direction of the political State in the economic structure, and 
connected this policy to that of the Soviet geopolitical bloc. Moreover, the 
‚socialist‛ turn of the Nasserist bloc also entailed a more profound integration of 
subaltern Subjects, especially industrial workers, into the authoritarian national-
popular Project. The key concept of ‚democratic cooperative socialism‛ was 
Egyptian and Arab unity, from which all other political and economic ideological 
notions, such as egalitarianism and social justice, were derived.524  
Prince or Pharaoh? 
Subsumption of the Worker Subject 
Despite their adherence to the Project of the national-popular bloc, the Free 
Officers forcefully blocked the independent development of its supporting social 
Subjects. Less than a month in power, the RCC government violently repressed a 
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strike at Kafr al-Dawwar, hanging two worker leaders.525 The worker Subject was 
integrated into the Nasserist bloc, but, under the slogan of ‚Unity, Order, and 
Labor‛526, in a colonizing way that obliterated its autonomous trade unionist 
organizations. Nasserist hegemony over the workers’ movement was secured by 
coercive consent: through a combination of unilateral and far-reaching social 
reforms, repression of organic intellectuals, and State-led corporatism, grassroots 
proletarian Subjectivities were subsumed under the top-down nationalist 
Subjectivity of the State’s Project.527 Strikes and independent worker actions were 
prohibited,528 but proletarian bargaining power – previously defended by the 
organically developed independent trade unions – was from 1957 on secured by 
the State-controlled General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (GFETU).529  
Labor historian Anne Alexander summarized the dual hegemonic role of the 
Nasserist unions in civil and political society: 
<as organs of social control they channelled benefits such as access to workplace-
based social welfare schemes to workers and worked hand in glove with state 
employers to enforce ‚social peace‛ within the workplace. As organs of political 
control they acted as an electoral machine for the ruling party, controlling 
nominations for the 50 percent of seats in parliament which were reserved for 
‚workers and peasants‛, and a mechanism for mobilising a stage army of 
apparently loyal regime supporters whenever the regime felt it needed to make a 
show of its ‚mass base‛. Consistent with both of these roles the trade union 
bureaucracy acted ruthlessly in concert with the repressive apparatus of the state 
to crush workers’ attempts to organise collective action and build their own 
independent organisations.530 
Unilateral concessions towards the workers’ social conditions softened class 
contradictions in the industrial sphere. In exchange for syndical and political 
passivity, the workers gained social reforms and rights such as a 42 hour 
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working-week, higher wages, social security, free healthcare, protection against 
arbitrary dismissal, and education.531 Even in the private sector, the government 
enforced minimum wage standards and protective laws.532 In the public sector, 
the introduction of workers’ participation or co-management had the objective of 
integrating the working class in the national project, softening class 
contradictions, and raising productivity. In reality it was participation without 
the right to debate or disagree. Industrial power relations did not change and the 
trade union leadership and the workers’ representatives were integrated in the 
State bureaucracy.533 The bureaucratization of the trade unions ‚<drained them of 
their fighting spirit, and made them incapable of confronting Sadat’s open door 
policy<‛534 The Nasserist hegemonic strategy of coercive consent vis-à-vis the 
working class would remain more or less in place until Mubarak’s neoliberal 
offensive in the 1990s. Marsha Posusney argued that: 
Although moving quickly to suppress workers’ protests with force, Egyptian 
authorities have almost always given in to some or all of the workers’ demands. At 
the same time, only the largest incidents are ever covered in the official press, and 
these are customarily blamed on outside agitators. Preventing any escalation of the 
protest and maintaining an image of national harmony and worker satisfaction 
seem to be far more important to Egypt’s rulers than minimizing financial 
concessions.535 
The reluctance of the bourgeoisie to play its part in the industrialization process 
and the rapprochement with the Soviet Union strengthened corporatist structures 
and stimulated an increasingly radicalizing anti-imperialist and socialistic 
rhetoric. The agent of ‚Arab socialism‛ was, in theory, the ‚alliance of working 
forces‛, consisting of peasants, wage workers, urban intellectuals and 
professionals, national capitalists, and the military. However, in practice, the 
popular masses were the object of authoritarian regime policies instead of an 
independent political actor. Despite the improved living conditions and social 
status536 of ‚the industrial worker‛ in Egyptian society, the proletarian Subject 
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was reduced to an economic-corporate state and a position of subalternity in the 
Nasserist bloc.  
Destruction of the Ikhwan 
Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi condemned the spontaneous popular uprising in 
Cairo on January 25 1952. Officially the Muslim Brotherhood did not support the 
insurrection, although individual members were active within the mass 
movement. The coup of the Free Officers was welcomed by the Supreme Guide as 
a means to solve the societal chaos, while rank-and-file Ikhwan saw the RCC as the 
harbinger of decolonization. Conversely, the Free Officers leaned on its support to 
deal blows to the Wafdist and communist movements. 537  In 1953 the new 
government banned all parties except for the Brotherhood, which remained loyal 
to the RCC. The Ikhwan were asked to join the unitary ‚Liberation Rally‛ party, 
and as a token of goodwill al-Hudaybi dissolved the Society’s paramilitary 
‚Secret Apparatus‛ and kicked its leaders out of the organization. During the 
power struggle between Nasser and Naguib in late 1953 and 1954, the 
Brotherhood first sided with Naguib, but then switched to the Nasser camp.538 In 
exchange for its support, the Brotherhood demanded an Islamic constitution, 
democratic institutions, freedom of press, and an end to emergency law. As 
Nasser was not inclined to share power, a number of Ikhwan members secretively 
founded a new paramilitary cell, which tried to assassinate the President on 26 
October 1954. The attempt failed, but it gave Nasser a perfect alibi to eliminate the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a competitor for power.539 
 During the wave of repression that began in 1954 the Society broke up into 
three parts. A first group consisted of Ikhwan militants who were imprisoned. 
Their main leader and ideologue was Sayyid Qutb, who translated the 
experiences of torture and abuse in the camps in a radicalization of the 
Brotherhood’s worldview. For him, the inhumanity and violence of the prison 
keepers signified that they were no longer Muslims, but idolizers of the Nasserist 
State.540 According to Qutb, contemporary Muslim societies, even though they 
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claimed to be Islamic, were (still) in a state of jahiliyya: religious ignorance.541 The 
traditional reformist strategy of the Brotherhood was doomed to fail in a context 
of jahiliyya and had to be replaced by an intellectual and a collective jihad: a moral, 
intellectual and political Project of personal and societal Islamization. A vanguard 
of righteous Islamists should educate the masses until the majority of Muslims 
participated in the Islamic Project.542  
 A second group was comprised of Muslim Brothers who were not detained but 
nonetheless remained in Egypt. They were led by Zaynab al-Ghazali and Abd al-
Fattah Ismail, who reorganized the movement according to the reformist ideals of 
Hassan al-Banna.  
 A third faction, under the guidance of Shukri Mustafa, founded the takfir wa-l-
hijra group whose members advocated either a physical or ideological escape 
from jahiliyya; either they withdrew from their community, or they continued to 
participate while hiding their nature as ‚true‛ Muslims.543  
 A fourth group migrated to the Gulf countries, where they were strongly 
influenced by the social conservatism of Wahhabism. Those who became 
successful businessmen returned to Sadat’s Egypt in the 1970s, constituting the 
backbone of the ‚Islamic‛ bourgeoisie.544 
 The inability or unwillingness of Nasser to integrate the Muslim Brotherhood 
into his authoritarian historical bloc would lead to its resurgence, almost ex nihilo, 
under Sadat in the 1970s. The repression and sundering of the Brotherhood in the 
1950s and 1960s laid the foundation of the three ‚modern‛ forms of Islamism in 
Egypt: Qutb’s radical Islamism mutated into jihadism; the apolitical reformism of 
takfir wa-l-hijra transformed into puritanical salafism; and petro-Islam grew into 
bourgeois Islamism. Lastly, the civil-democratic movement of the 2000s and the 
25 January Revolution of 2011 rallied a fourth and almost forgotten form of 
‚social movement‛ Islamism that had its historical roots in the pre-Nasserist 
national-popular bloc. 
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Nasser and the Left 
As a ‚new‛ and ‚unexpected‛ phenomenon, the Nasserist coup and the 
formation of the authoritarian national-popular bloc sowed confusion among the 
Egyptian Left. The largest communist organization, the Democratic Movement 
for National Liberation (DMNL) supported the Free Officers in 1952, as it saw 
them as an anti-imperialist force. 545  The government’s subsequent violent 
crackdown on communist activists pushed the movement into the opposition 
camp. Unilateral labor reforms in December 1952, and the subsumption of trade 
unionist leaderships under the new Liberation Rally party, however, weakened 
the class base of communist and leftist nationalist political activists, which had 
united in the National Democratic Front (NDF).546 As I discussed before, in 1954 
Nasser used the subsumed trade unions as a social force in the streets against the 
popular demonstrations that called for a democratization of the regime. This 
episode demonstrated clearly the distorted class base of the new Nasserist bloc. 
 By 1956 the RCC had distanced itself from the USA and moved towards a 
position of ‚non-alignment‛. All communist factions agreed to support Nasser’s 
Project. There was a clear tendency among communists to subordinate the 
struggle for democracy and socialism to the formation of a ‚popular front‛ 
against imperialism. The only substantial political difference between nationalists 
and communists was the latter’s emphasis on the vanguard role of the working 
class.547 However, a conflict between Nasser and the Iraqi communists in 1958 
created a divide within the Egyptian communist movement, with a majority 
taking the side of their Iraqi comrades.548  
 The Nasserite’s bloc ‚socialist turn‛ from 1960 onwards, was devised by 
Nasser as a political instrument to counterbalance the right, especially the 
influence of the old elites. Even though the old elites were bereft of formal 
political power and direct control over the State apparatus, the military clique 
had not completely destroyed the economic base of their class power. Private 
capital withdrew itself in the economic domains of landed property, real estate, 
internal trade, and construction. Their grip over the countryside, as well as new 
alliances with high-ranked officers and bureaucrats, enabled the old ruling classes 
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to influence the political decision making process through informal networks and 
channels. Changes in the internal political make-up of the regime – such as the 
formation of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962, the foundation of a Marxist 
cadre school (Egyptian Socialist Youth) in 1965, and the removal of pro-capitalist 
ministers from government – accompanied socialistic economic initiatives and 
improved relations with the Soviet Union.549 When in 1964 communist prisoners 
were released, the two biggest communist organizations voluntarily dissolved 
themselves into the ASU. 550 
 As long as the Nasserist State was able to ‚nourish‛ its subaltern allies into an 
economic-corporate state by social and economic reforms, by building its 
hegemonic apparatus, and by presenting itself as capable of leading Egyptian 
society forward, it remained a hegemonic force. However, the internal economic 
contradictions of the system and the loss of political prestige in the 1967 Six Day 
War, caused the slow breakdown of the Nasserist bloc.551 
 Today, leftist activists are still wrestling with the political heritage of 
Nasserism, for the regime appeared as both a social revolutionary and a political 
reactionary force. For example, Geber Serkis, a leader of the Arab Democratic 
Nasserist Party in Mahalla, claimed that: 
 Gamal Abd al-Nasser, when he was the President of Egypt, gave [the workers] a 
lot of rights and he made many laws to support and help them, for example he gave 
them a margin of the profits and allowed them to participate in the boards of the 
companies and factories and the leadership of the trade unions. One of the most 
important points in Nasserist program is the defense of the workers... Gamal Abd 
al-Nasser established that 50 percent of parliament should consist of workers and 
farmers. Today this is no longer the case, but during Nasser’s regime they were 
real workers and farmers.552 
Whereas Abir Mehdawi, a young leftist journalist, denied Nasser any progressive 
role: 
He arrested and detained my grandfather, he was against all forms of protest and 
opposition and locked many people away. He promised a big change in the 
economy, in civic liberties, etc, but in the end he did nothing. Under King Farouk 
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society was more free, although, of course, there was the British occupation. The 
last real national uprising was under Saad Zaghlul. When Naguib took power, it 
seemed he was alright. Nasser fucked up and showed Sadat and Mubarak after him 
the way.553 
I also remember a discussion with a group of young leftist activists in May 2009 
during a gathering in Afaaq Ishtirakiyya (Socialist Horizons), the NGO-type front 
organization of the illegal Egyptian Communist Party. Some youth, both socialists 
and left-nationalists, defended Nasser because of his welfare and anti-imperialist 
politics. For them, Nasser remained a mobilizing symbol of socialism and 
liberation, and this iconicity was physically present in the offices of Afaaq 
Ishtirakiya and Tagammu. In fact, our debate had started because of the saliency of 
his picture on the wall. The intellectual roots of this ‚positive‛ perspective could 
be traced back to 1960s and 1970s narratives of Nasserism and similar 
‚interventions‛ in the region that, in general, presented the military as a 
progressive and transformative force.554 In the absence of a strong, progressive, 
national bourgeoisie the ‚modern‛ military – and its petty bourgeois class base555 
– was the only social force that could and would substitute itself for the national-
democratic and anti-colonial Subject. 
 Other leftists in Afaaq Ishtirakiyya claimed that Nasser laid the foundations of 
the authoritarianism of Sadat and Mubarak, and that he was rather a tyrant than a 
liberator. Yet in their denouncing of Nasserism they unintentionally shared with 
the intellectuals from the liberal tradition a utopian vision of the pre-Nasserist 
constitutional monarchy, which was presented as a period of civil rights, 
freedom, and democracy. Their arguments were derived from the political and 
academic critiques of the developmental, military556, and democratic failures of 
the ‚Arab socialist‛ States that emerged from the 1970s onwards.557 
 Lastly, a few militants advanced a more circumspect image of Nasserism, 
pointing towards the dual character of the authoritarian popular bloc. This 
ambiguity is echoed by liberal intellectuals such as the novelist Alaa al-Aswany: 
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I do not think it was a coup, rather a coup supported by a real revolution. Nasser 
was a great leader and he did very positive things for Egypt. I cannot feel it myself 
because I am coming from the upper-middle class in Egypt; I was educated in 
French schools, and my parents and grandparents could always afford to give me 
the best education, but many Egyptian had for the first time the opportunity to 
enjoy a good education, healthcare, food, because of Nasser’s revolution. So I don’t 
think it’s fair to forget this. But also we shouldn’t forget that the current 
dictatorship and regime is based on Nasser. Everything: the security state, the 
control system, the elections< everything is based on this regime. The irony is 
that he established a dictatorship while he didn’t need it. Nasser was supported to 
the extent that in any free elections he would have easily gained a majority. That 
was not the case with the presidents who came after him. He was the one who built 
the dictatorship machine. And the problem with this machine is that everyone can 
use it. Everything is ready for the dictatorship, the security, the torture. If you are 
in the driving seat you just push the button and the regime will keep on 
running.558 
Al-Aswany offered us a glimpse of the contradictions that were at the core of the 
Nasserist bloc. The birth of the regime was ‚a coup supported by a real 
revolution‛. These two contradictory forces constituted the nature of the 
Nasserist bloc.  
Passive Revolution? 
With regard to the Nasserist intervention, neither ‚coup‛ nor ‚revolution‛ appear 
as sufficient and adequate concepts to understand the contradictory 
phenomenon. According to Omnia al-Shakry, the Nasserist intervention was a 
‚passive revolution‛: 
This social welfare model can be seen as a Faustian bargain in which ‚the people‛ 
exchanged democratic political liberties and a more radical restructuring of the 
social order for social welfare programs that deflected attention away from the 
restructuring of class relations, by emphasizing the piecemeal and palliative 
reforms for the laboring classes. In other words, it was a passive revolution.559 
I do not agree with al-Shakry. The term ‚passive revolution‛ was first deployed 
by Gramsci to understand the Risorgimento as a process of revolutionizing but 
non-revolutionary self-transformation of the Italian State. Afterwards, he 
expanded its meaning: ‚The concept of passive revolution, it seems to me, applies not 
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only to Italy but also to those countries that modernize the state through a series of 
reforms or national wars without undergoing a political revolution of a radical Jacobin-
type.‛560 Passive revolution came to denote a whole epoch of bourgeois class rule 
after the failed revolutions of 1848. In this period the revolutionary optimism of 
the bourgeoisie was shattered by the spontaneous uprisings of the same subaltern 
classes that had supported its coming to power in 1789. The revolts revealed the 
particular interests behind the bourgeoisie’s ‚universal‛ political project, but the 
subaltern Subjects were unable to forge a hegemony of their own, leaving the 
ruling classes in power. Losurdo summarized the meaning of ‚passive 
revolution‛ as:  
<the persistent capacity of initiative of the bourgeoisie which succeeds, even in the 
historical phase in which it has ceased to be a properly revolutionary class, to 
produce socio-political transformations, sometimes of significance, conserving in 
its own hands power, initiative and hegemony, and leaving the working classes in 
their condition of subalternity.561 
Furthermore, Morton explained the connection between the phenomenon of 
passive revolution on the national and the international ‚level‛ from the 
perspective of uneven and combined development: 
Instances of different passive revolution can thus be understood as part of a 
cumulative process of historically linked state formation moments within the world 
market order of capitalism and the international states-system. Incorporated 
comparison encapsulates the method of viewing processes of passive revolution as 
specific instances of state transition that are internally related through the 
general world-historical conditions of uneven and combined development. 
Different historically peculiar national processes of passive revolution across the 
postcolonial world can therefore be traced as connected variants within the 
international conditions of world capitalism.562  
Returning to the Egyptian case, in a superficial analysis it would be tempting to 
label Nasserism as a passive revolution. The outcome of Nasserism and Gramsci’s 
passive revolution was the same: ‚The result was a process of fundamental social 
change but without an attempt to embrace the interests of subordinate classes.‛563 
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 For Gramsci, however, passive revolution was the ability of the bourgeoisie to 
continue to reform the State in an era where its ethico-political legitimacy had 
been compromised. The transformation of the Italian and German social 
formations in the nineteenth century were passive revolutions because they were 
presided by a cynical capitalist class lacking a radical Jacobinian faction. 
Conversely, the Nasserist intervention was rather a partisan political act of 
Jacobinians who were not supported by their own bourgeoisie. The Nasserist 
Project may have been an authoritarian and a colonizing one, but it certainly had 
a strong ethico-political dimension up until the Six Day War of 1967. Passive 
revolutions are characterized by a weak hegemony; in fact, the main reason why a 
‚passively revolutionizing‛ ruling class can cling to power is because of its 
successful fragmentation of oppositional Subjects. Returning to al-Aswany’s 
telling comment that: ‚Nasser was supported to the extent that in any free elections he 
would have easily gained a majority‛ – it becomes clear that the Nasserist bloc, 
despite its coercive practices, constituted a powerful hegemony.564 
 Lastly, from a global perspective, Nasserism was part of the tide of national 
liberation movements in the Third World, which saw the construction of national-
popular blocs in the whole capitalist periphery. For many nations in the Global 
South, the real moment of passive revolution came in the 1970s, with the 
breakdown of Fordism in the West and the rise of neoliberal transnational blocs. 
Sadat, and not Nasser, represented the beginning of passive revolution in Egypt.  
 In order to understand the Nasserist intervention as a coup and a revolution, 
and as a transformation ‚initiated from above‛, but ‚supported from below‛, a 
concept is needed that expresses the contradictory character of the process. I 
argue that Gramsci offered such a concept in the shape of ‚Caesarism‛.565 
Caesarism 
In The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx analyzed the process in which a State or State-
faction bereaves the ruling classes of its direct and formal political power. The 
State appears to balance between the classes and gains a level of autonomy vis-à-
vis its constituent class. However, it still articulates the interests of the ruling class 
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and acts as its diligent guardian. Gramsci elaborated upon the concept of 
‚Bonapartism‛ through his concept of ‚Caesarism‛, which:  
<can be said to express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each 
other in a catastrophic manner; that is to say, they balance each other in such a 
way that continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal 
destruction. When the progressive force A struggles with the reactionary force B, 
not only may A defeat B or B defeat A, but it may happen that neither A nor B 
defeats the other – that they bleed each other mutually and then a third force C 
intervenes from outside, subjugating what is left of both A and B.566 
Gramsci noted that there were ‚progressive‛ and ‚reactionary‛ forms of 
Caesarism:  
Caesarism is progressive when its intervention helps the progressive force to 
triumph, albeit with its victory tempered by certain compromises and limitations. 
It is reactionary when its intervention helps the reactionary force to triumph – in 
this case too with certain compromises and limitations, which have, however, a 
different value, extent, and significance than in the former.567  
Moreover, he distinguished between the ‚classic‛, military form of Caesarism in 
nations without a fully developed civil and political society, and the modern type 
that can be brought about by the financial and political power of small groups or 
individuals.568  Lastly, he discussed the difference between ‚quantitative‛ and 
‚qualitative‛ Caesarism. Whereas qualitative Caesarism changed and developed 
the form of the State, its quantitative variant was content with a mere 
continuation of existing State practices.569 
 Gramsci’s understanding of Caesarism helps to elucidate the ambiguous and 
contradictory character of Nasserism. The Free Officers’ intervention was an act 
of Caesarism because, as a semi-independent, ‚external‛ force, it was finally able 
to end the power struggle between the national-popular and the neo-colonial bloc 
– a fight that had remained undecided in the decade after the Second World War. 
The Free Officers’ coup was anticipated by years of social and political upheaval 
and the building of mass movements. Perhaps there was not yet a revolution, but 
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there was certainly a revolutionary movement and a movement towards 
revolution. Instead of the organic completion of the revolution, the coup captured 
central State power before the masses had matured into a Subject that could 
challenge the State. The Nasserist intervention ‚deflected‛570 the revolution, and 
cut off the development of the popular masses towards a coherent political 
Subject: instead it offered its authoritarian direction as an alternative to the 
embryonic movement towards self-determination. Whatever the intentions or 
motives of the RCC, noble or opportunistic, its political intervention obstructed 
the development of the spontaneous mass movement as an activity-system with 
as its goal the revolutionary overthrow of the neo-colonial bloc. 
 The coup was relatively progressive, because the RCC took the side of the 
popular masses against feudalist and imperialist forces. This was reflected in the 
‚national-democratic‛ program of the Free Officers’ and their subsequent policies 
of land reform, welfare, and education, which favored the subaltern classes.  
 Lastly, Nasserism was a qualitative form of Caesarism, as it transformed the 
Egyptian social formation in a revolutionary way. Industrialization went hand in 
hand with the massification of education and political mobilization. Although the 
Free Officers had delivered the death blow to the old neo-colonial bloc by using 
military force, they could and would not base their rule solely on coercion. In 
order to subsume the population into its authoritarian nationalist Project, the 
State first had to create the terrain of a modern civil society. The absorption of the 
existing, underdeveloped modern civil society, together with lingering pre-
modern social forms into an expanding and developing political society also 
entailed the ‚massification‛ of these structures and practices. The political State 
created mass trade unions, professional syndicates, public companies, universities 
and schools, women, youth, and children organizations, cultural clubs, peasant 
associations, et cetera; drawing, for the first time in Egypt’s history, the majority 
of the population into the activity of a – tightly state-controlled – mass civil 
society. Just as the colonial era had produced the effendiyya, the expansion of 
modern education under Nasserism created a fresh layer of intellectuals who 
were embedded within the nationalist Project. Farida Na’ash stressed that women 
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were included as participants of civil and political life: ‚There are three areas where 
women gained new rights during Nasser: political rights, the right to work and the right 
to be educated. Education was free during Nasser’s time and so all the poor people sent 
their daughters to the schools.‛571 
 The Nasserist intervention initiated the development of a particular type of the 
modern integral State. The rule of the military clique was not only based upon its 
military domination, but also on its prestige and its economic and political 
direction of the Egyptian social formation. Similar to the French bourgeois State 
that emerged triumphantly from the revolution of 1789, the Nasserist project 
contained an ethico-political dimension, expressed in its populist, nationalist, 
‚tiermondist‛ and eventually ‚Arab socialist‛ ideology, which mobilized and 
inspired the masses.  
 Despite its character as a progressive and qualitative Caesarism, from the 
perspective of the development of the working class as a Subject, the Nasserist era 
was a throwback. Blunden pointed out that, when the direct needs of a Subject, 
appropriate to its current SSoD, are met, this constitutes a constraint on its self-
determination, and a developmental pathology may develop.572 The combination 
of an atomization of the proletarian Subject and a paternalist ‚softening‛ of its 
economic predicament, led to an improvement of the immediate living conditions 
of the Egyptian workers, but, at the same time, it obstructed the autonomous 
development of the labor force as a social and political agent. Workers were 
reduced to the passive clients of what Draper called ‚octroyal socialism‛: ‚<the 
handing-down of changes from above, as against their conquest from below.‛ 573  The 
capture of the State apparatus allowed Nasser to keep the form of the national-
popular counter-bloc, while radically transforming its internal balance of power 
through a combination of coercion and consent. The embryonic hegemonic 
apparatuses of the working class were destroyed. Worker leaders were detained, 
independent political and trade union organizations outlawed.  
 Nasser was not a ‚proletarian Prince‛, but his rise to power on the waves of 
revolution and mass mobilization necessarily transformed him into a ‚popular 
Pharaoh‛. While the subaltern classes were politically subordinated to the 
military dictatorship, the regime itself was heir to the class forces that generated 
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it. Nasserism was a product of revolutionary, popular mobilization and the 
dictatorship could not abandon its social base without forfeiting its ethico-
political dimension. 
State Capitalism 
Pushing back both the forces of domestic feudalism and foreign imperialism, 
Nasserist progressive and qualitative Caesarism temporarily created a space for 
State-led accumulation and the development of the productive forces in Egypt. 
The rationale of Nasserist ‚state capitalism‛574 was the inverse of the historical 
logic of capital in Western Europe. In Egypt, the goal of national development 
was pursued through the means of State-led capital accumulation, whereas in 
Western Europe the development of the productive forces was a by-product of 
profit-driven private accumulation.  
 Ironically, Nasser’s ‚Arab socialism‛ proved to be the most efficient way to 
appropriate and embed pre-capitalist social forms in capitalist relations of 
production. 575  State-led industrialization, construction, and land reclamation 
projects absorbed the surplus population from the countryside and turned 
peasants into modern wage laborers. Between 1961 and 1967 the propertyless 
workforce increased from six to 7.3 million.576 This process of formal subsumption 
of labor under capital – the expansion of wage labor – was complemented with a 
real subsumption of labor under capital: the transformation and modernization of 
the labor process and the methods of production themselves thanks to the influx 
of new sources of capital and technical expertise. 577  Real subsumption was 
introduced as a series of ‚political‛ State measures, instead of being the 
spontaneous ‚economic‛ outcome of a historical process. In order to maintain the 
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rate of accumulation 578  the State had to dynamically reinvest the economic 
surplus and continuously revolutionize the means of production.579 
 The logic of the ISI strategy demanded capital-intensive industries, which, in 
their early stage of development, lacked the capacity to export competitive 
commodities. Despite the unintended process of ‚accumulation by 
dispossession‛580 – the sequestration of foreign assets in 1956 and 1959 – and the 
loans and aid from the Soviet Union that had injected the Egyptian economy with 
a few strong, but limited, doses of capital, the State needed a steady source of 
surplus in order to perpetually expand and innovate its industries. State income 
could, in theory, be increased through an unequal exchange between agriculture 
and industry. Nasserist anti-feudal land reforms were aimed at creating a layer of 
small scale capitalist farmers, who would raise productivity and, in turn, generate 
a higher surplus, which could be diverted to Egypt’s nascent industries through 
taxation. The regime replaced the control and surplus extraction of the feudal 
landlords with centralized cooperatives that ‚became the principal instrument for 
channeling resources out of agriculture toward industrial projects‛.581 Although land 
productivity did not rise significantly a fraction of former feudal rents were now 
invested in industrial activities. 582  However, because large landowners were 
allowed to sell the lands that exceeded the 200 faddan limit, soon a new class of 
rich peasants came into being, which controlled the credit cooperatives and 
allocated State funds to their own economic activities. In addition, uneven 
taxation of crops led to reallocation of peasant resources to other crops.583 State 
capitalism began to dissolve feudal relations in the countryside, but it did not 
succeed in fully subjugating the agricultural sector to the interests of industrial 
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capital. Moreover, the unequal exchange between industry and agriculture, 
necessary to maintain the industrial rate of accumulation, undermined the 
attempts at increasing agricultural productivity.  
 Another strategy was augmenting the extraction of surplus-value in the 
industries itself: i.e. increased exploitation by extending the work day and/or 
reducing real wages. This, however, went against the core of the Nasserist 
national-popular Project. 
Organic Crisis II 
Nasser’s progressive and qualitative Caesarism was an inherently unstable and 
transitional configuration. Firstly, there was a contradiction between the class 
nature of the regime and its State capitalist logic of accumulation. The State had to 
carry out a difficult balancing act between, on the one hand, securing political 
consent from its popular base through its ‚octroyal socialism‛, and, on the other, 
allocating sufficient resources for its project of modernization: the State’s 
expansive ‚populist consumption policy‛ stood in contradiction to the 
‚investment demands of developmentalism‛.584 The industrializing ambitions of 
the regime necessitated an economic rationale of labor discipline, high 
productivity, and low wages. This logic conflicted with the interests of its social 
base – peasants, workers, and modern urban professionals – that demanded 
workers’ control (or at least real participation), reduction in working hours, and 
high wages. The socialistic rhetoric of the regime perversely exacerbated this 
contradiction, as it encouraged the popular masses to defend their social rights:585 
While the First Five-Year Plan was a success, growth rates almost halved during 
the Second Five-Year Plan (1965-70). 586  As the corporatist consensus put job 
security and full employment high on the agenda, industrial productivity was 
fettered by a high ratio of variable capital, rising fixed costs and under-capacity. 
From 1965 onwards, it became obvious that the system could not sustain both 
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capital-intensive industrialization and high levels of consumption.587 The regime 
was reluctant to cut consumption after a brief and much contested experiment in 
1965.588 Nasserist Caesarism then briefly turned to the ‚left‛ to counterbalance 
rightist layers of the state bureaucracy and their bourgeois allies who called for 
economic liberalization. However, the defeat of Egypt in the Six Day War in 1967 
weakened Nasser’s position and halted the leftist turn: prices and taxes were 
increased; the workweek was increased from 42 to 48 hours without 
compensation; forced savings were deducted from monthly wages; paid holidays 
were cancelled; et cetera.589 
 Secondly, the partial and authoritarian statization of the economy generated a 
tendency towards private capital accumulation and a ‚self-privatization‛ of the 
public sector. Egypt’s economy was never fully nationalized, and pockets of 
private accumulation continued to exist in agriculture, trade and some industrial 
sectors. Although the rural elite had lost lands, it was able to continue its 
domination of the countryside through traditional networks and the new 
government cooperatives. Because domestic trade was left relatively free and 
prices of consumer goods were only influenced through subsidies, commercial 
capitalists flourished.590 The industrial bourgeoisie developed new activities to 
accumulate capital, especially as subcontractors for the government. Without the 
full liquidation of the private sector, the growth of the public sector stimulated a 
proportional expansion of the subcontracting companies. 591  State capitalism 
strengthened private capitalists within its protective womb,592 who, ironically, 
favored more liberal economic policies.593    
 Thirdly, without any democratic supervision over the economy, the powerful 
State bureaucracy gained ever more the Subjectivity of an independent ruling 
class, treating the ‚public‛ sector as its own property. 594  However, as a 
bureaucracy cannot reproduce itself legally as a private class it has to find 
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footholds outside the ‚public‛ sphere to safeguard its private interests. 595 
Nasserist State capitalism was transitional because in the long run it had ‚an 
inherent tendency to divert resources to private hands< and therefore it paved the road 
for economic liberalization irrespective of the intentions of its political leaders.‛596 This 
tendency was reinforced by the appointment of former owners of private 
companies, such as construction mogul Osman Ahmed Osman, as managers of 
public companies.597 State capitalism stimulated the State bureaucracy to develop 
into some type of private capitalist class, and, conversely, existing private 
capitalists to (re)capture State power.598 
 Lastly, these endogenous contradictions were exacerbated by the war in Yemen 
(1963-67) and the disastrous Six Day War with Israel (1967). 599 The Nasserist bloc 
barely survived the defeat, probably more due to the fragmentation of its 
discontents than the strength of the post-war consensus.600 The national-popular 
Project was in shambles, and the Nasserist bloc fell back on its core actors: the 
State apparatus; the bureaucratic and technocratic middle classes; and the army. 
To secure their support, the import policy was changed, granting these groups 
expanded access to luxury consumer goods. Moreover, the first 
denationalizations were carried through in mid-1968, and licenses for private 
production quadrupled between 1967 and 1969. Incentives were given to the rural 
bourgeoisie to increase agricultural production.601  
 After the Six Day War the political optimism of the Nasserist epoch 
transformed into cynicism. The dream of ‚Arab socialism‛ was shattered and the 
State had lost its ethico-political dimension. The war and subsequent organic 
crisis forced the Nasserist bloc to change its accumulation strategy and the 
composition of its class alliances. Without the wholesale abolition of the private 
sector, the full liquidation of the old ruling classes, and the implementation of 
popular democracy, 602  Nasserist Caesarism was caught between the logic of 
accumulation and the interests of its class base. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Sadat’s Passive Revolution 
Egypt can claim to have pioneered neoliberalism in the Global South 
Alex Callinicos (2011) 
Passive Revolution 
Political Reform 
Even though a democratization of the State was out of the question for the ruling 
Caesarist clique, at the end of the 1960s there was a debate on the manner in 
which the economic crisis had to be solved. One faction proposed to reinforce the 
Nasserist historical bloc by a further radicalization of the ‚socialist‛ aspect of the 
regime; i.e. the full nationalization and statization of the economy. This strategy 
of accumulation was opposed by classes and social groups who wished to 
strengthen private actors through the liberalization of trade, the privatization of 
public companies, and the attraction of foreign investment:603 wealthy landlords; 
pre-Nasserist industrial capitalists who had become managers of public 
companies; bureaucratic State elites that had emerged during the Nasserist era; 
high-ranking army officers; and commercial capitalists who wanted to expand 
their activities. 
 When in 1970 Sadat became president, he supported the neoliberal strategy of 
accumulation and continued the process of economic liberalization and 
privatization that had already begun under Nasser. Unlike Nasser, however, 
Sadat leaned heavily on private capital groups in order to ‚solve‛ the problems 
that the Egyptian economy faced. The Nasserist political superstructure had 
become an obstacle for Sadat’s policies and during the ‚Corrective Revolution‛ of 
1971-1972 the state apparatus was cleansed from the influence of Marxists and 
Nasserists such as Ali Sabry and Sharawy Gomaa. Because of the weakness of the 
‚socialist‛ faction in the State apparatus and the economic-corporate state of the 
working class, the Right obtained a swift victory over the bureaucratic Nasserist 
Left, which was uncomfortable with mobilizing the masses.604 In 1976 the ASU 
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was hacked up in a ‚left‛, ‚center‛, and ‚right‛ platform, which became 
independent parties: the National Progressive Unionist Party or Rally Party 
(Tagammu); the Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (EASP); and the al-Ahrar party. In 
1977-78 Sadat created the National Democratic Party (NDP), which became, after 
its forced merger with EASP, the de facto ruling party of Egypt.605 The new course 
was presented as a democratic revolution: ‚supremacy of law, the state of 
institutions, the establishment of freedoms, and respect for the constitution‛.606  
Civil Caesarism 
The ‚democratic revolution‛ constituted the legitimization of a reduction and 
reconfiguration of the position of the military in the historical bloc. Nasser had 
already attempted to decrease the power base of the military within the 
authoritarian national-popular bloc by strengthening the position of the Interior 
Ministry and expanding its tasks and responsibilities. However, through the 
influential and charismatic figure of Field Marshal Amer, the military was able to 
continue its domination of domestic security until the Six Day War of 1967. 
Nasser used Amer’s fall and the tainted prestige of the Armed Forces to reduce 
the army’s authority to purely military matters. From 1967 onwards, the balance 
of power shifted from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Interior. To 
compensate for the military’s retreat to the barracks and to counterbalance its 
power, the President created Al-Amn al-Markazi, the (General Security and) 
Central Security Forces (CSF).607 The CSF became a ‚civil army‛ of some 300,000 
conscripted troops. In addition, the civil Amn al-Dawla, the General Investigations 
Department, was charged with internal repression. Whereas the CSF was 
established as a direct and straightforward coercive State instrument to beat up 
and fragmentize mass protests and strikes, General Investigations engaged in the 
selective detainment and torture of activists and political leaders. 608  Sadat 
expanded these civil apparatuses and developed them into the coercive tools of 
his new neoliberal Project. 
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 After the Camp David negotiations of 1978, the Armed Forces not only lost 
their political, but also their military function within the new bloc. To appease the 
officers, Sadat granted them economic concessions, as Paul Amar explained:  
<the military has been marginalized since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
signed the Camp David Accords with Israel and the United States. Since 1977, the 
military has not been allowed to fight anyone. Instead, the generals have been 
given huge aid payoffs by the USA. They have been granted concessions to run 
shopping malls in Egypt, develop gated cities in the desert and beach resorts on the 
coasts. And they are encouraged to sit around in cheap social clubs.609 
From Caesarist overlords, the generals degenerated into petty capitalists, whose 
mediocre surpluses were artificially shielded from private and public 
competition. The multi-party system was but a democratic façade for Sadat’s civil 
dictatorship.610 
Infitah 
During Sadat’s reign, military Caesarism turned into a civil dictatorship. Despite 
Sadat’s attempts at establishing Islam and bourgeois democracy as new 
ideological forms, the integral State lost its ethico-political dimension. A cynical 
epoch of ‚passive revolution‛ began, in which the ruling elites aimed to radically 
transform the economic structure without consent of their erstwhile popular 
allies.611 The rule of the Caesarists was no longer determined by their leadership, 
but by their ability to maintain the economic-corporate fragmentation of 
subaltern Subjects.612  Sadat’s new historical bloc was designed as an alliance 
between military generals, State bureaucrats, public sector managers, powerful 
landlords, subcontractors, new layers of private commercial and financial 
bourgeoisie, Islamic students, foreign capitalist investors, and the USA. 
 From the 1970s onwards, the passive revolution took on an offensive form. 
Large landowners were able to reclaim some of their sequestered lands and 
agricultural rents were raised for the first time since 1952.613 Private companies 
were legally protected against nationalization, public-private enterprises were 
regulated as private instead of public companies, and a number of ‚free economic 
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zones‛ were created that offered beneficial labor and tax conditions to foreign 
investors.614 As the national bourgeoisie was too weak to force an Israeli retreat 
from the Sinai, Sadat had to court the United States in order to solve the 
important question of the occupied lands. A reorientation of foreign policy, away 
from the Soviet Union and towards the USA, was a crucial addition to Sadat’s 
domestic political realignment. The October War of 1973 improved Sadat’s 
nationalist credentials in the short term, and allowed him in the long term to 
negotiate a separate peace with Israel, switch sides in the bipolar world order, 
and become a loyal client state of the USA.  
 In 1974 the President announced the Infitah (Open Door Policy), a program of 
economic and political liberalization and reintegration in the capitalist world 
market, aimed at attracting foreign investment.615 The Infitah was accompanied by 
huge loans from the Arab oil states and the USA, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) demanded that the Egyptian state devalued the pound and cut 
subsidies on basic consumer goods.  
 The Infitah was the explicit declaration of a new strategy of accumulation that 
reoriented Egypt’s domestic economic structure towards neoliberal changes in the 
global economy.616Sadat pioneered the emerging worldwide passive revolution of 
neoliberalism in the Global South by his transformation of the Nasserist historical 
bloc.617 However, the penetration (aptly named Infitah) and articulation of global 
neoliberalism in the Egyptian social formation failed to live up to its expectations. 
Despite a high economic growth of eight percent between 1975-82, foreign 
investment was little and almost solely directed towards the development of 
tourism and the new private financial sector. Privatization and liberalization of 
State companies, coupled with a high inflation, led to deindustrialization, jobless 
growth, an increase of unemployment and a decrease of real wages.618  
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Workers versus Infitah 
Sadat’s offensive passive revolution interpellated a development of subaltern 
Subjects, especially the workers’ and students’ movements. Due to the success of 
Nasserist hegemony, workers had remained relatively passive during the 1950s 
and 1960s, but in the 1970s they started to move when their economic 
predicament worsened and the national-popular bloc collapsed. A first wave of 
labor protests took place in 1971 and in 1972, primarily directed against the slow 
erosion of wages. The restoration of wage levels in 1972 and the October War in 
1973 temporarily halted the strike activities, which were resumed in the fall of 
1974. Between 1975 and 1977 workers protested against the Infitah, which they 
perceived as an assault on the rights and concessions they had gained under 
Nasser.619 The implementation of IMF austerity measures resulted in price hikes, 
which provoked the spontaneous ‚bread riots‛ of January 18-19 in Cairo in 1977. 
Industrial workers in Helwan struck and demonstrated in Tahrir Square. 
 As protesting workers did not receive any support from the existing trade 
union structures or political figures, they had to develop new grassroots networks 
and forms of organization – i.e. proletarian neoformations – to overcome their 
SSoD of economic-corporate fragmentation. Labor leader Barakat recalled that: 
In Abd al-Nasser’s days we tried to complain to the government and we directed 
our complaints to him, Abd al-Nasser. We thought he was protecting us against 
capitalism and we discovered that this was wrong. In the Sadat era we were 
working against Sadat himself and capitalism directly and our freedom was like a 
disaster. By law we were prevented from participating in the unions, and we were 
cut off from the candidate lists in the elections And we were arrested and jailed.620 
In the public sector, workers had conserved their old leaders and collective 
memories of the struggles of the 1940s and 1950s, which meant that they did not 
have to build their movement entirely from scratch. Beinin argued that: ‚Their 
social relations of production, above average level of skill and education, concentration in 
industries perceived as vital to the national economy, and relatively privileged conditions 
gave them the greatest capacity to organize themselves outside formal trade union 
structures or transform local trade union committees into organs of struggle.‛621 The 
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public worker strikes drew students, the unemployed and other urban subaltern 
groups into their activity-system of resistance.622 
 Even though there was an almost feverish political activity among workers and 
leftist activists during this decade, it was impossible for the working class to 
immediately develop itself from its shattered, economic-corporate position into a 
hegemonic force in such a short period.623 The political expression of the working 
class had been eradicated during the Nasserist era and had to be forged in the 
struggle itself. The spontaneous insurrection of January 1977 expressed the 
pressing predicament of the subaltern classes, but also their inability to forge a 
historical bloc of their own. Economic concessions by the State and the increasing 
migration to the Gulf countries restored real wages, and, combined with a precise 
repression of worker leaders, prevented major industrial action between 1977 and 
1981.624 
The Third Wave of Communism 
The roots of the ‚third wave of communism‛ can be traced back to 1967, in the 
wake of the Six Day War. The military defeat of Egypt is often perceived as the 
harbinger of the downfall of Arab nationalism and its subsequent substitution by 
Islamist subjectivities and practices. The 1967 war indeed provoked an ideological 
crisis, but not the sudden rise of religiosity and Islamism. On the contrary, it led 
to a huge popular mass movement, which lasted until the general uprising in 
1977.625  ‚It was the best era for the Left,‛626 leftist activist Wael Tawfiq claimed.  
 Already from the second half of the 1960s discontent among workers and 
students was fomenting over the lack of democracy and failing development 
goals. In February 1968 workers in Helwan went on strike against the light 
sentences of the Egyptian officers who were considered responsible for the defeat 
in 1967. Workers from other workplaces and students from all of Cairo’s 
universities joined their protest. 627  In November, students organized actions 
against education reform plans and in favor of an expansion of political freedoms, 
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occupying Alexandria University. News of the Western student and workers 
revolts reached the movement and stimulated the formation of a leftist counter-
culture: a semiotics that contained both global and local elements, combining the 
emancipative icon of Che Guevara with the authenticity of songs and poems by 
Ahmad Fuad Negm and al-Shaykh Imam.628 In 1969 mass meetings organized by 
leftists in Helwan gathered some 4,000 to 5,000 workers discussing political and 
economic issues.629 
 The Egyptian left at the beginning of the 1970s consisted of various tendencies, 
differing in ideology, social origin and/or generation. A first group were the 
radical elements in the Nasserist political establishment, especially among the 
mid-cadre of the ASU and the Organization of Socialist Youth, but also amid 
high-ranked officials and RCC members such as Khaled Mohieddin. A second 
layer was composed of the old guard of the Communist Party and the DMNL 
from the 1950s. Thirdly, a new generation of leftist students, intellectuals, trade 
unionists, and young workers became politically active, their loyalties divided 
between different shades of Marxism and leftist ‚Nasserism‛. Groups identifying 
with ‚Nasserism‛ defined themselves as anti-imperialist and defended the public 
sector and the social and economic reforms gained under Nasser.630  
 From 1968 to 1973 the student movement formed the nucleus of the leftist 
movement, reflecting the global wave of revolt. After the October War and the 
Infitah general living conditions deteriorated, and as universities struggled to 
function normally, political student activities collapsed.631 Economic malaise and 
labor unrest shifted the center of gravity of the protests to the factories and 
workers’ communities. In 1975 a series of clashes took place between workers and 
the police in urban areas and between evicted peasants and the security forces in 
the countryside. Students joined in the protests and marched on the People’s 
Council, demanding democracy and the right to assembly, strike, demonstrate 
and organize political parties.632 Social and economic issues were raised together 
with demands for political reform. 
                                                          
628 Al-Bendary: 2008; Anderson 2011. 
629 Posusney 1996: 220. 
630 Lachine 1977:4. 
631 Anderson 2011. 
632 Lachine 1977:4-5. 
178 
 
 During the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s two parties 
encompassed the majority of leftist activists: Tagammu and the Egyptian 
Communist Party (ECP). From its inception, Tagammu had been a construct of the 
regime. Moving towards a controlled multi-party system in 1975, Tagammu was 
established as the left wing of the ASU and turned into a full party in 1976. 
Headed by the leftist Free Officer Khaled Mohieddin, the party was a 
heterogeneous leftist front, including ‚Nasserists, Marxists, the enlightened religious 
trend633  that is democratic and socialist, and Arab nationalists.‛634 Through, on the one 
hand, a broad ideological consensus, based on anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism and 
the struggle for democratic rights, freedoms, and a socialist society free of 
exploitation, and, on the other, an organizational flexibility, the party was able, to 
a large extent, to contain its internal centrifugal forces. Although Tagammu had 
been pragmatic since its foundation, accepting the conditions set out by Sadat for 
its existence as a legal party,635 it tried to make the best out of a bad situation, 
often transgressing the political limits that the regime imposed.636 When Tagammu 
sided with the mass movement after the January riots of 1975, issuing 
declarations in favor of the right to strike and political freedoms, it was accused 
by Sadat of being a cover for illegal communists.637 Some 200 of its members were 
arrested.638  
 In the same year as the Tagammu ‚platform‛ was created, communists of 
various backgrounds closed ranks and founded the underground Egyptian 
Communist Party (ECP). The relation of the ECP with Tagammu was complex, 
both on an organizational and ideological level, and evolved strongly throughout 
the last three decennia. In the years after the ECP was established, its members 
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succeeded in acquiring influential positions within the Tagammu apparatus. The 
communist Salah Adly recalled that: 
In the seventies the ECP realized that the most powerful leftist party at that time 
was Tagammu. And of course there were a lot of communists then in Tagammu, 
Marxists, but they would not declare it, because the party law bans this kind of 
ideology, and we could not mention that some of the ECP’s members were in 
Tagammu. But it was widely known. The relation in the seventies and eighties 
between the ECP and Tagammu was good. We played a main role in developing 
the direction of Tagammu.639 
The ECP was itself a heterogeneous organization with various tendencies 
expressing the unresolved discussions that dominated the Egyptian communist 
movement since the Second World War. Its membership consisted of the old 
cadres from the 1940s and 1950s and young militants, which had emerged from 
the post-1967 student movements.640  
Islamist Resurgence 
The Islamic Bourgeoisie 
The Brotherhood of the 1970 differed fundamentally from its predecessor in the 
neocolonial era. Despite its anticommunism and sometime alliance with the 
Palace, the Society of the 1940s was a popular mass movement of approximately 
half a million members that advanced revolutionary national-democratic 
demands such as land reforms, State-led development, and nationalization of the 
Suez Canal. In the 1970s the Brotherhood had become an elite organization of a 
few hundred activists with ties to Saudi Arabia. 641 Sadat’s passive revolution 
convinced many Muslim Brothers who had migrated to the Gulf countries to 
return to Egypt, bringing with them petrodollars and social-conservative values. 
The Infitah also benefitted Ikhwan merchants, petty-traders, artisans, rich peasants 
and landlords who had stayed in Egypt. 642  Brothers active in the liberalized 
financial and service sectors became a rising ‚Islamic‛ business class. They lent 
money to new private companies, encouraging patron-client relations between 
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Islamic bankers, entrepreneurs, and State bureaucrats. 643  These landed, 
commercial and financial capital groups constituted a new ‚Islamic bourgeoisie‛. 
By the 1980s the rising private sector was controlled by eighteen families, of 
which eight percent had ties to the Brotherhood. About 40 percent of all private 
economic ventures were connected with Ikhwan interests.644 
 The Islamic bourgeoisie was sympathetic to an economic liberal, but social-
conservative interpretation of al-Banna’s original project. Their ideology rejected 
Western moral and cultural values, but defended a free market capitalist 
economy, and contained elements of anti-Semitism, anti-communism, and anti-
secularism. 645  Omar Tilmisani became the new leader of the Society and 
published its views in the monthly al-Da’wa (the Call) paper. Because of its 
support for the Infitah and its enmity towards the Left, the new Brotherhood 
gained the tacit approval of the Sadat regime. Together with State bureaucrats, 
military officers, and Infitah nouveaux riches the Brotherhood became a vassal of 
Sadat’s new hegemonic project.  
Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyyat 
The Islamic bourgeoisie could not have become a social force without the mass 
support of Islamist students who came from rural areas and small towns. 646 
Independently of al-Da’wa, independent groups of Islamist students started to 
provide services to their peers – organizing summer camps, study circles, 
physical training, selling cheap study books, et cetera.647 Thanks to the support of 
the State 648  – which saw in Islamism a counterweight against the Left – 
clientelism, violence, intimidation, an ethico-political vision, and the failure of the 
Left to offer an attractive alternative, the Islamist student movement grew 
quickly.649 At first they only mobilized around moral and religious issues, but the 
1977 insurrection and the peace treaty with Israel politicized the movement.650 At 
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the end of the 1970s al-Gama’at al-Islamiyyat – Islamist student associations – had 
taken over the domination of the Left on university campuses.651   
 However, al-Gama’at al-Islamiyyat were divided along sociological and 
ideological lines. Peasants from Upper Egypt, who migrated to the Gulf countries 
during the 1970s, often returned wealthy. They were able to buy land, establish 
markets, and set up charity organizations at the local level, gaining both 
economic benefits and social prestige. Their children became cadres in al-Gama’at 
al-Islamiyyat. 652  These layers were much more radical than the Lower Egypt 
student leaders, who had stronger ties to the reformist Muslim Brotherhood.653 
The repression of the 1977 insurrection and the Camp David negotiations 
increasingly alienated the radical Islamists from the Sadat State. 654  Sadat 
distanced himself from his erstwhile Islamic discourse and claimed that the 
Islamist student associations were funded and supported from abroad.655 
 In 1978 many Lower Egypt student leaders declared their allegiance to the 
Brotherhood, while Upper Egypt Islamists established their own al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya – the Islamic Group. Between 1979 and 1980 the Islamic Group fused 
with the radical al-Jihad organization.656 The increasing confrontation between the 
State and the radical Islamist groups, on the one hand, and the powerful example 
of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 on the other, led key figures such as Abd al-
Salam Farag to a Blanquist interpretation of political jihad – arguing that a small 
minority of righteous believers should overthrow and capture the State in a 
direct, paramilitary way.657 
 A pre-emptive detainment of 1,536 Islamic activists in 1981 forced the hand of 
al-Gama’a and al-Jihad, which plotted then to assassinate the President before their 
organizations were completely destroyed. At the yearly October War parade that 
commemorated the 1973 war against Israel, four of their military sympathizers 
opened fire on Sadat, killing him. One of them, Khaled al-Islambuli triumphantly 
claimed to have killed the Pharaoh.658 
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The New Brotherhood 
The merger of the largest and most successful Lower Egypt Islamic student 
association, led by Essam al-Erian and Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Fotouh, with the 
al-Da’wa group supplied the Brotherhood with fresh cadres and a new social 
base. 659  The withdrawal of the State from public services opened up new 
possibilities for the Islamists to expand their influence among the urban poor and 
impoverished middle classes. Rich Ikhwan patrons established their own charity 
organizations. Through the patron-client relations of these foundations the 
Islamic bourgeoisie was able to mobilize layers of the lower-middle classes, the 
‚lumpenintelligentsia‛ 660  and the subproletariat. Due to their exclusion from 
Sadat’s emerging bloc, students and professionals from the South in particular 
were attracted to radical forms of Islamism. Once they had benefited from 
Nasser’s land reform and free education and now, when they migrated to the 
cities, they lacked employment and social networks.661 Ironically, petrodollars and 
Infitah-money financed the private Islamic welfare policies that had become 
necessary due to Sadat’s privatization and liberalization politics of which the 
Brotherhood bourgeoisie was the main beneficiary.662 As Joel Beinin observed: 
‚<Islamism appeals to both the losers and the winners of global neo-liberal economic 
restructuring.‛663 Islamism came to represent the ideology of both those who were 
included and excluded from Sadat’s new hegemonic bloc. 
 Politicized Islam became a powerful weapon in the arsenal of Sadat’s offensive 
passive revolution that sought to dismantle the Leftist opposition and redirect the 
entire social formation towards free market capitalism.664 The use of ‚Islam‛ as an 
ideological marker had many benefits. Firstly, it mobilized familiar and deep-
rooted religious and cultural signs and practices that were immediately 
recognizable to the masses. Secondly, as a floating signifier, ‚Islam‛ was 
sufficiently vague to represent different and even contradictory class platforms. 
Thirdly, the deliberate confusion of political and religious uses of Islam 
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delegitimized the political criticisms of the secular Left as cultural attacks of an 
alienated and Westernized Other.665  
Islamic Fascism? 
The forces of resurgent Islamism, backed by the Sadat-regime, competed 
successfully with the Left over street politics. The defeat of leftist student 
movements in the universities left a lasting imprint on the activists of the ‚third 
wave‛. When I asked Fakhry Labib, an elderly Marxist and senior leader of the 
African-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), in 2008 whether the 
Muslim Brothers constituted a danger or a potential ally to the left, he answered 
that:  
They are very dangerous. They are enemy number one because they are fascists. 
This is not a problem of religion. They are the most rightist strata in capitalism. 
And in the countryside also, among peasants. So it is not a problem of religion at 
all, it is a problem of class interests. They are primarily an anti-revolutionary 
force. They are a problem. I feel that they are greater enemies than Mubarak. Not 
Mubarak as a man, but as a system, as a regime. They are more dangerous, because 
they will not grant you any reform. You see what they are doing in Sudan: 
destruction. Or in Iraq. Or what they have done in Palestine. They divided 
Palestine. Anywhere they divide and destroy. They are very dangerous. We want 
to go forward, some parts of the rightist strata want to keep the status quo, but 
others want to take you back. Back to where? To when? 
<I think they became strong because the rulers have spoiled them. We live under 
very bad conditions and they make use of it. We supposed that the contrary would 
happen, that the Left would make use of these conditions for its benefit. To my 
sorrow, I feel that there are some of the left, some communists, who are making 
alliances with them. This is a very bad thing. And they are trying to tell us that the 
our situation is comparable to South America where you find the liberation 
theology of the priests and so on... But this is completely different. Completely 
different.666  
The understanding of the Islamist phenomenon among many activists of the 
‚third wave‛ is informed by the experience of the Egyptian religious right in the 
1970s and the outcome of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The movements that 
were mobilized under the flag of a politicized Islam were seen as a reactionary 
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force, bent on destroying the leftist student and worker movements whilst 
serving the interests of the ruling classes – much like the historical experience of 
European fascism in the Interbellum. 
 Nadia Farah pointed towards the similarities between Islamist and fascist 
ideologies: (1) a cult of the State or the community embedded within an organicist 
worldview; (2) nationalism; (3) respect for private property and capitalist 
economy and a resistance against international finance and monopoly capital; (4) 
corporatism. Following Nicos Poulantzas, she analyzed fascism and Islamism as 
the ideological articulations of a weak middle class that desires to emancipate 
itself through the State, balancing between the interests of the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie. 667  However, she also acknowledged that the nature of a social 
movement is not determined by its abstract ideology, but strongly shaped by its 
particular activities.668  
 Rather than being a coherent ideology, Leon Trotsky defined fascism as a 
spontaneous mass movement with the downtrodden petty bourgeoisie at its core. 
When both bourgeois democracy and classic military dictatorships failed as stable 
State forms during the economic and political crises of the Interbellum, the ruling 
classes employed the fascist movement as a battering ram against the organized 
working class. The rule of fascism was first established in the streets through the 
destruction of workers’ organizations. The conquest of political society followed 
the fascists’ de facto domination of civil society. The fascist State then continued 
with the liquidation of the workers’ movement and the atomization of the 
working class, which prevented the development and crystallization of new class 
organizations. 669 
 At first sight, the Islamist movements of the 1970s had a lot in common with 
European fascism. As Gilbert Achcar and Samir Amin explained, Sadat and the 
Infitah-bourgeoisie wished to settle accounts with the Nasserist national-popular 
bloc and mobilized the spontaneous movement of the Islamist petty bourgeoisie – 
students, professionals, shopkeepers, et cetera – against the organized Left.670 
Ismail Sabri Abd Allah remarked at the beginning of the 1980s: ‚the social base of 
the Islamic movement is essentially a revolutionary base which was stolen from the 
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revolution. The social position and interest of the members of the Islamic movement 
should have made of it a progressive force.‛671.  
 However, ‚Islamism‛ does not exist as a stable and homogeneous movement. 
As a developing Project, the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has taken on 
many shapes since its inception in 1928 and did not remain unaffected by the 
transformations of the Egyptian social formation throughout the twentieth 
century. As Joel Beinin elucidated, politicized Islam expresses at times a 
grassroots protest movement, an instrument to suppress or mediate the class 
struggle, and a cultural framework for capital accumulation.672 Various classes are 
able to express their interests with the floating signifier of Islam: ‚Islam has always 
been present in the array of cultural elements available to define local identities. And in 
the modern era it has been mobilized for a wide range of contradictory political 
purposes.‛673 Nazih Ayubi concurred that religious interpretations ‚<may range 
anywhere from being on the one hand a tool of legitimation and preservation of the status 
quo, to being a vehicle for protest and a spearhead for revolution on the other‛ 674 
Therefore, the similarity between European fascism in the Interbellum and 
Egyptian Islamism in the 1970s is rather the political integration of potentially 
progressive middle-class forces in the reactionary historical bloc of a passive 
revolution, than an ideological or sociological analogue between the ‚systems‛ of 
fascism and Islamism. 
 Despite, or because of, its fascistic potential, Sadat was wary of any powerful 
independent Islamist movement. Unlike European fascism, the government did 
not use the Islamic student associations as a battering ram against the working 
class, but fell back on its classic agents – the police and the army – to suppress 
strikes. Furthermore, at moments of profound class confrontations, such as the 
1977 insurrection, the government found itself facing a spontaneous alliance of 
working and middle classes.  
 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Islamist movements of the 1970s played a 
reactionary role in aiding the state to suppress the first post-Nasserist popular 
mass movements of students and workers. The cadres of the ‚third wave‛ of 
communism personally experienced ‚Islamism as fascism‛. For many members 
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of this generation, the politicization of Islam became entwined with a counter-
revolutionary practice. Even though in the next three decades day-to-day politics 
sometimes required pragmatic alliances with the Muslim Brothers, the ‚third 
wave‛ cadres always remained suspicious of the ulterior motives of Islamic 
political agents, as they continued to cast the Ikhwan in the mould of 1970s 
Islamism. 
Organic Crisis III 
The uprising of 1977 was the zenith of the protest movement that had begun in 
1968. Leftist students joined workers in their protests, which quickly spread 
through the whole country, from Aswan to Alexandria. Even though the 
movement started as a protest about ‚everyday‛ economic grievances:  
<the demonstrators advanced beyond declaring disapproval of the specific 
economic policies that had prompted the demonstrations to challenge the 
legitimacy of the entire regime and its restructuring of Egyptian society as 
embodied in the open door policy. The slogans raised by the demonstrators began to 
articulate a vision of an alternative social order.675 
Sadat’s regime was shocked by the uprising and quickly restored the subsidies on 
basic consumer goods in order to disperse the spontaneous protests. The 
government denied the spontaneous nature of the insurrection and blamed 
‚secret communist organizations‛ for organizing the ‚riots‛.676 Sadat mobilized 
the police, security forces, and the army on the streets to stem the pre-
revolutionary tide. Once the masses were demobilized, the state implemented a 
zero tolerance policy for street politics. Leftist newspapers were shut down and 
socialist, communist, and Nasserist leaders – especially those active in the 
workers’ movement – were imprisoned.677 New laws restricted mass political 
action and gave life sentences for participation in demonstrations.678  
 On the other hand, the regime’s fear for a repetition of the ‚bread riots‛ slowed 
down the process of liberalization and privatization.679 Although the spontaneous 
opposition had not been able to present itself as a counter-hegemonic force and 
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transform the neoliberal bloc, it succeeded in temporarily halting Sadat’s passive 
revolution.680 Contingent changes in the economic structure – especially the influx 
of rents and migration of labor to the Gulf countries – created room for 
amendments in the neoliberal bloc. As I discuss further in the text, the 
accumulation strategy shifted from dispossession to rent accumulation. 
 One of the main reasons that the street politics of 1967-1977 failed to 
democratize the Nasserist and subsequent historical blocs was the inability of the 
Left to engage in a dialectical pedagogy with the workers’ movement and 
establish a genuinely collaborative Project. At the beginning of Sadat’s reign, 
many leftists believed that his coming to power signaled a leftist shift in Egyptian 
politics. Even after the President’s ‚Corrective Revolution‛, communists still had 
illusions in Sadat’s continuation of Nasser’s national-popular bloc and only 
hesitantly supported (if at all) the workers’ action in 1971 and 1972. 681  The 
October War of 1973 postponed any critical reflection of the Marxist intelligentsia 
on the changes in the Nasserist historical bloc until the declaration of Infitah in 
late 1974.682 The Left was shocked by Sadat’s ‚betrayal‛ of the Nasserist project 
and started to organize political opposition against the President. In the next few 
years, worker actions were supported, but: ‚Once again, workers’ struggles were 
represented by the Left as a component of the nationalist project, a front in the battle for 
economic self-determination.‛ 683  The Left’s organizational weakness and political 
myopia left it unprepared for either the strike movements of 1975 and 1976 or the 
insurrection of 1977. Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq explained: 
But the national question could not point the way to revolution and only in 1977 
this was discovered. The leftists were surprised with the uprising in 18 and 19 
January. The main activity was working among the students and there was little 
engagement with the workers’ movement. There were no organizations which 
profited from this moment, because of the absence of a strong organization and the 
weakness of political consciousness blocked the workers from making a connection 
between their own social problems and the nature of the system. So they were not 
working against the system, they had reformist demands. Whenever the 
government accepted it, the protest was finished. The parties could not lead their 
supporters. The leftist organizations were also too closed. They had a huge number 
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of members but they were not effective among the base of society. And the parties 
only discovered their weakness and little effectiveness during their actions. And it 
was easy for the system to find and destroy them after encouraging the Islamic 
groups in the universities. These were the two reasons of the failing of 1977.684 
There was separation in activity and thought between workers and ‚their‛ leftist 
intellectuals. Leftists were primarily occupied with the ‚abstract‛ issues of 
imperialism, Zionism, and national development, while the consciousness of 
workers began with their everyday economic grievances and worries. The fact 
that most leftists courted the illusive national bourgeoisie as allies in their anti-
imperialist struggle did not help their rapprochement to the workers.685 Socialism 
and self-determination were not recognized by leftists as part of the ZPD of the 
worker Subject. Leftists were locked up in their campuses, parties, and urban 
street protests, and did not focus on establishing a solidary system of activity 
with the spontaneous workers’ movement.686 In short, the lack of a collaborative 
Project between leftists and workers blocked the organic formation of a counter-
hegemonic alliance, and of a genuine philosophy of praxis that offered solutions 
for the emancipation of both workers and ‚their‛ intellectuals. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Mubarak’s Détente 
If there had been a capable leadership, the history of Egypt post 1977 would have been very different.  
Mahmud al-Werdani (in Farag 2007)  
Defensive Passive Revolution 
Economics 
Sadat’s new accumulation strategy did not fulfil its expectations. Between 1975 
and 1985 Egypt’s economy grew by an impressive average of eight percent per 
annum. However, this growth was not an expression of the development of the 
productive forces and actually led to deindustrialization, increasing 
unemployment – from 2.2 percent in 1960 to eleven percent in 1986 – and to a 
collapse of average real wages – from 70 USD in 1980 to eleven USD in 1991. High 
inflation rates – an average of 25 to 30 percent per annum – undermined real 
economic growth.687 Investments from the West remained low and the influx of 
new domestic and foreign capital was not directed towards Egypt’s industries 
towards sectors such as finance, trade, services, and tourism.688 This reflected the 
rise of commercial and loan capital and landed property vis-à-vis State-controlled 
industrial capital in the new historical bloc. Egypt’s industrial bourgeoisie 
remained weak because it had to compete on an unequal footing with an 
objective alliance between foreign capital and domestic landed and commercial 
capital. Commercial capitalists were not interested in revolutionizing production, 
but followed the principle of ‚buying cheap, selling dear‛ through trade and 
speculation, and by controlling local markets, real estate and petty production 
units. They were able to function as mediators between foreign capital and local 
selling places. Fractions of the Infitah-bourgeoisie that did not control trade 
networks suffered under monopoly prices of foreign multinationals and the 
domestic public sector. Together with commercial capitalists, large landowners 
engaged in speculative activities. These economic factions had no intention to 
invest in industrial sectors, as the combination of high rental income and real 
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estate property granted higher revenues. Most surplus value still existed in the 
form of rent, interest, speculation in politicized land markets or commercial 
income. In 1982 only twenty percent of total new capital was invested in 
manufacturing activities.689  
 Due to their monopoly position and because of their high amount of constant 
capital – which led to a more efficient production process and a lower value of 
produced commodities – foreign industries were more competitive than their 
Egyptian counterparts. In a free-trade neoliberal regime the amount of investment 
required to compete with foreign capital is considerable. Due to a lack of labor-
saving techniques and technological investments, along with the undesirability of 
a higher rate of exploitation, Egypt’s industries became even more dependent on 
foreign capital.690  
 Despite the failure of the ISI model, the end of State-led industrialization, and 
the collapse of the Nasserist consensus, the public sector continued to expand 
until the mid-1980s and the regime was able to sustain its redistributive polices.691 
State capitalism had given up its industrializing ambitions, but it was able to 
prolong its life-form through an accumulation of non-productive revenues or 
rents.692 From the second half of the 1970s, a steady stream of revenues from 
migrant workers’ remittances from the Gulf region, foreign loans and aid, tariffs 
of the Suez Canal, oil, and tourism, compensated the loss of income from the 
productive sectors. State-led rent accumulation constituted the economic 
backbone of a post-populist consensus. Rentier capitalism served the interests of 
both ‚public‛ bureaucrats and private capitalist actors: rents were accumulated 
and distributed centrally through the State, encouraging patron-client relations, 
while private capital entered the rent distribution process through subcontracting 
and the black market.693 Class fractions outside political society were able to buy 
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political positions, becoming a new bourgeois force within the State elite.694 In 
addition, a sizeable part of rents escaped State control and were absorbed by the 
Islamic banks and investment companies, fuelling the economic activities of the 
rising Islamic bourgeoisie.695 
 Yet, this ‚steady state‛ economy prepared its own crisis.696 In order to maintain 
the post-populist consensus, rents were not invested in industry or agriculture, 
but they were spent on imports and subsidies of consumer goods. 697  In the 
Nasserist era there was a relative trade-off between industrial growth and equity 
because the State interfered in the redistribution of national income. After the ‚oil 
boom‛ in the mid-1970s the amount of profit rose without an accelerated rate of 
accumulation. A fall in rentier income from 1984 onwards forced the ruling 
classes to search for a new strategy for accumulation. The policies of economic 
dispossession and State violence of the 1990s and 2000s expressed the desire of 
the Mubarak clique to return to Sadat’s neoliberal accumulation strategy and to 
forcefully reconfigure the hegemonic bloc. 
Politics 
Labor conflicts, political unrest and the assassination of Sadat in 1981 revealed the 
societal instability that neoliberal reform induced. From its inception, Sadat’s 
neoliberal strategy for accumulation had been in crisis. The Nasserist national-
popular bloc had never been successfully replaced by a neoliberal bloc. On the 
contrary, its unraveling had opened up spaces for contentious politics from 
workers, leftists, and Islamists. Sadat’s ‚offensive‛ passive revolution had been a 
failure. However, the emergence of the rentier economy had stabilized Sadat’s 
class alliances in a post-populist bloc. The passive revolution continued, but as a 
defensive process, in which the new ‚neoliberal‛ class fractions ruled without a 
neoliberal accumulation strategy. 
 The defensive turn of the passive revolution entailed a softening of the coercive 
dimension of the regime. Political prisoners were released, civil rights such as 
freedom of press and of association were restored – to a degree – and in 1984 
parliamentary elections were held. Relations with the Arabic nations, which had 
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soured over the separate peace with Israel, were improved. The political 
‚détente‛ was not a process of ‚democratization from above‛, but a tactical 
retreat of the dictatorship, leaving limited spaces open in civil and political 
society for contentious politics that remained subordinated to regime interests. 
Egypt’s parliamentary democracy was but a façade behind which the 
authoritarianism of the regime was carefully hidden.698 Via the prolongation of 
Emergency Law, the State had its civil society in a tight grip: banning strikes, 
demonstrations, and critical newspapers; and introducing military courts to deal 
with recalcitrant political opposition.699 The rules of the new democratic game 
were set by the government and the NDP. Elections were manipulated and voters 
were systematically bought or intimidated, as the Egyptian novelist Alaa al-
Aswany claimed: 
Well I do not think we have elections. When you say elections you are using a term 
from political science and this has specific criteria which do not exists here. What 
we have is a miserable form of theater which is repeated over and over again for 
thirty years. The results of these so-called elections are in the desk of the generals 
and Interior Ministry.700 
Mass demonstrations, street politics, and political strikes were out of the question. 
The Political Party Committee systematically blocked the legalization of 
important political trends such as the Muslim Brothers, and it monitored and 
supervised parties even after their recognition. However, as long as the legal and 
illegal, secular and Islamist oppositions played along, they were tolerated.701  
Workers in the Moral Economy 
A combination of state repression, relative wage stability, migration of workers to 
the Gulf and distribution of economic and strategic rents had kept the industrial 
peace between 1978 and 1981. Mubarak’s détente encouraged new, small-scale 
labor protests in 1982 and 1983. The drop in oil prices from 1984 on forced the 
government to enter negotiations with the IMF. A section within the Egyptian 
ruling class called for a far-reaching process of liberalization and privatization to 
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fight rising inflation and to restore the rate of profit. Due to the fall of real wages 
and the threat of neoliberal reform, workers increased their collective actions 
from 1984 on.702 They were led by local, organic worker intellectuals and often 
supported by leftist activists. Joel Beinin noted that, just like in the 1970s: ‚Once 
again, unionized workers in large-scale public sector enterprises, especially those located 
in major industrial centers, were most prominent in this upsurge of workers’ collective 
action.‛703 Since workers in the newly privatized companies were less organized, 
and because their situation was more precarious than those employed by the 
state, they were less inclined to participate in strikes. 
 The actions of the workers movement in this decade were primarily defensive 
and apolitical, aimed at achieving particular economic demands and restoring the 
strong bargaining position of the working class towards the regime. 704  These 
struggles often ended in the violent repression of the movement and/or 
concessions from the regime. The GFETU was caught between its loyalty to the 
Mubarak regime and its role as guardian of the Nasserist social reforms.705 The 
obstinacy of the labor bureaucracy, combined with grassroots working class 
actions, slowed down the process of neoliberal transition.706 
 Marsha Posusney claimed that, despite the sometimes very militant labor 
actions, workers were embedded within a ‚moral economy‛: ‚<the nature of labor 
protest in Egypt suggests that workers did adopt the Nasserist ideology of the 1960s, 
stressing reciprocal rights and obligations. Workers see their responsibility lying in 
production, to contribute to the postcolonial modernization and development of their 
country.‛707 The post-populist SSoD relegated the meaning of collective worker 
actions to symbolic tools, which ritualistically renegotiated the position of 
particular groups of factory workers within the ensemble of corporatist social and 
political relations. The activity of labor protest had as its object the affirmation 
and reintegration of workers within the moral-economic system. The main 
objectification of protesting workers at this point was not the classic ‚work-
stoppage‛, but the ‚work-in‛: workers stayed at the workplace after hours, 
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asserting their role as productive and loyal actors within the patronage activity-
system.708 Posusney observed that: ‚<workers themselves have eschewed actual work 
stoppages, using them only as a last resort. The most common alternative to strikes is the 
in-plant sit-in, during which management is ejected or ignored but workers continue 
running the factory on their own.‛709  
 As long as the State was able to fulfill its obligations, these forms of proletarian 
mediation interiorized a subaltern Subjectivity rather than developing worker 
Subjectness. The Strike remained entangled in the economic-corporate moment, 
unable to transcend its spatio-temporal particularity and economic 
‚parochialism‛. Because of direct, ‚vertical‛ State mediations – and violent 
repressions – of labor conflicts through the GFETU and the police, there was little 
solidarity between factories in the same sector, let alone between different 
sections of the working class.710 There was important support, however, from the 
urban communities in which companies were historically embedded. At this 
juncture, such forms of solidarity ironically undermined the development of 
working class Subjectivities by drawing workers into a shared yet amorphous 
activity-system of communal subalternity.711  
Crisis of the Left 
Between 1976 and 1981, Tagammu had waged a fierce opposition against the Sadat 
State, building a membership of 125,000 to 160,000 members.712 Its policy was one 
of mobilization and engagement with the struggle of workers and students. 
Although Tagammu and the Egyptian left in general intervened in the 1977 
insurrectionary movement, it was not able to organize, structure, and direct the 
masses against the power of the State. Some leftist leaders drew pessimistic 
conclusions about the potential of street politics to change the status quo. In 2009 I 
asked Rifaat al-Said, historian of the Egyptian Communist movement and 
chairman of Tagammu, if the mass democratic and worker protests of the 2000s 
constituted a force of societal change. The elderly man waved his hand in a 
disdainful gesture and answered:  
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What happened in Mahalla al-Kubra< even if it accumulated a thousand times, it 
cannot the change the regime. In 1977 we had an insurrection and moved 
thousands, millions of people, from Alexandria and Aswan. The regime didn’t feel 
the emotions of the people. It is the same in Europe, when millions went on the 
streets to contest the war in Iraq. Did the British government accept this 
revolution? No. So what happened? We demonstrated and suddenly in the 
morning we found the army in the streets. So we stopped. The Egyptians used to 
respect the army, not to be afraid the army, to respect it. Secondly, we didn’t want 
the return of the army as an influential force in politics. So, in my imagination it 
needs a patient accumulation of protest and oppositional actions and protests and 
sit-ins, and then, perhaps, the regime can retreat. We have the experience. We have 
changed a lot in this regime. If you were here twenty years ago and if we said such 
questions and replies, we were both imprisoned and all the people here would be in 
prison. We have vaccinated the regime to accept what we are saying. And we have 
vaccinated the people to be more courageous. What has happened historically 
should change historically. If you imagined a revolution or something like that, it 
is too far-fetched, in my imagination. Poor people don’t make revolutions, believe 
me. Poor people need to return in the afternoon with some pieces of bread to their 
family. They are too afraid. And if the poor didn’t find a way out, they usually 
return to God. And that is the main influence of Islamism today.713 
Al-Said entered Tagammu as a member of the illegal Communist Party at the 
beginning of the 1980s. Praised for his vision and erudition by some, and 
denounced because of his authoritarian rule and collaboration with the Mubarak 
State by others, al-Said is one of the most controversial personalities of the 
Egyptian opposition.714 At the beginning of the 1980s, al-Said began to advocate a 
non-confrontational policy towards the Mubarak regime. The failed uprising had 
shown the impossibility of revolutionary street politics and, in order to survive 
State repression, Tagammu had to refrain from challenging the State directly, by 
striking a balance between criticism and accommodation. Under al-Said’s and 
other Communist leaders’ influence, Tagammu slowly turned away from its 
historical engagement with the mass movement, instead focusing on activities 
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within the boundaries of Egypt’s restricted civil and political society. His 
disregard for self-determining politics ‚from below‛ would eventually lead him 
to denounce the January 25 mass mobilizations, which further marginalized his 
already much contested position in the party.715  
 When I visited Mansura in the same year, I met with Hamdi Qenawi, a middle-
aged Tagammu and Kefaya activist. Walid Ali and Muhammad Taher, both young 
members of Tagammu and journalists of the leftist Al-Badil journal, were present 
as well. Proudly Qenawi showed me the scarred location of a bullet that had 
penetrated his arm during the 1977 uprising and had not been removed since. He 
vehemently disagreed with al-Said’s disengagement with grassroots politics: 
‚During the seventies, Tagammu was very strong because it sided with the workers 
against the government. When Sadat moved to the right and towards the USA, there were 
many protests and demonstrations,‛ he recalled.716 Repression by the Sadat-regime 
weakened the Left, but this was not the real cause of its crisis: 
Even in 1980 there were still demonstrations and actions by Tagammu, for 
example during the student movement of 1980. The real turning point was the 
new presidential regime in 1981 and the idea within the ranks of Tagammu that 
the situation would change< When in 1981 Mubarak replaced Sadat, he 
continued his policies, but disguised his intentions better in the beginning. At first 
he made a lot of promises; he promised to be fair and just, and he released 1400 
activists whom Sadat imprisoned. Some people in Tagammu, like Rifaat al-Said, 
believed that the presidential administration of Mubarak differed from Sadat. He 
believed that Tagammu should give the regime a chance to change Sadat’s system. 
This was the starting point of our current weakness. We cut the relation between 
the party and the people< From then on there were good relations between the 
party and the regime; which is logical as it needed a license from the regime to 
exist.717 
From 1984 on Tagammu participated in parliamentary elections – which did not 
prove very productive, as this once mass party of the Left with strong ties to the 
industrial working class only got a few percent of the national vote. Government 
rigging was only one cause of the electoral defeat. Tagammu had acquired the 
right to compete in elections and to operate freely in the national political sphere 
in exchange for a moratorium on street politics. Without the ability to mobilize its 
                                                          
715 Conversations with Ahmed Belal and Haisam Hassan, March 2011, Cairo. 
716 Interview with Hamdi Qenawi, Mansura, 17 April 2009. 
717 Ibid. 
197 
 
traditional mass base, the party was cut from its organic electorate. At the end of 
the 1980s, its membership dropped to 25,000 members. 718  Tagammu activists 
remained active within farmers’ and workers’ organizations, but there was an 
increasing gap between the real ‚politics from below‛, embedded in local 
everyday struggles and life-worlds, and the abstract ‚politics from above‛, 
articulated in the Cairo HQ and performed in the virtual spheres of parliament 
and media. The growing discrepancy between local practices and national 
discourses and the cordial relations of the party’s leadership with the 
government, made workers suspicious towards Tagammu.719 Ironically, whereas 
the absence of mass street politics convinced the leadership of the ‚Third Wave 
Left‛ that democratization had to come through negotiations with the regime, its 
reluctance to mobilize subaltern actors bereft them of any substantial bargaining 
tool vis-à-vis the State.720 
Consolidation of the Ikhwan 
Whereas the Left failed to appropriate Mubarak’s détente for its own 
development – and was, consequently, domesticated by it – the Brotherhood 
made good use of the ‚pores‛ of Egypt’s distorted civil and political society.721 
Firstly, the resurrected Society was able to gain a foothold in the professional 
syndicates. The Nasserist massification of education in the 1960s and the 
guaranteed employment of graduates in the public sector produced a mass of 
middle class professionals in the 1970s and 1980s. The expansion of university 
education transformed professional associations from elite clubs into mass 
organizations of white collar workers. Because of their recent massification and 
their lack of a militant tradition, these labor organizations were less controlled by 
political society than the industrial trade unions. The Brotherhood presence in the 
professional syndicates flowed organically from its influence over the graduates 
who came from the Islamist student associations. Islamist student leaders became 
doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists – or not: between 1975 and 1985 university 
graduates tripled, yet the State budget for public sector employment was cut, 
creating a layer of unemployed and impoverished middle-class youth. This 
                                                          
718 Aoude 1994. 
719 Beinin 2007; Al-Khashab 2007. 
720 Howeidy 2006. 
721 Al-Ghobashy 2005b: 374. 
198 
 
dissatisfied ‚lumpen intelligentsia‛ constituted the primary social base of the 
Islamists during the 1980s.722 As the only organized oppositional force within the 
professional syndicates, the Brotherhood quickly dominated these associations. In 
1984 the Ikhwan controlled seven of the 25 seats of the board of the Physician 
Syndicate: by 1990 twenty of the 25 seats were in the hands of their members.723 
By the beginning of the 1990s they also gained majorities in the engineering, 
dentistry, pharmacology, agricultural and even bar and journalist syndicates, 
which had traditionally been strongholds of the Left.  
 Secondly, the decrease of State-led welfare and housing projects led to a 
growing number of urban poor in the ashwaiyyat: informal neighborhoods 
‚<where buildings have no permits, where streets have no formal names, where man 
wear the traditional galabia, where women sit and socialize in front of their homes in the 
alleyways<‛ 724  The social intervention of aid organizations connected to the 
Muslim Brotherhood transformed these subproletarian layers into the 
beneficiaries and clients of private Islamist charity.725 
 Thirdly, the Society was able to mobilize its local bases of grassroots support in 
the professional syndicates and ashwaiyyat to strengthen its position in the 
‚national‛ field of political society. As the Brotherhood was still an illegal 
organization it could not openly put forward its candidates in elections. This 
problem was solved through electoral coalitions. In the parliamentary elections of 
1984 the Brothers forged an alliance with the right-wing nationalist Wafd party, 
which was the only opposition front that put out a respectable score of 15.1 
percent.726 The ‚Islamic Alliance‛ of 1987 saw the Brotherhood absorbing the 
socialist Amal (Labor) party and the liberal al-Ahrar, and successfully obtaining 
seventeen percent of the vote.727 
 Throughout their interventions in civil and political society the Ikhwan were 
careful not to step too hard on the State’s toes. The Brothers realized that they 
were tolerated rather than recognized as a political force by the government. 
Their interpellations in parliament were first and foremost political performances 
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oriented towards their own rank-and-file and potential sympathizers. Despite 
enjoying majorities in many of the professional syndicates, the Brothers always 
left the chair to a member of the NDP. In this manner the regime was able to 
maintain its dominance, while the Ikhwan could always shift the blame of 
unpopular decisions to the NDP.728 Behind the screens the Brotherhood and the 
government negotiated the margins of opposition. The presence of the Ikhwan in 
these associations and in parliament was used to increase its political bargaining 
power in the negotiated consensus between the government and the 
opposition.729 There was a symbiotic relation between the Mubarak State and the 
Brotherhood, which continued as long as the Ikhwan did not grow too powerful or 
outspoken. This reformist strategy of the Brotherhood and its preference for 
recruiting members of the educated middle-classes alienated radical students, 
unskilled workers, and slum dwellers, particularly those who migrated from poor 
Upper-Egypt to metropolitan Cairo. These groups were attracted to more radical 
and/or puritanical forms of Islamic activism.730 
 The absorption of the Amal party in 1987 may give the impression that the 
Brotherhood began to move to the left at the end of the 1980s. Adil Husayn, 
general-secretary of the Amal party and chief editor of al-Sha’b (the People) re-
imagined a socialist discourse on social-Islamic lines, arguing for a corporatist 
society. Notwithstanding these corporatist voices, the election program of the 
Ikhwan in 1987 articulated a neoliberal economic view. It defended cuts in the 
public sector, an increase of productivity, and the private sector as the backbone 
of the economy. Apart from an Islamic touch – Islamic banking and zakat were 
seen as the primary tools for social justice and distribution of wealth – the social-
economic recommendations of the Brotherhood paralleled those of the 
government. Criticisms of rampant corruption, bureaucratization, and 
inefficiency were not directed at the nature of Egypt’s political economy, but at 
the stalled execution of neoliberal policies by the Mubarak clique.731 
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The Left and the Brotherhood 
The trauma of 1977, the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, the détente of the 
early Mubarak years, and the triumphant trajectory of Islamism frustrated and 
confused the Egyptian Left. Was the main enemy imperialism and Zionism, the 
Mubarak ‚regime‛, or Islamic fascism? With what political forces should the 
enfeebled Left ally itself?  
 When Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi advocated a national front between all 
political forces, including the government, against externally sponsored Islamist 
groups, Husayn Abd al-Raziq, then chief editor of al-Ahali, answered him that 
any national front should be directed against the USA, Israel, and the parasitic 
government. Militant Islamism was only a secondary danger in comparison with 
imperialism and its domestic agents. Throughout the 1980s Tagammu and other 
opposition parties refused to side with the government against the Muslim 
Brotherhood.732 
 When during the 1987 elections the Muslim Brotherhood effectively took over 
the Amal party, and when Communist candidates openly featured on Tagammu 
lists, the government put pressure on Tagammu to get back in line. The discourse 
of al-Ahali became one of ‚relative moderation‛, which is still the paper’s line 
today.733 Farida al-Na’ash acknowledged that ‚It was a policy of less confrontation, 
yes,‛ 734 but she claimed that:  
It was not a change in al-Ahali itself, but in the whole atmosphere at that time: the 
collapse of the USSR, the retreat of the left all over the world, and the police state, 
the hegemony of the police state in Egypt, and the martial law, the emergency law 
all over since Mubarak came to power in 1981, so there are many factors that led to 
the change to the political view of al-Ahali.735 
In the same year Fouad Zakariyya argued that even if both the Islamists and the 
regime were enemies, the fight against the Islamists had absolute priority:  
Once the governing body comes to speak in the name of the Shari’a, opposition 
turns to unbelief, any difference becomes an insolence in the face of God’s law or an 
apostasy that has to be punished applying the appropriate law. The conditions of 
political and social struggle will become much worse and much more difficult. I am 
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not exaggerating if I say that the idea of the struggle itself will then be thoroughly 
uprooted. Therefore the interest of the left, and with it all nationalist forces, in 
maintaining the proper conditions for a legitimate political struggle imposes on all 
the duty to close ranks and stand against a tendency threatening to eradicate the 
principle of struggle itself.736  
Zakariyya’s position, published in al-Ahali, sparked off a debate in Tagammu on 
the nature and role of Islamism, which was a repetition of the discussions on the 
‚nature‛ of Islamism since the 1970s. Of the eleven replies appearing in al-Ahali, 
only one argued in favor of a front with the government. Yunan Labib Rizq made 
the comparison between Islamism and fascism and called for a struggle against 
political Islam akin to the European fight against fascism in the Interbellum. Most 
saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a fraction of the big bourgeoisie, which should be 
fought, while others saw the radical wing of the Ikhwan as a potential ally against 
the government.737 At the end of the 1980s the intellectual debate on Islamism and 
the relation between secular leftists and anti-government Islamists had been 
thoroughly conducted. The three main different views that crystallized out of the 
discussion are – more or less – still those of today: Islamism as (1) a form of 
fascism (e.g. among Tagammu’s rightwing); (2) representing a faction of the 
bourgeoisie (e.g. among ECP leaders); (3) a potential ally in the anti-imperialist 
and anti-Zionist struggle (e.g. the line of the Revolutionary Socialists).  
Workers without a Prince 
The experience of 1977 created a divide within the left between those leaders, 
intellectuals, and activists who advocated a disengagement with street politics in 
favor of participation in the regime-controlled political community on the one 
hand, and those who tried to maintain relations with grassroots movements on 
the other. The leftists who withdrew from mass politics and who collaborated to 
various degrees with the state were either demoralized by the 1977 defeat, 
frightened by the specter of ‚Islamic fascism‛, or genuinely believed in a gradual 
democratization process led by President Mubarak. Marie DuBoc described a 
tendency towards ‚social fatigue‛ among some leftist intellectuals, a form of 
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alienation connected to ‚<the tension between actors’ longing for change and the 
permanence of the status quo.‛738 Fadi Bardawil observed that: 
Those thinkers and journalists have moved from an idealization of the 
revolutionary potential of the masses in their youth to a diametrically opposite 
view in their old age, locating the inherent ‘problems’ plaguing the region in the 
culture of these same masses. What remained a constant in this interpretive and 
political inversion is the distance separating the militant then, intellectual now, 
from the masses adulated then and despised now.739 
Due to their colonial mode of assistance these leftist intellectuals had never 
developed a dialectical pedagogy with ‚their‛ subaltern Subjects, which they only 
recognized in abstract and mystifying terms. Their distance from the class 
struggle obstructed a conceptualization of the economic-corporate predicament of 
the working class, and led them to ‚objectivist‛ explanations of the workers 
‚passivity‛: variations on the European Left’s post-1960s ‚embourgeoisement‛ 
thesis.740 
 Among those leftists who remained engaged with street politics and the class 
struggle, a renewed interest in the workers as a potential political Subject 
emerged. Many leftists and trade unionists rejected the colonial mode of 
assistance that had plagued the communist movement since its inception. 
However, some of them exchanged their previous colonialist attitudes for a total 
liquidation of the role of the Left in the development of the worker Subject. This 
liquidationism suggested that ‚<the working class is capable of organization and 
action without the assistance of the Left intelligentsia and need not be bound by its agenda 
or its disabilities<‛741 
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 This call for a withdrawal of leftist assistance went hand in hand with the 
gradual liquidation of the instructive role of communist and left-nationalist 
institutions. For example, Tagammu cartoonist Hassanein recalled that: 
Rose al-Yusuf was a school of caricaturists who were drawing for causes, not only 
for money, they were communists. Drawing was a cause in itself, not a way to 
make money. And then they made a school which learns to draw caricatures for 
money... Caricatures changed from being a cause in itself, a universal language, to 
draw just to make money and to distribute ideas which move the society 
backwards.742 
The collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of many institutions and 
practices that depended on its financial and cultural sponsorship. The feeble and 
distorted promise of a ‚proletarian Prince‛ – a hegemonic apparatus of and for 
the working class – which had emerged in the 1970s slowly fell apart in the 
second half of the 1980s and the 1990s. How could a philosophy of praxis develop 
when there was no shared activity where a proletarian ‚good sense‛ could 
encounter critical theory? With nostalgia, Hassanein recalled that: 
It was a tradition in Tagammu to educate the workers, helping them to understand 
present issues, how to solve problems and stand for their rights, and how to write, 
draw, and so on. But the reality is that the party is empty now. There were workers 
in Tagammu in the past, but now there aren’t as much workers, we are not in the 
factories as we were in the seventies or the eighties, we are away from them. I try to 
gather children and to teach them, but there is no money for this. So I get the colors 
and the pens from my own salary. Even when the children draw a gallery the party 
does not encourage me in this task.743  
However, in the second half of the 1980s, and throughout the 1990s, the seeds of a 
New Left were planted that would blossom during the civil-democratic and 
workers’ protests of 2000s. 
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Introduction 
Even though it could be argued that the period of the 1990s and 2000s already 
constitutes ‚history‛ and would fit under the previous section of Development of 
the Egyptian Workers’ Movement, I think it is important to draw a methodological 
line at this point. This part of the dissertation bridges ‚the past‛ and ‚the 
present‛ in multiple ways. Firstly, in general, political and economic 
transformations from the 1990s onwards have been perceived as the ‚direct 
causes‛ of the 25 January Revolution.744 Secondly, these two decades produced 
new organizations, ideological tendencies, and generations of activists, which are 
still playing an active role in the current political and economic protests. The 
1990s and 2000s represent the ‚lived time‛ of these collaborative Projects. Thirdly, 
at this point, references to journalistic and personal fieldwork sources start to 
saturate the text. Whereas the previous chapters might advance but a new 
perspective on the existing academic literature, the next sections integrate new 
empirical material, which is rendered explicitly in the text via the voices of my 
interview respondents.745  
 In Neoliberalism, I give an outline of the main economic and political 
transformations of the 1990s and 2000s, arguing that these reforms represented a 
return of the passive revolution to its ‚offensive‛ moment – ‚<a frontal attack on 
the working class and urban poor and on the poorer sectors of the peasantry<‛746 Much 
has been written already on the topic of neoliberal reform in Egypt: I aim to keep 
this chapter brief and to the point. However, the following chapter – The Civil-
Democratic Movement – is much more exhaustive, as it treats the development of 
the Egyptian Left and the resurgence of street politics in detail. The narrative ends 
with the disintegration of Kefaya in 2006. In Islamism in the Neoliberal Age, I sketch 
the transformations within the field of politicized Islam, before I move to a 
discussion of the complex relations between leftists and Islamists.  
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CHAPTER 11 
Neoliberalism 
When you’ve stood for two hours at the bus stop or taken three different buses and had to go through 
hell every day just to get home, when your house has collapsed and the government has left you sitting 
with your children in a tent on the street, when the police officer has insulted you and beaten you just 
because you’re on a minibus at night, when you’ve spent the whole day going around the shops 
looking for work and there isn’t any, when you’re a fine sturdy young man with an education and all 
you have in your pockets is a pound, or sometimes nothing at all, then you’ll know why we hate 
Egypt. 
‚Busayna‛ in Alaa al-Aswany’s The Yacoubian Building (2006: 138) 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
Rentier Crisis 
The rentier economy of the 1975-1985 had supplied the State with enough 
financial leeway to appease the popular classes that were excluded from the post-
populist bloc. However, from the second half of the 1980s on, rental income 
decreased and the ‚steady state‛ economy showed signs of exhaustion. The 
global fall of oil prices diminished the influx of petrodollars from the Gulf region, 
and a high inflation depressed real wages. National debt rose to more than 38 
billion USD in foreign obligation and the budgetary deficit increased to over 
twenty percent.747 The dry spell in rent income, combined with the reluctance of 
the State and private capital groups to invest in the productivity of agriculture 
and industry, necessitated a new strategy of accumulation that would drive up 
the rate of exploitation. Already in the 1980s the regime prudently started to push 
for neoliberal reform, but worker actions and the resistance of the corporatist 
labor bureaucracy postponed harsh measures until the beginning of the 1990s.748 
 The Gulf War of 1991 led to the return of many migrant workers to Egypt, who 
flooded the domestic labor market. It also resulted in the collapse of tourism, 
compounding the State’s fiscal crisis, which was induced by the regime’s inability 
to pay back its military debts.749 Lastly, for the USA, the collapse of Stalinism 
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decreased the value of Egypt’s ‚geopolitical rent‛: i.e. the price for its alliance 
with the Western bloc. The crisis of rent-based accumulation forced the Mubarak 
clique to turn to the IMF and World Bank to save the economy from 
bankruptcy. 750  In 1991 Egypt accepted an Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP) inspired by the neoliberal paradigm of the 
Washington consensus.751 The ERSAP aimed to contain and decrease foreign debt 
and inflation, by cutting state subsidies on consumer goods, privatizing public 
companies, liberalizing markets and prices, freezing wages, commercializing 
agricultural lands and implementing a flat tax. 
Rural Reforms 
The liberalization of agricultural prices and markets already began in 1987.752 
Desiring to transform the failing rentier accumulation strategy, the Egyptian 
government promoted ‚<a US farm-type model of extensive capital-intensive 
agriculture driven by market liberalisation, export-led growth and tenure reform.‛753 The 
underlying rationale of liberalization was that rising prices of agricultural 
produce would attract capital to invest in rural production.754 The State regarded 
landowners as willing allies in the realization of the free trade policies of the IMF, 
which promoted cash crop production. Similar to the colonial era, the economic 
interests of large-scale landholders were tied to those of foreign capital groups. 
 As a declaration of war against land tenants, Mubarak’s Law 96 of 1992 
abrogated Nasser’s Agrarian Reform Law of 1952, granting former landowners 
the right to reclaim the lands that their families had lost during the redistribution 
policies of the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, the prices of land rents were to be 
governed fully by market forces instead of determined by law.755 After a five year 
transition period, the New Tenancy Law came into effect in 1997: from then on, 
land rents were governed by market prices instead of the former fixed rent 
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system. Rents increased by as much as 400 percent.756 In addition, landowners 
started to drive tenants from their land. 757  A majority of lands became fully 
owned by the landed elite and embedded in a modern capitalist system of cash 
paid tenancies, allowing the landlords to accumulate capital at an accelerated 
speed.758 The livelihoods of some five million Egyptians were endangered by the 
New Tenancy Law as neoliberal reform in the countryside brought about a rise in 
land rents, the concentration of landholdings and rural violence as landowners 
sent police troops and thugs to chase farmers from their lands.759 
Industrial Reforms 
In the industrial sector, State companies were deliberately put at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis private enterprises in order to force their bankruptcy and subsequent 
privatization. A new ‚Ministry of Investments‛ was established, which became 
the primary executor of the privatization process. Selling shares of State-owned 
enterprises on the Cairo stock market created an economic mini-boom in 1996-97. 
The State earned 1.5 billion USD from these privatizations. Between 1993 and 
1999 over 100 factories passed into private hands.760 By 2002 half of the public 
enterprises were privatized or liquidated.761 After 2004, a new cabinet headed by 
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif stepped up the privatization and liberalization 
process. Corporate taxes were halved in 2005, from 40 to twenty percent of 
earnings, whereas personal taxes were raised, especially those on housing.762 
Private firms enjoyed the flat tax of twenty percent while the public sector had to 
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pay double.763 These aggressive policies resulted in an economic growth of five to 
seven percent.764  
 Economic growth, however, did not reflect a development of ‚expanded 
reproduction‛, but a rapid accumulation by dispossession. State factories such as 
the Qalyub Spinning Factory were sold far beneath their actual value.765 It had 
been a myth that public sector companies were unprofitable: ‚In 1989/90, on the 
eve of the reforms, 260 out of 314 non-financial state-owned enterprises were profitable 
and only 54 were making losses.‛ 766  Selling these valuable productive assets, 
however, resulted in quick and easy (yet unsustainable) profits, both for private 
actors and the State. Real wages in the public industrial sector dropped by eight 
percent between 1990 and 1996. 767  Moreover, capital was directed to the 
construction of real estate, the production of luxury goods, and grand schemes 
such as the Toshka irrigation project, rather than invested in export-oriented 
industrial production.768 
Neoliberal Accumulation 
The slow collapse of accumulation-driven State capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s 
and the emergence of a rentier economy had blurred State, semi-State, and 
private capitalist sectors. State elites became investors in large private sector 
enterprises or used State power to favor their friends and families in the 
subcontracting sector, realizing huge profits. 769  Egypt’s military-industrial 
complex developed a large civilian sector, engaging in construction, transport, 
telecom, food production, and capital-intensive desert reclamation, and building 
patron-client networks between private, joint-venture and military firms.770 The 
corporatist trade unions developed their own economic enterprises, managing 
pension funds, business investments, housing, and banks.771  
 The government ‚solved‛ the financial crisis of 1990-91 with a massive capital 
injection in the banking sector of 5.5 percent of GDP and an additional fiscal 
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exemption worth ten percent of GDP.772 Public holding companies remained the 
largest shareholders in many of the privatized enterprises. Some privatized firms 
were sold to public banks. State holding companies set up private corporations or 
joint ventures. In 1998 the State bought back shares in most of its privatized 
enterprises.773  
 The outcome of the policies of privatization and liberalization  was not a liberal 
utopia with an ensemble of competitive and productive private entrepreneurs, 
but a system of monopoly capitalism. 774  The strategy of accumulation by 
dispossession created a layer of ‚crony‛ or ‚thieving‛ capitalists who 
increasingly dominated and directed the neoliberal bloc.775 Neoliberal reform in 
Egypt did not at all entail a ‚retreat‛ of the State from the ‚economic field‛, but a 
redirection of State power and resources towards an increased accretion of rents 
via an aggressive policy of dispossession, which only benefitted a small clique 
within the ruling classes. 776  Sameh Naguib remarked that: ‚<the policies of 
neoliberalism were never about dismantling or even reducing the role of the state in the 
economy, but rather about increasing the role of the state as a facilitator of capitalist 
profit-making at the expense of the working class.‛777 The neoliberal transformation of 
the Egyptian social formation was a process of ‚State capitalism in reverse‛: the 
State lost its function and position as ‚universal capitalist‛778 and became the 
obedient tool of a particular and select group of oligarchs who were closely 
connected to foreign financial and select domestic capital groups.  
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Offensive Passive Revolution 
The advent of neoliberalism turned the passive revolution back to its offensive 
moment. The neoliberal strategy of capital accumulation by dispossession 
initiated a new era of intensified class confrontation and increased 
authoritarianism.779 The ERSAP strengthened capital and rent accumulation at the 
expense of the livelihoods of workers and farmers.780 Standing squarely behind 
private capitalists and landlords, the Mubarak clique finally pulled the plug out 
of the post-populist consensus. The State forfeited its obligations in the moral 
economy, thereby undermining the patron-client relations between the subaltern 
classes and the ruling classes. As a true cynic, the State revealed the shallowness 
of its democratic and corporatist commitments of the 1980s by the increased use 
of coercion against its class opponents: opposition parties, Islamist movements, 
workers, peasants, slum-dwellers, et cetera.781  
 In the countryside, the fragmented forms of resistance against the neoliberal 
land reforms organized by landless or small landholding farmers were violently 
repressed. 782  In villages such as Edku and Abu Hammad in the Delta, 
spontaneous riots broke out against State violence.783 By the mid-1990s, half of the 
rural population lived in poverty, an increase of ten percent in comparison to 
1990.784 By 2007 the passive revolution in the countryside had resulted in ‚<119 
deaths, 846 injuries and 1409 arrests<‛785 
 At the dawn of the 21st century, Egypt’s manufacturing sector employed 12.9 
percent of the labor force, producing 16.2 of the country’s GDP. 786  The 
commodified or ‚market labor force‛ increased from 17.2 million in 1998 to 22.3 
million in 2006 – an expansion that exceeded the demographic growth of the 
workforce.787 With regard to Egypt’s industries, privatization often led to mass 
firing of workers, with the aim of increasing productivity. As in the countryside, 
neoliberal reform in the industries did not stimulate investments. The process of 
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dispossession did not enhance the rate of capital accumulation, but increased 
surplus extraction in the form of rents.788 Cutting back on subsidies and wages 
decreased the purchasing power of the workforce, and the destruction of 
employment in the public sector was not compensated by new jobs in the private 
sector. In general, unemployment between 1998 and 2006 did not increase, as 
people either engaged in subsistence production, or joined the informal sector. 
Between 1998 and 2006 the share of the workforce employed in the informal 
economy increased from 57 to 60 percent.789 Moreover, in 1998 it was estimated 
that 70 percent of the workers in the private sector lived in poverty.790  
 The new accumulation strategy required a political reconfiguration of the post-
populist bloc; i.e. the exclusion of subaltern forces and the subduing of fractions 
of the capitalist class. The ruling neoliberal class presented its political project as 
an anti-Islamist alliance in order to: firstly, incorporate Western governments and 
enfeebled domestic nationalist, liberal, and leftist intellectuals in its hegemony; 
and secondly, restrict the capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood and radical 
Islamists to develop a counter-bloc. In political society, State control over 
elections and parliament was increased. The electoral law was changed to the 
disadvantage of the Ikhwan, which, together with other opposition parties, 
boycotted the 1990 parliamentary elections. The State tightened its grip over civil 
society as well. When the Brotherhood obtained majorities in the doctors’, 
journalists’, and bar associations, the government put all professional syndicates 
under direct state control.791 Attacks and assassinations by terrorist organizations 
such as the Islamic Group and the Islamist uprising in Middle-Egypt gave the 
government an excuse to repress the Brotherhood. From 1995 onwards, Ikhwan 
activists, student leaders, and members of parliament were systematically 
arrested, intimidated, detained, and tortured. In addition, critical journalists and 
human rights activists were increasingly brought before court and trialed. In 1999 
government passed a law that decreed that all NGO-type organizations  had to 
reapply for a license to operate legally in Egypt. NGOs that engaged in political 
activities were banned.792 
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 The neoliberal passive revolution of the 1990s and 2000s not only entailed an 
accumulation of dispossession in the economic sphere, but also a coercive 
dispossession of social and political rights in civil and political society. However, 
the lack of an ethico-political dimension to the politics of the neoliberal clique, 
and its reliance on direct domination rather than hegemony, provoked a growing 
resistance from subaltern Subjects. 
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CHAPTER 12 
The Civil-Democratic Movement 
And this is the first time we went to the street to call for a political demand that had an impact on 
Egypt itself. The last few years we went to the streets, many times, but to support Palestine, to 
support the Iraqi people, against Zionism, against imperialism, but no one went to the street to defend 
the interests of the people of Egypt. 
Ahmed Shabeen, Kefaya coordinator, Interview, Cairo, 13 March 2008 
Demise of the Third Wave 
In 1990 Tagammu participated in parliamentary elections that were boycotted by 
all other opposition parties. Khaled Mohieddin, chairman of the party defended 
their tactic: ‚<in order to make our voice heard, we had to use a new method of 
opposition. We did not explode issues, but we took positions on issues.‛793 In reality, the 
‚legal Left‛ was offered positions in parliament in exchange for a moderate 
political discourse and a hard stance against the Brotherhood.794 The fall of the 
Soviet Union and the concomitant discredit of socialist thought in general 
encouraged the Tagammu leadership to translate their tactical ‚secular-
democratic‛ turn into a new ideological framework. Communist leader Salah 
Adly explained that: 
At the end of the eighties a number of Marxists claimed that the direction of 
Tagammu, which opposed the government and took the side of the poor people and 
workers, led to a loss of support from the middle class and the industrial productive 
capitalists. They claimed that Tagammu had to diminish its class policies and to 
represent a more moderate policy, and to diminish its opposition towards the 
regime, so that it can use the media in a better way. But the results were 
devastating for Tagammu. Tagammu lost members in the parliament, members, 
and support in civil society.795 
For the elections of 1995 the traditional Tagammu slogan of ‚Freedom, Socialism 
and Unity‛ was replaced by ‚Justice, Progress and Democracy‛. The 1998 party 
congress stated that socialism was no longer on the agenda, and that Egypt 
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should strive towards ‚democracy‛ and ‚independent development‛. 796  How 
‚independent development‛ differed from ‚normal‛ capitalist accumulation was 
not clear, as the party no longer resisted privatizations in principle.797 Rifaat al-
Said cynically asked how one could defend socialism in an age of liberalization:798  
Of course, we have changed – there is no party that can remain the same. For 
example, our first platform spoke of the consolidation and support of the public 
sector, then reality changed and we had to adapt, so we changed that to ‚protection 
of the public sector‛. Then we called for the ‚defence‛ of the public sector and now 
that the public sector has been practically sold, we call for ‚the preservation of 
organizations and institutions of national importance.799  
Adly contemplated that: 
At the beginning of the nineties there were some changes in the direction of 
Tagammu, they went to the right and became a moderate leftist party. Its political 
positions are very good on paper, but in practice it does not cross any of the red 
lines which the regime draws for it. It does not mobilize, either in the streets, or 
among workers or farmers or against the regime itself.800 
The disengagement of Tagammu from class politics was the outcome of a process 
started in the 1980s, as I have discussed above. State repression and the 
demobilization of the masses after the uprising of 1977 made Tagammu leaders 
look for shortcuts towards successful leftist politics. The détente during the first 
years of the Mubarak-regime created illusions in the potential and autonomy of 
democratic politics on the national level. In order to operate within the 
boundaries of the restricted political community, the ‚legal Left‛ cut its relations 
with its traditional social base of workers, peasants, and students – thereby 
further weakening its position vis-à-vis the regime.  
 The rise of the Islamist movements and a reluctance to ‚go back to the streets‛, 
drove the leaders of Tagammu and the ECP even more in the arms of the regime. 
After the repression of the 1977 insurrection the prospect of mass mobilization 
was greeted with cynism from party leaders. In the 1990s and 2000s, with 
Islamism on the rise, it was anticipated with dread: Rifaat al-Said claimed that the 
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Brotherhood was the only organization capable of ‚controlling‛ a mass 
movement.801  In 1999, for the first time, Tagammu MPs did not vote against 
another term for President Mubarak.802 
 Tagammu’s collaboration with the regime and its disengagement from 
grassroots politics alienated members and sympathizers. In 2003 an internal 
report admitted that the party had lost its traditional influence in the universities, 
professionals syndicates, and trade unions.803 When in 2009 I spoke with Husayn 
Abd al-Razek, a leader of the old guard in Tagammu, he admitted that: ‚<for 
years, Tagammu took no initiatives whatsoever, people only sat in the party’s 
headquarters and in the offices of the newspaper, discussing, not taking any action to the 
streets.‛804  
A Secular Alliance 
Tagammu’s political shift to the right was entwined with a growing enmity 
against Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. When I met in 2008 
and 2009 with the charismatic Sharif Fayyad, a leading member of Tagammu, he 
claimed that the Egyptian people were not yet ready for real democracy, as fair 
elections would result in a landslide for the Muslim Brothers. Although the 
Mubarak State was not at all democratic, he considered it to be a lesser evil than 
an Islamic State. According to Fayyad, the Brotherhood mobilized religion to 
capture the ‚simple minds‛ of the Egyptian people, especially in the countryside, 
where feudal relations and backward forms of consciousness were still dominant: 
Tagammu should first support the establishment of a liberal democracy and full 
capitalist relations of production, before it would be able to fruitfully advance the 
idea of socialism.805  
 The rationale of the anti-Islamist stance was that, despite their sometime ‚civil‛ 
and ‚democratic‛ rhetoric, the Ikhwan were, because of their essential nature as 
‚Islamic fascists‛, fundamentally against a genuine secular, liberal democratic 
system. Their pro-democratic stance was an element of a ‚double discourse‛ that 
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hid a real agenda of the establishment of a theocratic State.806 Even more so than 
the regime, which at least preserved some elements of a secular and civil State, 
Islamism was a reactionary force, as the historical experience of Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, and Iran clearly showed. The intimidation and censorship of secular and 
leftist intellectuals, and the assassination of Farag Foda in 1992, reinforced the 
perception that secularism itself was under siege by Islamism. Because the Left 
was weak, it could not stand up against Islamism but in an alliance with the 
regime – an idea that had been a minority position within the Left throughout the 
1980s.807 
 This line of thought produced a ‚secular alliance‛ against the Ikhwan between, 
on the one hand, some Tagammu, Communist, liberal, and nationalist leaders and 
intellectuals, and, on the other, the Mubarak State.808 For example, secular leftists 
supported the repressive 1993 Unified Law that granted government the power to 
intervene in the elections of the professional associations in order to curb the 
power of the Ikhwan. 809  The government, for its part, integrated secular 
intellectuals into its project by (re)building and (re)financing cultural institutions 
such as the Cairo Book Fair,810 the Cairo Opera, and the Alexandria Library, and 
by opening up new money streams and platforms for writers and artists: ‚Thus, 
within a decade, the state went from being one of the chief obstacles to cultural 
production, to one of its chief protectors and subsidizers.‛811 The ‚real‛ war against the 
Islamists was articulated in the domain of cultural politics, with secular 
intellectuals and parties playing the part of the State’s enlightened allies against 
the dark forces of religious reaction.812 
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The Fourth Wave 
A New Left? 
In a 2007 article for MERIP Egyptian blogger and leftist activist Hossam al-
Hamalawy distinguished between an ‚old‛ and a ‚new‛ Left. Egypt’s New Left 
represented an organizational, ideological, and generational renewal. From an 
organizational perspective, the New Left was rooted in the emergence of groups 
such as the Revolutionary Socialists (RS) and of a leftist human rights’ 
community. Ideologically, the New Left rejected the strategy of the ‚secular 
front‛ and the enmity of Tagammu and the ECP towards Islamism. Lastly, the 
New Left attracted a new generation of young militants to radical politics, 
overcoming the gerontocracy of the fossilized parties of the ‚third wave‛.813 Al-
Hamalawy’s claim of the rise of a New Left in Egypt is, in general, correct, 
although I argue that his conception of the composition of this ‚fourth wave of 
communism‛ is a little partisan and restrictive, because of his own RS 
membership.  
 The roots of the New Left can be traced back to the 1980s, when leftists became 
dissatisfied with the policies of Tagammu and the ECP. For example, the 
disengagement of Tagammu from grassroots politics and its rapprochement with 
the regime led the Revolutionary Current (RC) of Michel Kamal, one of the most 
influential wings of the ECP, to claim that the ‚legal Left‛ was a means for the 
regime to corrupt the communist movement, integrating the radical left in the 
democratic façade of the State consensus. The RC defected from the ECP in 1989 
to form the small People’s Socialist Party.  
 A more important force on the Left were the RS. At the end of the 1980s a 
group of young Marxists set up a reading group, criticizing the Stalinist traditions 
of the Egyptian communist movement. This informal political circle was in 1991 
formally established as the RS, using the trade union elections as a jump board.814 
In 1995 they established the Center for Socialist Studies (CSS) in Giza, which 
became their legal front. 815  In the same period there was a discussion and 
subsequently a split in the organization, regarding the question of open work. A 
part of the RS argued that it was not yet the time for open work in the streets and 
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that the group should focus on propaganda and producing its newspaper. This 
faction split and established itself as Tahrir al-‘Umal (Workers’ Liberation) around 
the paper Sharara (Spark).816  
 In 2002 the groups reunited, since the Second Palestinian Intifada had solved 
the question of open work in practice. 817 Yet, at once, a new debate opened up 
concerning the nature of the united front within the developing civil-democratic 
movement. The second half of the 1990s had seen an increasing cooperation 
between leftist, Nasserist and Islamist groups at the grassroots level, especially in 
the Cairo and Ayn Shams universities, around a shared anti-imperialist and anti-
Zionist agenda.818 This experience led a majority of RS leaders to advocate a broad 
front of ‚anti-imperialist‛ forces, involving not only socialists and communists, 
but also Nasserists and Islamists. A minority supported a united front that was 
only composed of leftist forces, excluding the Ikhwan and other Islamist groups.819 
 In an interview I conducted in 2009 with Baho Abdul, a member of the RS and 
of the Tadamon workers’ solidarity group, she claimed that the politics of the RS 
differed from those of the Old Left on three fundamental issues: ‚First: our position 
towards the Muslim Brothers and< our view on anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist 
struggle, and the whole religion debate. Second: the question of reform or revolution, 
trying to push for change from below or above. Third: the question of how to pursue 
development.‛820 The ideology, tactics, and strategy of the RS constituted a critique 
of the Stalinist traditions of the Egyptian communist movement – a critique that 
was strongly influenced by the ideas of the neo-Trotskyist821  British Socialist 
Workers’ Party (SWP). Firstly, they rejected a ‚stagist‛ perspective on the (post-
)colonial revolution in favor of Trotsky’s concept of permanent revolution. 
Secondly, pace the ‚dead mass parties‛ of the ‚legal‛ Left, they advanced the 
Leninist notion of an active and vibrant vanguard party. Thirdly, from the 
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reading of Chris Harman’s The Prophet and the Proletariat,822 they derived the 
idea that the cultural context of Egypt necessitated a tactical alliance with Islamist 
youth around a shared anti-imperialism, in order to win these layers for the 
socialist Project.823 
 The rapprochement between Tagammu leaders and the Mubarak State also 
alienated Nasserists and leftist nationalists from the ‚legal‛ Left. In 1992 they split 
from Tagammu and founded the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (ADNP). In 
1996 a group led by Hamdeen Sabahi left the ADNP, establishing hizb al-Karama 
(Dignity Party). In contradistinction to the ADNP, al-Karama explicitly and 
unambiguously advocated political pluralism and civil democracy: ‚We are 
socialist but we also believe in democracy.‛ 824  Al-Karama oriented itself to street 
politics and participated in alliances with other political forces against the 
government. 
 Other communists and leftists withdrew from the political arena altogether 
and engaged with movements from below through organizations of the NGO-
type. Yussef Darwish and Kamal Abbas, for example, established in 1991 the 
Helwan-based Centre for Trade Union and Workers’ Services (CTUWS), focusing 
on offering services, solidarity campaigns and education to workers.825 Within a 
few years the CTUWS was also active in other industrial areas, such as 10 
Ramadan City, Mahalla, and Nag Hammadi. The foundation of the CTUWS 
anticipated the rise of civil-democratic NGOs and human rights centers in the 
1990s, of which the Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC) was one of the most 
influential. HMLC was established in 1999 to defend the rights of workers and 
political activists. The center offered legal advice, contacts with the media and 
support in court cases, as well as organizing seminars to raise awareness among 
workers of their labor rights. The center’s Cairo offices hosted meetings of 
political committees, movements and parties, such as 6 April and Tadamon, 
thereby becoming a hub of the democratic opposition in the next decade.826 
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The Trend for Change 
By the year 2000, the ‚legal‛ Left, and especially Tagammu, was but the historical 
remnant of the failed Prince of the second half of the 1970s. Once it had been a 
party of some 200,000 members, but the integration of its leaders and politics in 
the Mubarak post-populist and neoliberal bloc had reduced its active cadre to a 
few hundreds. From the 1990s onwards, Tagammu was a party in crisis. The 
grassroots movements of the 2000s deepened the malaise of the legal Left, 
because they saliently revealed its separation from the masses, and its inability to 
give systematic and coherent assistance to the subaltern struggles. Husayn Abd 
al-Razik, a leader of Tagammu’s old guard, admitted that: ‚For years, Tagammu took 
no initiatives whatsoever, people only sat in the headquarters and in the newspaper, 
discussing, not going outside, on the streets.‛827 He added that: ‚The last two, three 
years, however, we have been more active, organizing demonstrations, conferences and 
sit-ins in the streets.‛828 
 Still, the increased participation in street politics was realized in spite of the 
leadership rather than because of it. According to Ahmed Belal, almost all active 
members were against the leadership, which ‚occupied‛ party positions but did 
not ‚lead‛ the party in any way. There was a clear divide between, on the one 
hand, the political activity of the national leadership, which did not engage in 
grassroots politics, but instead dominated Tagammu’s representation in the media 
and in parliament; and, on the other, the leaders of local branches, who often 
participated in the struggles and movements from below. Within the branches, 
the political authority of directive intellectuals was not determined by their 
formal party position, but by their level of militancy and engagement in local 
struggles. Furthermore, much like in the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
organizations, added to the ideological and organizational disagreements, there 
was a generational conflict. The Tagammu and ECP party leadership consisted of 
mostly elderly cadres who had led the communist movement in the 1950s, 1960s 
and, at best, the 1970s, and now blocked the youth’s access to functions and 
positions within the party.829 Abd al-Nasser Ibrahim, a Tagammu leader of the 
Giza independent teachers’ movement concurred with Belal’s analysis: 
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In every movement you can find a member of Tagammu, but the leaders of the 
party are a tight circle and they only support their members in words. They don't 
prevent us from doing anything, but neither do they listen to us. This is a big 
problem in Tagammu< The leaders are close to the regime, they are afraid of the 
state, so they keep things under control.830 
In opposition to the ‚formal‛ leadership, leftist activists and leaders in Tagammu 
established the Trend for Change. A main obstacle for the Trend for Change was 
the sustained entryism of rightist ECP members in Tagammu. Husayn Abd al-
Razik, a communist himself, acknowledged, but minimalized the historical and 
contemporary presence of members of the ECP in Tagammu: 
The Communist Party played a very important role in building Tagammu. Rifaat 
Said and myself and many others of the leadership were members of the 
Communist Party. And the Communist Party decided that we, many of us, had to 
play a role in building this party. At that time comrade Nabil al-Hilali who was 
the most important leader of the Communist Party had a meeting with Khaled 
Mohi Al-Din and he gave them the names of the members of the Communist Party 
who would leave their posts in the Communist Party and become members in 
Tagammu, including of course Rifaat Said and others; many of the members of the 
Communist Party from Alexandria to Aswan became members of Tagammu. After 
a few years the Communist Party had the decision that those who took leadership 
positions in Tagammu had to leave their leadership posts in the Communist Party. 
They could no longer attend any meeting of the Communist Party< 
 In 1979 and 1980 there were two cases brought before court against the leadership 
of the Communist Party, the majority were members of Tagammu, so they decided 
that they had to leave and it happened from that time. Even some of the members of 
the Communist Party who became leaders in Tagammu, not all of them of course, 
few of them took a position against the relation with the Communist Party. 
Anyhow, the relation between Tagammu and the Communist Party is very clear 
now. The membership of Tagammu differs from the membership of the Communist 
Party. The Communist Party has also become weaker, because many cadres left it 
for Tagammu and even if they have members in the Communist Party the majority 
of them work in Tagammu. Also, the Communist Party has lost many of its 
leadership, now there is a new generation. I don’t think that we have a problem. 
Anyhow, there is a dying connection between the Communist Party and us.831 
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Abd al-Razik’s narrative about the relation between Tagammu and the ECP stood 
in contrast to Ahmed Belal’s experience: 
In 2007 some party leaders started to talk about the future of the party and they 
made statements. We were against these and tried to organize a tendency for the 
party elections of 2008. We lost the elections because there was another group, 
called ‚Unite‛, which was more organized than us. This was the first election for 
our Trend and as we had no experience like the others they won. They are members 
of the Communist party and sympathizers of these members. We refuse the 
domination of the Communist party as they occupy all important leadership 
positions, while Tagammu should be the house of all left tendencies.832  
For grassroots activists and leaders in Tagammu, the main strategic question was 
whether to remain in the party and fight the ‚formal‛ leadership for control over 
the party’s apparatus or leave the legal Left and support the creation of an 
alternative, organic counter-hegemonic apparatus. Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s many capable leaders, such as Mustafa Bassiouny, and Saud Omar, left the 
party to join other leftist formations. They argued that they better invested their 
energy and time in a new political Project that was actively engaged with 
grassroots struggles, than in an endless factional infighting in the dusty offices of 
Tagammu. Other militants argued that, despite its degeneration, Tagammu still 
owned a lot of political ‚capital‛ in the shape of its traditions, its position within 
the collective memory of the workers’ movement as the ‚house of the Left‛, its 
character as a national leftist party with branches in the whole country, its 
material legacy of offices, meeting rooms, et cetera. For these activists, the rise of 
the civil-democratic and workers’ movement was an opportunity to transform 
their fossilized organization (back) into a counter-hegemonic apparatus: 
Now Tagammu has the best chance to transform, because the regime is actually 
very weak. Tagammu is the only party with members in all the movements. But 
only if the party has the will to do so. The leaders don't want this, they have a good 
relation with the regime. We want to change the party. 833 
Wael Tawfiq had been a member of the RS up until 2010, but seeing the resistance 
within Tagammu, he decided to join the party to reinforce the leftist opposition.  
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There is a conflict in Tagammu right now. There are those who want Tagammu to 
play a bigger role than its limited part as a democratic power which gathers all 
tendencies. We are working against the party leadership. I think that Tagammu 
has the most leaders with the ability to work in the streets and around social issues. 
Of course not as strongly as the RS, but they have more numbers and they are an 
organization which exists in the whole country, and they are legal and have a lot of 
sites in the country and a big number of members and leaders.834 
Ahmed Belal, however, was pessimistic with regard to the future of the Trend for 
Change as a mere faction for internal party elections. 
We can go to the provinces and organize activities but you cannot only go there to 
present yourself as a front for the elections. It is the activities which attract people 
to support us. People are disappointed in the Trend because they are only an 
electoral front and they do not organize activities. A comrade said he wanted to 
quit, but I convinced him to stay because we are the youth. Others in the Trend are 
old and they do not want to do anything. If the Trend loses the next party elections 
we will be finished. I believe the youth is the real actor of change because we do not 
only work about elections; we want to change the party. We are young and we 
have a lot of personal problems, problems of marriage, problems of work, while they 
have money and time. I told my Trend that we should call the leaders in the 
provinces and organize activities to prepare for the elections, but the older members 
in the Trend do nothing.835 
The discussion among Tagammu activists about whether to stay and fight in the 
party in order to transform its historical capital into a counter-hegemonic 
apparatus, or leave the sinking ship, still endured after the 25 January Revolution. 
The revolution prompted a sizeable group of labor activists and youth, led by 
Alexandria MP Abu al-Ezz al-Hariry, to leave the party and join the Socialist 
Popular Alliance Party, whereas other activists such as Ahmed Belal and Haisam 
Hassan remained in Tagammu, where they established the radical Union for 
Egyptian Socialist Youth (UESY) in opposition to the leadership-dominated 
Union of Progressive Youth (UPY). 
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Old Skins 
In Hossam al-Hamalawy’s narrative, the novelty of the New Left resided in its 
innovative ideas, fresh generation, and new organizations. While this is certainly 
true, one should be careful not to simply equate the membership of the relatively 
new organizations – such as the RS and HMLC – with the New Left, and the 
rank-and-file of traditional parties – such as Tagammu and the ECP – with the Old 
Left. Throughout my fieldwork I met young and revolutionary militants of 
Tagammu and the ECP who were highly critical of their leaders. On the other 
hand, new parties, such as the ‚Democratic Left‛, and many of the human rights 
organizations, defended a clear reformist and liberal-democratic agenda. 
Although the RS drew upon a new generation of leftist students from the 1980s 
and 1990s to form the core of their organization, they also forged alliances with 
workers and independent leftists from the ‚older‛ generation of the 1960s and 
1970s. Conversely, Tagammu and the ECP – parties where power was firmly in the 
hands of a pro-regime gerontocracy – still attracted layers of youth who engaged 
with the street politics of the 2000s. Simply put, there was also a (limited) New 
Left in the Old Left. What ultimately separated the ‚new leftists‛ from the ‚old 
leftists‛ was an engagement with street politics. The reconfiguration of small 
leftist forces in the 1990s planted the seeds for a New Left, but activists remained 
largely isolated from the subaltern masses. The real turning point for a resurgence 
of Egyptian ‚politics from below‛ came with the Second Palestinian Intifada of 
September and November 2000. 836  In the following section, I present a brief 
overview of the mobilizations since the year 2000 which saliently show the 
organic and spontaneous development of what I deem a grassroots civil-
democratic movement in Egypt.  
A Civil-Democratic Project 
Rise of Street Politics 
In 2000 students organized massive demonstrations in Cairo in support of the 
plight of the Palestinians – collective actions ‚from below‛ that ended two 
decades of political demobilization. Independent activists and some twenty 
NGOs established the Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidarity with the 
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Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI).837  Even though the foundation of the EPCSPI was a 
leftist initiative, it attracted Nasserist and Islamist activists who joined as 
individuals or as representatives from parties, syndicates, or NGOs. The Popular 
Committee organized solidarity demonstrations in Cairo and all major 
universities, convoys and relief campaigns, and a boycott of Israeli and Western 
commodities. The EPCSPI became a social and political network that, under 
pressure of international and domestic events, spawned new movements. It also 
became a platform for political discussion, coordination and cooperation between 
leftist, Nasserist, and Islamist activists.838  From March to September 2001 the 
EPCSPI organized sit-ins and hunger strikes in support of the Intifada and a 
demonstration in Tahrir Square to condemn USA support for Israel. Atrocities 
against Palestinians in April and May 2002 triggered new student demonstrations 
in Egyptian universities and a large rally was held in front of Cairo University. 
When students marched to the Israeli embassy, Central Security forces violently 
intervened. On 14 October, as the first public protest of its kind, Muhammad 
Hassanein Heikal condemned the ‚dynastic succession‛ by Gamal Mubarak.839  
 The war in Afghanistan and the looming intervention in Iraq gave a new 
impetus to the development of the existing solidarity networks. On 18 and 19 
December the first conference against imperialist war and Zionist occupation was 
held in Cairo, an event that gathered a broad coalition of leftists, nationalists, and 
Islamists. In January and February 2003 small rallies in Cairo and other cities 
protested the preparations for war against Iraq. The military intervention in Iraq 
was greeted on 20 and 21 March with 20,000 Egyptians occupying Tahrir Square, 
which gave birth to the 20 March Movement.840 This rally saliently signaled the 
return of mass politics in Egypt.841  
 Over the course of the next months, the anti-war and Palestinian solidarity 
movement began to tackle domestic issues. The third anniversary of the Second 
Palestinian Intifada on 27 and 28 September was transformed into a protest 
against the government. 842  The Second Cairo Conference in December 
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emphasized the connection between the Mubarak government, US-imperialism, 
and Zionism.843 For the first time, the Brotherhood formally participated as an 
organization. 844  In September 2004, the 20 March Movement, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the ECP, al-Karama, HMLC, and other organizations established 
the Popular Movement for Change with the slogan of free and democratic 
presidential elections. On 12 December the Popular Movement organized the first 
explicit anti-Mubarak demonstration with the central slogan of free and 
democratic presidential elections. Although it mobilized ‚only‛ 300 to 400 
activists, at the time the event constituted a landmark in Egyptian ‚street politics‛ 
for its bold criticism of the President.845  
 On 21 February 2005 Kefaya (Enough) was established as a unitary movement 
of existing committees and campaigns. During the Cairo International Book Fair a 
second anti-Mubarak demonstration took place. In March the Muslim 
Brotherhood organized a separate rally demanding political reform. In April, 
judges and university professors followed suit. The month of May saw the 
emergence of the Youth for Change and Workers for Change, Kefaya offshoots 
who addressed social issues such as unemployment, housing and the need for 
independent trade unions. In June, the Writers for Change, Journalists for Change 
and Doctors for Change followed. 846 
 Meanwhile, the Mubarak regime began to take the movement seriously. At the 
beginning of the 2000s the government had cautiously supported the Palestinian 
solidarity campaign and attempted to co-opt the movement. As the protests grew 
in numbers and shifted towards a criticism of domestic policies and the ‚dynastic 
succession‛ issue, the regime felt increasingly threatened by the movement 
which, because of its spontaneity and hybrid political constituency, appeared as a 
‚vague multi-headed monster‛. 847  Central Security arrested hundreds of 
protesters and Muslim Brotherhood members and violently repressed the 
peaceful Kefaya demonstration of 25 May. On 4 June, former ministers and public 
figures close to the regime established the National Coalition for Democratic 
Change as a means to create a ‚bridge‛ between the regime and the opposition 
                                                          
843 Ibid. 
844 Abdelrahman 2009: 43-4. 
845 Howeidy 2005. 
846 Howeidy 2005. 
847 Abdelrahman 2009: 50-1. 
231 
 
movement. These diversionary tactics did not pacify the movement: on the 
contrary, on 8 June Kefaya organized a 2000 strong demonstration in memory of 
Saad Zaghlul.848 
Collaboration 
The New Left played a crucial role in the building and direction of the civil-
democratic movement. Gihan Shabeen remembered that: ‚We were noticeable, we 
were young< we are not so young now, but we were young compared to other leftists, 
and we were active. We loved to work in the streets.‛ 849  However, the scale and 
spontaneous dimension of the movement on the one hand and the participation 
of liberal, nationalist, and Islamist forces on the other, implied that ‚street 
politics‛ constituted a field for political work and struggle, rather than a simple 
instrument of leftist politics. Kefaya had galvanized layers of the urban youth and 
created spaces for contentious politics. The Muslim Brothers were increasingly 
engaged with the civil-democratic movement. For example, in 2004, they helped 
to organize the third Cairo Conference.850 Young and militant members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood built a shared activity-system with activists from the New 
Left, dissidents from Tagammu and the ECP, and progressive journalists from al-
Badil, al-Shorouk, al-Dostour, al-Masry Al-Yawm, et cetera. The rise of internet 
activism further encouraged political discussion, the dissemination of 
information, and the mobilization of protest groups.851  
 Even though the activity of these various groups was originally oriented 
towards solidarity with the plight of the Palestinian and Iraqi populations, it 
quickly became a collaborative Project that developed a goal of its own: a civil 
and democratic state. The activists and networks that emerged from the civil-
democratic movement would eventually become the organizers of the first, small-
scale demonstrations on 25 January, which turned into a nationwide popular 
revolution.852 The poet Abd al-Rahman Yussef, son of the preacher Yussef al-
Qaradawi and campaign leader of Muhammad al-Baradei, claimed that the civil-
democratic movement of the 2000s also laid the spiritual and intellectual 
foundations of the 25 January Revolution: 
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We are talking about the spirit of the revolution. In the revolution a lot of different 
forces and ideas came together. It was not only a political issue, but also a 
humanist and ideological protest. The words of writers and poets had a big role in 
charging people with emotions and ideological ideas. The Egyptian revolution is 
the result of a long struggle, prepared by writers, poets and political activists. The 
revolution is about rejection, how to learn to say no. This rejection has been part of 
organized writers' opposition since the formation of Kefaya. This helped the 
political and trade union movements.853 
Yet in 2006 Kefaya appeared to be far from the spiritual and activist spark that 
would ignite a revolution some five years later. Firstly, the regime itself changed 
the constitution so that the president could be elected directly, one of the chief 
aims of the civil-democratic movement. Of course, at the same time, it made sure 
that Mubarak would succeed himself as president. Political cartoonist Salah Abd 
al-Azim recalled that: ‚After the presidential elections, when Mubarak succeeded, the 
movement suffered a setback and was convinced that Gamal Mubarak would become the 
new president.‛ 854  Just as many other activists, this episode in the struggle 
demoralized him and he became politically inactive during the following years. 
Secondly, as a movement, Kefaya lacked a real directional center. It was scattered 
over bickering political families and prone to sectarian infighting. Thirdly, as a 
civil-democratic movement, Kefaya remained largely confined to the social circles 
of students, intellectuals (in the classic sense), urban professionals, and other 
middle class groups.855 As a whole, the network did not succeed in connecting its 
explicit anti-Mubarak rhetoric with the economic woes of the working class, the 
poor, and the peasantry. 856  Kefaya spawned a number of more or less class-
oriented groups, such as the 9 March Movement, the Coalition for the Defense of 
Health, Teachers Without a Trade Union, Doctors Without Rights, et cetera; but 
these grassroots committees were scattered and often focused on their own 
particular objects.  
 Already in 2005 the broad front between the Left, civil society groups, and the 
Brotherhood collapsed because Tagammu withdrew from the coalition.857 The lull 
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in the civil-democratic movement after the presidential elections also blocked the 
development of a collaborative Project between the Society and secular 
opposition forces. There were still instances of cooperation between the Ikhwan 
and other political groups, but these moments had an ad hoc, local or particular 
character. 
 The regime did not have time to rejoice in the collapse of the civil-democratic 
movement, as the demise of Kefaya was intersected by the rise of the workers’ 
movement, which would pose an even greater challenge to the Pharaoh. The 
acceleration of the privatization and liberalization process since 2004 stimulated a 
resurgence of the workers movement, which became the main vehicle for anti-
regime protests after the collapse of Kefaya. Workers’ strikes and collective actions 
re-interpellated and re-mobilized sections of the political Left, transforming their 
political practices and discourses, and creating new divides among leftists 
according to their attitudes towards the workers’ movement.  
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CHAPTER 13 
Islamism in the Neoliberal Age 
<people< can be different in wealth as they differ in opinions, as they differ in color, and so on. 
Essam al-Erian, Muslim Brother leader, Interview, Cairo 10 March 2008 
Jihadism and Salafism 
Even though secular leftists played an important role in initiating the first 
Palestinian solidarity campaigns, anti-war rallies, and Kefaya protests, it was the 
Muslim Brotherhood that was able and willing to mobilize tens of thousands of 
people in the streets.858 The Society proved to be an often vacillating, yet powerful 
ally of the broad anti-Mubarak opposition. From being either the unruly storm 
troopers or capitalist supporters of the Sadat bloc in the 1970s, the Egyptian 
Islamic movement had mutated and differentiated itself throughout the 1980s, 
crystallizing in the 1990s and 2000s into roughly three archetypes: jihadis, salafis 
and reformist Islamists.859  ‚Jihadism‛ encompasses militant, radical and often 
violent groups that aim to overthrow and/or conquer the State, by popular 
resistance, guerrilla tactics, or individual terrorism. ‚Salafism‛ groups all Islamic 
tendencies and organizations that focus their attention on ‚policing‛ the religious, 
cultural, and moral behavior of themselves and others – ‚commanding the good‛ 
and ‚forbidding the wrong‛. ‚Reformists‛ are chiefly political movements or 
parties which, to some degree, accept the framework of (civil and democratic) 
politics – hizbiyya – and choose to participate in it.860  
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 Ideologically, jihadism had its roots in Sayyid Qutb’s political interpretation of 
jihad, and especially its subsequent appropriation as the violent, armed struggle 
of a small, dedicated vanguard. In opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, most 
jihadis rejected hizbiyya – participation in political society – in principle, because 
of its corrupting influence and secular nature. 861  Sociologically, the jihadist 
movement was composed of a mixture of middle class elements, who had their 
exclusion from the post-populist bloc in common. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
rural and provincial-urban poor from Upper Egypt migrated to the peripheries of 
large cities such as Cairo, often seeking employment in ‚informal‛ economic 
sectors such as construction, services and petty trade. Because of the high cost of 
living in the urban centers, these social groups were entrenched in peripheral 
ashwaiyyat. In these ‚informal communities‛ the rural and provincial-urban 
migrants were joined with the city’s ‚own‛ heterogeneous collection of 
impoverished youth, professionals, and newly married couples who lacked the 
financial capacity to live in the center.862 The social and spatial marginalization of 
these layers, and the negligence of their plight by traditional political forces – 
including the Brotherhood – created a potential base for radical Islamist groups 
such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. The absence of working class organizations, and 
the presence of radical Islamist groups, diverted a potential class activity-system 
towards religious communalism, as Beinin explained: ‚The adherence of labor 
contractors, foremen, and unskilled workers to the Islamic Group in Imbaba exemplifies 
the ability of a populist Islamist discourse to express the grievances of the poor while 
mediating conflicts that might otherwise have erupted on a class basis.‛863  
 Whereas the assassination of President Sadat failed to rouse mass popular 
support for an Islamic State, the retreat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan had 
shown many Egyptian warriors the possibility of defeating even that ‚Evil 
Empire‛ through guerrilla warfare. This experience laid the foundations of, on 
the one hand, the ‚local‛ activity of individual terrorism and guerrillaism in 
Central Egypt during the 1990s, and, on the other, of the shift towards ‚global 
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jihad‛ – if Islamist resistance in Afghanistan had led to the defeat of the Soviet 
Union, direct attacks on the USA could lead to the demise of that other Evil 
Empire. When Islamist mujahedeen returned from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, 
they brought with them the convictions and methods of armed struggle against 
an illegitimate regime.  
 Unlike the salafists, jihadist organizations such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya had 
clear political goals. From the 1990s on, the Islamic Group opposed Mubarak’s 
passive revolution, protesting: ‚<the rise in land rents, political corruption, the 
extension of the state of emergency and infringement of human rights.‛864 In order to 
fight and weaken the State, the organization mainly targeted military personnel, 
civil servants, police, and tourists. From 1992 to 1997 al-Gama’a and the State were 
involved in a small civil war in central Egypt that claimed 1,500 lives.865 During 
this decade, ‚domestic‛ jihadist movements such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya became 
estranged from the ‚global‛ jihadist organizations such as al-Jihad. The failure of 
overthrowing their own national governments led global jihadists to attack 
foreign targets such as the World Trade Center in 1993. Attacking imperialism 
‚directly‛ was seen as a shortcut to the fall of the comprador regimes in their 
homelands.866  
 The terrorist acts of the Islamic Group provoked and justified a violent and 
authoritarian reaction of the State, which extended far beyond the repression of 
jihadist cells.867 The ‚war on terror‛ granted Mubarak’s passive revolution a solid 
foundation from which to go on the offensive and restrict the civil and the 
political rights of the whole population. In the cities, the ashwaiyyat were overrun 
by Central Security forces and brought back under control of the State: for 
example Imbaba and Ayn Shams in 1992 and 1998. By the late 1990s, Islamist 
guerrillaism was defeated. Despite the spectacular ‚event‛ of 9/11, as a 
movement, jihadism was on the retreat in Egypt in the 2000s. Terrorist 
organizations such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya laid down their arms, renounced the 
use of violence, turned to reformism, and tried to set up a political party.868  
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Development of the Brotherhood 
Brothers and Workers 
During the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood was less interested in the constituency 
of radical Islamism – the rural poor and unskilled urban laborers – and instead 
focused on recruiting the better educated, yet impoverished middle classes. 
Moreover, unlike both the Left and the Islamic Group, its strategy of engagement 
with State-dominated civil and political society seemed to bear fruits. The Society 
combined a formal participation in parliament with a political activity in the mass 
organizations of the middle class and informal, local grassroots initiatives. In 1992 
the Brotherhood confirmed its hegemony in the professional syndicates by its 
conquest of the journalist and bar associations, which were traditionally leftist 
and secular strongholds.869 Moreover, Ikhwan members established educational 
facilities and NGOs, which outnumbered their secular counterparts, and 
developed their own field of cultural production in civil society through books, 
newspapers, radio, television, and from the 1990s onwards: satellite television 
and the internet. They created a ‚shadow‛ religious establishment that criticized 
the State officials of al-Azhar, and influenced court rulings.870 
 After its successes in these domains of civil and political society, the Ikhwan 
sought to expand their influence over the industrial working class. Until the early 
1990s the Brotherhood was a clear proponent of Sadat’s Infitah-project. However, 
the social impact of the acceleration of neoliberal reform in the 1990s, along with 
the Brothers’ rapprochement towards the workers, necessitated adjustments to 
the liberal-economic discourse.871 Moreover, out of the Brotherhood’s absorption 
of the Amal party during the 1987 parliamentary elections, an Islamist-corporatist 
tendency emerged, led by Adil Husayn. 872  Husayn reformulated the classic 
Nasserist and post-populist idea of a moral economy along Islamic lines, but the 
substance remained the same: the employer has a duty towards the workers to be 
just and to pay a fair wage, while workers have a duty towards the employer to 
be productive and reliable.873  
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 Be it in the name of the popular ‚national good‛ or the natural organicism of 
the religious community, the corporatist view denies a fundamental conflict of 
interest between labor and capital. Furthermore, in an age of privatization and 
liberalization, Islamic corporatism was framed within a traditional nationalist 
narrative that favored conspiracy theory over an analysis of the political economy 
of global capitalism. Israel and the USA were cast as the main antagonists in a 
geopolitical drama, putting Egypt under pressure to sell off its public assets to 
foreigners in order to weaken the country.874 For example, Said Husayni, Ikhwan 
MP in Mahalla, claimed that: ‚The problem of privatizations in Egypt is that we have 
lost ownership of our industry. It is transferred to criminals or foreigners.‛875 
 The integration of leftists elements from the Amal party opened up a syndicalist 
branch of the Muslim Brothers that participated in trade union elections. The 
syndicalist discourse of the Brotherhood’s ‚Islamic Trend‛ in the 1991 trade 
union elections was surprisingly leftist – probably a means to engage with the 
Nasserist and leftist consciousness of most industrial workers. The Ikhwan 
defended the right to strike, criticized the neo-liberal program of the regime and 
especially the wholesale liquidation of the public sector, and resisted government 
meddling in the trade union elections.876 Increased poverty and a revived class 
struggle interpellated a ‚workerist‛ tendency within the Brotherhood, pitting the 
old bourgeois elite against young and militant layers, especially in Alexandria.877 
The election program of 2004 moved the State back into economic discourse as an 
agent of modernization and social reform. Privatization was not wrong in se, but 
the manner in which the Mubarak-regime was using privatization weakened the 
State’s capacity in modernizing the economy and securing basic living standards, 
free medical care, pensions, welfare and education for the population. The 
Brotherhood attempted ‚<to incorporate a populist critique of neo-liberalism in its 
erstwhile pro-market discourse.‛878  
 Yet, despite their rhetoric, the ‚syndicalist‛ Brothers did not actively organize 
militant collective actions in the trade union domain. 879  There were Ikhwan 
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workers, but there was no real structural relationship between the Brotherhood 
and organized labor.880 The Society was careful not to provoke the regime and not 
to alienate its own powerful conservative wing. In fact, because of their tradition 
of non-confrontation with the regime, the Ikhwan could excuse themselves from 
collective labor struggles, as the State left them little room for legal action.881 The 
vacillating support of the Brotherhood for the workers only allowed it to achieve 
gains in the trade union field that were very modest compared to its successes in 
the professional syndicates.882  
Civil-Democratic Ikhwan 
During the 1990s, the Brotherhood took over the leading role of the Left in the 
anti-imperialist struggle. The Society mobilized support for the Palestinian 
Intifada, boasting strong ties with HAMAS, and against the Gulf War of 1991. 
These actions indicated a growing political independence of the Brotherhood’s 
leaders from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. However, similarly to the 
resistance against neoliberalism, the ‚anti-imperialism‛ of the Ikhwan was not 
framed as a political-economic critique, but as a cultural-religious clash of 
civilizations between Islam and the West. Moreover, in order to evade a 
confrontation with the regime, the complicity of the Egyptian government in the 
Palestinian and Iraqi cases was often downplayed.883 After the invasion of Iraq, 
the Brotherhood even organized a joint rally of ‚national unity‛ with the NDP 
against foreign aggression.884 Sameh Naguib explained this vacillating attitude of 
the Brothers as the outcome of a balancing act between the pressure of their rank-
and-file, who demanded a radical anti-imperialism, and the pragmatism of the  
bourgeois leadership.885  
 For the Mubarak State the Brotherhood’s boycott of the 1990 parliamentary 
elections, its victories in the 1992 municipal and professional associations’ 
elections, and its ‚anti-imperialist‛ street politics, constituted a clear sign that 
parts of civil and political society were slipping from its control.886 The State 
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sought to bring the Society back under its control by laws that decreased the 
influence of the Ikhwan in the professional associations, and by intimidating its 
members and leaders.887 State repression initiated a crisis within the Brotherhood, 
as it liquidated large sections of its cadre. In addition, the Society’s ‚youth‛ 
leaders – i.e. the students of the 1970s generation – demanded a share in the 
movement’s leadership. This would eventually lead to a split, whereby Abu Al-
Ela Maadi established the hizb al-Wasat (Center Party).888 
 The government’s attempt to retake full control over civil and political society 
led to splits in the whole opposition. As I discussed above, within Tagammu, 
criticism against Rifaat al-Said’s ‚secular alliance‛ mounted, and young 
Nasserists left the ADNP to create the al-Karama party.889 The State’s offensive 
against Islamism also forced the Brotherhood to start building a coalition of its 
own. In 1994 Ikhwan members visited the 82-year-old Nobel Prize winner Naguib 
Mahfuz after he was brutally stabbed in the neck by radical Islamists. This 
signaled the beginning of a rapprochement between Brothers and non-Islamist 
opposition forces. The political basis for a front between Islamists and Leftists 
was anti-imperialism – even though they often had a different view on the 
content of the concept – and the struggle for civil and human rights. State 
repression and an engagement in parliamentary elections moved the demand for 
democracy to the forefront of the Society’s political agenda.890  
 The Brotherhood victories in the parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2005891 
were as much a reflection of the Society’s popularity as the regime’s desire to 
portray itself as the only real ‚secular‛ alternative to Islamist rule.892 Yet the 
Brothers’ political engagement, both in parliament and in the streets, with bread 
and butter issues and the problems of unemployment and police brutality, 
transformed the political, ‚reformist‛ wing of the movement into a civil-
democratic actor. Reformists such as Essam al-Erian and Abd al-Moneim Abu al-
Fotouh embraced a discourse of democracy, civil liberties, and human rights, and 
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engaged in practices of cooperation and negotiation with other civil society 
groups and political tendencies. This process led Mona al-Ghobashy to the claim 
that: ‚Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan) has 
morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by anointed 
elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated, savvy 
professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian parties.‛893 However, 
the reformists faced stiff competition from the traditionalist, conservative 
factions. Whereas the reformists occupied the ‚external‛ positions of the 
movement as members of parliament, spokesmen, leaders in the professional 
syndicates, et cetera, the conservatives continued to dominate most ‚internal‛ 
positions of power, especially the Guidance Bureau.894 In the wake of the 25 
January Revolution reformist figures such as Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Fotouh 
came into conflict with the conservative leaders, and split from the Brotherhood. 
A Leftist-Islamist Front? 
Levels of Cooperation 
Whereas the leaders of the Old Left saw the presence of the Muslim Brothers in 
the civil-democratic movement as a threat, New Left activists cautiously 
welcomed their participation. They argued that the detained, intimidated and 
tortured Ikhwan activists and leaders were as much victims of the dictatorship as 
their leftist, liberal, and Nasserist counterparts. Rather than being determined by 
an ideological essence of Islamist fascism, the political activity and consciousness 
of rank-and-file Brothers was constituted through their ‚lived experience‛ of, on 
the one hand, arbitrary State repression, and, on the other, cooperation and 
negotiation with other trends.895  
 Jillian Schwedler and Janine Clark distinguished between three levels of 
cooperation between leftists and Islamists: ‚tactical‛, ‚strategic‛ and ‚ideational‛. 
‚Tactics‛ is basic cooperation in the sense of ‚<joint activities on an issue-by-issue 
and short-term basis‛. 896  Tactical cooperation does not require ideological 
justification. It can be a jointly organized demonstration or sit-in. At this point, 
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tactical cooperation happens purely on the level of mobilization. Strategic 
cooperation, on the other hand, necessitates a political rationale. The 
‚<engagement is sustained and encompassing of multiple issues‛897, but this does not 
mean that there is a shared worldview. Cooperation shifts to the domain of more 
or less stable, shared, organizational forms, such as committees. Joint activity 
becomes a system of activity. Conversely, ideational or high-level cooperation 
‚<is when groups remain distinct entities but strive to develop a collective vision for 
political, social, and economic reform.‛898 Ideational cooperation takes place when the 
activity-system develops its own immanent goal: i.e. becomes a collaborative 
Project. 
 Tactical and strategic forms of cooperation could be found among all 
participants in the civil-democratic movement, even within the ranks of the 
‚secular‛ Old Left. For example, the Tagammu offices in Cairo hosted the 
meetings of a ‚trans-party‛ labor committee, in which Muslim Brothers such as 
Yosry Bayumi participated. 899  More politicized forms of cooperation, such as 
Kefaya, were often short-lived, however.900 Of all leftist forces, the RS developed 
the most profound engagement with Islamism and especially the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The RS condemned the ‚sectarian attitude‛ of the ‚anti-religious 
left‛, and accused Tagammu and ECP leaders of alienating the radicalizing 
Muslim youth by its principal stand on secularism – thus driving them into the 
arms of the Brotherhood. Contrariwise to the Old Left, the RS did not see 
Islamism as an inherently fascist force, but as a confused anti-imperialist 
movement that could be reoriented to a project of socialism.  
The Prophet and the Proletariat 
The rationale for the collaboration between the RS and the Ikhwan was derived 
from Chris Harman’s The Prophet and the Proletariat.901 Harman criticized sectarian 
as well as opportunistic attitudes of the Left towards the phenomenon of 
politicized Islam: ‚It has been a mistake on the part of socialists to see Islamist 
movements either as automatically reactionary and ‘fascist’ or as automatically ‘anti-
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imperialist’ and ‘progressive’‛ 902  Islamism was a distorted critique of capitalism 
from a utopian petty bourgeois class perspective. As such: ‚Socialists cannot regard 
petty bourgeois utopians as our prime enemies.‛ 903 The Left had to side with the 
Islamists when their democratic rights were attacked by the capitalist State. This 
tactical stance was summarized in the slogan: ‚With the Islamists sometimes, with 
the state never.‛904 However, at the same time, leftists had to acknowledge that:  
The Islamists are not our allies. They are representatives of a class which seeks to 
influence the working class, and which, in so far as it succeeds, pulls workers either 
in the direction of futile and disastrous adventurism or in the direction of a 
reactionary capitulation to the existing system – or often to the first followed by 
the second.905 
Instead of condemning Islamists as ‚fascists‛, or embracing them as ‚anti-
imperialist‛ allies, the Left had to develop a critical attitude of collaboration with 
Islamic social and political movements in order to colonize them:  
<many of the individuals attracted to radical versions of Islamism can be 
influenced by socialists – provided socialists combine complete political 
independence from all forms of Islamism with a willingness to seize opportunities 
to draw individual Islamists into genuinely radical forms of struggle alongside 
them< 
When we do find ourselves on the same side as the Islamists, part of our job is to 
argue strongly with them, to challenge them – and not just on their organisations’ 
attitude to women and minorities, but also on the fundamental question of whether 
what is needed is charity from the rich or an overthrow of existing class 
relations.906 
When reading Harman’s nuanced ‚deontology‛ for a leftist collaboration with 
Islamist forces, one should keep in mind two crucial factors that determined his 
view. Firstly, he advanced leftist-Islamist collaboration in a decade when the Left 
in the Islamic world – and in the global community at large – was on the retreat. 
The Prophet and the Proletariat was written for leftists who were looking for 
ways to connect with the masses in conditions that were unfavorable for socialist 
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thought. In the Egyptian civil society, the weak Egyptian Left was confronted 
with a formidable Islamic movement that constituted an obstacle for its own 
development. Leftists could not simply ignore politicized Islam, but they were too 
feeble to overcome the obstacle on their own: they either had to rally the support 
of other forces – such as progressive liberals or the State – in order to vanquish it; 
or engage with it in a collaborative way in order to absorb it.  
 Secondly, Harman devised leftist-Islamist collaboration primarily as a ‚united 
front from below‛: as a rapprochement between leftists and radicalized Islamic 
youth. The concept of the ‚united front‛ has a long history in Marxist politics. In 
general, it points towards the tactical or strategic alliance between workers and 
other subaltern groups, and the attitude of the proletarian vanguard vis-à-vis 
reformist class organizations and their members. A ‚united front from below‛ is 
the creation of alliances and connections with members of a subaltern group at 
the grassroots level, ignoring the formal structures which already organize it. A 
‚united front from above‛ entails a formal coalition between organizations.  
Class Politics? 
The orientation of the RS towards the Islamic youth was realized through a 
united ‚anti-imperialist‛ front from below and above. The united front from 
below was effected by struggling together: by supporting solidarity campaigns 
against the detainment and torture of Islamist activists by the state; by sharing 
prison cells with Muslim Brothers; and by encouraging individual Brotherhood 
members to participate in demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of collective 
action and street protest. Throughout the 2000s, the united front from above with 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Amal party was established through ‚tactical‛ 
and ‚strategic‛ forms of cooperation: jointly organized demonstrations; the Cairo 
Conferences; and the establishment of the Free Student Unions, which consisted 
of members of the Revolutionary Socialists, Muslim Brother students, and 
independent leftists. 
 The cooperation between the RS and the Ikhwan led to harsh criticisms from 
members of both the Old and the New Left who doubted the desirability of a 
leftist-Islamist alliance. Arguments were raised against such a front on the basis 
of civil-democratic and class arguments. Ahmed Shabeen, founder and 
coordinator of Kefaya, told me that: ‚We know that the Muslim Brothers are very 
dangerous; they want Egypt to be an Islamic state. We, leftists and nationalists and 
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liberals, want Egypt to be a civil state< We defend our organization against any 
intervention of the Muslim Brothers.‛ 907  Even though Ahmed Shabeen did not 
condone any ‚secular front‛ with the government and promoted street politics as 
an avenue for change, he shared the Old Left’s deep seated suspicions towards 
the Brotherhood. Amal Abd al-Hadi, a physician of the New Woman Foundation 
(NWF) NGO, was equally distrustful of the Brotherhood because of its patriarchic 
ideology and practices:  
They have changed, for sure. I mean, instead of saying ‘the woman’s place is at the 
house’ directly and bluntly they say: ‘women have the right to work and to 
education’< But their program does not offer women specific things< For me 
feminism means secularism. You can be an activist for women’s rights, regardless 
of your religious background. But feminism and religion don’t go together. 
Because you are speaking about patriarchy and all religions are patriarchal.908  
Essam Shabeen of the ECP, for his part, condemned the RS because of what he 
saw as a form of class collaboration: ‚They are actually anti-left. They are working 
with the Muslim Brothers< the Brothers are rightists, even though they are against the 
government.‛909  
 When I finally got to meet RS blogger Hossam al-Hamalawy – after a friendly 
introduction by Guardian journalist Jack Shenker – over a quick cup of coffee in 
Nasr City, he pointed out, in defense against these accusations, that the ‚anti-
religious‛ Left exaggerated the extent of the alliance between RS and Ikhwan.910 
Back in Mohandiseen, the Swedish journalist and expert in Egyptian social 
movements, Per Bjorkland, agreed that the RS had a much more critical stance 
towards the Brotherhood than its leftist counterparts argued. 911  Baho Abdul, 
member of the RS and a founder of the Tadamon workers’ group, elucidated:  
There was a temporary coalition during the Kefaya movement, for only two 
months with a few events, around some democratic demands. That’s all. It’s true 
that the Revolutionary Socialists have a different opinion towards the Muslim 
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Brothers, in the sense that we deal with them as we deal with every rightwing 
party. We are not like Tagammu: forging a ‚secularist‛ alliance.912  
Nevertheless, Baho Abdul admitted that the alliance created problems, both of a 
practical and an ideological nature: 
In theory, when in a demonstration with the Brotherhood, we don’t want each side 
to have their own slogans, but to have common slogans. In practice, when in a 
demo, the Muslim Brothers start shouting their slogans and we counter these with 
ours. They always break the rules< The original idea was to join the Muslim 
Brothers in their actions and criticize them. In practice, however, there has been 
too little criticism.913 
In practice, cooperation between leftists, Nasserists and Islamists, often entailed 
clashes, tensions and sometimes even violence.914 The idealized relations between 
‚equal partners‛ during the negotiation phase of the activity of political 
cooperation differed from the real relations of power that materialized in the 
concrete performance of a jointly organized demonstration, committee, or 
conference. Moreover, in their fervor to correct what they perceived as the 
sectarian attitude of the ‚anti-religious‛ Left, the RS seemed to have bent the stick 
too much to the other side.  
 Consequently, there is a paradox to be found in the attitudes of both the Old 
and New Left towards the Muslim Brotherhood. The negative stance of the 
traditional ‚third wave‛ leftists towards the Muslim Brothers is a cynical self-
fulfilling prophecy. By condemning the entire Islamist movement as Islamofascist 
or reactionary, they weaken the legitimacy of Ikhwan reformist tendencies, 
strengthening the position of the conservatives and radicals. Ironically, since the 
divide between Brothers and the Tagammu leadership in the 1990s, the political 
demands and discourses of both tendencies have come to resemble each other. 
Both parties are in favor of ‚honest‛ privatizations, a guiding role for the State in 
a free market economy, improved labor and civil rights, and liberal democracy. In 
fact, is the layer of Islamic capitalists that leads the Brotherhood perhaps not the 
best candidate for the elusive ‚national bourgeoisie‛, which the stage theory 
ideologues of Tagammu and the ECP deem necessary for Egypt’s ‚independent 
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development‛? Tagammu’s ‚secular front‛ was of great service for the State as it 
prevented the coalescence of two opposition movements that shared a 
surprisingly similar political and economic outlook. 
 Unlike the ‚third wave‛ leftists, the Revolutionary Socialists radically rejected 
the notion of a ‚progressive bourgeoisie‛ in a colonial or postcolonial context. 
Educated in the Leninist and Trotskyist tradition, they stressed the capacity of the 
working class to lead the Egyptian masses in its struggle against imperialism. 
Because of the class nature of the workers’ movement, a fight for democracy and 
national sovereignty conducted under proletarian hegemony would take on 
socialistic aspects. However, up until the Mahalla strikes, the united front tactics 
of the RS were not primarily oriented towards the existing workers’ movement. 
The RS tried to reach out to the militant Islamist rank-and-file through an ad hoc 
united front ‚from below‛, discussing politics within the anti-imperialist and 
civil-democratic mass mobilizations. Furthermore, the RS engaged in a united 
front ‚from above‛ with the Brotherhood and other political tendencies, which 
materialized as ‚civil-democratic‛ and ‚anti-imperialist‛ fronts outside the 
workers’ movement, through the activity-system of organizations such as the 
Free Student Union. Accordingly, the collaboration between the RS and the 
Brotherhood was not based on the class interests and mobilization of the workers’ 
movement, but on civil-democratic demands – which were shared as much by 
secular right-wing parties such as Wafd or Ghad. Furthermore, through a focus on 
the defense of civil, human, and cultural rights – e.g. via solidarity campaigns 
against torture and in favor of the right to wear the headscarf on university 
campuses – the RS instructed the ‚Islamic youth‛ it sought to attract, not as a 
solidary ally of the workers’ movement, but as a cultural civil-democratic 
Subject.915 
 In a way, from the 1990s onwards, both the Old and New Left sought ways to 
develop forms of political activity in the context of an economic-corporate 
working class and a restricted civil society. Because of the relative strength of 
Islamism – and especially the Ikhwan – as an oppositional force in civil society and 
grassroots politics,916 the ideological and tactical attitude of leftists towards the 
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Brotherhood became a central point in the development of leftist politics and 
Subjectivities. Even though leftists differed in their analyses of the nature of the 
regime, of the role of the party, of strategy, of imperialism, of the working class, et 
cetera, throughout the 2000s they shared an engagement with the Islamist 
problematic. Islamism mediated the politics of both the Old and the New Left. 
The two tendencies equally established fronts with bourgeois forces in order to 
expand their influence. The ‚secular‛ as well as the ‚anti-imperialist‛ fronts 
derived their rationale from non-class politics, and primarily revolved around 
civil-democratic rights. As such, they were rather popular than united fronts.917 
However, whereas, in general, the Old Left leaders turned away from grassroots 
movements, pursuing a front ‚from above‛ with the State and liberal secular 
parties, the New Left at least engaged with street politics, planting the seeds of 
the civil-democratic movement.  
 It is ironical that Harman’s ‚defensive‛ strategy of leftist-Islamist collaboration 
was applied most vigorously by the RS in the decade that finally saw the 
resurrection of grassroots political systems of activity in which leftist ideas and 
modes of struggle could thrive. To the consternation of many leftist forces, the RS 
would even continue its ‚critical support for‛ the Brotherhood during the run-off 
between Muhammad Morsy and Ahmed Shafiq in the ‚revolutionary‛ 
presidential elections of 2012.918  
 The RS’ defense of the civil and human rights of Brotherhood activists against 
the transgressions of the Mubarak State in the 1990s and 2000s had developed 
into a ‚popular front‛ strategy with the conservative bourgeois leadership of the 
Ikhwan against the ‚bigger evil‛ of ‚anti-bourgeois military dictatorship‛. 919 
Likewise, Tagammu leaders continued their ‚secular front‛ to the extreme of 
‚critically supporting‛ the ‚ex-regime‛ presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq 
against the ‚bigger‛ evil of reactionary Islamism. 
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Introduction 
In the decade leading up to 2011, the baton of rebellion was passed back and forth repeatedly between 
two distinct categories of political actors. One category is that of the bourgeois groups, led by 
intellectuals and activists, focussed in Cairo and Alexandria, and focussing on political rights and 
broad systematic changes. <As Kifaya faltered and fell by the way side, the second category – working 
class groups – organised around economic demands, often quite local, and strongest in the industrial 
cities of the Nile Delta and along the Suez Canal, began to rise. These in turn inspired more bourgeois 
activists, and an increasingly intense feedback loop was created. 
Austin Mackell (2012b: 21) 
Twin Pillars of Revolution 
In the citation above, Austin Mackell pointed to the twin pillars of the revolution: 
forms of ‚political‛ and ‚economic‛ protest that emerged from the 1990s onwards 
and were oriented against the offensive of the passive revolution. 920  In later 
chapters I analyze the ‚political‛ and the ‚economic‛ as the two alternating 
moments of the revolution. The interpenetration and reciprocity of these 
movements was much more problematic than a straightforward passing back and 
forth of ‚the baton of rebellion‛, however. Firstly, even though the two most 
salient shapes of the political and economic protests were, respectively, Kefaya, 
and the workers’ mobilizations and organizations that the Mahalla strikes 
initiated, there were many other instances of struggle, especially in the 
‚economic‛ field. For example, one of the first subaltern groups that began to 
revolt systematically – yet in a fragmented way – against neoliberal reform were 
the farmers, but they were not able to create ‚an increasingly intense feedback 
loop‛ with the civil-democratic movement as the workers did. Moreover, it even 
took the workers fifteen years to transform their defensive struggles into a semi-
coherent movement that was able to interpellate political activists. Before the 
Mahalla strikes between 2006 and 2008 there were many other labor conflicts in 
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the textile sector: in 1994 7,000 workers of the Kafr al-Dawwar Spinning and 
Weaving Company occupied their factory; in 1998 workers of the Misr Helwan 
Spinning and Weaving Company protested the dismissal of 6,000 of the 8,700 
workers; and in 2005 there was a four month sit-in at the Qalyub Spinning 
Company. 921  Throughout the 1990s and 2000s there have been numerous 
‚economic‛ protests, by farmers, villagers, and workers, but these remained 
isolated and fragmented.922 The government of Ahmed al-Nazif intensified the 
privatization and liberalization process, and deepened the economic predicament 
of many subaltern actors. The importance of the Mahalla movement was not that 
it was the first worker protest, but that it initiated a development of the worker 
Subject away from its economic-corporate condition. 
 Secondly, as I discuss in the next chapters, the reciprocity between the civil-
democratic and the workers’ movement did not unambiguously develop both 
Projects. Workers were often suspicious of civil-democratic actors, and political 
activists frequently approached the class protests in a colonizing and 
commodifying way. Despite victories and successes – such as the establishment of 
four independent trade unions – the relation between civil-democratic and 
proletarian activism remained weak. The twin pillars of revolution continued 
their existence as separate systems of activity, which sometimes interacted and 
collaborated, but often followed their own discrete goals. They were temporarily 
united in the revolutionary process, only to be differentiated again after the fall of 
Mubarak. 
Overview 
In Chapter 14 The Mahalla Strikes I briefly sketch the background of the industrial 
complex of Ghazl al-Mahalla. Subsequently, I present a short chronology of the 
strikes between 2006 and 2008. Because these worker actions have been already 
documented in detail – especially by Joel Beinin923 – I focus my attention on the 
analysis of the movement in the following chapters. Chapter 15 Development of the 
Strike discusses the strike movement from the perspective of its development as a 
collaborative Project or social Subject, and its struggle for ‚vertical‛ and 
                                                          
921 Beinin and al-Hamalawy 2007a. 
922 Bassiouny and Said 2007. 
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‚horizontal‛ coherence. After the defeat of the uprising of 6 April 2008, the 
Mahalla workers lost their position as the vanguard of the strike movement. 
However, the workers’ movement continued its developmental trajectory, 
principally by the formation of the Real Estate Tax Authority Union (RETAU) and 
other ‚trade unionist‛ neoformations. With this outline of the development of the 
Strike in mind, I turn to the role of intellectuals and their types of assistance in 
Chapter 16 Intellectuals of/for the Strike. I focus in particular on the role of non-
proletarian actors in the development of the strike movement. After the 
disintegration of the civil-democratic movement, many of these actors were 
drawn to the salient workers’ movement. I discuss the various types of assistance 
lent by political activists, journalists, artists, and human rights activists. 
 Whereas Chapter 16 Intellectuals of/for the Strike presents different types of 
assistance, Chapter 17 A Deontology of Assistance elaborates the various ‚ethico-
political‛ modes of assistance in which non-proletarian actors supported the 
worker Subject. I follow Andy Blunden’s typology of non-recognition, 
colonization, commodification, and solidarity. Solidarity is found to be the 
necessary mode of assistance that encourages a dialectical pedagogy. However, 
solidarity in itself does not guarantee a form of assistance that really develops the 
worker Subject. In Chapter 18 The Proletarian ZPD I draw a picture of the debate 
among actors on the capacities of the workers’ movement as a trade unionist and 
political Project. This is followed by Chapter 19 Roads to Counter-Hegemony, which 
investigates the various counter-hegemonic Projects that were in the making 
before the 25 January Revolution. This chapter concludes both Part III Against the 
Pharaoh and Part IV The Mahalla Strike Movement, and anticipates the debates 
about the character of the revolutionary Project that emerged after the fall of 
Mubarak. 
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CHAPTER 14 
The Mahalla Strikes 
Where are the men? Here are the women! 
Women workers initiating the 7 December 2008 Mahalla strike 
Ghazl al-Mahalla 
The strikes of the textile workers of Ghazl al-Mahalla – the Misr Spinning and 
Weaving Company in the Nile delta city of Mahalla al-Kubra – can be seen as a 
turning point in the sociogenesis and emancipatory struggle of the Egyptian 
working class since the 1980s, because of the scale, the intensity, the success, and 
the impact of the protests. The industrial complex in Mahalla is of economic and 
symbolic importance to the whole Egyptian workers movement. Today Ghazl al-
Mahalla is the biggest factory in the whole of the Middle East, occupying 1,000 
acres of land and employing some 27,000 workers. It is not only a proletarian 
space – a small society entirely made up of workers and their families – it also 
constitutes a historical-generational unit of workers whose parents and 
grandparents were employed in the same factory.  
 In a way, Mahalla al-Kubra was the birthplace of Egypt’s modern industry, as 
well as its industrial working class. The national capitalist Talat Harb founded the 
factory in 1927 in a location close to the Delta cotton fields and near to a large 
reservoir of ‚proletarianizable‛ labor, using ‚indigenous‛ capital drawn from the 
newly established Bank Misr.924 In the 1930s it accounted for twenty percent of all 
Egypt’s exports.925 Since its foundation, Ghazl al-Mahalla has often acted as the 
vanguard of the working class, initiating important strikes and articulating the 
interests of the whole Egyptian working class.926 Whenever Mahalla workers won 
an industrial victory, this led to a general upturn of industrial action in the whole 
of Egypt. The first real strike took place in 1938, when workers demanded a 
change in their work pattern from two shifts of twelve hours to three shifts of 
eight hours. Their actions were still framed within a nationalist Subjectivity of 
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resistance against British neocolonialism, and they tried to negotiate their rights 
within the boundaries of productivity and profitability of their ‚national‛ 
factory.927   
 In 1947 workers held another strike, demanding the reinstatement of worker 
leaders who had demanded better working conditions. Tanks entered Mahalla to 
suppress the strike movement. Three workers were killed, and seventeen 
injured.928 Even though the strike was indicative of a growing sense of solidarity 
among workers, its defeat paralyzed worker actions in Mahalla until 1952. 
Emboldened by the Free Officers Coup, workers organized a strike against 
factory management, one month after Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s capture of State 
power. The strike was, however, brutally repressed. In exchange for economic 
concessions, the trade union movement pledged its loyalty to Nasser, effectively 
preventing itself from becoming an independent political force. The colonization 
of the workers’ movement by the Nasserist regime prevented industrial actions 
until 1967. 
 After the Six Day War, the regime started to abandon its socialistic 
guardianship over the working class. Sadat’s Infitah prompted new industrial 
actions in Ghazl al-Mahalla. In 1975 workers returning to the factory after the 
October War led a strike for better working conditions: ‚<workers took over the 
factory< demanding overtime pay, extension of the employment reforms to industrial 
workers, and improved health conditions.‛ 929  Worker leader Hamdi Husayn 
explained that the nationalist Subjectivity of the previous decades was 
transforming into forms of class consciousness and activity:  
The most important thing about the strike of 1975 was that it was poor workers 
against capitalism. They entered the luxurious apartments of the engineers and 
they took food from the fridge. They tied the food to ropes and started waving it 
from the balcony to incite the other demonstrators. That’s how the famous quote 
started: ‚they eat pigeons and chickens, we are tired of eating beans. And the beans 
are tired of us! 930 
Mubarak continued Sadat’s program of liberalization and privatization, but at a 
slow, skulking pace. In 1985 and 1986 Mahalla workers protested, demanding 
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that they be paid for Fridays, their weekly day off.931  Factory management gave 
in and granted them a 30 day monthly wage.932  Two years later they were back at 
the barricades. Mubarak cancelled the educational allowances to workers, which 
prompted, within hours, some 20,000 Mahalla workers to take to the streets in 
order to contest the decision. Since the decision was taken at the highest political 
level, the workers’ mode of protest was increasingly politicized as well. Hamdi 
Husayn recalled that: ‚We made a coffin draped in black cloth and with Mubarak’s 
picture on it. We walked out on 21 September and that was the first time we shouted: 
‚Down with Hosni Mubarak.‛ That was the first time people clearly stated it.‛ 933  The 
strike was brutally repressed by security forces. Worker leaders were detained 
and lost their jobs, and/or were relocated to workplaces away from Ghazl al-
Mahalla and their families. The defeat of the 1988 strike paralyzed the Mahalla 
workers’ actions throughout the 1990s. Only in 2006 did the Mahalla workers 
move again in force. 
On the Offensive 
On 3 March 2006 Prime Minister Nazif promised all public-sector manufacturing 
workers a raise of their annual bonus equal to a two-month wage. But in 
December the bonus was nowhere to be seen on the Mahalla workers’ paycheck. 
The Ghazl al-Mahalla management and the Minister of Labor refused to pay out 
the promised bonus. Mahalla worker Amal al-Said remembered that:  
We complained to the syndicate and to the factory management. But all to no avail. 
So we decided to strike. We wanted increased production incentives, more food 
allowance, better working conditions, and the two-month bonus. We closed all the 
mills to go on strike in Talaat Harb Square. We stayed there.934 
They refused their salaries and on 7 December at least 10,000 workers protested in 
front of the factory gates. When the security forces tried to shut down the factory 
the next morning, some 20,000 workers demonstrated. Their rally was joined by 
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students and women from the urban community. 935  Wedad al-Demerdash 
explained that it was the women workers who initiated the strike: 
The men tried to convince us to go on strike. But when we walked out into the 
streets, they lagged behind. So I asked them why they weren’t joining us in the 
street. They replied that they would join us after we went out first. Then a 
colleague shouted: where are the men? Here are the women! This irritated many 
men. But they laughed. The word spread and the women continued to repeat this 
refrain. 936 
 After four days the strikers were victorious, gaining a 45-day bonus and a 
promise that the factory would not be privatized. Because the union committee 
delegates had attempted to thwart the strike, 937  the organic workers’ leaders 
demanded their resignation from the General Union of Textile Workers and fair 
trade union elections. Almost 13,000938 workers from Mahalla signed the petition. 
When their request was ignored, some 6,000 workers quit from the GFETU.939  
 In the last week of September 2007 the workers of Mahalla went on strike 
anew, demanding a further increase of their bonuses and food allowances, a rise 
of the minimum wage to 1,200 EGP, and the resignation of the management – and 
they were victorious.940 As the strike was organized in Ramadan, the workers 
stayed in the factory and people brought them food in the afternoon.941 Drawing 
on the experience of December 2006, workers occupied the factory and 
established their own security force to protect the factory from a lock-out. They 
organized committees responsible for security and health issues, along with food 
provision for the strikers. Worker leader Muhammad al-Attar recollected that the 
mode of the strike had changed from a simple protest at the factory gate to a 
protracted struggle with factory management and the security forces: ‚We set up 
tents and proved to the government that we could hold to our cause longer than they 
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could to theirs.‛ 942 Much of the organization of the strike was now coordinated by 
Kamal Fayumi and Sayyid Habib of the Textile Workers’ League, an independent 
trade union committee that had played a secondary role in the previous strike 
and which was close to the RS.943 The strike lasted for six days and ended in 
victory for the Mahalla workers who gained a two-month bonus along with extra 
bonuses in January and June 2008 and January 2009. Additionally, they succeeded 
in impeaching the trade union leaders who were too close to the regime, and in 
reducing factory debt by one billion EGP.944 
 The strike spirit also got a hold over workers in various other sectors and 
governorates, such as the cement industry in Tura and Helwan, Cairo subway 
drivers, bakers, and so on.945 In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, the strikes were 
not restricted to public sector employees, but also encouraged workers in private 
companies, such as Arab Polvara Spinning and Weaving in Alexandria, to 
struggle for their rights.946  
 In February 2008, once more, some 20,000 workers and citizens took the streets 
of Mahalla. The factory had claimed a loss of 45 million EGP, despite a capital 
injection of 450 million EGP. Amal al-Said angrily recalled that ‚It was a joke. We 
needed to protest< We wanted to know the reason for the loss.‛ 947  The February 
demonstration was jointly organized by worker leaders such as Kamal Fayumi 
and Sayyid Habib and political activists from the New Left tendencies. The 
protesters demanded a national minimum wage, improved living conditions, and 
also raised political slogans against the President and his son.948  
Insurrection 
On 6 April 2008, leftist worker leaders and activists planned a new strike. Some 
political groups, bloggers and intellectuals seized the event to call for a political 
‚general strike‛ against the regime, without, however, organizing anything on 
the ground. Sayyid Habib recalled that:  
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We invited all workers for the strike on 6 April, but some Islamic and political 
trends invited the people to make a general strike on this day. The biggest mistake 
was that they called people for strikes and they could not organize the people. In 
Ghazl al-Mahalla we decided to stop our strike. When people outside the factory 
made an action we participated as people and not as workers. So it was a big 
mistake that political trends called the people to make a strike and at the same time 
not organizing the people.949 
The Mahalla movement was not ready for such a counter-hegemonic 
undertaking. The regime, for its part, was well prepared for the confrontation. Six 
days before the strike, worker leaders were intimidated by GFETU chairman 
Husayn Megawer to stop their preparations or be arrested.950 Four days later, 
plainclothes policemen were called into the police station of Mahalla: they were 
given walkie-talkies and instructions for wrecking havoc in the city. 951  The 
security forces acted with a pre-emptive lock-out, arriving in the factory before 
the first workers and taking over the machines.952 According to Ahmed Belal, an 
activist of Tagammu and a resident of Mahalla:  
<the violence started after Haisam al-Shami, a policeman, beat an old woman. 
People became angry, began to fight and threw stones at the hated Central Security 
troops, who retaliated with tear gas. For two days Mahalla became the arena of a 
violent clash between police and citizens. Three youths were killed and shops, 
houses, hospitals and schools were destroyed.953  
The combination of repression and co-optation – the regime pledged to accede to 
some of the workers’ demands – put pressure on the strike committee to cancel 
the strike. In the end, Mahalla workers and their families participated in street 
protests as citizens, shifting their demands to the high price of bread.954 They 
were met by violence and the insurrection was quelled. While there were some 
symbolic solidarity actions in other cities, in general the adventurist call for a 
‚mass strike‛ was not heeded and the Mahalla uprising remained isolated.955 
Faysal Lakusha bitterly remembered that: ‚When Mahalla citizens had their 
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demonstrations on 6 April, no one in the country had a strike, no one supported them, no 
village or town had a strike.‛956 
 After the botched revolt the Mahalla movement disintegrated. Whilst there was 
much talk of the necessity of creating an independent trade union, this 
neoformation did not develop beyond the level of the strike committee. 
Concessions from factory management and the threat of State repression divided 
the leaders and rank-and-file workers of Ghazl al-Mahalla over the further 
development of their movement.957 Fatma Ramadan explained that: 
The violence of 6 April only lasted for a few days, five or six, and after this the 
movement rose again. A lot of strikes happened. So it wasn’t the violence that made 
the workers afraid, but it made them more organized and it gave them the 
knowledge of how the government would react. But the government and the labor 
union created new pressures through firing the workers, especially the leaders. The 
workers saw the leaders who were in the streets and were fired now and who don’t 
have money or food and they think twice before they join a strike. That’s the new 
system. In addition: the economic crisis had an impact on the labor movement.958 
Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq summarized the causes of the failure of the Mahalla 
movement after 6 April as follows: 
There are a lot of reasons, most of them related to organization and consciousness. 
The main issue for the political organizations which were active in Mahalla in 
2006 was how to win a lot of members from this movement. However, the 
movement itself needed a lot of organization and development. About the 
leadership< there were problems from two sides: on the one hand, from the 
political forces which discovered these leaders, and on the other, from the leaders 
themselves who didn’t create substitution leaders. After the destruction of these 
leaders – because of the security or because of themselves, because they love to be 
famous – there was a gap between them and the base of the workers’ movement. 
The leadership was destroyed by transferring them to other companies, by early 
retirement and by making them famous; they became like superstars and this made 
the public and base workers not trust them. For example, in one of the fights, three 
of the workers leaders were invited to a conference in the Journalist Syndicate. And 
I said: ‚it’s not logical, you are supposed to be in your power base and the media 
must come to you and not the other way around‛, but because of the influence of 
the political forces and their ‚superstar‛ aims, they gave the security and the 
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administration the opportunity to create an image of these leaders, that these 
leaders are not defending the workers’ demands, that they are becoming superstars 
and only defending their own personal interests.  
There is a third reason. The political forces which emerged on 6 April transformed 
the strike into a ‚superstar‛ action, making the state and the government extra 
careful for the movement. No one imagined that the government could be so smart 
and use violence in such a subtle way. The security went to every place where the 
strike was and they finished the strikes. The way to do it was to say to the workers 
that the political forces would not support them, but that they need the workers 
and will use them and control them in order to become famous and so on. Then 
there is the violence which the workers in Mahalla and the strike members face up 
until now. 
The Prime Minister came to Mahalla – Nazif came to Mahalla and agreed to all the 
workers demands. One of the labor demands, and they thought it was not possible, 
was firing the management, and it happened. Nazif realized it for them. The 
management was officially investigated and that was for the workers a big victory. 
Especially because they thought it was a near impossible aim. And it was possible 
for the government to convince a lot of the workers, by their deeds, by money, and 
so on< The end of the strike was because of the lack of organization and the 
attempts of the political powers to control it and to use it and not to support it. The 
leaders of the strikes when they did not make any substitution leaders and the 
power of the state were the reasons of the failure.959 
With the defeat of the Mahalla workers the whole proletarian movement lost its 
center and its vanguard. However, the Mahalla protests had initiated a new wave 
of workers’ actions that did not simply subside after 6 April, but it continued to 
engulf other workplaces and sectors, stimulating new demands and 
organizational shapes. The directive center that the Mahalla workers had become 
was replaced with the central demand of the minimum wage, which, at least 
symbolically, united the Egyptian working class. Moreover, the movement found 
a new model for struggle and organization in the form of the Real Estate Tax 
Authority Union (RETAU), which inspired, even before the 25 January 
Revolution, other movements to create their own independent trade unions.  
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CHAPTER 15 
Development of the Strike 
But the workers’ movement teaches itself. This is what happened in Mahalla. It is a role model for the 
workers: how they became strong, how their protests developed, and how they learned and built their 
own road. 
Hisham Fouad, SLCHR and RS leader, Interview, Giza, 26 October 2010    
Growing Systematicity 
 As I have discussed in previous chapters, during the era of the moral economy 
worker actions were guided by a subaltern Subjectivity of support for the State-
led nationalist project. Workers rarely went on strike, in the classic sense of a 
protracted work stoppage, but instead stayed at the workplace after hours, 
reinforcing their symbolic position of fidelity within the patronage system.960 In 
fact, production often increased during these episodes, and it was the State that 
cut off electricity, water, or gas to halt the ‚work-in‛. In general, these protests: 
‚<lasted less than 24 hours< The very short duration of protests curtailed opportunities 
for the movement to develop workers’ consciousness and organisation, as well as 
preventing them from triggering a solidarity movement or copycat strikes in other 
workplaces.‛961  
 However, because of the neoliberal breakdown of corporatist patron-client 
relations, the ‚work-in‛ tactic had become an anachronism. Neither the 
management nor the government was interested in working class displays of 
loyalty. Labor leader Sabr Barakat summarized that: 
In the beginning of the work of the labor movement, the movement was infected by 
the paternalist control of the government: the Abd al-Nasser state was a state 
which gave us social rights but stopped our freedom. After this came Sadat, who 
stopped our social rights AND our freedom. Then came Mubarak, who introduced 
us to global capitalism.962 
The Mahalla strike of December 2006 started as an activity with a simple and 
spontaneous mode of action – protests in front of the factory gates – and a 
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straightforward objective: obtaining the promised bonus. The work-stoppage that 
lasted for three days necessitated the development of new directive, technical, 
and discursive competences to cope with the realities of a protracted strike.963 
Alexander elucidated that: 
Strikes lasted longer, sometimes for a week or more, and thus demanded a greater 
and more sustained organisational commitment than disputes that were either 
quickly settled or crushed by the security forces. A tactical shift by the authorities 
who attempted to deal with most strikes by negotiation, rather than direct 
repression, was also highly significant as directly elected negotiators were able to 
gain valuable experience in representing striking workers’ interests to the 
employers and the state.964 
The strike activity produced its own neoformations: fresh organic intellectuals – 
leaders, organizers, spokesmen, writers, singers, cartoonists, et cetera; and 
relatively stable networks and centers to direct and organize the worker actions. 
As the labor representatives of the GFETU were maneuvering against the strike, a 
spontaneous strike committee was leading the workers’ struggle.965 The factory 
had to be occupied by workers in order to prevent security forces of taking over 
the premises and continuing production.  
 When occupation became the leading activity of the 2007 strike, it expanded 
and deepened the activity-system. The occupying workers needed food, shelter 
and protection, which stimulated the formation of new committees responsible 
for these functions. 966  Demonstrations and solidarity actions were organized 
outside the space of the factory to obtain the practical and moral support from the 
whole community. As a city of working class families, Mahalla al-Kubra 
participated spontaneously into the proletarian activity-system of the strike, 
thereby ‚proletarianizing‛ the Subjectivities of its citizens. The contingent chain 
of strike actions had become a coherent system of activity with its own logic. 
Interiorization 
Ironically, the success of the activity-system that sprang from the strike actions 
was a brake on its direct development. When the workers achieved their 
                                                          
963 Bassiouny and Omar 2007; Al-Mahdi 2009. 
964 Alexander 2012. 
965 Interview with Sayyid Habib, Mahalla, 12 November 2010. 
966 Bassiouny and Omar 2007. 
267 
 
demands after four or five days of strike, their strike activity and its 
objectifications obviously came to a halt. However, the objectified strike activity 
had been interiorized back into the fledgling worker Subject. Firstly, victory 
reinforced the workers’ consciousness that it had been their will and agency as 
collectively organized striking workers which had realized their demands. 
Objective success was translated into subjective confidence. The Mahalla workers 
knew that they could deploy the same kind of activity in the future to defend 
their interests. Secondly, when they faced the same problems of unpaid bonuses 
in 2007, they did not have to begin protesting from scratch, but they could 
immediately import their experiences from the previous year to the current strike 
and take the development of the system of activity to the next level. The activity-
system had continued its life-process as a developing Concept in the memories, 
thoughts and discussions of the workers. Thirdly, strike objectifications such as 
committees, mass meetings, sit-ins and ‚tent-cities‛ had stimulated practices of 
collective debate and decision making, and were interiorized as democratic 
traditions into the workers’ movement, stimulating its Subjectness.967 The strike 
activity had developed both the organization and the consciousness of the 
workers and even though the process of its institutionalization – its grounding in 
more or less stable structures – was, after each strike, temporarily halted, it was 
interiorized in the consciousness and habits of the workers. 
 Interiorization also entailed a transformation of the original ‚direct‛ and 
‚economic‛ objective of the strike in accordance with the dynamic of the activity-
system. The strike was initiated because of an object external to the activity of 
striking, but from its own life-process emerged new goals and aims. Whereas the 
strike was first an instrument to defend the livelihoods of the Mahalla workers, it 
developed its own immanent rationale and goal: it became a Project. The 
development of the Subjectness of the workers – the consciousness of themselves 
as a social Subject – developed in line with the formation of a concept of their 
predicament. The workers’ critique of their predicament was expanded and 
deepened throughout their strikes. A ‚basic‛ economic struggle for livelihoods 
developed into a ‚higher‛ conflict for national labor rights, and even into a fight 
against al-nizam: 968  the ‚regime‛ or ‚system‛. There was a clear ‚vertical‛ 
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development from economic-corporate and particularist practices and forms of 
consciousness to a trade unionist and even political Subjectivity. The first obstacle 
on the road to the workers’ demands, the factory’s management, was followed by 
the GFETU – which sabotaged their capacity to strike – by the security apparatus 
that repressed them, and by the political regime that had initiated the 
‚neoliberal‛ economic reforms in the first place. The ‚good sense‛ by the Mahalla 
workers of their predicament developed from a simple criticism of the corruption 
of the particular factory management towards a political-economic critique of the 
general authoritarian and capitalist nature of al-nizam. More and more workers 
saw the GFETU, the State, and the president no longer as guardians and patrons 
in a moral economy, but as class enemies.969 During the 6 April insurrection in 
Mahalla, posters of Mubarak were torn apart by jubilant youth.970 This episode 
expressed the growing connection which was made in thought between 
particular forms of economic exploitation and the general political domination of 
the Mubarak regime.971 The politicization of the strike movement worried the 
regime, which explains its willingness to grant concessions to the workers. An 
attack on the undemocratic GFETU, which traditionally mobilized the workers in 
pro-government rallies and elections, was perceived as a challenge towards the 
authoritarian regime itself.972  
Projection 
The immanent goals and objectifications of the strike activity-system were not 
only interiorized back into the Mahalla worker Subject, but also saliently 
projected ‚outside‛ the movement. Firstly, this projection was an invitation for 
other workers and non-proletarian groups to participate in the strike activity-
system in a solidary way. In its development from an economic-corporate 
condition to trade unionism, the working class not only has to overcome its 
‚vertical‛ disorganization in particular workplaces, but also its ‚horizontal‛ 
atomization in different spatio-temporal instances of struggle. Spontaneous 
actions in solidarity with the Mahalla workers imagined a proletarian unity that 
was not yet institutionalized. Sayyid Habib recalled that: ‚<the workers at Kafr ad-
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Dawwar made a symbolic strike for two hours. In Shibin al-Qom also for two hours and 
in Giza for three hours. Other factories made statements in solidarity with us.‛973 Sueze 
labor leader Saud Omar remembered that: ‚We supported the Mahalla workers by 
statements and by organizing protests in Cairo in front of the GFETU or parliament.‛974 
In this manner, the spatio-temporal particularity of the Mahalla strike was 
overcome through its continuous reenactment by other worker activity-systems. 
As I discuss in the next chapter, because of its salient victories, the Mahalla strikes 
also interpellated forms of assistance from ‚traditional intellectuals‛.  
 Secondly, the Mahalla strikes projected the ability for Egyptian workers in 
general to solve their economic predicament through a specific type of collective 
action. Veteran worker leader Talal Shukr explained that: 
Well, the movement of the workers exists since 1976, it is a continuous movement 
and has not stopped since then. But in December 2006, the workers of Ghazl al-
Mahalla made a great movement. They demanded a salary raise. Other workers 
gained hope through the Mahalla workers' victory and struck as well. They 
advanced the same demands: a good salary, decrease in the cost of education, etc. A 
good salary is necessary: it's a means to lead a decent life. In addition, the strike 
was an important learning experience: it showed the workers the power of a strike 
as an instrument.975 
Mahalla was not only the barometer of the Egyptian class struggle, passively 
indicating the low and high tides of the workers’ movement, but it also actively 
taught other workplaces about the power of strike action. The projection of the 
Mahalla strikes was heteroleptic, in the sense that it showed other instances of the 
workers’ movement a more advanced stage of their own activity-system-in-
development. It was this heteroleptic instruction that stimulated other workers, 
first in the textile companies, then in other industrial sectors, and ultimately in the 
proletarian ‚periphery‛ – for example real estate tax workers, health technicians, 
teachers, and pensioners – to emulate the Mahalla activity-system.976 ‛Ghazl al-
Mahalla taught a lot of different people how to strike, e.g. teachers, doctors. When our 
workers get their bonus and salary, all the workers benefit from it.‛ 977 ‚When others saw 
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this experience they made their own strikes. The consciousness started from Mahalla,‛978 
asserted Faysal Lakusha. The Mahalla workers became instructors of other 
workers, who used similar methods to get the same results.  
 Thirdly, the development of the organization and demands of the Mahalla 
workers imagined the existence of independent trade unionism, even though its 
structures and networks did not yet exist. In practice the Mahalla activity-system 
was ‚<already operating as an independent trade union‛. 979  The autoproleptic 
activities of the strikers projected themselves in a more advanced stage of 
Subjectness. Slowly the performance of independent worker activism and its 
objectifications – which were originally born out of necessity to mediate the new 
‚neoliberal‛ relations between workers, factory management and the State – were 
interiorized as a trade unionist and even political Subjectivity among the Mahalla 
workers. By sharing strike experiences and organizational and discursive forms, 
the development which the Mahalla workers made within their own activity-
system became co-present in the life of many workers, even though the class was 
still far from being centrally organized on a national level.  
 Fourthly, the development of the Mahalla activity-system anticipated the 
workers as a social Subject capable of formulating a political alternative to the 
reality of the Mubarak regime. During their strikes workers implicitly realized the 
rights of assembly, protest and free speech which the Egyptian civil-democratic 
movement had explicitly, yet unsuccessfully, called for. Hisham Fouad, a leader 
in the Revolutionary Socialists and the Sons of Land Center for Human Rights 
(SLCHR) presented the working class as a Subject which is capable of realizing 
civil rights and political democracy:  
The workers’ movement is a democratic power itself< When workers organize a 
demonstration in Cairo, they have to occupy the streets and arrange transport for 
their comrades. When they want to negotiate with the Minister, they have to elect 
delegates from the different governorates. This is an example of workers’ 
democracy.  
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Those who talk about democracy and who advance democratic demands cannot 
accomplish any of these demands, but the workers accomplish these demands 
without using any political slogan.980  
Alexander explained that: 
Egyptian workers took by storm the same rights which other ‚political‛ campaigns 
for democracy had been forced to abandon under pressure from the state: the right 
to assembly, the right to protest, to free speech. The strike wave carved out spaces 
for discussion and organization in thousands of workplaces across the country, 
driving the struggle deep into the fabric of Egyptian society.981  
The Defeat of Mahalla 
Between 2006 and 2008 the Mahalla workers constituted the vanguard of the 
Egyptian workers’ movement, instructing and pushing the vertical and horizontal 
development of the worker Subject forward. Even though there was no direct 
organizational connection between the different collective actions, the same 
scenario was often repeated, revealing the logic of class struggle. However, at the 
same time there was an unevenness in the development of class consciousness 
and in the radicalism of the demands. Whilst strikers in Mahalla, Kafr al-
Dawwar, and Shibin al-Kum turned against their official trade union 
representatives, other workers were more cautious towards the GFETU – even 
when their syndical officials were obstructing their actions.982 Faysal Lakusha 
remembered that it was difficult to overcome the ad hoc character of solidarity and 
coordination in this period: ‚We started to coordinate, e.g. in Kafr al-Dawwar. The 
coordination was not so good, however. They moved after us, not with us. We have to 
make additional efforts to make them move with us and to coordinate the struggle.‛983  
 The February 2008 demonstration expressed the high point of the Mahalla 
movement, but afterwards the workers’ leaders were divided over the direction 
of the movement. Some actors advocated a deepening of the political aspect of the 
strikes, while others recommended caution and moderation. In addition, the 
State, both on the level of factory management and state security, tried to 
undermine the organization of the workers by separating and alienating the 
                                                          
980 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 26 October 2010. 
981 Alexander 2011. 
982 Beinin and al-Hamalawy 2007a. 
983 Interview with Faysal Lakusha, Mahalla, 20 May 2009. 
272 
 
organic leadership from its rank-and-file. Mahalla strike leaders were detained, 
put on early retirement or transferred to other factories.984 Prominent workers 
who were given a platform in the national media were accused of opportunism 
and ‚stardom‛.  
 The Mahalla strike committees had been the seed of independent trade 
unionism, but the 6 April 2008 strike fiasco cut right through its developmental 
trajectory. Yet, even though the Mahalla workers were no longer able to play a 
vanguard role between 2008 and 2010,985 the prolepsis of their strike activity had 
set in motion processes of development towards trade unionism in other 
workplaces. Inas Safti of the Forum for Women in Development claimed that: 
There are strikes happening everywhere. There are other factories like Qenawi 
factories, there are groups of workers going on strike for days and days< The 
Mahalla workers are not aware of this, they are not conscious. The thing is that 
because they lack political consciousness they don’t understand that you shouldn’t 
measure [the struggle] by how many rights you have attained, but< by the fact 
that the protests are going all over the sectors. And [the real question is] how these 
small strikes and groups of protestors can interact and collaborate and work 
cooperatively to build and to organize the labor movement again.986 
Sabr Barakat explained that: 
The movement grows more than in the past. Maybe the shape and the image is not 
bigger, but they are having a big success and a deep impact. And they are creating 
a new dynamic for the Egyptian working class. And they are pushing the 
consciousness to new areas where the old labor movement experience never 
penetrated. Because there were areas that were closed and where the old labor 
movement did not reach. Now they are connecting their struggle. They know that 
organizing themselves will make the situation better and that a connection with 
the old experience of the labor movement will push them more towards a national 
activity of the workers.987 
Although the Egyptian working class was still far from being centrally organized 
on a national level, the Strike became co-present in the lifeworld of many 
workers. By sharing strike experiences, methods, organizational and discursive 
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forms, aims and demands, workers constituted a joint yet decentralized 
proletarian activity-system, oriented towards the shared object of defending basic 
livelihoods. The movement had to develop the necessary neoformations such as a 
trade union apparatus, shared demands, and a directive center in order to unite 
the various workers’ activity-systems, not  only in thought, but also in practice.  
Towards Independent Trade unionism 
The Real Estate Tax Authority Union 
After 2008 the development of the workers’ movement was pushed forward 
organizationally by the formation and consolidation of the Real Estate Tax 
Authority Union (RETAU) and unions of teachers, health technicians and 
pensioners; and discursively by the formulation of the demand of an equitable 
national minimum wage. Whereas the Mahalla strikes had shown workers it was 
possible to achieve their demands through collective struggle and organization; 
the successful strike of the tax workers and the establishment of the RETAU 
demonstrated how an effective trade union leadership and apparatus could and 
should be built. Kamal Abu al-Eita, leader of the RETAU, recapitulated their 
experience: 
For us as the tax syndicate, we were the first to organize strike committees in the 
whole country. When we had achieved all our demands, we doubled our wages 
from 340 EGP. We changed our leadership, the state union; and the Ministry of 
Finance, through the strike. We were allowed to have reforms. After we won our 
own demands, we came to another stage in our democratic struggle. We have 
organized a public and independent trade union containing 30 committees in the 
whole country. It was by agreement of all strike committees in the whole country. 
A successful strike brings a successful independent trade union. Using our own 
trade unions and in the negotiations we succeeded in doubling our wages. And in 
July we’ll achieve another doubling of wages. We have already organized a new 
fund for the social care in the trade union to give workers a pension. It costs 1.5 
million.988 
Kamal Abu al-Eita’s story revealed the immanence of the worker Subject through 
the spontaneous strike activity. Just as the Mahalla strikers, the tax workers began 
by contesting a purely economic demand. The experience of the strike elucidated 
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both the main obstacle for the workers, the State syndicate, and its solution, the 
independent trade union. When the tax workers began their strike they had no 
idea that they would be the first since 1952 to establish an independent trade 
union. However, from the dynamic of the conflict followed that, if they wanted to 
be successful, they had to organize and systematize their activity. The Mahalla 
workers had failed to do so successfully, and they had been defeated. 
 Among Mahalla workers the victory of the RETAU was received with mixed 
feelings. On the one hand, they applauded the successes of their comrades in 
advancing their activity-system to a level that they had not yet reached 
themselves, but, on the other, the creation of the RETAU glaringly confronted 
them with their current inability to develop their own movement. A common 
idea among some labor activists was that the regime had ‚allowed‛ the 
independent RETAU, because it was situated at the periphery of the workers’ 
movement and did not directly threaten the GFETU as a pillar of the system. For 
example, Abdul Kader, a Mahalla worker, claimed that the RETAU ‚<took our 
example, but they already succeeded. Kamal Abu al-Eita, their leader openly admits this. 
The government knows that if the workers of Mahalla succeed in setting up an 
independent union, the GFETU will collapse.‛989 Even veteran worker leader Talal 
Shukr was skeptical about the RETAU victory:  
The tax collectors of buildings have developed an independent union. The ILO 
supports it. This is the first time since 1952 that there's an independent union. It 
sets an example for other movements. At the same time it's only a show, an 
illusion of liberty. The government allows this union to deceive the ILO.990 
However, labor journalist Siham Shewada stressed that the reason of the failure 
of the Mahalla strike movement and of the success of the RETAU was determined 
by their ability to develop a stable leadership:  
After the strike of 2008 in Ghazl al-Mahalla they didn’t have any labor activity 
anymore. The reason was that there wasn’t a real worker leadership there, despite 
what the media was telling us. In 2008 the state union leadership started to kick 
out the active worker leaders in Mahalla and transferred them to Cairo and 
Alexandria, and it was as if they killed them slowly. If there was a real leadership, 
the factory would have made a strike to support those who have been kicked out. If 
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they were a real leadership, there would have been strikes in solidarity with them. 
So they were not real leaders. 991 
Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq agreed: 
After the Mahalla strike was finished, because of the bad organization there was no 
group able to speak for Mahalla, and this was different for the tax workers’ strike. 
A lot of political organizations, especially the leftists, asked the Mahalla workers to 
make a substitution union, but it was so obvious that they were thinking that they 
would play the role of organizing the workers and creating new actions. And I 
think this was a bad idea of the parties. In addition, the government and political 
organizations started to work against the substitution leaders.992 
CTUWS director Kamal Abbas was of the same mind: ‚The ideal example for the 
independent union was the struggle of the real estate tax workers and of the pensioners: 
they had a conscious and political leadership which was able to take good decisions and 
prepare for strategies and tactics.‛993 
Seeds of a Trade union Federation 
The RETAU was followed by the pensioners’ union in 2008, an initiative of 
Tagammu MP al-Badry Farghaly.994 With regard to the health technicians union, 
comprising all workers who graduated from the Health Technical Institute – such 
as anesthetist assistants, laboratory and machine technicians, et cetera – its leader 
Ahmed al-Sayyid recalled that: 
We announced the trade union by the end of 2009< We didn’t make any strikes 
because our job is very sensitive. We started maybe in a café, at someone’s place, 
with some friends; we were delaying to start it formally. Then we noticed that our 
numbers increased, because the alternative was the state syndicate. With this 
amount of numbers we met Kamal Abu al-Eita. We learned from him how to set up 
a good trade union. Kamal Abu al-Eita started his trade union with a strike, but 
we took the decision to first set up our organization, gather a lot of members, 
announce our demands, and only then, when we did not get our demands, we 
should organize a strike. We organized a weekly meeting for the Cairo members, on 
Saturday and on Thursday, and a monthly meeting of all the members in the 
branches. Each month we went to the different governorates to spread our ideas, 
each first Friday of the month. We went to all the governorates of the country but 
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we had a slow reaction, answer because people were afraid of the repression of the 
government. The old state trade unions formed an obstacle for us because people 
thought that we would steal from them, like the syndicates used to do in Egypt. For 
a whole year we didn’t take any fees from any member, we just invited people to 
join us and we were convinced that whomever we won in a governorate, city or 
village, that those people would be really engaged to become members in the trade 
union. Not asking for fees in the beginning was a good tactic because it showed 
that we were not after the people’s money. During these trips and journeys we took 
a lawyer with us who knows the legal details about the law for syndicates in Egypt. 
Even I studied the law myself just to know about my rights. In addition to educate 
the people in their lost rights, we also encouraged them to be more active in their 
state unions, especially in the regions of Upper Egypt, because of their low wages. 
Despite these problems and atmosphere we succeeded in making our first trade 
union meeting and created the trade union to discuss the internal constitution and 
organization of the union. All of us lost our jobs because of this struggle. In 
addition to the police repression. We held a main conference in the journalists’ 
syndicate with the help of Kamal Abu Eita, and we announced the creation of the 
trade union. We tried to announce the union to the Ministry of Manpower and all 
other Ministries, but they refused to accept our documents. So we took the other 
legal way by sending the documents to the court.995 
Ahmed al-Sayyid’s narration elucidated that the role of the RETAU in the take-off 
of the Egyptian independent trade union movement was not merely ‚leading by 
example‛, but the creation of a shared, solidary activity-system whereby leaders 
such as Kamal Abu al-Eita helped in the practical organization of new trade 
unions. Just as the Mahalla strike committees were already informally operating 
as a trade union, the cooperation between the four independent trade unions 
anticipated the formation of a national federation of independent trade unions, 
which was realized after the fall of Mubarak. 
The Teachers 
The teachers, for their part, had been involved in struggles since 2005. After 
fifteen years of work, teachers still only earned 600 EGP and had to obtain extra 
income through private lessons, as Abd al-Nasser Ibrahim, a teacher in Giza and 
Tagammu activist, clarified:  
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Families in Egypt spend 30 percent of their income on education. They look on 
teachers as greedy people. Our real private salary comes from the people in private 
classes. Once we have a higher salary, we'll stop our private classes. 996  
Mubarak had promised them better working conditions and salaries, but instead 
a law was implemented which paved the way for the liberalization and 
privatization of the school system, under the guise of safeguarding the quality of 
education. In addition, teachers challenged their own societal position as loyal 
pillars of State power. Abd al-Nasser Ibrahim claimed that:  
The government turns the teacher into a policeman. The books serve to keep the 
pupils quiet. Don't discuss, don't ask! We are the first police officers in society. We 
kill their ideas and deliver them to the government to take their freedom away.997 
Abd al-Hafiz, an English teacher and Tagammu activist, stressed that the regime: 
‚<depended mainly on the fact that an ignorant people is easy to lead. So they just tried 
to turn schools into a tool to rule the society.‛ 998 The school was a reflection of the 
authoritarian society with practices of direct control and supervision: ‚Every 
school had a spy. Every administration has someone who is the contact with the state 
security< They make the students to file reports on the teachers. And the teachers against 
the students and against each others<‛999 Because the Egyptian education system 
was an important space for the social and political reproduction of al-nizam, the 
‚economic‛ protests of teachers’ often included a component of anti-
authoritarianism, especially when they created solidary activity-systems with the 
students’ movements.1000  
 Activists such as Abd al-Nasser Ibrahim in Giza created committees to defend 
the teachers’ rights. From 2006 on Abd al-Hafiz began to take unpaid vacations 
and he established the Egyptian Center for Educational Rights, an NGO which 
contested the new law and defended the rights of teachers. 1001  The teachers’ 
movements were scattered and needed a central point for coordinating their 
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actions and demonstrations.1002 Abd al-Hafiz recalled how he had to start from 
scratch in organizing the teachers’ protest: 
<I started it with a statement, I published it and I signed it with the teachers’ 
association in Cairo, in al-Arish, in Giza, in Alexandria, in Munufiya. But there 
was nothing. Then some teachers from al-Arish telephoned the newspaper, and 
asked for my number, and they told me: ‚we would like to join the teachers’ 
organization in al-Arish‛. I said ok. I have a friend in al-Arish so I called him 
‚Ashraf, how are you, you are responsible for the work in al-Arish‛ and so it 
started. It started with small groups, then bigger groups, and then came the idea of 
a trade union. 1003 
Even though a lot of teachers agreed with the necessity to contest neoliberal 
reform in the domain of education, not everyone was of the opinion that an 
independent trade union would be the best method in achieving their goal. One 
group of teachers emphasized that they could and would only try to reform the 
existing State teachers’ syndicate. Another group, chiefly consisting of Muslim 
Brother members and sympathizers claimed that they first had to see if there was 
a possibility to reform and change the teachers’ syndicate from inside. If not, they 
could still leave the syndicate and set up their own trade union. A smaller faction, 
led by Abd al-Hafiz, however, decided to build an independent trade union, on a 
class instead of corporatist basis: ‚we are going to build a trade union for the teachers 
as workers, as paid wage-workers.‛ 1004 
 The development of the trade union went faster than originally planned, 
pushed forward by increased exploitation by the Ministry of Education: 
We had three to four thousand members. We planned to announce our union by 
the end of 2011 this year. But accidently it happened that seven teachers died, one 
per day during the secondary school examinations. It was because the Minister of 
Education decided to double the work hours and to give them no chance to get sick 
leaves. So those who suffered from bad diseases just started to die. So we decided to 
announce our call for a trade union as a reaction. This was on 14 July 2010. And 
of course every day we have new members. We are getting stronger and stronger. 
We made our own constitution. We will have elections within two months.1005 
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The 25 January Revolution would accelerate the maturation of the teachers’ 
protest movements and organizations into fully-developed independent trade 
unions. In the fall of 2011 the general teachers’ strike became one of the biggest 
coordinated strikes in Egyptian history. 
The Nurses 
There were, of course, many other workers’ movements before the 25 January 
Revolution that did not yet fully develop into trade unions:1006 for example, the 
Voice of the Nurses Movement. Nurses in State-run hospitals suffered from very 
low wages and appalling working conditions. Sayyida al-Sayyid Muhammad, a 
nurse and RS member made clear that: ‚<they work twelve hours, they have one 
pound and 25 piasters each shift for the twelve hours in university hospitals like al-Qasr 
al-Aini< They deduct taxes from our wages even if the shifts are like twelve hours 
through the night.‛ 1007 However, in organizing the defense of the interests of its 
members, the movement had to overcome some particular and peculiar obstacles. 
Firstly, in Egypt, nurses were treated as social pariahs. Inas Safti explicated that: 
<the nurses sector in Egypt is extremely prejudiced against and they are 
extremely underprivileged. Because socially it is looked down upon, it is really 
perceived in a negative way socially. It’s very degrading to women nurses and for 
very awkward reasons that does not apply to female doctors or surgeons. Nurses 
work late at night and that’s why they are perceived in a bad way socially< but 
the same applies to doctors or surgeons and they are not frowned upon. 1008 
Secondly, the nurses were scattered over three State unions. Most nurses were 
affiliated to the general union for nurses, but nurses who worked in universities 
were members of the Union of Education and Scientific research, and nurses 
related to the Ministry of Health were part of the Union of Health Services.1009 
Thirdly, nurses were spread over many different hospitals which were isolated 
from one another and there was much variance in working conditions between 
hospitals.1010 Fourthly, there were contradictions between the Ministry of Health 
which promised the nurses an increase in their salary, and the Ministry of 
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Finance, which cancelled the decision, sowing confusion among the nurses if they 
would obtain a pay rise or not.1011 
Yet, nurses were quite militant and achieved some victories in the past years: 
There was a strike in Tanta: we made a strike because of the meals. We didn’t 
receive meals or even money in order to get food as a meal< Then they gave us 
only eight pounds per month. So we told them ‚no! Take your money and we will 
take the food‛. Because the meal actually costs more than eight pounds. So if I 
work in the hospital and I am hungry, eight pounds will get me nothing< We 
negotiated that we could take a hot meal during our work at night< According to 
the ministry we get two uniforms per year, shoes, and a veil, but we get nothing at 
Tanta. They only gave us 50 pounds. So we negotiated to get uniforms instead of 
the money. This is better. The value and cost of the uniform is getting higher, so we 
want the uniform instead of the money< There was also a hospital at Qasr al-
Shibeen. Normally they would get a 125% bonus as a motivation for them added to 
their basic salary< The management didn’t want to give it to them, also not in 
Beni Suef, in Cairo, in any place, from Alexandria to Aswan<1012 
The resistance of the State unions against the strikes and actions of the 
independent nurses’ movement forced the nurses to develop their own forms of 
organization and coordination. From January 2010 onwards, activists tried to 
overcome the fragmentation of the nurses, contacting spontaneous strike leaders, 
and coordinating the various instances of struggle.  
The workplaces who went on strike got their money. Those who didn’t make their 
strike got nothing. And those who didn’t communicate with us didn’t get 
anything<  
The nurses of Qasr al-Shibeen influenced other nurses: there was a strike in Tanta 
and Cairo University< We explained it and took the picture to our colleagues so 
they made strikes in order to take their rights. After this strike there was a period of 
strikes in many places. In the beginning of June or July. There were five strikes in 
one day: Ismailiyya, two places in Cairo, Benha, Minya. There were also strikes in 
Beni Suef< There were strikes in many places. And thank God they were able to 
take a part of their rights, not yet all of them, but they will ask again for the rest of 
their rights.1013 
                                                          
1011 Ibid. 
1012 Ibid. 
1013 Ibid. 
281 
 
The strike movement also opened up possibilities for the social position of the 
nurses: 
The nurses movement does not only represent a good example of organized labor, it 
is not only a role model for workers, it is also taking the role of defending this 
sector and defending their image and presenting a better image of nurses because 
they are always looked down upon.1014 
On 19 July 2010, the nurses’ movement held its first conference in the Journalists’ 
Syndicate, moving towards the formation of an independent trade union. 
Striking Before Parliament 
Apart from the organizational development of four independent trade unions, 
since 2009 workers also increasingly protested in front of parliament, almost 
physically introducing their local and particular strike to the space of national 
politics. This autoproleptic chain of continuous sit-ins in the national sphere 
imagined separate instances of struggle as part of one coherent workers’ 
movement, and it enabled workers to generalize their separate and particular 
experiences into shared class demands. Two main demands emerged from the 
contemporaneous sit-ins: a fair minimum wage and expanded rights for the 
temporarily employed.1015 
 To conclude: before the 25 January Revolution there was already an 
independent trade union movement in Egypt. The salient and successful Mahalla 
strikes had given workers the preferable method, the confidence and the 
consciousness to use collective struggle – the Strike – as a means to overcome 
their economic-corporate predicament. The victory of the tax workers and the 
establishment of the RETAU granted workers a concrete model of 
institutionalizing their spontaneous activity-system into a trade unionist shape. 
The demand for a fair national minimum wage, which had been raised 
spontaneously in the Mahalla strikes, emerged as a central goal of the developing 
worker Project, which interpellated and united different workers as members of 
the same working class. 
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CHAPTER 16 
Intellectuals of/for the Strike 
The thinker resides at the Café Riche 
Ya3eesh! Ya3eesh! 
Preening and pompous, glib slick and loquacious 
Never goes to the demos - 
Crowds? never, good gracious! 
With a few empty words 
Some wide turns of phrase 
He whips up solutions for every bad case 
The thinker lives, may he live long live live! 
Live on, my countryfolk, live on, ya3eeesh! 
Ahmad Fouad Negm (in: Booth 2009: 37) 
Mahalla’s Proletarian Intellectuals 
As neither the traditional leftist parties nor the state-controlled General 
Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (GFETU) played their part as proletarian 
leaderships, the task of organizing and directing the various struggles fell onto 
the grassroots committees:1016 ‚The trade union gives only services to the workers, but 
doesn't defend their demands. In reality: workers make their own leadership.‛ 1017 
Proletarian intellectuals are the product of both the present and the past of class 
struggle. Old leaders and activists are interpellated and re-activated by worker 
actions, and new organic intellectuals are produced through the activity of protest 
itself. With regard to the Mahalla movement, strike leader Sayyid Habib 
explained that: 
 The Mahalla workers had the advantage of a more or less continuous leadership 
since 1975. The strike leaders organized groups in every section of the company, 
incessantly discussing with the workers and calling on them to make a strike. 
Through the strike movement a new generation of leaders emerged, which led the 
strikes of 2007 and 2008.1018  
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The strikes of the 1990s and 2000s called the old worker leaders of the 1970s and 
1980s back into action, and from the labor protests themselves emerged a layer of 
new, young activists. This was necessary because from 2007 onwards the regime 
started to transfer traditional strike leaders to other workplaces in order to break 
the strike spirit and organization.1019 
 Most of the ‚old‛ worker leaders were not affiliated to any political 
organization, 1020  but they were active and organized in official GFETU 
committees. Even though they shared a Subjectivity of being ‚workers‛ they were 
often white-collar employees: supervisors, engineers, and educated layers with a 
different social status in the company.1021 In fact, before the rigged trade union 
elections of 2006, a majority of Mahalla worker leaders were part of the labor 
bureaucracy, and their removal from the GFETU committees was an additional 
and important stimulus to the organization of protests outside the formal 
structures of the State syndicate. A cynic might conclude that these worker 
leaders only turned to their rank-and-file to defend their own, narrow 
bureaucratic interests. Regardless of the intentions of the Mahalla proletarian 
intellectuals, it is much more productive to conceive of the relation between 
organic intellectuals and their class base as a reciprocal process. The workers 
gained the cooperation of ‚their‛ intellectuals as much as these figures won the 
support of ‚their‛ rank-and-file. It is the self-organizing activity of the workers 
that interpellates old intellectuals back to the proletarian Project and produces 
new organic leaders and activists. Conversely, the lack or disintegration of such 
an activity-system alienates organic intellectuals from their class base. This 
reciprocal relation is in trade union circles expressed in the ‚good sense‛ notions 
of ‚pressure from the base‛ and ‚pressure from the top‛. Therefore, the question 
is not whether this or that individual proletarian intellectual is ‚essentially‛ a 
‚bureaucrat‛ or a ‚genuine‛ defender of worker interests, but if he or she 
participates in a solidary and organic way in a proletarian activity-system. 
 In Mahalla, the old proletarian intellectuals who were ousted from the GFETU 
structures supported the workers in their confrontation with the official labor 
representatives and helped them in setting up their own independent 
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organizations at the factory level to organize the strikes.1022 In addition, with the 
help of ‚traditional‛ intellectuals such as political and civil activists, they 
established the Textile Workers’ League, which played a crucial role in organizing 
the September 2007 strike.1023 Both ‚old‛ and ‚new‛ strike committee leaders 
were conceived of as the ‚real‛ and organic leaders of the Mahalla worker 
Subject. 
 Workers also engaged in the aesthetic and ideological articulation of their 
struggle, becoming ‚cultural‛ organic intellectuals:  
The art of the caricature is not about drawing pictures but about making the lines 
say something and they can do it. Drawing is something the workers can learn in 
three months or so if they wanted to. But the workers are the creators of the ideas. 
So it’s not only a possibility: it’s a reality that some workers are artists.1024  
Whereas Hassanein al-Fanan was optimistic about the organic development of 
workers’ art, Wael Tawfiq stressed its limits: ‚In each strike, especially during the last 
period, some artistic expressions appeared, people who wrote poetry and so on, but each 
time it dies.‛1025  
 The art forms that workers spontaneously produced were ad hoc creations or 
performances within the strike activity-system. Songs, poetry, graffiti and 
cartoons were reproduced within the collective memory of the working class, but 
without an institutionalization of the cultural dimension of the Strike, it was 
difficult for workers to develop these art forms in a stable, coherent and 
systematic way. It was still the songs of Shaykh Imam and the poetry of Ahmed 
Fouad Negm from the 1970s that dominated the cultural expression of the 
workers’ protests in the new millennium. The development of strike committees 
into trade unions answered the need for direction and organization of the 
workers’ activity-system. Some trade unions also engaged in cultural production, 
but this had traditionally been the domain of the Modern Prince, and required the 
formation of a suitable apparatus and pedagogy.  
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Assistance in Development 
Back to Class 
Returning to Marx’s principle that the emancipation of the working class is the 
task of the working class itself, one could argue that the Egyptian workers were 
perfectly able to solve their own problems. They formed their own organic 
intellectuals, started to overcome their economic-corporate predicament, and 
even developed in the direction of a political force before the 25 January 
Revolution. On the other hand, it was clear that non-proletarian actors played an 
important role in developing the workers’ activity-system(s) by raising 
awareness, connecting various instances of the Strike, setting up organizations, 
expressing the struggle aesthetically and ideologically, et cetera. The question of 
whether workers are able to develop ‚autonomously‛ and ‚in isolation‛ from 
other forces into a Subject-for-itself is, in reality, nothing but a thought 
experiment. In any social formation, workers confront and are confronted by 
other social Subjects that mediate their developmental trajectory. The question 
thus is not whether workers are influenced by other actors, but how they relate to 
these ‚external‛ forces and how their formation as a social Subject is shaped by 
this interaction. Conversely, non-proletarian actors can be interpellated by 
workers to join and support their activity-system. 
 Before the Mahalla protests, civil society actors were relatively little interested 
in ‚economic‛ struggles. Helmi Sha’rawi of the African Arab Research Center 
(AARC) admitted that: 
It is shameful that this privatization has been happening like that without any 
protest. Workers were dismissed from their factories without any protest 
movement. What is this? I myself am surprised. From 1975 to 1995, during 20 
years the whole economy has been reorganized and transformed, the whole society 
was changed, dismissing people from their work, giving them pensions to leave 
with hundreds< If it will continue it will be a failure of the whole progressive 
movement in Egypt.1026  
Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq agreed: ‚Had the political leaders in the nineties 
discovered the reality that workers have the same aims and problems because of the 
privatization, then they could have stopped the privatization itself.‛1027 
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 Of course, until the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, there was little 
grassroots mobilization in general, be it around economic or political issues. The 
Second Palestinian Intifada stimulated a new generation of young activists to 
participate in solidarity meetings, sit-ins and rallies, ending two decades of 
apathy towards street politics. This spontaneous activity-system spawned its own 
neoformations in the form of solidarity networks, which were transformed into 
anti-war committees with the advent of the Afghanistan and Iraq war. The anti-
imperialist movement soon metamorphosed into a civil-democratic social Subject, 
especially in the form of Kefaya. 
 However, by 2006, the Kefaya Project had exhausted itself. Although the civil-
democratic movement signified a rupture with the hegemony of the Mubarak 
clique, it did not succeed in building its own hegemonic apparatus, nor in 
drawing workers, peasants, and broad layers of the urban middle classes and 
sub-proletariat into its activity-system. Hisham Fouad of the SLCHR and the RS 
emphasized that: ‚If the workers did not enter in a direct way in the Movement for 
Change it is because of two reasons: the Change movement did not form any social 
demand and the workers did not add their social demands to its agenda.‛1028 The purely 
political demands of the civil-democratic Subject did not offer the subaltern 
classes the means of overcoming their economic problems.1029 
 Cut off from society at large and ridden with internal disagreements, the Kefaya 
movement started to disintegrate – just when the Mahalla strike movement was 
on the rise. Baho Abdul, a member of the RS and of Tadamon, acknowledged that:  
The urban middle-class intellectuals had failed to build relations with the workers. 
Before 2006 no one in the political field was interested in the workers' movement, 
because there did not seem to be a real movement. The strike of December 2006 
changed everything. All parties went to the movement.1030  
The saliency of the strikes led to a re-appreciation of the workers’ movement as a 
force of societal change, and called a number of traditional intellectuals ‚back to 
class‛. 
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Types of Assistance1031 
When they engaged with the Mahalla strike movement, traditional intellectuals 
such as journalists, lawyers, human rights and political activists, writers and 
artists offered the emerging worker Subject different types of assistance: 
‚<reinforcing the protests through media support, trying to unite or to gather the labor 
communities, and developing, uniting and diffusing the existing demands‛.1032 
 Firstly, because of their social function, mobility and position as intellectuals, 
these actors could more easily transfer the experiences, methods and lessons from 
one instance of struggle to another. They acted as liaisons between organic 
intellectuals, literally mediating the internal communication and consciousness of 
the decentralized worker Subject. Even though workers were still ‚physically‛ 
confined to the particular instances of their separate protests, their struggles 
became ‚virtually‛ connected through shared demands and practices. This type 
of assistance was not only spatial, but also temporal. Traditional intellectuals 
sometimes acted as an auxiliary reservoir of the collective memory of the working 
class: when ‚old‛ proletarian intellectuals were, for whatever reason, cut off from 
the embryonic ‚fresh‛ organic layers, political activists, journalists, writers, et 
cetera, then traditional intellectuals transferred class experiences to the new 
generation.1033 
                                                          
1031 The problem with presenting an analysis of assistance is that the portrayal should adequately 
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whether to discuss assistance from the perspective of (1) the workers; or (2) the traditional 
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next chapter, I reinvestigate these various forms of assistance through the lens of the workers’ 
movement, paying special attention to the different modes of assistance and the question which 
assistance pushed the development of the worker Subject forward. I conclude with a discussion 
of the dialectical pedagogy of the strikes, which could be conceived of as the mechanism which 
united organic and traditional intellectuals in an authentic, shared system of activity.  
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 Secondly, through a diffusion of these experiences ‚on the ground‛ and their 
projection in the national sphere, e.g. in the media, traditional intellectuals made 
the spatially isolated strikes temporally contemporaneous in the lives of many 
workers. Workers got to know that their comrades in other companies struck to 
overcome problems similar to their own. They realized that they shared the same 
goal and that the objective of their strike activity was, for all purposes, the same.  
 Thirdly, the projection of workers’ action in the national sphere saliently re-
introduced the working class as a social force in Egyptian society. This projection 
mediated, on the one hand, the consciousness of workers of themselves as a class. 
Traditional intellectuals enabled workers to imagine themselves as a coherent 
working class despite the fact that they were far from organized as a national 
workers’ movement. On the other hand, this projection influenced the attitudes of 
other societal actors towards the workers. As I discuss below, the saliency of the 
Mahalla strikes called many traditional intellectuals ‚back to class‛.  
 Fourthly, journalists, writers and activists helped to develop the particular 
grievances of the Mahalla strikers into general demands of the working class. 
These general demands, such as a fair national minimum wage and a solution for 
the position of temporary workers, in turn, unified workers from different sectors 
and lifted their struggle from the economic-particular to a national trade unionist 
level.1034  
 In conclusion, assistance by traditional intellectuals imagined and organized 
workers from Mahalla and elsewhere as a national working class, and 
encouraged them to overcome their economic-corporate condition. The types of 
assistance can be summarized as ‚connection‛, ‚projection‛ and ‚expression‛. 
Connective assistance brings experiences from different spatial and temporal 
instances of struggle together and allows workers to share their competences and 
methods. It mediates the horizontal, reciprocal learning process between workers, 
enabling them to instruct one another and push their mutual development 
forward. Projective assistance helps the workers to lift their struggle from the 
local, particular level to the national, general scale. It mediates the vertical 
sublation of the spatial fragmentation of the working class by the heteroleptic 
imagining of the workers as a social Subject. Mahalla workers metamorphosed 
from a workforce striking for their own specific interests into the vanguard of a 
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national working class. Lastly, expressive assistance supports the development of 
a philosophy of praxis by the interpenetration of the spontaneous ‚good sense‛ of 
the strikers with ‚scientific‛ forms of knowledge: narration, analysis, 
theoretization, conceptualization, et cetera – i.e. the maturation of a ‚true‛ self-
concept of the workers’ movement and of a political-economic critique of the 
neoliberal historical bloc. 
Political Activists 
The Old Left 
When I confronted Tagammu chairman Rifaat al-Said about the militancy of the 
Mahalla strikes, he remained pessimistic, pointing to the failed insurrection of 
1977. The only option for the leftist opposition was to slowly build its forces until 
‚the regime, perhaps, retreats‛.1035 In al-Said’s view, the political role of Tagammu 
had been narrowed down to an oppositional discourse in the media and during 
elections.1036 He did not recognize the workers’ movement as a social force able to 
transform al-nizam. 
 At first sight, the position of Samir Al-Fayyad, another Tagammu leader, was 
opposed to the perspective of al-Said. According to al-Fayyad, grassroots 
movements would play a fundamental role in changing the Egyptian regime. He 
added that, in the past, communists and socialists had made the mistake of 
dominating these movements, suffocating their potential to emancipate 
themselves. Today ‚the workers must do it themselves‛, and a party like Tagammu, 
through propaganda, parliamentary interventions and the media, could only 
support the actions, strikes and sit-ins that spontaneously emerged from the 
people itself. As the movement was not yet mature enough to challenge the 
regime in a unified, political way, Tagammu should refrain from advancing 
radical demands.1037  
 In contrast with al-Said, al-Fayyad recognized the agency of the workers’ 
movement. Yet in his discourse, Tagammu was perceived as external to the 
development of the movement itself; the party could not and should not be 
actively intervening in the class struggle and raising political consciousness. With 
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al-Fayyad, the principle of the self-emancipation of the working class was turned 
into an excuse for liquidating any proleptic role of leftist political activists in the 
class struggle. The assistance of Tagammu was restricted to projecting the workers 
as an autonomous movement and expressing their current state of development, 
instead of imagining them as a more advanced social and political power, and 
thus pushing their Subjectness forward. As I explained previously, this discourse 
of disengagement had its roots in the self-criticism of leftist intellectuals during 
the 1980s, with regard to their historical colonizing mode of assistance towards 
the workers’ movement. 
 Leaders of the Tagammu ‚Trend for Change‛ explicitly went against the 
discourse of disengagement with the workers’ movement that dominated the 
party leadership. In April 2009 I met with Ali al-Dhib, co-founder of Tagammu, 
member of the Central Committee, and secretary of the Council of Advisors, who 
forcefully claimed that: 
The goal of Tagammu is socialism. The current crisis shows that capitalism fails; 
even the capitalists themselves now take recourse to nationalizations. This means 
that we should go back to the original role of a socialist party. The last 5 years have 
seen a wave of strikes, demonstrations, new NGOs, which confirm this< The 
constant pressure on wages forces the working class to protest. However, they are 
not yet organized as a political force. Moreover, the movement is very fragmented, 
both in organization as in the level of political consciousness. Mahalla is the 
vanguard of the movement. Tagammu should join these movements and always be 
at the heart of the strikes< Officially, Tagammu hopes the regime will give enough 
democratic room for reform. Personally, I am not sure of this strategy and I don’t 
think there will be this kind of opportunity.1038 
Al-Dhib attacked the official party line on three fronts. Firstly, Tagammu should 
explicitly strive for socialism, not ‚national capitalism‛ or any other ‚Third Way‛. 
Secondly, the party should actively engage with the class struggle and street 
politics to raise political consciousness. Thirdly, democracy would not arise from 
top-down reforms – change had to come from below. These three concerns 
reverberated especially among the youth and the middle-cadres of this ‚Old Left‛ 
party. This discourse of engagement pushed Tagammu activists into an active 
assistance towards the workers’ movement. It stimulated them to participate in 
the proletarian activity-system – ‚<join these movements and always be at the heart of 
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the strikes<‛ – in order to help workers to overcome the horizontal atomization of 
their movement – ‚<the movement is very fragmented, both in organization<‛ – and 
vertically develop ‛ <the level of political consciousness‛.  
 Leftist Tagammu labor activists such as Talal Shukr had a long tradition of 
assisting the workers’ movement: ‚We support the workers' movement at any place, 
for example through our solidarity articles in al-Ahali. We gather workers, give them 
training and raise syndicalist issues.‛1039 Tagammu labor leader Abd al-Rashid Hilal 
summarized the assistance by the party’s labor committee as follows: 
First the committee sends reports to all the newspapers, not only al-Ahali. Second, 
the committee goes to the strike to see the aims of the workers and to send 
documents to the union as the Tagammu labor committee. We also give legal help. 
If the workers need a lawyer, Tagammu will offer them for free. We will give them 
food, clothes, blankets, etc.1040 
Apart from some connective assistance, the Tagammu labor committee mostly 
offered practical support by acting as a middleman between strikers and the State 
union, giving legal aid, and distributing material goods to continue the strike. 
However, it would be more correct to see these labor leaders with a clear working 
class background as organic proletarian intellectuals who had been politicized in 
the 1970s and then became a part of the fledgling Modern Prince that Tagammu 
once appeared to be. Labor leaders such as Saud Omar who left the party because 
of its right-wing and disengaged leadership, recognized the role of these 
individual leftist Tagammu activists in supporting the workers’ movement: 
In Cairo the central labor office in Tagammu is more active and it has a lot of labor 
leaders that are smart and active and we are cooperating with a lot of strikes. But 
it’s a pity a lot of Tagammu leaders are so old<1041 
Yet, from the Second Palestinian Intifada on, there seemed to be some truth in 
Helmi Sha’rawi’s statement that: ‚The political parties were sleeping but they have 
become better now.‛1042 For example, Geber Serkis of the ADNP recalled that they 
not only supported the Mahalla workers through their al-Arabi newspaper, but 
also were standing side by side with the strikers:  
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During the last strike the labor secretary of the Nasserist party and others came 
from Cairo and entered the factory, despite the security, and give the workers 
statements to support them and to support their legal issues. We also have some 
Nasserist workers in Ghazl al-Mahalla.1043 
Whereas the leaders of the Trend for Change voiced the concerns of rank-and-file 
Tagammu members in the Cairo headquarters, a number of the Old Left’s young 
militants actively participated in local economic and political struggles – often 
without support from the party leadership. Ahmed Belal, leader of the UPY, 
member of the Central Committee of Tagammu, and political activist in his 
hometown of Mahalla al-Kubra, emphasized the necessity for political activists to 
go to the factories and link up with the workers.1044 When I was in Mahalla in 
2009 and 2010, I spoke with Belal, who attempted to turn the UPY into a vehicle 
of intra-party opposition, and Muhammad Fathi, who was active in the labor 
group of Tagammu in Mahalla. Muhammad Fathi confided in me that: 
The events in Mahalla have made Tagammu members more conscious about the 
need to be close to the common people in the streets and the factories. But the 
leadership obstructs our party branch in Mahalla in working with the workers. For 
example, during the strike in December 2007, the leadership warned the workers 
not to speak with us lest the police would come and arrest them. They play a 
negative role.1045  
Local activists organized solidarity actions, in defiance of party leadership: 
‚Support for the strike in Mahalla was only organized by particular activists in the Union 
of Progressive Youth. The party leaders in Cairo refused to participate in order to protect 
their relations with the government.‛1046Muhammad Fathi explained how Tagammu 
activists strengthened the worker activity-system: 
On September 23, the day of the strike, the Union of Progressive Youth organized 
a demonstration in solidarity with the workers in front of the City Council< We 
discussed with the workers how we could advance their demands and we spoke 
with the media and the newspapers, asking them to come to our city. We called the 
leaders in our party, demanding them to take a more radical position because we 
believed that this strike would be the locomotive that would pull all the future 
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strikes. We asked our party in Cairo to appraise this movement in a good way. We 
also called some people who could bring food for the workers< We told the workers 
that their strike was a good action and we talked with them about their rights< 
We also tried to organize international support< We were in the factories for six 
days, side by side with the workers, and we smuggled statements inside and 
distributed them.1047  
Through the presence of grassroots activists in Mahalla, who also participated in 
national and even international systems of political activity, the spatial 
boundaries of the strikes were more easily overcome. These activists could switch 
between their Subjectivity as an embedded actor in the Mahalla activity-system 
and as a member of the national and global political community. Using their dual 
position as Mahalla citizens and Cairo-based politicians, they were able to offer 
important connective and projective assistance to the developing strike 
movement. Saud Omar commented that there were many such activists and 
leaders within the Old Left who were ‚<cooperating and playing a good role<‛1048 
on an individual basis.1049 Even though the ‚party line‛ of the Old Left was often 
one of disengagement with the class struggle, individual activists and leaders 
assisted the workers’ movement in developing and systematizing its activity.  
The New Left 
Between 2000 and 2006 the Revolutionary Socialists had focused on the 
democratic struggle and the recruitment of students. The rise of street politics and 
the civil-democratic movement in 2002 had solved the split between the RS and 
Sharara group in practice, and the two factions reunited. Yet the failure of Kefaya 
opened up new lines of discussion. One faction claimed that the RS had made a 
mistake with its involvement in Kefaya, and that they should have focused on 
building their own apparatus instead of engaging with a ‚petty-bourgeois‛ 
movement, whereas the other tendency suggested that the idea of building the 
party through these movements had been sound, but that they should analyze 
where Kefaya went wrong.1050 
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 The resurgence of the labor movement and the decline of Kefaya oriented the 
RS ‚back to class‛.1051 In 2006, Baho Abdul was one of the RS youth who was 
disappointed with the inability of Kefaya and the Youth for Change to forge close 
ties with the workers’ movement. She saw the gap between traditional 
intellectuals and workers as one of the biggest problems of the struggle against 
the regime. While the urban, almost exclusively Cairo based, middle-class 
intelligentsia busied itself with politics without movements, the protest 
movements that emerged spontaneously in the factories, in the slums and in the 
countryside were alienated from the political field. This divide between the social 
and the political, and between workers and intellectuals, stimulated leading 
members of the RS such as Fatma Ramadan to support the establishment of 
Tadamon: ‚a solidarity movement which tries to bridge the gap between intellectuals and 
workers, political and social demands.‛ 1052 
 The RS developed an internal division of labor, whereby one part was engaged 
with the workers’ struggle, while another focused on building the organization 
and publishing the paper. Tadamon was explicitly established to assist the 
workers in the development of their activity-system, as Baho Abdul explained: 
The main idea of Tadamon is that change won’t come from above, from politicians, 
journalists and writers, but from the bottom. So we began to think how the workers 
can be unified, how they can learn from each others’ experiences and how they can 
overcome problems.1053 
In 2010, Fatma Ramadan summarized the short history, tasks and modus operandi 
of Tadamon as follows: 
<Tadamon started since three years. The Mahalla strikes were like an earthquake 
to all the people, so we were thinking how to change the workers and how to 
connect the workers to the villagers and fishermen, and how to make a network 
between them, and how to support them, not only financially, but also through 
exchanging experiences.  
A year after starting Tadamon we realized that we had one aim: connecting the 
workers and giving them support, but we realized also that there were a lot of 
questions: such as how to connect with the labor movement. So we had a lot of 
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salons and conferences with workers and villagers to get inside the movement, not 
to support it from the outside. 
At first we just gave advice and aid. Step by step the workers came to Tadamon to 
ask for advice concerning a strike. 
Between February and May last year there was a new strike wave from workers of 
seven to eight factories and they began a series of demonstrations in front of the 
parliament. Tadamon was trying to connect the workers of the seven to eight 
factories with each other so they would be stronger. To connect Ominestu and 
Amon Situ and Tanta workers and show them that their aims about salaries are the 
same and to bring them together to the union, to make them write a joint 
statement, to unite the movements. 
In the next step we saw that a lot of organizations and a lot of people supported the 
workers, but everyone on its own. Like Tagammu and the Egyptian Center for 
Economic and Social Rights supported the workers but on their own. So we tried to 
make one committee that brings all the supporters of the workers together so they 
can speak with one voice and give one advice. Otherwise Tagammu for example 
advises to end the strike and Tadamon gives them the advice to continue the strike. 
So they decided to create this committee to speak with one voice.1054 
What did Tadamon’s explicitly formulated assistance in proletarian development 
entail? Firstly, Tadamon wanted: ‛<to get inside the movement, not to support it 
from the outside<‛. There was a drive among Tadamon leaders to not just establish 
a relation of assistance between two groups, civil-democratic activists and 
workers, but to create a shared activity-system of solidarity. Secondly, Tadamon 
tried to overcome the internal socio-spatial fragmentation of the working class by 
connecting labor leaders with one another, transferring methods and lessons, and 
‚<show them that their aims about salaries are the same<‛. Mustafa Bassiouny, a 
leading member of the RS illustrated how intellectuals transferred the workers’ 
experiences from one instance of struggle to another:  
During the Mahalla strike we used a lot of whistles and drums, and when I went 
to the tax workers strikes we exchanged the experience of the drums and whistles. 
<We also informed the workers on how to conduct negotiations, how to strike, and 
how to deal with the security.1055 
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Thirdly, workers were connected with other subaltern groups such as villagers 
and fishermen to exchange experiences and unite their struggle. Fourthly, 
Tadamon aimed to unite and streamline the assistance of other traditional 
intellectuals who were active in the workers’ movement. Additionally, through 
the organization of international solidarity, e.g. via the Cairo International 
Conference and Liberation Forum; ‚workers gain strength and hope, they are able to 
see the broader picture, see things in international class terms, et cetera.‛1056 
 Tadamon’s activity of solidary assistance transformed the group from the 
extension of a political organization, the RS, into a diverse group of traditional 
intellectuals with proletarian Subjectivities:  
<students, journalists, researchers, political activists< all connected in their idea 
that the workers will change the political situation. Activists and journalists that 
are members in Tadamon are trying to create a network between us and the 
workers and the villagers and we want to think together with the workers how they 
can push for change.1057 
Saud Omar praised the role of New Left political organizations vis-à-vis the Old 
Left parties: 
I have a long time experience working in political parties, since 1979 until 2005. 
The political parties only comment on the action and write about them. And to say 
that this is the best class form or something. The political parties are not really 
active in these problems. And they are pretending that they have a powerful role in 
the strikes. A bigger role is for newer organization: Tadamon, the RS, and a lot of 
the labor leaders who are members of the labor committee.1058   
The Muslim Brotherhood 
When I asked Said Husayni, Muslim Brother MP for Mahalla, if the Ikhwan 
supported the workers in their strikes, he claimed that: 
The Muslim Brotherhood supported the first strike on 7 December, 2006, which 
was a historical strike. I supported it, as an MP and a businessman. The Muslim 
Brotherhood workers participated in the strike. I went to the workers in the 
company and gave their demands to the management and the parliament.1059 
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Talal Shukr, however, pointed out that: 
In the beginning they declared their participation. After a few days, they withdrew. 
They are continuously balancing. In most situations they take steps back, as they 
don't want to anger the government. The workers do not accept this attitude and 
they know that labor is not the field of the Muslim Brotherhood.1060 
Likewise, leftist blogger and RS member Hossam al-Hamalawy acknowledged 
that the Ikhwan had a presence during the Mahalla strikes, but that they, as an 
organization, failed to give the workers any real assistance. During the September 
2007 strike, Said Husayni was even denounced by the workers, who refused to let 
him in the factory because of the lack of support from the Brotherhood. 1061 
Muhammad Fathi recalled that: ‚Said Husayni came to the strike and the Muslim 
Brotherhood said that he would make a statement for them. But he only came for 
show.‛1062 
 When I asked Kamal Abu al-Eita if the Ikhwan played a role in the independent 
trade union movement, he laughed and answered: 
Nothing! No support. I only have one Muslim Brother in a union of 50,000 
members. Ikhwan owns a lot of factories that had strikes. That’s it. They are 
adopting capitalist policies. Even if they call it an Islamic economy it is capitalist. 
They are the sons of capitalism: even their trade and finance are capitalist. The 
government was using the Brothers to frighten the workers<1063 
The answer of al-Badry al-Farghaly, founder of the pensioners’ union, when 
questioned if there were members of the Brotherhood in the pensioners’ union, 
was laconic: ‚Ma fish, never.‛1064 Ahmed al-Sayyid of the health technicians’ union 
also claimed that the Society did not support them at all:  
The Ikhwan is only an ogre. An ogre made by the ex-regime. It is not real. The 
Ikhwan are not playing a big role. The regime only uses them to frighten people. I 
never met one of them during my trade union work.1065 
                                                          
1060 Interview with Talal Shukr, Cairo, 21 April 2009. 
1061 Conversation with Hossam al-Hamalawy, Cairo, 14 May 2009. 
1062 Interview with Muhammad Fathy, Mahalla, 12 November 2010. 
1063 Interview with Kamal Abu al-Eita, Giza, 20 March 2011. 
1064 Interview with al-Badry Farghaly, Cairo, 21 March 2011. 
1065 Interview with Ahmed al-Sayyid, Cairo, 23 March 2011. 
299 
 
Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq gave another example of the vacillating attitude of the 
Society towards the development of the Strike:  
You will discover the reality of the Ikhwan in the labor strikes. Especially the 
factories that had a lot of Ikhwan labor leaders. You have to connect with them 
because they are workers in the factory, but they are also members in Ikhwan< In 
the Helwan Cement strike a year ago, there were two trade union committee 
members who were from the Muslim Brothers. They were acting like the leaders, 
but when they wanted to end the strike after merely achieving two of the five 
demands in the strike all the workers went to the left. The Brothers said ‚come on, 
let’s finish the strike, we have realized two of the five demands‛. I and a lot of 
comrades advised against ending the strike and it made a row between us and the 
Brotherhood members and they started to attack our group, claiming that we 
wanted to destroy the workers’ future, but the workers defended us against the 
Brotherhood members.1066  
In general, as an organization, the Brotherhood assisted the workers by helping in 
their negotiations with the management and the Ministry of Manpower, and by 
providing material support to strikers, but it did not support the development of 
the workers’ Project. Baho Abdul of Tadamon agreed: ‚The Muslim Brotherhood 
never leads, but often helps, for example, with food distribution to strikers.‛1067 Helmi 
Sha’rawi of the AARC conceded that the Brotherhood provided food to the 
strikes, but ‚<the prestige of helping and being helpful is important for the Brothers, not 
their presence in the movement.‛1068 Kamal Abbas, director of the CTUWS, explained 
that: ‚<since 2005 they were closer to the labor movement, not because of the workers, 
but for their own benefit.‛1069 The Society sometimes recognized the interests and 
problems of workers as workers, but it did not recognize them as a legitimate and 
independent social or political force.  
 Saud Omar, however, painted a more complex picture of the attitude of 
individual Muslim Brothers towards the workers’ strike activity:  
The Muslim Brotherhood is a political power with its own project, but inside this 
organization there are a lot of social forces< So part of the Society is genuinely 
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defending worker demands< Step by step the Brotherhood is changing – slowly 
maybe – but there is a dialogue, a growing understanding of labor cases<1070 
The Suez labor leader gave the example of Yosry Bayumi, a Muslim Brother MP, 
who defended the rights of workers in parliament and the media. In Suez, the 
local branch of the Muslim Brothers came closer to the workers since the Mahalla 
strike movement, because the workers pushed them to this orientation. ‚In the end 
the passenger finds the car that can transport him to the right direction,‛ Omar 
smilingly concluded.1071  
 Fatma Ramadan agreed with Saud Omar that individual Ikhwan members 
genuinely assisted the workers’ movement. For instance, in Tadamon: 
We had youth from the Ikhwan, because it’s logical for them to join Tadamon 
because of the social and economic situation. We did not discuss the problems 
between the Ikhwan, who are right, and the left because we have an agreement on 
the idea that it is the workers who will change the country. The social problems are 
the connection between the different groups, so we do not discuss political 
differences. When Ikhwan and other leftists joined Tadamon they joined as 
individuals and they had an agreement that they will never discuss problems 
between the Ikhwan and the left. Tadamon is there only for the workers.1072 
Those youth members of the Society who joined Tadamon agreed ‚<that it is the 
workers who will change the country<‛; in contradistinction to the Brotherhood in 
general, they recognized the workers as a crucial social and political force in its 
own right. However, because the concept of ‚class‛ as a political-economic frame 
of analysis and mobilization traditionally belonged to the Left, working class-
oriented organizations such as Tadamon were generally conceived of as politically 
leftist, regardless of the fact that these organizations gathered ‚<a lot of members 
from the Ikhwan and all political organizations‛.1073  
 Apart from individual Islamist activists, there were also factions within the 
‚extended family‛ of the Brotherhood that supported the workers’ struggle, such 
as the Amal Party. Diaa al-Sawi, leader of the Amal youth organization claimed 
that: 
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Before 2000 we had a big role, but in the last period we had not a big role among 
the workers, but we supported them through media, the paper and the website, 
through demonstrations in Cairo. Some delegates were used to going to the 
demonstrations of the peasants at that time: also to the Mahalla demonstration. 
Political delegates of our party went there and supported them.1074 
However, as Diaa al-Sawi himself admitted, the role of organized ‚workerist‛ 
tendencies within the Islamist movement was limited to the engagement of a few 
individuals who were able and willing to mobilize their parties’ apparatus to 
support the strike movement. 
Journalists 
Journalists played an important role in the development of the Mahalla strike 
movement. Of course, not all journalists became fellow travelers to the workers’ 
movement. Mustafa Bassiouny remarked that the role of journalists: ‚<can be 
positive or negative, you have to specify if they are ‚national‛ *al-watani] or not. 
‚National‛ journalists are writing against the strikes. Other journalists can be very 
positive for the labor movement.‛1075 Medhat al-Zahed concurred that: ‚It depends on 
the journalists and the newspaper. So it differs.‛ 1076  In general, journalists from 
newspapers such as al-Arabi, al-Ahali, al-Badil, al-Masri al-Yawm, al-Dostour and 
al-Shorouk covered labor issues in a way that assisted the development of the 
workers’ movement.1077  
 Sabr Barakat explained that Mahalla became a turning point for the Egyptian 
workers’ movement, not only because of the character of the strike itself, as ‚<the 
labor movement didn’t stop at any time. It differed in shape from era to era<‛,1078 but 
because:  
The difference is [that] the multimedia and the press and the newspapers moved to 
the strikes and labor movement and covered it, so our voice became louder and the 
strike image became clear< 
By their help during the past few years the voice of the workers became louder. And 
their ability to contact each other has improved. So we can organize a lot of strikes, 
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more widespread strikes, more class strikes. The movement gained a new political 
aim.1079 
Saud Omar was of the same opinion: ‚There was a lot of support from the media. We 
gained a lot of experience: how to organize the strikes; how to define the demands; how to 
organize demonstrations. The media support was so important.‛ 1080 Mahalla worker 
Faysal Lakusha commented that: ‚I was in the 6 December strike and I don’t deny that 
the media were standing next to us and supporting us< The role of the media was very 
important, and they were supporting and covering us.‛1081 Abir Mehdawi, a young 
journalist, explained that: ‚<some journalists are also activists, more and more 
nowadays. They play a role in sharing experiences and bringing local issues to the 
regional, national or even international level. They help spreading the culture of 
protest.‛1082  
 Journalists gave ‚connective‛, ‚projective‛, and ‚expressive‛ assistance to the 
strike movement. Firstly, they diffused particular methods and forms of 
organization to the Egyptian working class in general, either indirectly and 
vertically, by writing about specific class conflicts in the national media, or 
directly and horizontally by transferring experiences from one concrete struggle 
to another. Secondly, by bringing the story of the Mahalla strikes in the national 
media, they projected and imagined the workers as a social force able to challenge 
the system. This narrative reinforced class Subjectivities among workers in other 
companies and encouraged them to solve their own particular problems in the 
same way as the Mahalla strikers. Thirdly, by expressing the demands of the 
Mahalla workers in the national sphere, they stimulated the generalization and 
articulation of these demands as aims of the whole Egyptian working class.  
 Whilst the media did not pay much attention to working class actions before 
2006, the saliency of the Mahalla strike movement drew them ‚back to class‛, 
especially because the struggle immediately followed the disintegration of Kefaya. 
Because of the political and organizational weakness of the opposition parties, 
journalists often played an active role during the civil-democratic and class 
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protests of the 2000s. 1083  Khaled al-Balshy, chief editor of the leftist al-Badil 
newspaper, was of the opinion that:  
The press in Egypt plays a big role, because the political parties are weak. 
Newspapers function as NGOs and parties. For example, in the Kefaya and 
Mahalla movements we played a clear role< After Kefaya in 2005 the anger in our 
society was articulated through the independent media. The media enable the 
movement to share its experiences on a national level. People who want to strike 
even ask us for our advice.1084  
There was an interesting two-way transformation process whereby, on the one 
hand, journalists covering street politics became political actors, and, on the other, 
political activists became engaged in grassroots journalism to be closer to the 
workers. In Hossam al-Hamalawy’s experience ‚the easiest way to engage with the 
workers is being a journalist, as any political activism is a priori suspicious. Being the 
media means having authority.‛ 1085 Mustafa Bassiouny, who was not only a leading 
member of the RS but also a journalist for al-Dostour, agreed: ‚For me journalism 
was a tool to be near to the labor movement< As a journalist I could get near to the 
workers without worrying about security and so<‛ 1086 
Artists 
Whilst in the past the communist and left-nationalist movements had used their 
institutional and financial means to bring traditional intellectuals and workers 
together, since the 1980s the support from the Old Left for these initiatives 
dwindled. During the 1980s and 1990s, most artists became disengaged with 
street politics and the class movement.1087 Essam Hanafy, a young caricaturist 
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working for the Nasserist al-Arabi newspaper, claimed that this was because of 
economic and social pressures: 
<the newspapers choose the cartoonists who defend their vision, so they are close 
to the new liberal economic policies. They are obliged to express the interests of the 
owners of the newspapers and not the national and social good< There is a huge 
number of cartoonists but few of them are engaged. Some laws restrict the artists 
to express themselves. Then there is social pressure. For example there was a 
political cartoonist who was engaged to be married, but the family of the bride 
broke the engagement because it was too dangerous.1088  
However, the rise of the civil-democratic and class movements in the last two 
decades called artists back into an engagement with political and economic 
issues. Writer Alaa al-Aswany contemplated that: 
<a writer has a double vision, a double duty. A duty as a citizen and a duty as a 
writer. Many writers joined these movements, especially because these movements 
are not political parties. They are movements for a very determinate purpose, for 
democracy, justice and freedom. I cannot think of any writer who could stay away 
from the issue of freedom for example< I believe writers should join these 
movements.1089 
Despite the political engagement of a new layer of traditional intellectuals with a 
cultural function, only a few of these artists and writers recognized the workers 
as a social and political force. For example, when I asked the cartoonist Salah Abd 
al-Azim if he had been engaged with the workers’ movement in his art, he 
replied: 
No, for me this was not important. Mubarak was using these elements to 
complicate the struggle< for me the struggle is foremost against Mubarak. This is 
the struggle. The soil is not able to grow everything. First we should change the 
soil, then we can plant anything we want.1090 
Artists had to be explicitly leftist, and not just politically liberal, progressive or 
anti-authoritarian to recognize the Mahalla strike movement as a social Subject. 
For instance, al-Ahali cartoonist Hassanein ‚al-Fanan‛ claimed that ‚the workers of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
they did not push forward the development of these groups into assertive social agents. They 
rather expressed the passivity and dependency of these societal layers vis-à-vis al-nizam. 
1088 Interview with Essam Hanafy, Cairo, 25 November 2010 
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Ghazl al-Mahalla make the artists move: the artists do not move the workers. They are the 
ones giving artists ideas. Artists base their ideas on the workers.‛1091 Caricaturists, in 
particular, played a central role in the articulation and development of class 
demands and forms of consciousness. According to Essam Hanafy:  
The caricature is related to the society. The caricaturist has to follow up social and 
political events, especially subjects involving workers and peasants; those who 
suffer social and economic problems due to the current policies of capitalism in 
Egypt. He has to follow the news and check what happens with his activist friends. 
The cartoonist’s mission is not only to make jokes, but also to make the people 
conscious. He expresses the situation in pictures. We were with the peasants 
against the landlords. Peasants were killed. Art must express the problem at hand, 
for example the insurrection of the Mahalla workers. There was a big pressure on 
the workers. The cartoonist acts upon events and of course he should sympathize 
with the workers and the peasants.1092   
Because of the cartoon’s political use, Hanafy explained that ‚The cartoonist is< 
put under pressure and imprisoned because they are dangerous,‛1093 and he joked that 
‚<writing a cartoon is like walking on a field with landmines.‛1094 Art forms such as 
songs, graffiti, cartoons, sketches, and poems, projected and expressed the 
workers’ predicaments as well as possible solutions to overcome them. Hassanein 
explained that: 
I was trying to draw what the workers want and the things as they see them. This 
helps the workers to think. The caricatures make the workers know their 
interests and goals as a short-cut; they can understand everything from 
just a small picture. This makes them appreciate caricatures. We know the 
problems, but we know from them what the problem is really like: what and how 
they really see it.1095 
The caricature or cartoon was instrumental in the development of a ‚true‛ 
concept by workers of themselves as a social and political force, and of a critique 
of al-nizam. Firstly, cartoons are easily accessible and reproducible; they are not 
exclusively found in art galleries, which are detached from the ‚lifeworld‛ of the 
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class, but they are ‚<the art of the poor people<‛1096, printed in newspapers and 
painted on walls and streets. Secondly, a caricature is a sign that combines a 
‚simple‛ form or signifier with a ‚complex‛ content or signified. A political 
cartoon has the potential to act as a microcosm of the whole nizam, inviting the 
interpreter to unfold the simple image of the caricature into the complex Gestalt of 
the subject matter it represents.  
Human Rights Activists 
During the 1990s and 2000s – similarly to journalists – human and civil rights 
activists often had to step in to fill the void left by the bureaucratization of the 
trade unions and the disengagement of political parties with grassroots 
politics.1097 Political activists frequently established or joined NGOs to get hold of 
a semi-legal apparatus and domain of work. The RS created the Center for 
Socialist Studies in Giza and some of its members, like Hisham Fouad, were 
active in the Sons of Land Center for Human Rights; the ECP had its Socialist 
Horizons Center; Saud Omar became active in the Suez Democratic Forum; et 
cetera.  
 Two centers gathering activists stood out for their support for the workers’ 
movement in general and for their role in the Mahalla strike movement in 
particular: the Center for Trade Union and Worker Services and the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Center.1098 Other noteworthy NGOs with a (partial) ‚working class 
orientation‛ were the SLCHR1099 and the New Woman Foundation1100. 
 The CTUWS was one of the pioneers of grassroots-oriented NGOs in Egypt. 
The organization was established in 1990 in Helwan and spread to other 
industrial cities such as Mahalla al-Kubra. In 1993 it was recognized and 
supported as a partner-NGO of Oxfam Novib. Kamal Abbas summarized the 
tasks and aims of the center: 
 <we organize the leaders in the companies, exchanging the problems of labor in 
different factories, then working with them, organizing campaigns. When a strike 
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or demonstration begins, we keep in contact with them, contact the media and keep 
in touch with them. In addition, we help workers with their negotiations, giving 
them ideas, and so on.1101  
In December 2006 the Mahalla branch of the CTUWS was the main focal point of 
the strike movement, offering practical, legal and material support to the workers 
and organizing solidarity.1102 
 The HMLC was established in 1999 and had its roots in legal aid associations of 
the 1990s. One of the key figures was Khaled Ali, a lawyer and human rights 
activist since 1994, who was a co-founder of HMLC and who, in 2010, created the 
Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR). Khaled Ali elucidated 
his assisting role as a traditional intellectual towards the workers’ movement: 
Throughout my activism I was working on labor issues and helped with the 
establishment of the coordinating committee for labor and union rights since 
2001... Firstly, as a lawyer I was giving free legal advice and litigation, and 
secondly I worked as a trainer for workers to raise their awareness of their labor 
rights< The most significant cases were during the trade union elections. The first 
one in 2001-2006; the second one in 2006-2011< During these elections one of the 
cases that was raised was the privatization of health insurance. These cases were 
very important because they halted the privatization of health insurance< There 
were two other cases: firstly: the minimum wage. The center was successful in 
getting a judgment of the court in the workers’ favor. This is the first time a court 
set a minimum wage for workers< Secondly, the case of Tanta company when the 
owner prevented the workers from the right to work. The workers right to work 
was always used against the workers during strikes, but this time they were able to 
use this right of workers to work against the businessman himself. The court 
sentenced him to imprisonment< I also issued a lot of publications for workers to 
raise their awareness: for example, I issued a report on workers without trade 
unions and trade unions without workers, on the trade union elections 2001-2006. 
I also issued many other publications about labor conditions, and so on.1103 
Osama Muhammad Khalil, a director of HMLC, explained that: 
We work with workers’ problems and the problem of fired workers. Sometimes the 
journalists bring us workers cases, sometimes workers bring us their cases directly. 
We only accept cases that deal with unions and firing. A lot of the employees in the 
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center are activists themselves. Everyone knows about the HMLC; when there is a 
strike the center establishes a committee to help the workers in the strike.1104 
The assistance given by human and civil rights centers was primarily oriented 
towards the overcoming of practical obstacles in the development of the workers’ 
strike activity. Firstly, human rights lawyers knew the procedures, registers, 
codes and performances of the legal apparatus, and by lending the workers their 
expertise they made sure strikers could appropriate the same concrete ideological 
and institutional tools that the regime and the ruling classes used against them. 
Secondly, as legal specialists, these traditional intellectuals raised awareness 
among workers of their labor and constitutional rights, projecting and 
interpellating strikers as members of a national working class with its own, 
shared system of rights. Workers had general rights, both as citizens and as wage 
laborers, and the consciousness of these general rights in turn generalized 
proletarian and civil-democratic Subjectivities among the workforce. Thirdly, 
human and civil rights activists such as Khaled Ali did not only fight to safeguard 
the existing labor conditions, but also to improve the rights and livelihoods of the 
workers, for example through the demand of a fair national minimum wage. 
From 2010 onwards the ECESR organized and supported worker protests 
demanding the national minimum wage, and these actions became a leading 
activity for the class as a whole, stimulating the unity of the workers’ 
movement.1105 Fourthly, because of their connection to international organizations 
such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) and trade union solidarity 
campaigns, NGOs with a working class orientation stimulated an exchange of 
experiences, achievements, and ideas between Egyptian and foreign 
syndicalists.1106   
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CHAPTER 17 
A Deontology of Assistance 
The political trends and the intellectuals have to be more close to the workers and the people if they 
want to make a general strike< They have to grasp our way of living. The awareness of the workers is 
low. Political leaders have to speak the same language of the people. They don’t want to go to the 
workers but they want the workers to go to them. That’s why the political trends and the workers are 
far from each other. 
Sayyid Habib, Mahalla worker leader, Interview, Mahalla, 12 November 2010 
Modes of Assistance 
Traditional intellectuals came to the budding workers’ movement with various 
interests, attitudes and methods, which were not all beneficial to the development 
of the proletarian activity-system. I use Andy Blunden’s (2010) typology of 
‚modes of assistance‛ to discern between shared activity-systems of colonization, 
commodification and solidarity. As I have explained this approach in detail in my 
methodological chapters, here I simply summarize the main outlines. Drawing on 
Hegel, Blunden observed that there are different ways in which one can interact 
with a Subject: (1) non-recognition; (2) colonization; (3) commodification; (4) 
solidarity. Non-recognition means that the existence of the Other is not 
acknowledged. When two Subjects who do not recognize each other as Subjects 
meet, they ignore each other, or, in the worst case, one of them is symbolically or 
physically eradicated. Colonization is the subsumption of a servile Subject into 
another, dominant, Subject. Workers are recognized as a social actor, but their 
Subjectivity ‚as workers‛ is submitted to other projects. The colonizer often 
presents itself as the guardian of the interests of a helpless Other. 
Commodification is the one-dimensional recognition of a Subject as a means to 
an end and not as an end in itself. The Subject is fully acknowledged, but treated 
as a mere exchange value: a commodity. Recognition is conditional, depending on 
the usefulness of the Other. Solidarity is a single system of activity between two 
Subjects aimed at reinforcing the agency of both Subjects.  
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Non-Recognition 
Even though the Mahalla strikes called many traditional intellectuals ‚back to 
class‛, not all of them recognized the workers as a social Subject. Rightist leaders 
of the Old Left such as Rifaat al-Said dismissed the notion that the workers could 
play a role in overcoming their own economic predicament, let alone be an agent 
in overthrowing the regime.  
 Some liberal political activists and artists such as Salah Abd al-Azim who 
believed in the power of al-sha’b to challenge al-nizam were suspicious of the 
workers’ movement and considered strikes as a means for the regime to divert 
attention from the civil-democratic struggle. They discarded the notion of a 
proletarian Subjectivity and only recognized a civil-democratic Subjectivity: the 
right of workers to protest and mobilize as citizens against the corruption and the 
authoritarianism of the system.  
 Most Ikhwan leaders rejected the notion of a proletarian Project as well. A 
number of them acknowledged the plight of the workforce, but advocated a new, 
Islamic moral economy between employers and employees as a sublation of the 
contradictions between labor and capital. For example, ‚reformist‛ Ikhwan leader 
Essam al-Erian stated that: 
...Islam introduced many principles and regulations for our life and it obligates us 
to be just. In Islam "social justice" means that rich people are obliged to pay what 
is called zakat to the poor. This is obligatory. And they are also advised to pay more 
than the zakat – maybe like a tax, but not a tax by the state, but a tax through 
religion. More than that, the individual is responsible for offering the minimum 
life expenses to his relatives, not only to himself; he cannot live alone. He is 
responsible for his family, he is responsible for his close relatives, his parents, 
maybe his daughters... not his daughters, his sisters; and maybe also his disabled 
brothers. He is responsible. And if somebody brought him before court, he is 
obliged to help those. So social justice means in our view and in Islam a very broad 
principle that is not imposed by the regime or by the government, it comes from the 
roots, the grassroots of the people. When they believe in it, they can cooperate with 
each other.1107 
In his point of view, ‚social justice‛ does not flow from a certain political-
economic constellation – an ensemble of social relations and forces that governs 
the material sources of wealth according to principles of equity and fairness – but 
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is the result of the individual moral attitudes of the rich and wealthy who, under 
the influence of Islam, support those in need. While this kind of charity may 
alleviate the direct suffering of individuals and groups, it perversely fetters the 
development of these subaltern categories into self-determining and autonomous 
social Subjects by institutionalizing a relation of dependency and clientelism.  
 Other traditional intellectuals, such as Tagammu leader Samir al-Fayyad, did 
conceive of the workers as a social force, but these figures did not recognize 
themselves as an agent capable of assisting the worker Subject in its development. 
Under the guise of the principle of self-emancipation – ‚the workers must do it 
themselves‛ – they liquidated any role for themselves in supporting the labor 
movement.  
 In general, however, the saliency and the militancy of the Mahalla strike 
movement, in combination with the disintegration of the civil-democratic 
movement, forced traditional intellectuals to develop an attitude towards the 
emerging worker Project. Assistance of the workers’ movement took on the shape 
of colonization, commodification, and solidarity. 
Colonization 
Colonization is the subsumption of a Subject into another Project. A colonizing 
Subject presents its own development as the best way to realize the goal of 
another Subject. The submissive Subject is subjugated to the lead of the 
dominating Subject.  
 When encountered with the strength and confidence of the workers’ 
movement, many Ikhwan activists could not simply ignore the workers as a social 
force. Some individual Muslim Brother militants and leaders came closer to the 
working class through their participation in a shared activity-system, according to 
Saud Omar1108 and Fatma Ramadan1109. Others tried to incorporate and subjugate 
the strike activity in the Project of the Society. This was done, firstly, through an 
overestimation of the role of Ikhwan leaders in the Mahalla strikes and the 
workers’ movement in general. Brotherhood figures such as Said Husayni 
projected themselves as the natural leaders of the working class. Their lack of 
militants in the organized labor movement was explained by a reductio ad 
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absurdum: because they had a great influence in the factories, they were the 
primary target of the regime and security apparatus; ergo their weakness was 
proof of their strength. 1110  Secondly, the workers’ ‚good sense‛ of the 
contradictions between labor and capital was reframed within a national-
culturalist paradigm. For example, Said Husayni translated the demand of the 
renationalization of privatized firms, which expressed the proletarian Subjectivity 
of many workers that the public companies where they labored were ‚theirs‛,1111 
into a cultural-colonial or nationalist issue: ‚The problem of privatizations in Egypt is 
that we have lost ownership of our industry. It is transferred to criminals or foreigners. 
The whole process is illegal.‛ 1112  Muhammad Abbas, a youth leader of the 
Brotherhood claimed that the Mubarak regime:  
<opened the doors of Egypt widely for foreign workers and industries. It didn't 
take care of the national industries to be able to compete with foreign industries. It 
is a problem of the system, not of individuals. The system protected the owners of 
the companies, and gave them technology. We will not get foreign workers to work 
here. There is a decision, I believe, to limit foreign workers. For sure, before we are 
Muslim Brothers we are Egyptians, so it is important that the Egyptian people 
should work and be employed. In the companies of al-Ikhwan we do not have any 
foreign workers.1113 
Pitting Egyptian workers against foreign laborers, and Egyptian employers 
against foreign capitalists, shifted the ‚good sense‛ of political-economic 
exploitation away from the relation between labor and capital, towards a cultural-
political contradiction between productive Egyptians and parasitic foreigners. 
However, as worker leaders such as Kamal Abbas, Kamal Abu al-Eita, Ahmed al-
Sayyid, Al-Badry al-Farghaly, Talal Shukr, and others, made clear, in general the 
colonizing attitude of the Brotherhood had little impact on the development of 
the proletarian activity-system.1114 
 Colonization was also a mode of assistance found among activists of the civil-
democratic movement. The episode of the 6 April 2008 ‚general strike‛ 
epitomized the colonization of workers’ actions by civil-democratic actors. 
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Charles Hirschkind framed the intervention from the perspective of the civil-
democratic movement as follows: 
The strike, the largest anti-government mobilization to occur in Egypt in many 
years, had been initiated by labor activists in support of striking workers at the 
Mahalla textile factory who had for months been holding out for better salaries and 
improved work conditions. In the month leading up to the strike, however, the aim 
of the action enlarged beyond the scope of the specific concerns of the factory 
workers. Propelled by the efforts of a group of activists on Facebook, the strike 
shifted to become a national day of protest against the corruption of the Mubarak 
regime, and particularly against the regime’s complete inaction in the face of 
steadily declining wages and rising prices.1115 
Charles Hirschkind emphasized the importance of 6 April because of: ‚<the way 
the idea of a general strike had been generated... Egypt witnessed its most dramatic 
political mobilization in decades, an event that brought together people across the political 
spectrum, from Muslim Brotherhood members to Revolutionary Socialists.‛1116 Yet on 
the ground, especially in Mahalla, most workers did not perceive the call for a 
general strike by ‚external‛ civil-democratic forces as an extension of their 
struggle, but rather as a voluntarist, political hijacking of their project. Mahalla 
worker leaders and labor activists accused Kefaya and other civil-democratic 
movements, parties and organizations of mobilizing them for their own political 
struggle.1117 The failure of the 6 April Mahalla strike was partially due to these 
civil-democratic forces, which turned a strike into a high-profile political action, 
without preparing or organizing the workers for this new type of confrontation 
with the state. Baho Abdul commented that: ‚The strike was called by some forces in 
Kefaya, but the timing was bad. They ignored the workers' demands and did not listen to 
them.‛1118 Khaled Ali noted that:  
It attracted many human rights activists but this didn’t start them to work more 
on labor issues. But actually< it drove many political movements and political 
activists to jump on these movements and many politicians and political 
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movements tried to reap the benefits of this. They were releasing conflicting 
statements that divided the movement itself.1119 
Rather than introducing the ‚idea‛ of a general strike into the workers’ 
movement, the colonizing attitude of civil-democratic actors was one of the 
factors that led to the defeat of the Mahalla strike and the subsequent popular 
uprising. Between 6 April 2008 and the 25 January Revolution, Mahalla no longer 
played a leading part in the development of the Egyptian workers’ movement.  
 A more subtle form of colonization could be found among leftists who 
propagated some form of ‚stage theory‛ of the class struggle. The workers’ direct 
social demands had to be supported by the political parties in order to win them 
over to the fight for democracy that took precedence. This idea was popular 
among most liberal, Nasserist, Tagammu and ECP intellectuals. For example, 
despite being a local Tagammu activist engaged in the Mahalla strike movement, 
Muhammad Fathi asserted that: ‚In Egypt you need a democracy first, then people 
become organized in classes and they will fight as classes.‛1120  ECP leader Salah Adly 
claimed that the class struggle in Egypt was muddled by ‚<the problem of Israel...‛ 
and ‚<the problem of Islam<‛, which blurred a sharp contradiction ‚<between 
rightist classes and classes like farmers and workers<‛1121 
We place our hopes in the civil movement. It is a basic force upon which the Left 
has to rely for any change. The protest movements in Egypt are still spontaneous 
and developing, they are not politicized but they are the first steps on the path of 
change. And they are the first mission of the Left. The Left has not a presence in 
society unless it relies on these classes: these classes represent the force of change. 
Even if we don’t agree with the other parties in the social domain, the political 
problems take priority< It is important to say that the struggle for democracy is 
different for leftists than for rightists. It does not mean only the freedom to elect 
and change the laws, but it means also the freedom of establishing trade unions 
and organizations for workers, farmers, students, the poor<1122 
Hamdeen Sabahi, the leader of the neo-Nasserist al-Karama party saw in the 
workers a force ‚central to any political change in the country the way they have been 
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throughout history‛1123 but at the same time, al-Karama hesitated to support the 
formation of independent trade unions – which was ironic seeing as the first 
independent union, the RETAU, was established by Kamal Abu el-Eita, himself a 
long-time Nasserist leader.1124 Whereas leftist nationalists often emphasized that 
social justice was more important than democracy, they did not conceive of the 
workers as a separate societal force with a Subjectivity and Subjectness distinct 
from al-sha’b, the people.1125 
Struggle as Commodity 
A relation of commodification or exchange between two Subjects entails a mutual 
process of recognition by both actors of one another. Assistance is based on a quid 
pro quo base, as each activity-system conceives of the other as a useful instrument 
for its own development. The Other is only recognized as a means for the Self, 
and not as an end in itself. 
 During the Mahalla strike movement, journalists, human rights activists, and 
leftist parties have been accused of recruiting the workers’ struggle for their own 
benefit. Khaled Ali summarized the important yet ambiguous role of journalists:  
<the most positive thing that happened in this stage was the attraction of human 
rights activists who worked with workers and tried to support their strikes and 
movements, and also journalists. They covered many issues of the labor movement. 
Actually they were very, very good at this. This is a positive side of the media and 
journalists covering the labor issues. This was due to their profession: they work on 
the level of the event.1126  
Many journalists covered the Mahalla strikes because they constituted, first and 
foremost, a news-worthy incident. As long as the movement remained a hot 
topic, this attitude did not have a negative effect on the movement, as it enabled 
workers to use the media themselves to reach out to other layers of the working 
class and the political community. There was a trade between workers producing 
an ‚event‛ and journalists sharing these events as ‚news‛ with civil society at 
large.  
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 However, as soon as the saliency and novelty of the strikes diminished, they 
lost their status as ‚event‛ and many journalists became disinterested and 
disengaged with the movement. Faysal Lakusha, a Mahalla worker leader, 
resentfully commented: 
After the failed strike of 6 April 2008, the government started to fire worker leaders 
and the media did not stand by us. After the fire is out we have victims, but the 
media is not talking about the victims of the fire. The chief editors don’t talk about 
the worker victims because there were no big actions.1127  
Medhat al-Zahed, senior journalist of al-Badeel newspaper agreed that for most 
journalists who covered the Kefaya and Mahalla movements, ‚protest‛ was just 
another product to sell:  
Of course when there is an active movement it will attract attention< When 
demonstrations happen in the street this is exciting and most [political] trends will 
report it. But only then. In-depth journalism is weak. You will find exciting, but 
not meaningful stories...1128  
Political Sectarianism 
Only politicized journalists or activists dabbling in grassroots journalism 
continued their engagement with the workers’ movement irrespective of its 
‚value‛ as news. Yet their assistance was often based on an exchange relation that 
recognized the strikes primarily as a means of accumulating members and 
building influence amongst the working class. Hassanein ‚al-Fanan‛ criticized 
the Left for its instrumental relation to the Mahalla strikes and its illusion of 
support: 
All the other movements are jumping on the Mahalla movement and are trying to 
recuperate it, to gain something from it< Even if they are sincere, even if there are 
some people who are really interested in this cause and even if they try hard, they 
made the workers believe that they are powerful forces but they aren’t.1129 
Labor leader Sabr Barakat noted that:  
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A lot of political activists are using the labor movement as a means to take off. I did 
this in my youth, but it is a big mistake. The working class is the strongest force at 
the moment and has the biggest effect, larger than any other movement. What 
happened in Mahalla, the rise of the workers movement, was used by political 
activists, but it was not good for the movement’s progress. It tried to push the 
movement in a certain direction.1130  
Traditional intellectuals agreed with worker leaders that the role of political 
activists was not always beneficial in the development of a proletarian activity-
system. Khaled Ali remarked that ‚<many political activists jumped on the Mahalla 
movement and tried to reap the benefits. They were releasing conflicting statements which 
divided the movement itself.‛1131 The different leftist trends accused each other of 
recruiting workers to their organization without supporting the movement itself. 
Tagammu activist Muhammad Fathi, for example, criticized the RS:  
The Revolutionary Socialists came to join the demonstration. They came from 
Cairo with their Western attitudes and did not have a big influence. The workers 
would not work with them. The Revolutionary Socialists said that they supported 
the workers, but at the same time they tried to recruit new members. It is not a 
problem that they came to the strike, but the workers thought that their attitude 
was opportunistic and that they did not really support their cause.1132  
RS militant Hossam al-Hamalawy, for his part, called the Socialist Horizons 
Center of the ECP a ‚<corrupting force in the left. They don’t have any influenc: they 
take a youth from a demo and call him a strike leader.‛1133  
 Of more interest than mutual accusations of sectarianism is the self-criticism of 
some leftists. Wael Tawfiq, for example, acknowledged that: 
All the political powers did it. It was a reality and all the people saw it. The most 
important thing was that they didn’t calculate the moment and the power of the 
movement. Any start of any strike, if it is big or small, the most important thing is 
to support it; to organize it and to push it forward: especially because of the low 
consciousness, the low level of political ideas of the workers and the Egyptian street 
and the lack of organization. All of this created this outcome: it made the struggle 
fail. All these movements did not become organized because of the attitude of the 
political organizations. The biggest political powers in the strikes had only one or 
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two members and said ‚it is our struggle!‛ because of their numbers. At the same 
time, their members didn’t work to make substitution leaders or to organize the 
factories. 
There was a big struggle between the political forces, criticizing each other, trying 
to win members and elements from the strike instead of supporting it. There were a 
lot of documents distributed that created a lot of conflict; each political 
organization had its own text that conflicted with the others< A lot of political 
organizations treated the Mahalla movement as a launch pad for a new workers’ 
movement and they didn’t treat it as what it really was : a big strike.1134  
Every organization that had the idea of making a trade union began to say: ‚we 
have won three or four worker leaders: we will start from them and build a new 
organization.‛ And this destroyed the idea.1135  
Tagammu activist Ahmed Belal was of the same opinion:  
The problem of the Mahalla movement today is the problem of the competition 
between leftists. When the strikes happened I said that all leftists should work 
together as comrades and support the workers. This did not happen. The activists 
of the leftist parties joined the movement as activists of their party and they tried to 
recruit workers’ leaders for their party. We let the workers’ leaders alone in 
Mahalla, while they tried to recruit them. The last years there were no strikes 
because each leftist faction has taken one worker leader each. We should support 
the movement, not try to lead it in the place of the workers’ leaders themselves. 
Now the leaders are divided and they compete against each other and this destroys 
the movement.1136  
Gihan Shabeen of the Socialist Renewal Current (SRC) admitted that the 
assistance of the RS had not always been beneficial to the development of the 
strike movement: ‚We analyzed our involvement in the strike as sectarian. Our 
activists were issuing very high demands and were splitting the movement. They were not 
issuing the demands that regrouped the movement and unified the movement, making it 
succeed.‛ 1137  Whereas RS leader Mustafa Bassiouny claimed that: ‚During the 
Mahalla strike we profited more than any other political power. We recruited more than 
any other one active in the labor movement. We believe that the resurgence of the workers 
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class creates opportunities for all leftist and progressive forces,‛ he also acknowledged 
that: ‚<the struggle for small party profits will destroy the labor movement.‛1138 
 Political ‚sectarianism‛ and ‚opportunism‛ were expressions of two 
fundamental problems that the Left faced with regard to its assistance in the 
building of a worker Subject. The first issue was the balance between party 
building and the development of the strike activity-system. Without an 
organizational apparatus and ‚center‛ of some sort, political activists were not 
able to assist the proletarian Project in an effective way. These ‚institutional‛ 
forms were to a large extent shaped in articulation with the development of 
political movements and economic struggles. Without an influx of new 
intellectuals and the formation of instruments to connect, project, and express the 
workers’ struggle, the Left would not have been able to play its important part in 
developing the proletarian activity-system. This attitude was a political answer to 
those intellectuals such as Samir al-Fayyad who did not recognize a role for 
external actors in the workers’ movement. Yet, the criticisms of worker leaders 
and leftist activists pointed towards a Selbstzweck1139 of the apparatus. Political 
activists ‚recuperated‛ and ‚used‛ the labor movement; ‚gained‛ something 
from it and ‚reaped its benefits‛; conceived the workers ‚as a means to take off‛ 
and a pool to ‚recruit new members‛. Rather than political mediations of the 
workers’ movement, leftist groups became ends-in-themselves, considering the 
workers as a means to develop their own apparatus instead of proletarian 
Subjectness. This resulted in ‚opportunism‛ and ‚competition‛, a ‚division‛ and 
‚corruption‛ of the movement, and an ‚illusion of support‛. This form of political 
sectarianism was clearly the result of a commodifying mode of assistance and its 
antidote, as I explain below, was solidarity. 
 However, political sectarianism was not always an expression of a 
commodifying mode of assistance. The second problem was a miscalculation of 
the ‚proletarian zone of proximal development‛, as I argue below. This political 
pathology was indicated by such intuitions that activists ‚did not calculate the 
moment and the power of the movement‛, that they treated the strikes as ‚a 
launch pad tor a new workers’ movement‛, and that they didn’t treat the Mahalla 
activity-system ‚as what it really was: a big strike‛. These notions articulated a 
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discussion within the Left on the potential trajectory of the Mahalla movement at 
that time: could the strike Project develop into a trade unionist movement, or 
even into a political formation, and what role could and should leftists play in 
stimulating these lines of development? 
Solidarity 
The solidary mode of assistance stands in opposition to both the colonizing and 
commodifying relations because it approaches the Subject that it assists as an end 
in itself and considers its own agency as a scaffold for the autonomous 
development of the other activity-system. The Other becomes the primary object 
of the activity of the Self. Furthermore, the solidary Subject offers its assistance 
under the directions and conditions of the Other. Solidarity can be perceived as 
an activity in its own right. ‚Intra-class‛ solidarity between different instances of 
class struggle is a first step to overcome the spatio-temporal fragmentation of the 
worker activity-system. As I have discussed in the chapter on the development of 
the Mahalla strikes, spontaneous actions in solidarity with the workers imagined 
a proletarian unity that was not yet institutionalized. Solidarity actions projected 
the workers as a class and a force in society. Solidarity united the different 
moments of the Strike into one co-present, yet still decentralized Subjectivity. 
Once the solidary actions are ‚institutionalized‛ – in the sense that they acquire a 
coherence, an apparatus and a ‚center‛ – they become a proletarian collaborative 
Project, a system of activity by and for workers. 
 Secondly, solidarity creates the possibility of an ‚inter-class‛ shared activity 
system between, on the one hand, organic and traditional intellectuals, and, on 
the other, between workers and other subaltern actors such as fellow citizens, 
farmers, slum dwellers, the deprived middle classes, students, et cetera. The 
systematization and ‚institutionalization‛ of inter-class solidarity leads to the 
formation of a united front or historic bloc between subaltern forces. 
 A key concept in the development of a solidary system of activity is trust. 
Andy Blunden explained that: ‚New trust between strangers comes out of 
participating together in a common project. So the qualification is that before I can expect 
that we will decide together what we do, first off, ‚you decide what I can do to help 
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you.‛‛ 1140  For the workers in Mahalla, trust and reciprocity were already 
embedded in their pre-Strike activity as workers:  
We spend eight hours every day together. It’s more than the time we spend at 
home. We are all together. Christians and Muslims. At work, we are like a family. 
We eat together. If my Christian colleague needs some money, we make a 
collection. Maybe his son needs money to go to hospital. It’s not important if it’s 
for a Muslim or Christian.1141 
The Mahalla strikes expanded the relations of trust from within the workplace to, 
on the one hand, the local community, and, on the other, other companies. 
Mahalla was a city of working class families, who participated in the strike 
movement and acquired proletarian Subjectivities. ‚It was war and the workers and 
the citizens were on the same side,‛1142 Sayyid Habib recalled. ‚When a worker or his 
family went out to buy bread for the strikers and the vendor knew that it was to support 
the strike, he often refused to take money.‛1143  
 Throughout the 1980s the embedding of worker Subjects within the particular 
activity-systems of cities such as Mahalla al-Kubra and Helwan, and within the 
national context of the moral economy, had ‚communalized‛ the class protests 
rather than ‚proletarianized‛ the communities. 1144  Sam Moore observed that: 
‚<community is not a substitute for the class basis of union organisation and cannot of 
itself generate class politics or consciousness, although it can inform and strengthen this 
through a dynamic relationship which may transform both.‛1145 The radicalization of 
labor protests in the 1990s and 2000s in reaction to the neoliberal State offensive 
began to reverse the dynamic of ‚communalization‛. Instead of absorbing worker 
Subjectivities into communal practices and identities, the community assisted the 
strike movement in a solidary way. The development of the Mahalla strikes 
between 2006 and 2008 interpellated the citizens of the local community as 
solidary participants in the worker activity-system. Before the Mahalla strikes, 
industrial actions:  
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<had been strictly local—there had never been an attempt at any industrial action 
on a national scale. That was in part because surveillance was so tight that workers 
only organized strikes with those they knew and trusted, who lived next door to 
them, close by the factory. They lacked the confidence necessary for national 
strikes, because they could not extend the same trust to workers from other 
neighbourhoods or provinces.1146 
The victory of the Mahalla workers, the emulation of their strikes by other 
workers, and the solidarity campaigns created new bonds of trust between 
workers. Traditional intellectuals played an important part in organizing these 
forms of intra-class solidarity. Their role was recognized by labor leaders such as 
Sayyid Habib: ‚<there was a real solidarity movement from some parties and political 
trends and some students from Tanta university< Also the CTUWS, some members in 
Tagammu and some journalists from al-Dustur and al-Badil.‛1147 Before any proleptic 
instruction can take place, the instructor has to be recognized as a genuine 
participant in a shared activity-system. However, workers did not easily 
acknowledge political actors external to their activity-system as genuine allies. 
Sayyid Habib commented:  
The political trends and the intellectuals have to be more close to the workers and 
the people if they want to make a general strike< They have to grasp our way of 
living. The awareness of the workers is low. Political leaders have to speak the same 
language of the people. They don’t want to go to the workers but they want the 
workers to go to them. That’s why the political trends and the workers are far from 
each other.1148  
Political activists had to prove themselves as solidary actors: ‚You must be present 
in the strike and make sure that the workers trust you.‛ 1149  Because the Mahalla 
community was already in solidarity with the workers, political activists who 
were part of this community could more easily gain the trust of the strikers. 
Ahmed Belal clarified: ‚Political activity for me in Mahalla is easy, because I struggle 
together with the people from my community, not only with statements, but by joining 
their demonstration and by speaking with them every day. Our comrades in Mahalla are 
                                                          
1146 Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
1147 Interview with Sayyid Habib, Cairo, 12 November 2010. 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 16 October 2010. 
323 
 
also our friends.‛1150 The part that Tagammu activists such as Ahmed Belal and 
Muhammad Fathi were able to play in the strike movement flowed directly from 
their integration as citizens into the Mahalla community. 
 For actors outside an already existing shared activity-system it was more 
difficult to present themselves as genuine participants. Abir Mehdawi explained 
that: ‛Only through activism, people accept our otherness after a while, e.g. people started 
to accept me as a smoking woman when I helped them< and after a while we even could 
talk about communism.‛1151 Wael Tawfiq elaborated upon his own experiences of 
forging bonds of trust with workers: 
In 2004 in Ghazl al-Lib, we started to work four months before the strike. Those 
four months we were working to build the minds of the people and to raise their 
consciousness and to organize them and to make them strong against the 
government and because of this work before the strike, the strike continued for two 
months as a good strike, and this became the longest strike in Egypt for a working 
factory< Working in the strike before it actually starts is the most important 
thing. I remember that the workers said that ‚we want to make the strike 
tomorrow‛ and I said ‚no we should wait and prepare ourselves‛. We didn’t win 
even four people from the strike, but it had a big impact on all the other strikes. 
There was a strong relationship between the workers and us. You must be present 
in the strike and make sure that the workers trust you.1152  
With regard to the formation of the RETAU, Mustafa Bassiouny explicated that:  
The RS was best connected to this movement, but the leader of the movement was 
Kamal Abu al-Eita, a member of al-Karama. We had a clear agreement between RS 
and him: we will support the strike and the union to become independent from the 
government and us, al-Karama and RS. Our role is just to support it. Since 2007 
we are cooperating on this idea: to support and not to influence. Kamal Abu al-Eita 
said in an important interview that the RS was the best force in the struggle and 
that the RS created the union; we, however, said no: it was the workers struggle 
and it is their union.1153 
Establishing a relation of trust between traditional intellectuals and workers was 
realized by ‚going to the workers‛, standing ‚side by side‛, ‚struggling 
together‛, ‚be present‛, ‚grasping their way of living‛, ‚to support and not to 
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influence‛, and ‚being close to the people and tell them the truth‛1154. ‚We are not 
taking any decisions for the workers movement. If the movement has a bad decision we 
will support them even if we see it’s a bad decision,‛ 1155 pledged Mustafa Bassiouny. In 
order for assistance to be solidary, it had to be unconditional, honest, and 
oriented towards the development of the assisted Subject: ‚...people start to organise 
themselves and journalists and left-wing movements help them, but not in a patronizing 
way. They stand side by side with the people and listen to their questions and help 
them.‛1156 
 The political deontology of selfless and honest support created bonds of trust, 
which, in turn, facilitated a solidary mode of assistance. Within the shared system 
of solidarity a collaborative Project may develop between non-proletarian and 
proletarian actors, provided that they establish a dialectical pedagogy: a process 
of reciprocal learning that pushes forward the development of the Subjectness of 
all actors involved. Assistance must be solidary if it is really to be genuine. Yet 
assistance must also be instructive to the development of the Subject if it is to be 
relevant. This begs the question of the ZPD of the Egyptian workers’ movement 
before the 25 January Revolution. What types of assistance accelerated or 
retarded the development of the worker Subject? 
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CHAPTER 18 
The Proletarian ZPD 
The political movement only touched the social movement: there was not a strong connection yet. The 
political activists went too fast, raising the idea of a strike in the whole country, which was not 
possible at that moment. 
Fatma Ramadan, labor leader, Interview, Cairo, 11 October 2010 
Development-oriented Instruction 
Whereas solidarity is a necessary condition for the creation of an authentic and 
reciprocal relation of learning between workers and non-proletarian actors – a 
dialectical pedagogy – in itself it does not guarantee an instructive process that 
advances the development of the worker Subject. Vygotsky argued that 
instruction only leads to development when it stimulates the maturation of the 
central neoformation of a Subject at a certain point in its sociogenesis. There is 
only so much distance a Subject can cross between its actual and potential 
development, the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), within one 
developmental line. With regard to the formation of proletarian Subjectness, its 
ZPD depends on its current Social Situation of Development (SSoD), and on the 
actual ‚moment‛ within its whole developmental process. Instructors, who can 
be either ‚internal peers‛ (organic intellectuals) or ‚external teachers‛ (traditional 
intellectuals), have to focus their efforts on elaborating those functions that allow 
the Subject to develop itself within and from a given SSoD. Instruction that moves 
‚behind‛ or too far ‚ahead of‛ development is either irrelevant or 
counterproductive. For example, while the telos of a revolutionary replacement of 
the bourgeois State with workers’ democracy may perhaps be ‚true‛ for the 
proletariat at any time, it remains a purely abstract truth as long as this object 
cannot be related to the concrete spatio-temporal developmental level of the 
worker activity-system. This does not mean that worker sociogenesis and 
emancipation can be reduced to a linear scheme of preset stages, but that, for each 
concrete moment, there is a ‚zone‛ that delineates possibilities and constraints of 
further development depending on the actual circumstances. In other words, a 
particular discursive or organizational neoformation might advance the 
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development of the workers’ movement at one point in its trajectory, but retard it 
at another.  
 With regard to the Mahalla strike movement, the discussion about the ZPD of 
the Egyptian workers was not a purely theoretical analysis brought from without, 
for both organic worker leaders and traditional intellectuals were continuously 
debating the possible directions, capacities, and goals of the developing worker 
Subject. From this perspective, political ‚sectarianism‛ consisted of those forms of 
instruction that transgressed the ‚upper‛ limit of the ZPD of the movement, 
projecting the working class in a potential moment of their emancipatory 
trajectory that was too far ahead of their actual developmental level. Conversely, 
forms of instruction that remained ‚below‛ the ‚lower‛ limit of the ZPD of the 
movement acted as a brake on the development of the activity-system. These 
forms of assistance could be useful, of course, but from the perspective of the 
development of the Subject they were not productive.  
Independent Trade Unionism 
Almost all political actors, and especially those from the Left, agreed that: ‚The 
purpose for all of us is to participate in the basic union committees in the factories and on 
the site. But the highest and biggest union organizations are controlled by the government 
through the Ministry and the Security.‛ 1157  Even though the GFETU was a 
bureaucratic pillar of the regime, local factory committees often offered a field of 
work for organic intellectuals of the working class. However, the success of the 
Mahalla strike committees and the formation of the RETAU in 2008 raised the 
question of the possibility of an institutionalized independent trade unionism in 
the societal context of the Egyptian working class. 
 Some organic and traditional intellectuals recognized only the potential of a 
marginal development of the worker Subject; as long as there was no real 
democracy in the national political sphere, a free, independent, and democratic 
trade union was unattainable. State repression, exemplified in the 6 April 
uprising, rendered the idea of any large scale and independent workers’ 
movement within the framework of the Mubarak dictatorship unfeasible. With 
this episode in mind, Muslim Brotherhood leader Said Husayni claimed that:  
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The Muslim Brotherhood published a statement that we are supporting the right of 
strike for workers. We are with the Egyptian people. But at the same time we said 
that this is not the right movement to make change against the regime, because (1) 
it's a hard dictatorship. The regime will use all ways to defend itself; and (2) the 
world regime won't support a revolution at this moment, as our government 
supports Israel. So a general strike will not succeed at the moment, but perhaps in 
the future.1158 
Leftist labor leaders and activists disagreed about the possibility of independent 
trade unionism in the Mubarak era. Helmi Sha’rawi of the AARC claimed that:  
Up to now we can say that the consciousness of the working class is not yet 
strongly trade unionist< The great issue for Marxist trade unionists is to either 
create new unions or fight within the existing trade union. In the movement you 
will find those who are pushing for independent unions. Of course we agree with 
this principle, but in the current atmosphere it will be very weak: how will you 
collect your contribution or shares and so on. How? It is not allowed under the 
emergency law that you are living under.1159  
Abdel Rashid Hilal, a senior worker leader in Tagammu, emphasized that workers 
and their strikes had to be oriented towards ‚<a political-democratic goal‛ as 
‚<the independent union will not come without democracy‛ and while ‚<Tagammu 
aims to have a union that solves the social problems of the workers, until this happens, 
Tagammu will struggle to create new tools to fix it.‛1160 He rejected the possibility of a 
straightforward emulation of the RETAU experience in other workplaces: 
There won’t be a new example like the union of the tax workers. It was a group 
with the same aim. Their leaders had a political view. They wanted to change the 
salary system. It’s hard to make independent union, like the tax workers’ union, 
because the government does not recognize it as a real union and the regime will 
not negotiate with them. The international labor unions are recognizing these 
independent unions but here they are not recognized [by the regime]. So we have to 
make our own local small committees in the government union so we can have the 
independent union step by step. Otherwise the government will not recognize it: it 
won’t be a real union. We can’t work in the government unions unless the workers 
have a political perspective and unity. And that is what Tagammu wants to do: to 
organize the workers around one goal and one interest and give them political ideas 
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and make small committees in the unions. Then we can gather all these small 
committees to make an independent union.1161 
The formation of independent trade unions would be a slow and time-consuming 
‚bottom-up‛ process, without any shortcuts: ‚It is easier for the workers’ movement 
to fill a gap where there are no existing union organisations than it is to displace existing 
bureaucratic unions that are opposed to the workers’ movement.‛1162 Baho Abdul of 
Tadamon argued that the formation of the RETAU had been a fringe development 
and did not represent the main trajectory for the whole Egyptian worker Subject: 
It's too soon for an independent union, because people don't yet understand what 
it means: they don't yet have the experience to run a union. Besides, the 
government will never accept it. They accept the tax collectors' union because it 
isn't a big threat to them. I am of course in favor of the organization of the workers, 
but a real union needs money and legitimacy before it can work.1163 
 The orientation towards the working class and the attitude towards independent 
trade unions were one of the main reasons for the split of the SRC from the RS in 
2010.1164 According to Gihan Shabeen:  
The main problem was that of the independent unions. We said that it was not 
enough to talk about independency because that is a merely democratic demand, 
but it is also necessary to build the union from below and to make it completely 
democratic, and that this was not the time to talk about independent unions for 
workers, we had to look at every place, and see how they can and want to organize 
themselves, even if they want to organize themselves legally. The issue is to 
organize themselves, or making small groups to do whatever necessary, not talking 
about independent unions.1165 
Tadamon and SRC leader Fatma Ramadan explicated that: 
In fact we are not pushing for the workers to form independent unions and 
committees. We are looking at the facts on the ground: the conditions for the 
workers are not good to form independent trade unions on their own.  The workers 
are on the defensive and the government is defending the State trade union, so 
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until the workers unite and take a stand, it is not a good moment to create 
independent trade unions.  
Now it’s not the independent trade union era, but the workers need organization, 
however you call it: a committee, a trade union. Everyone in a factory should be 
organized in a committee. Step by step the workers will join, but even in Mahalla 
where they had the biggest strike, if the leaders would call their members to 
establish an independent union they would be isolated.1166  
Likewise the CTUWS, which had played an important role in the Egyptian 
workers’ movement from the 1990s on, was unwilling to turn the Mahalla strikes 
into the vanguard of independent trade unionism, and it came increasingly into 
conflict with political forces such as the Revolutionary Socialists that advocated 
this kind of development.1167 RS leaders argued that the emergence of the RETAU 
had demonstrated the possibility of independent trade unionism in Egypt and 
that the efforts of political activists should be focused on strengthening the 
emerging trade union structures as they constituted the leading neoformations of 
the contemporary moment in the trajectory of the workers’ movement. Mustafa 
Bassiouny explained that: 
<the workers are ready when they are ready. We can’t say that a movement with 
strikes and demonstrations and demands can’t have an independent trade union – 
because in practice they were already operating as an independent trade union. In 
Mahalla in September 2006 the workers chose 25 workers for them to negotiate. 
They organized strikes and were bringing food for 20,000 strike members. There 
were a lot of hard times, I saw it myself. And a lot of times I thought the strike was 
going to be finished. If that was not a trade union, what is then a real trade union? 
The labor movement showed it was ready. If the workers are ready we must be 
ready too. And if they aren’t ready, we should not ignore them and say ‚oh they 
are not ready for our ideas‛< 
Before the independent tax union a lot of activists were afraid of this idea. The 
example of the tax workers will help other workers. We believe that the workers 
movement is much stronger now.1168 
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Khaled Ali of the ECESR agreed with vanguard role of the RETAU, but was a 
little more cautious and pessimistic towards the future: 
Right now the future is blurred and actually the labor movement has taken many 
steps but I don’t think these steps will allow it to take its full rights in the future. I 
don’t think this will lead to concrete success, unless the movement will be able to 
organize itself. The only strong organization in Egypt for workers is the GFETU. 
This is the only organization in Egypt, but the workers themselves do not have 
such an organization. Until this moment they are not able to get full worker rights. 
To do this they have to organize themselves like the real estate tax collector 
workers. They have made a trade union and it is faced now with a harsh fight, but 
the workers need to organize themselves like this< I hope this will happen. 
Actually the real estate trade union is confronted with many difficulties and hard 
measures against it and pressure to abort it. I hope, but I don’t think they will be 
able to continue.1169 
Sabr Barakat claimed that activists should:  
<push the workers more and more to the way of their own independent unions. 
Away from the government and the governmental trade union organizations< 
And I think workers in Egypt are near to snatching their own union< The strikes 
are a tool to obtain the independent unions. The end solution is: independent 
unions. But the union organization itself is a tool to get our rights and to protect 
them. And to further develop the labor rights. 1170 
Talal Shukr elucidated that some members of the Tagammu labor committee had 
always looked favorably on the formation of new trade unions: 
We have encouraged the workers to create their own, independent union, with 
their own ways, far from the regime union. Tagammu was with the independent 
movement and supported the demand for a new union. Already in 2001 we had a 
committee in the party to steer workers towards the idea of an independent 
movement.1171 
Mahalla workers such as Wael Abu Zaid wanted to follow the example of the 
RETAU workers: ‚We struggle for a new trade union, because the union now is very 
weak and doesn't support the workers. Our next step is to go to court to establish our 
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independent union. Then we'll create a general committee for the new union.‛1172 Sayyid 
Habib elaborated upon their attempts to form an independent trade union: 
We collected 14,000 signatures against the union and we have 1,200 signatures to 
stop the Mahalla membership in the GFETU. Now we want to make an 
independent trade union and we plan to make this now especially since the 
GFETU wants to delay the elections of the syndicates with one year. We want an 
independent union just as the tax union in Cairo.  
We try to collect the workers who are members of the trade union assembly. The 
members of this assembly are all the workers in Mahalla al-Kubra. Before we 
withdrew our confidence but the trade union ignored it. We will not withdraw our 
confidence again, but we will collect these members to create an independent 
union.  
There are no big problems in the tax trade union, only problems between the trade 
union and the GFETU because of the government. The tax workers went to the 
Labor Ministry and gave them the papers and documents. There are also people 
from the ILO here in Cairo and they gave them the same documents and papers. 
According to the law if the Ministry does not answer after 30 days the union is 
legal. In Mahalla we will do the same. We will go with our documents to the Labor 
Ministry and send it to the ILO. This will mean that we have an independent 
union like the tax workers< 
If we cared for the emergency law we couldn’t do anything. Our strikes were 
illegal under emergency law. After this all kinds of workers made their strikes, 
even the employees of the government.1173 
In conclusion, the discussion between 2008 and 2011 about independent trade 
unionism was not whether to support independent worker strikes or committees 
or not, but to what extent the institutionalization of these grassroots struggles was 
possible within the ZPD of the movement. Whereas some organic and traditional 
intellectuals argued that the demand for an independent trade union advanced 
the development of the worker Subject, others conjectured that this goal 
transgressed the ‚upper‛ boundaries of the ZPD of the worker Project at that 
time. 
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Political Subjectivities 
A second debate involved the margins of the politicization of the movement. 
Within the Left there was a consensus that the separation between social and 
political demands and movements constituted the main obstacle for the formation 
of a social and political force that would be able to challenge the regime. Tagammu 
activist Ahmed Belal observed that: 
The situation in Egypt changes every day. Now a lot of people start to demand 
their rights, not only workers, but also judges, doctors, pharmacists, bakers, 
farmers... a lot of people now start to demand their rights. But they do not demand 
anything political up until now. They just demand their rights. For example, the 
engineers want to have an independent syndicate. Doctors: the same. Workers: the 
same; they want a bonus, salary, et cetera. But no one calls for political 
demands.1174 
Tagammu leader Husayn Abd al-Razik claimed that:  
These protests are important, but they can't change the political situation in 
Egypt. They have no political orientation. They only address immediate social and 
economic problems. Every group fends for itself and the government attempts to 
buy off the different sections and layers. And when movements have a political 
character, they lack organisation. So there are political organisations without a 
social base, and social movements without a political organisation. No political 
party has a real connection to the common people.1175 
Al-Karama journalist Tareq Said was of the same opinion: 
The big problem in Egypt is the separation between political and social actions. 
When political activists do action, social activists disappear, when social activists 
do action political activists disappear. There will only be change in Egypt when the 
two unite. A lot of people in Egypt don’t care about freedom or democracy, they 
care about their salaries, their living, how to raise their children. When people 
understand change will happen only connected to politics, then change will 
happen.1176 
Some organic and traditional intellectuals were pessimistic about the 
politicization of the workers’ movement and did not recognize any space for the 
entwinement of political and social demands in the ZPD of the worker Subject 
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during the Mubarak era. Mahalla worker Faysal Lakusha, himself a NDP-
member, claimed that: ‚If we will say that we are supported by political parties, the 
government will attack us, both the workers and the parties.‛1177 His colleague Abdul 
Kader asserted that: ‚<we see our demands as labor demands, not as political 
demands< If we give labor demands a political form we won't succeed. In other 
circumstances, for example against our union, these demands become political.‛1178 Talal 
Shukr explained that:  
Workers don't want politics to interfere in their work. When the workers organize 
a movement, the government treats them kindly, when political parties enter to 
control the movement, the government reacts very strongly. So the workers want 
to be independent from the parties...  
They only want to raise their salary and standard of living. Maybe in the future 
there will be a combination of political and syndical actions, but this will take 
several years. Some political movements use the workers for their own objectives. 
The workers fear politics, they just want to reach their objectives, like salaries etc. 
We must wait: in the near future they will understand the relation between the 
economic and the politics. They will understand the necessity of making this 
connection.1179 
Other activists stressed both the necessity and possibility of politicizing the 
movement. Helmi Sha’rawi advocated a ‚stagist‛ approach to politicization: ‚At 
least in the beginning you should help crystallize the demand,, the social economic 
demands: then you can call the workers of Egypt to protest against this and that 
policy.‛1180 Al-Badil editor Medhat al-Zahed emphasized the reciprocal relation 
between political and social activism as mutually reinforcing activities: political 
groups should incorporate trade unionist demands and social movements should 
develop a political perspective.1181 Tagammu activist Muhammad Fathi asserted 
the need for a political intervention of leftists in the workers’ movement:  
The general direction of Tagammu is one of support for the workers, only the 
demands of the workers, giving no political direction at all. But here however, in 
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Mahalla, we give them a political perspective. We hope that we convince the 
members of Tagammu next year to have a political perspective for the workers.1182 
Tagammu labor leader Abd al-Rashid Hilal argued that the role of leftists was 
precisely the politicization of the workers’ struggles:  
The workers took the first step and then the political organizations came to speak 
their discourse. The translation of this movement in a pro-democratic movement is 
the responsibility of political activists such as Tagammu workers in the committee. 
They have the task to move these strikes towards a political-democratic goal.1183 
However, such an interventionist attitude ran the risk of simply colonizing the 
workers’ struggle for the civil-democratic movement, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Hisham Fouad observed that: 
There is often an attempt to politicize the movement without developing the 
demands of the movement itself. One should wait until the movement reaches a 
good level before turning it into a political one. When there are no labor unions or 
labor parties there is an absence that we cannot fill. We only have a little number of 
activists. We should support the workers’ demands themselves. Through this 
process the workers’ aims are developed, and they develop into an independent 
group and from there they start to form demands that relate to the society at large, 
for example the demand of the minimum wage. Through the process of creating 
groups like this they will develop their demands from an immediate, low state to a 
higher form. On the other hand, they are facing a huge enemy. This enemy has to 
be conquered first and only then you can pose higher demands.1184 
The Mahalla strikes, for the first time since the 1970s, and perhaps even the 1950s, 
‚<had the potential of relating the social to the political domain.‛1185 Mahalla workers 
began to connect their local, particular struggle to the domination and 
exploitation inherent in al-nizam. However, the experience of the failed 6 April 
strike showed the devastating effect of a colonizing politicization and a political 
instruction that went beyond the ‚upper‛ limit of the workers’ ZPD. Fatma 
Ramadan explained that: 
The political movement only touched the social movement: there was not a strong 
connection yet. The political activists went too fast, raising the idea of a strike in 
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the whole country, which was not possible at that moment. This made the 
government use violence against the workers, and they paid some of the workers 
leaders to side with the government, and the Prime Minister, and the Minister of 
Manpower and the Minister of Investments went to the workers to grant them 
some of their demands.1186 
Although the Mahalla workers began to develop political Subjectivities, these 
were all but matured during the 6 April strike of 2008. Furthermore, the central 
task of this period was still the overcoming of the economic-corporate condition 
through the building of central neoformations, such as independent strike 
committees and trade unions. By assisting the workers in a solidary way to 
develop and institutionalize their strike activities, and helping them to develop 
their ‚good sense‛ into a ‚philosophy of praxis‛, traditional intellectuals were 
strengthening the civil-democratic movement. 
The State and the ZPD 
Up until the 25 January Revolution, the ZPD of the Strike in Egypt was 
determined by the predicament of Mubarak’s neoliberal passive revolution, 
which propelled workers into action, but at the same time restricted their capacity 
to systematize its protests.1187 The Pharaoh was not a passive obstacle, waiting to 
be overcome by the workers’ movement, but an active force, which shaped the 
worker Subject as much as it was transformed by it. ‚The process of< elaborating 
the political self-definition of the working-class movement, is one in which the adversary 
is inevitably and actively present,‛ Alan Shandro sharply remarks.1188 The SSoD of 
the workers was a ‚contentious space‛, ‚<a part of the social world built at the same 
time against and in reference to the political field and its formal institutions.‛1189 
 There is no automatic relation between the development of the working class 
and its SSoD. The SSoD is not an absolute condition, but a predicament relative to 
a Subject at a certain point in its development.1190 For example, in the 1980s and 
1990s the economic predicament of the Egyptian private sector workers went 
much deeper than that of the state employees, yet they were less likely to protest 
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because they were less organized and their situation was more precarious.1191 
While the neoliberal reforms, at first, led to passivity in most private companies, 
they stimulated resistance in the textile sector. The public sector workers had 
already developed a degree of Subjectness in the form of collective traditions, 
memories, methods, leaderships, and discourses. Their class Subjectivity was 
transformed through the struggle against neoliberal reforms and was moved to a 
higher plane of Subjectness. Since the working class Subject in the textile sector 
was more developed than the fragmented Subjectivities in the private factories, it 
was better prepared to overcome the predicament of neoliberal reform.  
 However, Jan Romein’s ‚law of the handicap of a head start‛1192 seemed to rear 
its head with regard to the development of Subjectness as well. Whilst the 
Mahalla workers put the concept of the Strike as a tool of securing economic gains 
and labor rights back on the agenda of the whole Egyptian working class, at the 
dawn of the 25 January Revolution they were still struggling to fully develop the 
outcome of the Strike logic: an independent trade union. Class actors in the 
‚periphery‛ of the workers’ movement had already formed their own trade union 
neoformations: the real estate tax workers; the teachers; the health professionals; 
and the pensioners. These factions came late but fresh to the scene of social 
protest. They were not demoralized like the Mahalla workers and because the 
strike movement had become a shared activity-system, they could immediately 
import their experiences into their own struggle. Even though the workers’ 
movement had experienced a setback, it continued its slow and gradual 
development into a more coherent Subject. 
 Whereas the establishment of independent trade unions had shown the 
potential development for the whole workers’ movement, the crushed Mahalla 
uprising on 6 April 2008 served as a warning for the industrial ‚core‛ of workers 
not to challenge State power. The extent to which independent and democratic 
trade unionism was possible in the Mubarak-era, in particular, remained a point 
of discussion among leftist activists and labor leaders.  
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Educating the Educators 
Dialectical Pedagogy 
When the activity of solidarity and proleptic instruction mediates the relation 
between the worker Subject and non-proletarian actors, a dialectical pedagogy 
arises: an interpenetration of different types of instruction, which develops the 
participating Subjects and their shared activity-system. Throughout the Mahalla 
strike movement, traditional intellectuals pushed the development of the worker 
Subject forward by their solidary connective, projective and expressive assistance, 
elevating the worker Subject from its economic-corporate moment to a trade 
unionist activity-system. Wael Tawfiq was quite explicit in the pedagogical tasks 
of solidary actors: 
 Most leaders in the Mahalla strikes were not in any organization. They were 
natural leaders, spontaneous. The most important thing before distributing your 
program is to search and find these leaders and work with them to organize the 
movement. And work in two ways with them. Firstly, you have to raise their 
consciousness... Secondly, you have to prepare them to work against the 
government. This is the real work that must be present in any strike, not only in 
Mahalla.1193  
In turn, the autoproleptic actions of the working class acted as a heteroleptic 
magnet on leftist intellectuals. Mustafa Bassiouny contemplated that: ‚The long 
term strikes like in Mahalla gave me a clear image of the daily struggle of the workers and 
how strikes change the political atmosphere< I learned more from the workers than the 
other way around.‛1194 Baho Abdul stressed that: ‚We have much to learn from the 
natural leaders, especially their discourse and their ways to communicate. That's why 
we'll publish our newspaper in ‘ammiya1195.‛1196 
 For New Left organizations such as the RS, Tadamon, and later the SRC, the 
active involvement in the workers’ movement led to a political and social 
transformation. New layers of recruited workers changed the class base of these 
movements, which were primarily composed of students and middle-class 
traditional intellectuals. Politically they moved away from purely civil-
democratic politics and went ‚back to class‛. Old Left parties such as Tagammu 
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and the ECP continued their disengagement from class politics, but faced 
increased internal dissent, both from disgruntled leaders organized in factions 
such as the Trend for Change, and local activists who participated in the many 
social and political movements of the 2000s, such as Ahmed Belal.  
 However, it would be misleading to present the emergence of a dialectical 
pedagogy between workers and traditional intellectuals as the defining political 
relation from 2006 on. On the contrary, most political activists, journalists, artists, 
et cetera, did not participate in a  shared, solidary activity-system with workers 
and other subaltern classes: even those leftists who assisted subaltern Subjects in 
solidarity did not automatically become ‚democratic philosophers‛, or constitute 
a collaborative Project with a goal immanent to their shared activity. 
Democratic Philosophers 
A solidary mode of assistance constitutes a shared activity between proletarian 
and non-proletarian actors. This activity-system brings together organic 
intellectuals of and traditional intellectuals for the workers’ movement, creating 
the social field for a dialectical pedagogy: the interpenetration of everyday ‚good 
sense‛ and ‚scientific‛ critique. A dialectical pedagogy and its philosophy of 
praxis is embodied in the ‚democratic philosopher‛, who is either an organic 
proletarian intellectual – whose good sense is embedded within a coherent theory 
and a social organization – or a non-proletarian traditional intellectual – whose 
"scientific‛ consciousness is grounded into the spontaneous philosophy and 
activity of the working class. Or, in Medhat al-Zahed’s words: 
When people realize their near interests is connected with their strategic interests 
and when they are conscious as a class – and a class has an attitude towards all 
matters – the workers will find that it is very important for them to protest 
privatization of health and so on. Civil society organizations and parties have to 
make this connection.1197 
As I discussed before, the solidary activity-system that developed around the 
Mahalla strike movement was built by both old and new generations of organic 
and traditional intellectuals. Some of these were already ‚historical‛ democratic 
philosophers – labor leaders such as Talal Shukr and Kamal Abu al-Eita – or they 
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were activists, such as Wael Tawfiq, who became practical-critical philosophers 
by their participation in the shared system of solidarity. 
 However, other intellectuals, both organic and traditional, did not develop a 
philosophy of praxis through solidary activity. They either remained ‚stuck‛ in 
their everyday or scientific modes of consciousness, or they developed a hybrid 
or even schizophrenic pedagogy and consciousness. For example, in Dikirnis, a 
small village near Mansura, the Tagammu branch had been at the forefront of the 
resistance of farmers, who tried to safeguard their lands against the encroachment 
of the local landlords. When I arrived in Dikirnis, Mahmud Foda – the secretary 
of Tagammu for Mansura who lives in the village – and three farmers – Hagga 
Zeki, Said Abd al-Mali and Ahmed Rashil – awaited me. They informed me about 
the self-organization of the farmers and their occupation of the lands that the 
landlords tried to take away from them. Together with other leftist factions and 
parties, Tagammu members supported and organized the farmers, whilst 
articulating their grievances in the national media and the parliament. On the 
local level, the activists stood up against the Muslim Brothers and the Wafd party, 
which supported the right of the landlords to reclaim their lands. Mahmud Foda 
denounced the Wafd as a party that defended the interests of landlords and 
capitalists. Yet, when we talked about national politics, his rhetoric changed. As a 
proponent of the ‚democracy first‛ strategy, the Tagammu secretary emphasized 
the need to create a broad electoral front against the regime, including all secular 
and democratic forces. ‚Including the Wafd?‛ I asked. ‚Including the Wafd,‛ he 
answered. When I asked Foda how he would convince the farmers present of 
voting for a coalition between Tagammu and the Wafd, he claimed that, due to the 
dictatorship, ‚Egyptian political activists have to work in a narrow framework‛.1198 
 This anecdote illustrated the possibility of unresolved contradictions between 
social Subjectivities within the microcosm of the political actor. Mahmud Foda 
supported the struggling farmers against their class enemies, reinforcing their 
activity-system with connective, projective and expressive assistance. At the local 
level, he was a genuine participant in a grassroots activity-system of solidarity. 
Yet, in the same conversation, he defended a broad democratic front with the 
peasants’ sworn class enemies – a Subjectivity which was born from the 
                                                          
1198 Interview with Mahmud Foda, Hagga Zeki, Said Abd al-Mali and Ahmed Rashil, Dikirnis, 17 
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colonizing logic of the Old Left that democratic change should precede structural 
social reforms; i.e. a stage theory of class struggle. The Mubarak dictatorship 
warranted the strategy of ‚democracy first‛ in the national sphere, which, 
ironically, could only exist alongside forms of class politics in the local sphere 
because of the isolation of national politics from the street, and because of the 
separation of political and social struggle. Foda’s ‚bottom-up‛ experience of 
solidary assistance to the struggle of the farmers did not reconstruct his ‚top-
down‛ political theory. Nor did his democratic stagism prevent him from 
supporting the peasants. There was no organic connection between these two 
lines of politico-conceptual development. 
 Likewise, in the national-political sphere, worker leader Faysal Lakusha 
remained loyal to the NDP and the Mubarak State, despite his everyday struggle 
against the agents of its passive revolution in the shape of police, thugs, and 
factory management. Similarly, Tagammu activist Muhammad Fathi clung to the 
theory that there was no ‚real‛ class struggle in Egypt as long as there was no 
genuine bourgeois democracy and developed capitalism, while he actively 
participated in the everyday reality of the Mahalla strikes.  
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to advance an exhaustive explanation 
for these hybrid forms of political consciousness, of which the particularity is 
constructed by the intellectual trajectories of the individual activists. However, it 
is clear that, in general, the development of the workers’ movement as an 
independent1199 social Subject was as much restricted by its own ZPD as by the 
ZPD of its ‚educators‛ – the Left. In the 2000s the Egyptian Left, like the workers’ 
movement, was fragmented and in the process of reconstructing itself. By 
establishing shared systems of activity, the civil-democratic and workers’ 
movements ‚educated‛ leftists as much as they ‚educated‛ these formations. 
Through their engagement with the workers’ struggles, leftists advanced various 
conceptions of the developmental level of the workers’ movement. However, the 
same held true for the workers who evaluated the capacity of the Left to offer 
directive, technical and cultural assistance – and often found the existing leftist 
parties and organizations wanting. For example, Nagwan Soleiman of the SLCHR 
claimed that the lack of politicization of the workers’ movement was not due to a 
‚hard‛ upper limit of its ZPD, but because of the organizational weakness of the 
                                                          
1199 In the sense of not being subsumed and subjugated under another Subject. 
341 
 
political field. The necessity of a phase of proletarian ‚trade unionism‛ before 
hizbiyya or ‚partyism‛ owed as much to the underdevelopment of the Left as it 
was a consequence of the workers’ economic-corporate predicament: 
The problem is in the politics, with the political activists and the civil activists. 
Before the political activists start to organize the workers they should start 
organize themselves. Later on they can agree on a certain agenda on how to 
interact with the labor movement. But the labor movement will not be developed 
into a political movement without this.1200 
In order to successfully halt Mubarak’s passive revolution and reconfigure the 
neoliberal bloc, workers, leftists and other subaltern classes had to create a 
counter-hegemonic bloc, which, in turn, necessitated the construction of counter-
hegemonic apparatuses and class alliances. Unsurprisingly, because of the 
fragmentation of the subaltern classes and of the Left, there was no consensus on 
the composition and character of this bloc. 
 
  
                                                          
1200 Interview with Nagwan Suleiman, Giza, 26 October 2010. 
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CHAPTER 19 
Roads to Counter-Hegemony 
Democracy is not a matter of elites, but it is the way you organize people to defend their interests. 
Democracy is a matter of the deprived people. The bourgeoisie only fights for a share of the cake. 
Democracy is not a matter of making this or that statement, but it needs a grassroots social and 
material base. The traditions and experiences of the workers’ movement are crucial in establishing this 
base. 
Medhat al-Zahed, senior editor of al-Badil, Interview, Cairo, 8 April 2009 
Shapes of the Prince 
The construction of the neoliberal bloc and its passive revolution throughout the 
1990s and 2000s forced leftists to look for roads to develop a counter-hegemonic 
Project. Medhat al-Zahed summarized the main obstacles of the formation of a 
counter-hegemonic bloc as follows:  
The problem of the political field in Egypt is twofold: (1) it is fragmented and must 
be united; (2) there is a divide between political activism and social movements. 
The petit-bourgeois trends and lack of experience form obstacles for the 
development of a political alternative. A good strategy, formulating suitable 
demands, et cetera, is fundamental for the movement.1201 
The main predicament for the Left, i.e. its ‚vertical‛ and ‚horizontal‛ 
fragmentation, mirrored the economic-corporate condition of the subaltern 
classes that it sought to emancipate. In order to overcome its own fragmentation 
as a Subject, leftists had to create shared systems of activity with other leftists and 
with subaltern actors. As I discussed before, leftists proposed different strategies 
to overcome their fragmentation and constitute a counter-hegemonic bloc. These 
political methodologies were rooted in both historical traditions and the realities 
of contemporary phenomena. They entailed, implicitly or explicitly: (1) a critique 
of Egypt’s political economy and a proposal for a reconfiguration of base and 
superstructure relations; (2) a conception of the social force capable of challenging 
the neoliberal bloc and of its possible and necessary allies; (3) a strategy of dealing 
with State power; (4) a methodology of building a hegemonic apparatus. Below I 
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sketch the three main leftist Projects as archetypes, with the caveat that the 
realities of the political field are evidently much more complex. 
A Secular Bloc1202 
A first form of critique was uttered by the ‚secular alliance‛ of rightist Tagammu 
leaders and intellectuals (in the narrow sense). It was largely a ‚civilizational‛ 
critique that considered the growing influence of Islamic puritanism in civil 
society as a reactionary force in itself. At least the Mubarak dictatorship was 
modern, and its authoritarianism kept grassroots fundamentalist forces in check. 
Without the protection of a strong ‚civil‛ State the rights of women, Copts, and 
free-spirited Egyptians would be trampled upon. The political Subjectivity of the 
‚secular Left‛ was not mediated by an engagement in street and workplace 
politics, but it was derived from their experience with ‚Islamic fascism‛ in the 
1970s, the renewed Islamist terrorist attacks in the 1990s, and the State’s 
cultivation of Islamism as ‚enemy number one‛. It was a Subjectivity of fear, 
retreat, passivity, and helplessness. In the end, the secular alliance did not 
constitute an emancipatory Project, because it did not develop any notion of the 
building of a subaltern Prince against the power of the Pharaoh; on the contrary, 
the powerless ‚secularists‛ called on the power of the State as a Savior-Ruler to 
emancipate them from the danger of Islamism. They were rather subaltern allies 
within the neoliberal bloc than participants in a counter-hegemonic Project.  
 The alliance of the ‚secular Left‛, grouped around the State as the main social 
force, consisted of right-wing Tagammu and ECP leaders, liberals, intellectuals (in 
the narrow sense), and layers of the upper middle classes, who feared to lose their 
Western lifestyle when Islamists should come to power. The preferred strategy of 
dealing with State power was to simply embrace it, and cautiously call for 
democratic reform, until the dictatorship ‚<perhaps, retreats‛.1203 
 As the ‚secular Left‛ was not a counter-hegemonic force it did not bother to 
create a counter-hegemonic apparatus, and was content with the restricted legal 
political spaces granted by the State. It could publish its opinions freely in the 
media, as long as it did not transgress any of the State’s ‚red lines‛, such as 
writing negatively about the President. It could freely participate in elections and 
                                                          
1202 See Chapter 12 The Civil-Democratic Movement. 
1203 Interview with Rifaat al-Said, Cairo, 12 April 2009. 
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was even given a voice in parliament, as long as this voice was submerged in the 
noise of the NDP majority. It was allowed to organize meetings in its party 
headquarters and debate anything, as long as these discussions were not taken to 
the streets and workplaces. In conclusion, its politics consisted of participation 
without mobilization, and a (relative) freedom of speech without the freedom to 
act accordingly. 
A Civil-Democratic Bloc 
A second critique flowed from the real activity of the civil-democratic movement. 
Among activists and grassroots leaders of the Old Left, Kefaya and its derivatives 
were hailed as the heirs of ‚their‛ historical national-popular counter-blocs. The 
emergence of the civil-democratic movement out of sustained anti-imperialist 
protests seemed to vindicate the view that Kefaya was the last phase of the anti-
colonial struggle that would bring the pro-Zionist and pro-American 
‚comprador‛ class down. The neoliberal bloc was primarily conceptualized as 
foreign political domination, and its negation, the counter-bloc, as a broad anti-
imperialist, democratic coalition that encompassed not only the exploited and 
oppressed workers, peasants, and middle classes, but also national capitalists. 
Therefore, leftists with a ‚stagist‛ approach to the class struggle, such as 
Tagammu and ECP leaders, advocated the subsumption of subaltern Subjects, 
such as the workers’ movement, into the counter-bloc. 1204  This constituted a 
continuation of the historical ‚colonial mode of assistance‛ towards the worker 
Subject. 
 Conversely, militants of the New Left often saw the emergence of the 
spontaneous and grassroots civil-democratic movement as the negation of 
traditional and discredited party politics. Rather than a continuation of the Old 
Left’s national-popular bloc they envisioned the civil-democratic movement as an 
authentic form of democratic grassroots politics that transcended the classic 
debates and issues. The main predicament for the Egyptian population was the 
lack of democracy. Once Egyptians were able to free themselves from the 
Mubarak dictatorship, they would be able to determine their own fate. 
Mobilization around universal civil and human rights served as a short-cut to 
circumvent issues such as class and Egypt’s political economy. In order to 
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overthrow the Pharaoh, leftists should collaborate with all political and societal 
forces who shared the same goal: liberals, nationalists, Islamists, et cetera. This 
perspective was not an external idea forced upon the civil-democratic movement; 
it was immanent to the emerging collaborative Project as activists from different 
political families worked together around the same goal. However, the exclusion 
of subaltern actors and their economic struggles from the activity-system 
distorted its ‚philosophy of praxis‛. The civil-democratic movement only 
advanced a clear political critique of the passive revolution’s practices of 
domination, coercion and exclusion, and did not reveal the connection of these 
superstructural forms to transformations in Egypt’s economic structure. The 
concept of al-nizam was foreign-sponsored ‚dictatorship‛ rather than a neoliberal 
ensemble of domestic and global political and economic relations. 
 The ‚anti-imperialist‛ and ‚democratic‛ Left found each other in the civil-
democratic movement and advanced the same type of alliance: a coalition 
between all ‚democratic‛ forces, including economically right-wing liberals, 
nationalists, and ‚civil‛ Islamists as representatives of the ‚progressive‛ or 
‚national‛ bourgeoisie. The vague conception of ‚the people‛ as the primary 
social actor against ‚the dictator‛ represented the broad coalition of class forces.  
The strategy of the civil-democratic movement primarily entailed a war of 
movement against the State, embodied in street protests that directly challenged 
presidential power. The emerging counter-hegemonic apparatus of the civil-
democratic bloc reflected the heterogeneity of its participants and contained 
parties such as al-Karama, al-Ghad, al-Wasat, and al-Gabha; human rights’ 
organizations; journalists; activists from Tagammu, the ECP, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood; movements such as Kefaya; and, later on, loose youth networks such 
as 6 April and the Al-Baradei Campaign.1205 The civil-democratic counter-bloc 
represented a collection of counter-hegemonic apparatuses, rather than a coherent 
‚party‛ with a clear directive center. At the highpoint of the civil-democratic 
movement in 2005, Kefaya was emerging as a potential apparatus that could unite 
the various participating Projects. Its collapse re-fragmented the civil-democratic 
movement, which reverted to a war of position by building and consolidating its 
grassroots committees and virtual networks.  
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A Subaltern Bloc 
Democratic Immanence 
A layer of leftists had participated in the civil-democratic movement without 
losing sight of the structural ‚economic‛ dimension of the neoliberal bloc. They 
were drawn to the emerging social movements and forms of class struggle that 
the neoliberal passive revolution provoked. For these leftists, the recognition of 
the worker Subject as a powerful social force able to challenge the State often 
went hand in hand with, on the one hand, the failure of the civil-democratic 
movement as a counter-hegemonic Project, and, on the other, the saliency of the 
workers’ movement and its victories. Pace the civil-democratic bloc, which 
operated according a liberal logic of political emancipation, they advocated a 
national-popular bloc as the political and economic emancipation of the subaltern 
classes: ‚<we support the poor people and the workers and farmers.‛ 1206 These leftists 
expressed the historical promise of an emancipatory Project that had been 
continuously repressed by the sequence of ‚populist‛ blocs, where subaltern 
groups were dominated by domestic elites such as landlords and ‚national‛ 
capitalists.  
 Against the stagist strategy, where ‚democracy‛ comes first and ‚social 
justice‛ later, the ‚subaltern‛ Left moved an integral and immanent concept of 
the democratic process. Medhat al-Zahed explained that: 
Liberal democracy is not a sin. The right to demonstrate, people beg for this. So you 
can use every opportunity to strengthen yourself. Democracy is about enabling 
and empowering the weak people, taking benefit of every available opportunity. But 
all the time I want to empower weak groups. And we need to understand that the 
national question, the democratic demands and social demands are connected to 
each other< Democracy will not happen first and then social demands will start. 
No, you cannot focus on democracy to solve the other questions. On the contrary, 
by focusing on social matters you will create democracy. Because you will discover 
that when you struggle alongside people who are deprived of democracy  and who 
fight for their own interests, that they will organize themselves and they will craft 
their weapons during their battles.1207 
The Mahalla strike movement showed how workers ‚crafted their weapons 
during their battles‛ – i.e. how, from the development of their collaborative 
                                                          
1206 Interview with Geber Serkis, Mahalla, 12 November 2010. 
1207 Interview with Medhat al-Zahed, Cairo, 9 November 2010. 
348 
 
Project, democratic forms of self-governance emerged. Democracy is not a 
‚system‛ that has to be injected into society: it is a mode of governance that is 
already implicitly present within the practical critique of the subaltern 
movements.  
Class Composition 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, leftists disagreed about the developmental 
level of the workers’ movement. The position of the working class within the 
subaltern counter-bloc depended on their appreciation of the ZPD of the workers’ 
movement. Leftists who had a low estimation of the workers’ ZPD assigned the 
proletarian Subject an assisting, but not a leading role in the subaltern national-
popular bloc. Workers were subsumed in the subaltern ‚masses‛, either because 
they had not yet differentiated themselves sufficiently as a class actor – for 
example in the conception of leftist Tagammu and ECP activists – or because they 
were not expected to constitute themselves ever as a separate class – according to 
leftist Nasserist and nationalist activists. Other leftists, especially those with a 
Trotskyite background, cast the workers’ movement as the (potential) leading 
actor and ‚hegemon‛ of the subaltern counter-bloc. Participation in the workers’ 
collaborative Project guarantees the emancipation of other subaltern groups: 
therefore, rather than constructing an amorphous subaltern bloc, leftists should 
build an explicit ‚proletarian‛ Prince.  
 For Gramsci, the constitution of a proletarian counter-hegemony required a 
horizontal expansion of its activity-system: ‚The proletariat can become the leading 
and dominant class in the measure in which it succeeds in creating a system of class 
alliances that will permit it to mobilize the majority of the working population against 
capitalism and the bourgeois State.‛1208 Other subaltern Subjects are drawn into the 
Project of the working class, joining the proletarian counter-bloc, on the condition 
that, firstly, they are attracted by salient worker actions in the Strike, recognizing 
in the proletarian struggle the road to their own emancipation; 1209 and, secondly, 
that they become equal collaborators in the workers’ Project. 
 In a rural country such as Egypt, the integration of farmers into the proletarian 
bloc was essential to the successful formation of a counter-hegemony. The role of 
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the Sa’id1210 was to Egypt what Sicily was to Italy.1211 Hisham Fouad of the SLCHR 
and the RS pointed to the limited instances of collaboration between workers and 
peasants, and how the Mahalla movement interpellated farmers to organize 
themselves. Moreover, the still ongoing process of proletarianization sometimes 
entwined worker and peasant Subjectivities, as some workers were peasants 
before, or had family members who worked in the countryside. Despite the 
similarity between the workers’ and peasants’ demands and interests, and their 
common resistance against the neoliberal passive revolution, there was, in 
general, little solidarity between the two classes. Fouad explained that, firstly, 
before the worker and peasant movements could be united, they had to be united 
within themselves. Secondly, the structures that could connect these two 
movements were still non-existent.1212  
 After the fall of Mubarak, the different conception of the role of the working 
class in the subaltern bloc was reflected in the creation of, on the one hand, the 
Socialist Popular Alliance Party, which aimed to gather all subaltern actors in a 
national-popular bloc around a broad socialist program; and, on the other, the 
Workers National Democratic Party, which established itself explicitly as the 
political expression of the working class. 
Weak Parties 
Some leftists argued that the development of a counter-hegemony did not 
necessarily entail a concomitant building of directional, technical, and cultural 
apparatuses. Geber Serkis of the ADNP, for example, explained that: 
We believe that the role of parties is to create a climate now, not to organize the 
people, because the parties are not strong. In addition the people are very angry but 
still far from the parties. We have faith in the popular movement otherwise we 
would sit in our parties and houses< We in the parties do not want to be heroes. 
The only hero is the people. We believe that there are some leaders among the 
Egyptian people. Those leaders will come forward and call for change. Parties 
cannot do anything but create a climate until some leaders from the people rise up 
and call for change. This happened in some countries, not only Egypt. The 
members of the parties are now not of the normal people, but they are elite. The 
                                                          
1210 Upper Egypt. 
1211 See Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
1212 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 26 October, 2010. 
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elite can only create a climate, but it cannot make a real change. Only people can 
make a real change.1213 
Traditional intellectuals should only join the existing movements and support 
them. For political activists, engaged journalism seemed to be the preferable way 
to do politics under the conditions of the Mubarak dictatorship. As I argued in 
the previous chapters, journalists played an important role in the development of 
the Egyptian worker Subject. Engaged journalists wrote about labor problems 
and strikes, supported the workers’ movement with connective, projective, and 
expressive assistance, and constituted thereby one of the pillars of a potential 
proletarian hegemonic apparatus. Conversely, journalism allowed political 
activists to approach the workers’ movement in a roundabout way, (partially) 
overcoming both State repression and workers’ suspicions vis-à-vis political 
activism.  
 Al-Badil editor Khaled al-Balshy, however, admitted the limits of political 
journalism: ‚as the problem in Egypt is a political problem, it has to have a political 
solution, and in the end the press can't take the lead in this.‛1214  The role of political 
journalism was restricted because journalists lacked direction and organizational 
resources: the framework of a ‚party‛ in the narrow sense. In order to forge a bloc 
against Mubarak’s passive revolution, actors had to create stable and coherent 
networks and centers. However, every actor involved in either the strike or the 
civil-democratic movement acknowledged that the existing political parties were 
weak at their best, and corrupt at their worst. Even though individual activists of 
the Old Left and the parties of the New Left oriented themselves towards the 
strike movement, Muhammad Abd al-Azim, a Mahalla worker and journalist, 
observed that: 
Parties played a role during the strike but not a great role. You can see its results. 
Normally we could have a good connection between the political parties and the 
workers and now we cannot. This shows that there were problems. Not only 
because the parties are weak, but also because the workers are scared of political 
parties and they don’t like to participate. Especially because the workers have 
specific class demands, not general political demands like the parties, for economic 
and social change. The role of parties was not prepared: it was only some meetings 
with workers in the factory, telling them how to deal with the problems they faced. 
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<the parties have to change themselves. When the parties change themselves they 
will become stronger and when the parties are stronger they can lead the workers 
and then there can be a connection between workers and the parties.1215 
This was a circular argument that expressed a circular reality: because the 
political parties were ‚weak‛, they didn’t attract workers; and because they 
didn’t attract workers, they were weak. 1216  The argument that parties were 
‚weak‛ and should become ‚strong‛ expressed a ‚good sense‛ of their 
predicament. Political parties were ‚weak‛ because they lacked technical, 
cultural, and directive prestige, and because their ties to the workers’ movement 
were often frail and inorganic. Workers did not trust the small political 
organizations because they were seen as ‚alien‛ to their activity-system, and/or 
because they did not believe these groups were able to stand up against al-nizam. 
One does not need a rational choice explanation for workers’ apolitical behavior 
to realize that, at that time, for most workers, the benefits of joining a weak (and 
often illegal) opposition party did not seem to outweigh the risks of losing their 
job, getting arrested and tortured, and thus endangering their families and 
livelihoods. 
The Cultural Field 
The development of a hegemonic apparatus does not only entail the formation of 
a political directive ‚center‛, but also the constitution of a field of dialectical 
pedagogy. The Modern Prince is not only a ‚party‛ in the narrow sense, but also 
an ensemble of cultural institutions. Tagammu’s cartoonist, Hassanein, elucidated 
the potential cultural role of a counter-hegemonic apparatus: 
                                                          
1215 Interview with Muhammad Abd al-Azim, Mahalla, 12 November 2010. 
1216 As Ahmed Belal pointed out, this circular dynamic was also present among the Egyptian 
youth, who, in general, perceived parties in a negative light: ‚Mubarak governed Egypt for 28 years. 
All these years we've made the same mistake – and those on Facebook are making it now as well. The 
Mubarak regime says that the parties are weak and that people have to go to the NDP, because in other 
parties you go to prison, you are without job. Now when I'm in the party I can't work in any government 
job, I didn't serve in the Egyptian army because I'm a leftist. So people are scared, and say we won't join or 
participate any political party. The youth on Facebook say the same: don't join the parties because they are 
weak! They came one day to the party and I said to them, if the party is weak come to them. But they say 
no. But they are soldiers without officers, and we are officers without soldiers, we can't make war. They 
refused to join the parties. So the parties will be weaker. [And when the parties are more weak...] then we 
can't stay in touch with the workers and other people.‛ (Interview with Ahmed Belal, Cairo, 6 April 
2009.) 
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When I gather the children and make them listen to Shaykh Imam, or play the oud, 
or draw, it is a way to make their consciousness revolutionary. When they become 
older and listen to Shaykh Imam they will listen and understand things they didn’t 
understand when they were children. It is a way of understanding and thinking, to 
raise them in their role to become leaders, to make them think for themselves, and 
to let them make decisions, and to let them make a revolution< 
The children, the journalists, I trained them and they are still here, like Sahar and 
Brania, they draw caricatures and they make the newspaper. I trained Heba and 
Haisam and Muhammad Galab how to write as a Tagammu activist should write. 
They should be the leaders in the future, of the journalists and the whole party. The 
leftist movements and the party had always the tradition that they trained them 
and then left them to go where they want like Rose al-Yusuf. Now this is made by 
only the effort of one member, myself. It is not a plan. If Tagammu would make 
this in an academic way it would be different and better. Now I have to do it 
myself. They had programs to make youth leaders, how to do politics, to speak and 
write in a political way, to be journalists. Tagammu had written programs, it used 
to train people, but now I have to do it by myself.1217 
Leftist actor Muhammad Zaky Murat agreed that leftists had neglected building 
counter-hegemonic cultural institutions with organic ties to the workers’ 
movement: 
Independent leftist artists who work on democratic themes did not have any 
supervision or direction from the leftist leadership that pushed them to the workers’ 
movement< We need a real party that is engaged with labor issues and that 
engages artists with workers in order to produce a progressive culture.1218 
 
The problem was not the production and performance of counter-hegemonic 
forms of art or education, but the fragmented, unsystematic and ad hoc nature of 
these activities, which prevented the development of a coherent counter-culture: 
‚There are movements, but they are weak. In spite of what the government does, there are 
a number of youths who go to cafés and present theater for fifty minutes and then the 
police comes and arrests them. So they have no opportunity to develop their art.‛1219 
Essam Shabeen of Afaaq Ishtirakiyya concurred: 
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353 
 
This is important in Egypt: there is no sponsorship for independent art< Political 
organizations try to support it, but it is difficult. For example we support the 
festival of short films. But in general these groups do not have financial support or 
an audience for their art. They are all youth during their university years, when 
they have more freedom and time. After university it is difficult for them to work 
in art, because they are forced due to the economic situation to search for jobs, but 
there are little opportunities for work, their salaries are very little so they have to 
work in two jobs and often they don’t have time for any political activity< The 
street theatre is a model for this. Artists get married, others look for jobs, there is 
no support or sponsorship for them. The cultural places don’t welcome them, 
because these places and even the parties only welcome the well-known artists, but 
they don’t encourage those artists who are still beginning. Here, in Afaaq, we 
welcome many theater artists, they are our friends and so on<1220 
Party Building 
Leftists building the subaltern counter-bloc developed different strategies in 
constructing political and cultural hegemonic apparatuses. Firstly, there was the 
‚New Left in the Old Left‛: the engaged labor leaders and activists in Tagammu, 
the ECP, and the ADNP. These groups hoped to ‚capture‛ their organizations, 
and orient these directly available apparatuses to the development of the 
subaltern movements. Their counter-hegemonic practice was reminiscent of early 
Western social-democracy, in the sense that they hoped to build a popular mass 
party that eventually would be able to impose its hegemony on civil and political 
society. Whereas some militants such as Wael Tawfiq conceptualized their 
participation in the Old Left structures as a temporary entryist tactic, which was 
but one step in a fluid war of movement against the State, most Tagammu activists 
saw their internal struggle as part of a deeply entrenched and protracted war of 
position. Activists such as Haisam Hassan and Ahmed Belal aimed to connect 
their political struggle to the everyday activity of the subaltern masses, and used 
the legality of Tagammu as a springboard for this activity. For example, Haisam 
Hassan told me about how he and other Tagammu activists used the November 
2010 elections as a pretext to ‚do politics‛ in popular neighborhoods such as Darb 
al-Ahmar and Abdeen in Cairo. They talked with working class people, 
discussing their daily problems, and made a neighborhood newspaper that 
bundled these issues together with relevant excerpts from Tagammu’s political 
and economic program. This way they connected the people’s particular, 
                                                          
1220 Interview with Essam Shabeen, Cairo, 13 November 2010. 
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common sense understanding of their daily predicament with a general critique 
of Egypt’s political economy.1221 Such partisan initiatives created a temporary 
field of dialectical pedagogy. However, because the Old Left apparatus as a 
whole did not engage in a coherent and systematic way with the everyday 
popular struggles, these shared activity-systems were fickle and undeveloped. In 
general the Old Left structures remained isolated from the subaltern struggles, 
and failed to become a sustained field of dialectical pedagogy. 
 Secondly, leftists such as Kamal Abbas, Nawla Darwish, Khaled Ali, and Saud 
Omar established ‚radical‛ NGOs, centers, or committees that aimed to assist 
subaltern Subjects without offering an explicit political strategy for the capture of 
State power.1222 What these formations lacked in political direction, they often 
compensated for in terms of technical and cultural assistance to the developing 
subaltern Subjects. The radical NGOs engaged in a war of position against the 
State, largely ignoring political society, but building strongholds and claiming 
spaces for subaltern Subjects within civil society. Khaled Ali explained that the 
ECESR ‚<participated and coordinated with many political organizations in Egypt. For 
example Tadamon, we cooperated with them on many issues and we hosted them. We 
opened our apartment until they opened their own office. Before this they hadn’t had a 
place to meet and the center here hosted them.‛1223 As long as movements were still 
struggling to overcome their economic-corporate condition, these structures 
played a crucial role in instructing and supporting their development. Their 
proleptic role often ended when subaltern Subjects moved to the political domain. 
Although the radical NGOs did not develop a counter-hegemonic strategy of 
their own, they offered subaltern Subjects frameworks to build their own counter-
hegemonic apparatuses. 
 Thirdly, many young leftists were loath to join either a political party or an 
NGO, and became active in networks such as 6 April and movements such as the 
Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD). Unlike the radical NGOs, 
these formations were often highly politicized and preferred street mobilization 
and direct action above organizational institutionalization. HASHD, for example: 
                                                          
1221 Interview with Haisam Hassan, Cairo, 28 September 2010. 
1222 This category also encompassed ‚workerist‛ grassroots groups such as the RS-constituted 
Tadamon. Other centers such as Afaaq Ishtirakiyya and the Center for Socialist Studies were directly 
connected to political formations such as, respectively, the ECP and the RS.  
1223 Interview with Khaled Ali, Cairo, 25 October 2010. 
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‚<was not a hierarchical structure, it didn’t have a leader, it was basically committees 
that revolved around a program<‛1224 Although these leftists aimed to combine a 
political with an economic critique of the neoliberal bloc, their class composition – 
mostly students and urban professionals – and modes of activity – new social 
media and street protest – prevented them from developing a profound and 
sustained collaborative Project with subaltern groups such as industrial workers, 
farmers, and slum dwellers. Furthermore, organized activists from parties such as 
al-Karama, the RS, and al-Amal often structured the activities of these loose 
movements: ‚When they organize a protest and some people of 6 April are seen 
participating in it, the media will frame it as an activity of the 6 April.‛1225 
 Lastly, some leftist groups, such as the RS, upheld the Leninist vanguard 
model of party building. According to this strategy, as long as leftists operated 
under conditions of a repressive dictatorship, they could only establish a small 
and underground organization of dedicated revolutionaries. The vanguard party 
was seen as the embryonic proletarian hegemonic apparatus and the embodiment 
of the proletarian ‚collective intellectual‛.1226 The connection of the vanguard to 
the subaltern masses was often mediated by ‚front organizations‛ and alliances 
that attracted activists with a lower political profile. For example, RS activists 
intervened in the civil-democratic movement, and recruited non-proletarian 
layers, which were then oriented towards the class struggle where they assisted 
the development of the worker Subject. Conversely, via its engagement in the 
class struggle, the party recruited organic worker leaders, who were then fused 
with non-proletarian intellectuals. The RS spawned a host of front organizations – 
the Free Student Union, HASHD, Tadamon, the CSS, et cetera. This approach was 
to a large extent inspired by the British SWP’s tactic of party building through 
front organizations.1227  
 However, the vanguard model was criticized from within the RS by a group of 
leftists who would split from the organization in 2010 to establish the SRC.  
In the end we developed the analysis that small organizations such as ours see 
themselves as the nucleus of the revolutionary party. Even if the militants 
themselves are very good and not sectarian, this point of view will make them act 
                                                          
1224 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
1225 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 11 November 2010. 
1226 Interview with Mustafa Bassiouny, Cairo, 17 March 2011. 
1227 E.g. the Anti-Nazi League, the Stop the War coalition, and Respect. See Shain 2009. 
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sectarian. If I see myself as the nucleus of the revolutionary party, and there is 
another group behind me, I will see him wrongly, and I will see him as [a 
competitor]. 
 We developed the analysis that a revolutionary party was never built this way, as 
a small group of revolutionaries of fifty, or ten, and that they would recruit people, 
becoming one hundred next year, and then the year after that< It is never built 
that way. And when working in several strikes and struggles< You are not 
thinking how these struggles can succeed. You are only thinking: that man is a 
very good one, I can recruit him, and so on. This is the way we can name< the 
party-building approach. We were against this approach. We thought that building 
the movement was much more sophisticated than that. There are several radical 
points in the society and we can only be a catalyst to reunify those people and 
making a bridge between them. It will be a process, not a straight line, but with 
twists and turns will the revolutionary party be build. And we are not the nucleus 
of this. We just think of ourselves as a group of revolutionary activists who are 
inside the movement, who just exchange experiences and constitute a bridge 
between people and movements, enabling people to get to know each other, develop 
their demands and ways of struggle. In this way, in this dialectical way, we can 
have the party in the end. So in 2010 we had a split. This is how the SRC began. 
This is our history.1228 
The SRC criticized the Selbstzweck of vanguardism. By conceptualizing grassroots 
democratic and class movements in an instrumental way, as the mere building 
blocks of a party, the development of the vanguard – and not of the subaltern 
Subject itself – was at the center of the Project. This was also the criticism of some 
Mahalla workers with regard to the intervention of the RS in ‚their‛ strike.1229 The 
hegemonic apparatus is not developed by professional revolutionaries outside the 
movements, but from inside the subaltern activity-systems themselves. The SRC 
conceptualized leftists as assistants in the formation of a counter-hegemonic bloc 
rather than as its already existing core. This criticism also echoed the concern 
among many leftists for political pluralism. Fakhry Labib, for example, mused 
that: 
But I believe in something new, something different than the past. In the past we 
believed that there should be only one communist party in one country. Now I 
believe in plurality. You can have three, four, five parties, no problem. Coordinate 
                                                          
1228 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
1229 See previous chapters. 
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together, but do not fight each other. We spent a lot of time fighting each other. So 
it destroyed a lot of time, it destroyed ourselves. Today we say "you want a party, 
ok, have a party, let's work together". Perhaps there is a party in Alexandria, a 
party in Mahalla, a party in Aswan. Ok. But work together, coordinate 
together.1230 
Before the 25 January Revolution there were various unsuccessful attempts at 
bringing the fragmented leftists together, for example:  
<the Socialist Alliance, which started in 2006< The Alliance consists of 
Tagammu, CP, al-Karama party, the Revolutionary Socialists, and some centre 
parties such as Democratic Left and organizations such as the ECESR< the SA 
doesn’t do anything. Each group competes against each other and the meetings do 
not result in anything. Even if we all left our party and started a new one together, 
we would compete with each other and split again.1231 
The 25 January Revolution partially solved the strategic debate. Together with 
Tagammu’s left wing, the SRC constituted the Socialist Popular Alliance Party 
(SPAP), differentiating itself from other leftist projects. The RS, for its part, did 
not develop its own ‚mass‛ party, but assisted in the formation of the Workers 
National Democratic Party (WNDP). However, it is to be seen if the SPAP and the 
WNDP are developed as real, mass collaborative Projects, rather than as mere 
extensions of the existing leftist organizations. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1230 Interview with Fakhry Labib, Cairo, 17 February 2008. 
1231 Interview with Ahmed Belal, Cairo, 9 October 2010. 
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Meeting in Afaaq Ishtirakeyya (with Salah Adly on the right, and Helmi Sha’rawi in the center of the 
panel) Cairo, April 2009 
 
 
 
Amal Abd al-Hadi     MB MP Said Husayni 
NWF HQ, Cairo, 23 February 2008   Ikhwan HQ, Mahalla, 20 May 2009 
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Mustafa Bassiouny (left) and Sayyida al-Sayyid Muhammad (right) 
Center for Socialist Studies, Giza, 12 October 2010 
 
 
 
Hamdi Qenawi (left) and Muhammad Taher (right) 
‚Andrea building‛, Tagammu HQ, Mansura, 17 April 2009 
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Meeting with farmers and Mahmud Foda (right), Tagammu HQ, Dikirnis, 17 April 2009 
 
 
 
Meeting with workers (with Sayyid Habib in the middle), CTUWS HQ, Mahalla, 20 May 2009 
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Saud Omar (left), Haisam Hassan (middle), Engineer Club, Suez, 17 October 2010 
 
 
 
Menal Khalid, Cinema Workers’ Union, Cairo, 25 March 2011 
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First meeting of the Union of Egyptian Socialist Youth, Tagammu HQ, Cairo, 21 March 2011 
 
 
 
Spontaneously directing traffic around   Military defending al-Borsa, Cairo 
Tahrir Square, Cairo, March 2011   March 2011 
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Revolutionary Graffiti, Cairo, near Tahrir Square, March 2011 
 
 
 
Poster against sectarianism (by Hassanein)  The commodification of the revolution 
Cairo, Tagammu HQ, March 2011   Cairo, Tahrir Square, March 2011 
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Introduction 
If, one day, the people want life, fate must yield 
Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi (in: Antoon 2011b) 
Writing History in the Making 
This part of my dissertation was both the most electrifying and frustrating to 
write. On the one hand, the 25 January Revolution constituted, in every way, a 
unique opportunity and experience. From a personal point of view, the revolution 
vindicated my intuition and hope that ‚the masses‛ were still a social force able 
to ‚make history‛. Moreover, it proved that Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in 
the region were not inoculated against movements from below by their 
authoritarian ‚regimes‛, or by their cultural and religious predispositions. Lastly, 
it filled me with joy that my Egyptian friends and acquaintances finally felt in 
command of their own destinies and lives. As such, it was at the same time a 
deeply political and humanist experience. From an academic perspective, the 
revolution allowed me to develop and expand my research in ways I could not 
have dreamed of. Firstly, the revolution brought the tentative relation and 
ambiguous reciprocity between the civil-democratic and workers’ movement to a 
whole new level. Secondly, the disorganization of the State created new 
opportunities and ‚upper boundaries‛ for trade unionism. The future 
development of the Strike that I had cautiously contemplated in thought was now 
becoming real before my eyes. Lastly, as one of the few Belgian academics 
involved in the study of contemporary political and social protest in Egypt, I 
became part of the journalistic, political, and intellectual debate ‚at home‛ about 
the nature of the ‚Arab Spring‛. I return to the ramifications of such a 
participation and engagement in A Self-Reflecting Note.  
 On the other hand, the 25 January Revolution posed many challenges to my 
research. As the revolution presented a new phase in the development of the twin 
pillars of ‚political‛ and ‚economic‛, I added an analysis of the revolutionary 
process to my investigation of the Mahalla strike movement. This decision was 
not without implications for the development of my research. Firstly, I had to 
cancel my planned analysis of textual sources (in Arabic) about the Mahalla strike 
movement, and replace it with a new field trip to Egypt in March and April 2011, 
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and the study of the newly unearthed primary sources. In other words: the 
expansion of the subject matter narrowed my primary empirical data to 
interviews and observations. Secondly, writing about ‚history in the making‛ 
seemed to be always and necessarily incomplete and outdated. With regard to the 
Egyptian case, my dissertation, up until the moment of writing, is incomplete 
because its subject matter – the revolution – is unfinished and continues to 
unfold. Taking the fall of Mubarak as a formal end point of the analysis seemed 
pointless, because the main developments of the trade union movement 
happened after February 2011. When I began writing, the parliamentary elections 
of 2011 seemed a logical choice to delimit the dissertation, but soon I found 
myself integrating some of the 2012 events in the text. The revolution runs its 
course and as a political scientist I cannot but try to keep up. Moreover, because 
of their historical importance and saliency, the Arab revolts spawned a whole 
field of academic literature – right at the time when I had to focus my efforts on 
writing and presenting my research. Sometimes it was discouraging to see how 
some of my ‚original‛ writings were rendered outdated, not only by the 
revolutionary process itself, but by the academic race to be the first one to publish 
something meaningful on the revolutionary process. Likewise, the editors of the 
Interface journal mused that: 
Too many experts who claim sympathy with Arab people’s struggles, and claim to 
be in opposition to Western hegemony and exploitation of the globe have rushed 
quickly to assert expertise on the Arab revolution, and to make early judgments on 
it mere weeks or months after it started, as if it is something that has ended, rather 
than seeing it as something that is in the making.1232 
Although I integrated – to my best ability – the freshly emerging literature on the 
revolution, the following chapters are based largely on interviews and journalistic 
sources. In fact, Chapter 21 Story of a Revolution, for example, is a reflection of my 
own perception of the unfolding of the revolt, as it chiefly uses the same sources 
that were available to me at the time, complemented with post factum interviews 
and secondary literature. Furthermore, the ad hoc analyses of anthropologists such 
as Samuli Schielke, or sociologists such as Muhammad Bamyeh, which appeared 
in Jadaliyya, constituted a special domain of source material: they did not only 
speak about the revolution; the revolution spoke through their stories. Their 
                                                          
1232 Shihade, Flesher, and Cox 2012: 1-2. 
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narrations mediated in important ways my conceptualization of the 25 January 
Revolution, and I deploy their voices next to those of the actors in the text. 
Overview 
At this point, the whole dissertation could be read as a prelude to the 25 January 
Revolution. The ‚deep‛ causality of the revolutionary process is rooted in the two 
decades of neoliberal and violent passive revolution, which, in turn, was 
precipitated by the crisis-ridden development of the Egyptian social formation. 
Likewise, the protagonists of the revolutionary drama had been educated in the 
‚general repetitions‛ of the political and economic protests that contested 
neoliberal reform. In Chapter 20 Reason in Revolt I contemplate that, for most 
Egyptians, there were not only many reasons to revolt, but that revolt became 
increasingly ‚reasonable‛. I also briefly engage with the direct motives of the 25 
January Revolution: the murder of Khaled Said; the 2010 parliamentary elections; 
and the Tunisian Revolution. This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter 21 
Story of a Revolution, which shapes up as a light narrative of the events, and forms 
a framework for the following chapters. For those readers who are not familiar 
with the chain of events, this chapter offers a concise summary. 
 The analysis of the 25 January Revolution really begins with Chapter 22 A 
Revolutionary Project. Firstly, I discuss the concept of revolution, and I inscribe 
myself in Trotsky’s emancipatory and political reading of the ‚essence‛ of the 
revolutionary process: ‚<the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership 
over their own destiny.‛ 1233  Secondly, I take Paul Amar’s critique of the three 
dominant ‚frames‛ of the revolution as a lead-off to investigate the nature of the 
emerging Subject. ‚The people‛ as a collaborative Project was constructed 
throughout the revolutionary process. Thirdly, I investigate, step by step, the key 
moments in the development of the revolutionary activity-system. Fourthly, I 
engage with the role of activists and the notion of ‚spontaneity‛. Fifthly, I pay 
special attention to the role of art in constituting a temporary directive ‚center‛ 
for the movement – in the absence of structures that could play such a part. 
Lastly, I offer some preliminary thoughts on the developing Subjectness of the 
movement, which is, at the same time, an introduction to the next chapter. 
                                                          
1233 Trotsky 2001: 17-8. 
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 I continue the analysis of the revolutionary process in Chapter 23 The Republic of 
Tahrir, by zooming in on the Square that came to symbolize the entire revolution. 
I begin to explain the four leading activities of Tahrir: demonstration, occupation, 
festival, and governance. Subsequently, I turn towards the role of ‚intellectuals‛ 
in the Square. I finish with some brief observations of how Tahrir, apart from 
being a collaborative Project, also projected the image of an alternative society 
into Egypt and the world. 
 After Tahrir, in Chapter 24 Workers and the Revolution, I focus on the 
development of the worker Subject within the womb of revolution. In accordance 
with most observers at the time, I stress that workers only belatedly entered the 
revolutionary Project as workers. Before they joined the protests as non-
differentiated units of al-sha’b, but not as a workers’ movement. However, when 
workers participated as class Subjects, they helped to turn the tide for the 
revolution. The ‚proletarian‛ strikes and the ‚civil‛ marches on parliament and 
the presidential palace pressured the military to depose of Mubarak. After the fall 
of the President, the strikes and development of the worker Subject continued 
and expanded, whereas the collaborative Project of al-sha’b disintegrated. In order 
to understand the dialectic between revolution and the strike movement, and 
between political and economic protests, I deploy Rosa Luxemburg’s concept of 
the Mass Strike. Next, I explore the possibilities and constraints of independent 
trade unionism, and the role of the workers’ movement in the completion of the 
revolutionary process. 
 In Chapter 25 The Counter-revolution, I sketch the main dynamics of the forces 
that aim to block a completion of the revolutionary process. Firstly, I give an 
outline of the military and civil groups that dominate the State – I do not go much 
into detail because most of these forces have been sufficiently investigated earlier 
in the text. Secondly, I present the development of State reaction against the 
revolutionary movement. Thirdly, I discuss the military intervention, comparing 
the Caesarism of the SCAF with that of the Free Officers in 1952. Fourthly, I 
address the ‚winners‛ and ‚losers‛ of the uprising: i.e. the reconfiguration of the 
ruling bloc. Fifthly, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood before, during, and after 
the uprising is examined. A distinction is made between the attitudes of the 
leadership and those of radical youth members. Lastly, the call for 
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‚normalization‛ and ‚stability‛ that was issued after the fall of Mubarak is 
explained as one of the most dangerous weapons of the counter-revolution. 
 Finally, Chapter 26 The Revolutionary Prince scrutinizes the crystallization of the 
mass activity of al-sha’ab in various political Projects. The occupation of Tahrir 
was an insufficient activity to overcome the predicament of the SCAF’s 
predicament. After the collapse of the ‚Republic of Tahrir‛, the two remaining 
neoformations of the revolutionary were the popular committees and the trade 
union movement. After Mubarak’s fall, the fledgling counter-hegemonic blocs 
that were developing before the 25 January Revolution re-emerged in new forms. 
I focus in particular on the different imaginations among leftists of the subaltern 
bloc. I conclude that the completion of the revolution requires the formation of a 
collaborative and solidary Project between subaltern forces, in which the workers’ 
movement plays a key role. 
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CHAPTER 20 
 Reason in Revolt 
For reason in revolt now thunders, 
and at last ends the age of cant! 
The Internationale 
Reason to/in Revolt 
Many political activists and analysts, both inside and outside Egypt, recognized 
in the second half of the 2000s that the Egyptian social formation was overripe for 
revolution. Journalist John Bradley aptly named his 2008 book: Inside Egypt: The 
Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution.1234 I myself claimed in a 2009 article 
on the Egyptian Left that: ‚The objective conditions and the consciousness of the 
Egyptian people are ready for change.‛ 1235  Many engaged Egyptian intellectuals 
recognized the rationality of revolution years before 25 January. In 2009 
Hassanein, the al-Ahali cartoonist, prophesized that: ‚The situation is growing 
worse, sooner or later there will be a revolution.‛1236 Senior journalist Medhat al-Zahed 
claimed that:  
Within three or four years Egypt will change, one way or another, the official 
structure will collapse as social conflict looks for a way to express itself beyond the 
limited pseudo-democracy. People don't like to go on the streets and protest, but 
they do it out of necessity. Anger will continue and accumulate. Through the 
struggle they will find a way to unify and the movement will gain a political 
dimension.1237  
Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq suggested to me that: ‚Even in the next year there could 
be a revolution: we should be ready and start organizing right now, or we won’t have a 
successful revolution.‛1238 Two months before the revolution, and in the middle of 
the parliamentary elections, I conducted an interview with the Egyptian writer 
Alaa al-Aswany. With regard to the violence surrounding the elections, he 
declared that: ‚<what is significant is that the regime has reached the point where it 
                                                          
1234 Bradley 2008. 
1235 De Smet 2009: 14. 
1236 Interview with Hassanein, Cairo, 14 April 2009. 
1237 Interview with Medhat al-Zahed, Cairo, 8 April 2009. 
1238 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 20 October 2010. 
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finds itself obliged to shoot the people, the citizens. This is a very significant sign that we 
are close to a real change in the country.‛1239  
 Some leftists, however, rejected the possibility of a revolution – even though 
Egypt appeared to suffer plainly from Lenin’s three ‚symptoms of a 
revolutionary situation‛: (1) a crisis of the ruling classes; (2) an increase in the 
suffering of the subaltern classes; (3) and an increase in the ‚activity of the 
masses‛ against the system.1240 Let us return, for example, to Rifaat al-Said’s 
cynical remark in 2009: ‚If you imagined a revolution or something like that, it is too 
far-fetched, in my imagination. Poor people don’t make revolutions, believe me. Poor 
people need to return in the afternoon with some pieces of bread to their family. They are 
too afraid.‛1241 There was some truth in Said’s statement, in the sense that the 
condition of poverty may be a reason to revolt, but is in itself not a revolutionary 
force.1242 Consequently, Lenin had added to his three conditions that: ‚<revolution 
arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are 
accompanied by a subjective change<‛1243  
 Two decades of increased economic exploitation and political oppression in 
Egypt had not only produced passively poor and fearful Objects of regime 
policies, but also active Subjects and Subjectivities1244 of resistance, as evidenced 
in the previous chapters. 1245  Moreover, it was the growing consciousness of 
inequality, rather than poverty itself, and of injustice, rather than coercion itself, 
which fuelled a mood of revolt, as Amina Al-Bendary explained: 
It is not simply the inflation and the soaring unemployment rates that have caused 
people to revolt this January. They have been protesting these over the past few 
years. But what pushed them was the sense of flagrant injustice; that prices 
increase while some cronies make billions; that certain social circles and groups 
monopolize economic opportunities; that power is also monopolized; that there are 
new groups rising, carving out their ever increasing territories and pieces of the 
cake and elbowing others out.1246 
                                                          
1239 Interview with Alaa al-Aswany, Cairo, 26 November 2010.  
1240 Lenin 1974: 214. Emphasis in original. 
1241 Interview with Rifaat al-Said, Cairo, 12 April 2009. 
1242 Also see Ambrust 2011a. 
1243 Lenin 1974: 214. Emphasis in original. 
1244 See Ismail 2011. 
1245 See Lesch (2011) for a concise summary of the ‚causes‛ of the revolution. 
1246 Al-Bendary 2011a. Also see Ambrust 2011a. 
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This notion of ‚relative deprivation‛ – the ‚<actors’ perceptions of discrepancy 
between their value expectations and their value capabilities‛1247 – is in itself insufficient 
to explain revolutionary mass movements,1248 but in the Egyptian case it points 
towards another process: a growing politicization of the problematic of poverty, 
and the acquisition of an ‚impression‛ – a ‚good sense‛ in Gramsci’s jargon – of 
the political economy that was responsible for the increasing class divide in 
society. Even the relatively de-politicized narrative of the Mubarak clique as 
‚thieves‛, implied that they stole a portion of the wealth that belonged to all 
Egyptians. Many Egyptian realized that, in Shakespeare’s words, ‚though this be 
madness, there is method in it‛. This experienced systematicity of domination, 
oppression and exploitation would enable the masses to contest not only the 
figure of the Pharaoh, but the entire nizam. Nizam is often translated as ‚regime‛, 
but the word carries a much broader connotation of method, structure, order, 
system, rule, and regulation. The reason to revolt was strengthened by the 
implicit realization that there was reason in revolt; that poverty was not naturally 
or divinely predestined, but that revolting against the unjust system was entirely 
rational and reasonable.1249  
 It is easy to explain revolution as ‚the rational becoming real‛ – to paraphrase 
Hegel – but where does one concretely situate the activity of revolution in the 
ZPD of the Egyptian civil-democratic and workers’ movements? When do the 
reason to and in revolt actually lead to the activity of revolting? It is now 
commonly understood that – except for the creeping effects of the global crisis of 
capitalism from 2008 onwards – three ‚events‛ pushed the Egyptian populace 
over the brink of revolution. First was the brutal murder of Khaled Said, which 
enraged middle class youth; then followed the mind-boggling fraud of the 
parliamentary elections; and lastly, and probably most importantly, the Tunisian 
Revolution. Whereas the first two events instructed the Egyptian people on the 
arrogant brutality of the regime and its complete disdain for the dignity and 
rights of its citizens, the prolepsis of the Tunisian Revolution showed a concrete 
way out of the societal predicament, as anthropologist Samuli Schielke succinctly 
summarized: 
                                                          
1247 Gurr 1968: 1104. 
1248 Kuran 1991: 16, 21. 
1249 Also see Naguib 2011. 
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Egyptians have so long lived in a sense of oppression, a sense of frustration and 
pressure, they have hated the system but felt that there is nothing you can do. They 
have subverted the system by being chaotic and lazy, diverting the system to their 
ends, but all this has in turn become the system, encapsulating them in a highly 
frustrating state of suffering from a corrupt system and at the same time being a 
part of it. Suddenly the revolution in Tunisia opens a door of possibility, rejecting 
the system becomes something that makes sense: there is a point to it. In one night, 
the country changes.1250 
Khaled Said 
The Iraqi poet Sinan Antoon remarked that: ‚If Bouazizi’s self-immolation was the 
spark in Tunisia, the brutal beating to death of Khaled Said, a 28-year old man from 
Alexandria, at the hands of two undercover policemen back in June of 2010 angered many 
Egyptians and spurred demonstrations.‛ 1251  Political scientist and human rights 
activist Sabry Zaky explained the significance of Khaled Said for the mobilization 
of the middle class youth in the months leading up to the revolution: 
<Khaled Said represented every one of them. Before this incident they were 
thinking like this: ‚ok, the torture and police station is something normal because 
they use it against criminals or baltageyya, thugs, or anyone who is related to this 
Ministry and it is happening against the lower classes, ordinary people in the 
streets, squatters, and so on. But when this happens to one of us, belonging to the 
middle class, oh my God, we are not far away from this, this can happen to us.‛ So 
this was a very important incident that ignited a lot of middle class people. ‚We 
will not allow them to do to us, what they dared to do to Khaled Said.‛ This is one 
of the factors that explain what happened, I think. 1252 
The name of the Facebook group, We are All Khaled Said, expressed this feeling 
of solidarity. The brutal murder of Khaled Said served as an exemplum of the 
violent degeneration of the entire Egyptian social formation. Since the passive 
revolution that began in the 1990s, in addition to the centralized State attacks on 
political and human rights activists and social movements, local police officers 
habitually harassed, tortured, and extorted ordinary citizens:1253 ‚Police demanding 
bribes, harassing small micro-businesses, and beating those who refuse to submit had 
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become standard practice in Egypt.‛ 1254  The oppression and exploitation of the 
population by petty bureaucrats and administrators were seen as the local 
expressions of the corruption of the whole nizam. The policemen who assaulted 
Khaled Said were not categorized as aberrations, but as the logical agents of a 
system of domination. The murder on Khaled Said spurred middle class youth on 
to organize and protest against the police State, not only through Facebook 
groups such as We are All Khaled Said and 6 April Youth, but also in movements 
such as HASHD, where they were further politicized.1255 
Supercilious Elections 
If the murder of Khaled Said served as an exemplum of the rottenness of the 
system on the local level, the parliamentary elections of November 2010 became a 
symbol of the complete hubris of the rulers and their estrangement from society. 
Amina al-Bendary commented:  
In the last parliamentary elections NDP members alienated many sectors of 
society, both players in the political system and the overwhelming silent majority 
left out of it, by monopolizing the election process from nomination to election, 
resorting to any and all means necessary to keep non-NDP candidates out of 
parliament house; gerrymandering, intimidation, detention of opponents 
(especially Muslim Brotherhood members), old-fashioned rigging, physical violence 
— any and all means possible.1256 
Thanks to an unprecedented display of massive fraud and intimidation 
Mubarak’s NDP secured 209 of the 211 seats in the first round of voting.1257 The 
Muslim Brotherhood, the biggest opposition force in parliament, almost 
magically lost all but one of its 88 seats. In the past, parliamentary elections had 
given the regime, on the one hand, an aura of legitimacy,1258 and, on the other, a 
means to forge a base of consent with other political groups, such as the Wafd, 
Tagammu and the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the 1980s, one of the strengths of the 
Mubarak regime had been its ability to include and absorb political opposition 
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forces. However, the room to negotiate had diminished during the State’s ‚war of 
maneuver‛ against its opponents in civil and political community in the 1990s 
and 2000s. The stubborn and disdainful rejection by the NDP’s leaders of any 
meaningful concession for the opposition came, ironically, at a moment when the 
regime’s hegemony was at a historical low point. In 2008, human rights activist 
Bahey al-Din Shabeen acknowledged that the arrogance of the ruling caste 
concealed its fundamental fears and weaknesses: 
The regime was shocked by the impact of the movements in the streets, the political 
mobilization that took place the last two years. So, now the international attention 
is gone, the regime is working hard to readjust the situation so that the opposition 
will not be able to respond in the same way even if the international attention 
returns. This is one reason. The second reason is that the regime, in a way, is in a 
transitional period. The president is too old and there are a lot of rumors about his 
health situation and his performance and it seems that there is no consensus on 
how the situation will change if the president disappears today, tomorrow, ... This 
is what makes the regime feel weakened. It adopts every day more and more 
defensive mechanisms, which are in fact very aggressive actions, in legislature and 
in practice against people.1259 
The obsession of the inner NDP circle with the creation of an obedient parliament 
that would secure Gamal Mubarak’s succession to power, combined with a 
supercilious and anxious refusal of any substantive democratic reform,1260 spelled 
the end of the regime. In Suez, the 25 January Revolution was anticipated by mass 
protests against the election results: 
In the first day, after the result of the elections, Suez had a demonstration of five or 
six thousand people standing in front of the police station, the governorate and 
state security buildings, which are close to each other. This day was a tryout for the 
revolution in Suez... We had a protest in the morning demanding an end to the 
regime, the police, and so on. This was during the elections, three months before 
the revolution. By the end of the day and after the results there was a huge 
demonstration in the streets of Suez, 15,000 citizens, and this was a huge number 
in these days.1261  
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Tunisian Prolepsis 
Like other activists, Gihan Shabeen of the SRC emphasized the importance of 
Tunisia as a source of inspiration for the Egyptian revolution: ‚Tunisia changed 
everything. Since twenty years ago we couldn’t convince people that things would change 
through the people’s power itself. Tunisia changed everything. We all saw on the 
television how Egypt could change.‛1262 Zaky commented that: ‚<the revolution was 
inspired by the Tunisian revolution. Everyone said: ‚oh my God, it’s possible, they ousted 
Ben Ali, they can do that. The audacity. And we can do this too.‛ 1263 Khaled al-Balshy 
noted that:  
After the Tunisian revolution a lot of Egyptians discovered that the toll of 
revolution is not as heavy as they imagined. It isn't such a big struggle. In Tunisia 
there were only 80 victims, so let us see how many people in Egypt should be killed 
to remove Mubarak. After the Tunisian revolution, a lot of Egyptians and my 
friends were asking ourselves if we could do the same or not. I wrote an article that 
the image of the Egyptian regime as being powerful is untrue, that it is in reality 
weak. I did not really believe in the article, but I played my role in encouraging 
people. What happens now in the whole Middle East is copying the Tunisian 
experience.1264 
Youth activist Ahmed al-Gourd summarized the emergence of the idea of 
revolution in Egypt succinctly:  
It basically comes down to this: after Khaled Said was killed last summer, a 
Facebook page, We are all Khaled Said, was founded. After a few months people 
started to join the page and started to read everything that was being said in it. 
After that came the fake parliamentary elections of November 2010. But also that 
wasn’t enough. The real trigger was the Tunisian revolution. It basically showed 
Arabs that they are capable of overthrowing their leaders.1265 
Since the year 2000 street politics had returned to Egypt, both in the shape of a 
civil-democratic and a workers’ movement, but whereas most political activists 
agreed on the desirability and necessity of a radical change of some kind, they 
could not locate the activity of revolution as a potential development within the 
general political ZPD of their time. Sabry Zaky admitted that: ‚No one expected it, 
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even though there were many indicators, but actually no one expected it.‛1266 Khaled al-
Balshy concurred: ‚<no one could imagine that it would happen like what happened on 
25 January.‛1267 The proleptic instruction of the Tunisian revolution offered the 
Egyptian masses a glimpse of their own revolutionary potentiality. All that was 
needed was a spark that allowed this potentiality to develop into actuality. The 25 
January protests became the catalyst of this revolutionary process, as I describe in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 21 
Story of a Revolution 
The revolution still has no ritual, the streets are in smoke, the masses have not yet learned the new 
songs< The revolution is mighty but still naïve, with a child’s naïveness. 
Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (2001: 177)  
Organizing the Day of Revolt 
Because of widespread popular resentment towards the increased violence and 
authoritarianism of the Mubarak-regime and the shining example of the Tunisian 
Revolution, an ‚unlikely alliance of youth activists, political Islamists, industrial 
workers and hardcore football fans‛ 1268 felt confident to call on the Egyptian people 
to rise in protest on National Police Day, a national holiday on 25 January. This 
recent holiday commemorated the Battle of Ismailiyya on 25 January 1952, when 
police officers sided with the anti-colonial resistance against the British 
occupation forces. Ironically, the liberators of 1952 who were honored on Police 
Day had become the loathed epitomes of the oppressive State.1269  
 Mobilization towards the Day of Rage was organized through virtual and 
‚real‛ grassroots organizations and networks. In cyberspace, the two main 
mobilizing forces were the 6 April Youth Movement and the We are All Khaled 
Said Facebook networks. Whereas the We are All Khaled Said group was the 
more popular one, the 6 April network still had some 70,000 members and a more 
political profile, including both economic and democratic demands.1270 We are All 
Khaled Said issued the call for a march against torture, corruption, poverty and 
unemployment on 25 January, and the 6 April Movement quickly joined its 
initiative. Facebook users changed their profile picture to indicate symbolic 
support for the protest.1271  
 Rather than a mobilizing force in itself, these virtual networks were mediations 
and instruments of youth networks and grassroots organizations that existed 
‚outside‛ the virtual sphere. Saskia Sassen explained that: ‚In Tahrir Square, 
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Facebook space is not ‘social life’. Rather, it is more akin to a tool.‛1272 Paul Amar keenly 
observed that: ‚The so-called ‚Facebook revolution‛ is not about people mobilizing in 
virtual space; it is about Egyptian internet cafes and the youth and women they represent, 
in real social spaces and communities, utilizing the cyberspace bases they have built and 
developed to serve their revolt.‛1273 The poet Sinaan Antoon agreed with this analysis 
and pointed the attention to the real Subject of the revolution, not technology, but 
people: ‚Yes, new technologies and social media definitely played a role and provided a 
new space and mode, but this discourse eliminates and erases the real agents of these 
revolutions: the women and men who are making history before our eyes.‛1274 
 The call to protest from the new social media was strengthened by leftist e-
zines such as al-Badil. Khaled a-Balshy, chief editor of al-Badil, explained how al-
Badil played a role in the mobilization towards 25 January: 
After the Tunisian revolution, especially on 24 January, I wrote something 
strange, and even members of al-Badil were asking: ‚what the hell are you doing 
now?!‛ I wrote on the day when Ben Ali resigned on the website: ‚The First One‛. 
With the start of the Tunisian revolution I put the Tunisian flag on the logo of al-
Badil. When Ben Ali resigned and the protests in Egypt started, I switched to the 
Egyptian flag, symbolizing the shift of the revolution to Egypt. A lot of my friends 
were asking : ‚what the hell are you doing, you are kidding‛. On 24 January, we 
contacted political forces with the question: ‚will you attend the revolution or 
not?‛ And I wrote an article on 24 January to invite the people to the protests of 
25 January because in my opinion it was the beginning of the end. And I said: ‚if 
you don't participate in these events you will be outside of Egyptian history, which 
will be written tomorrow‛. My friends in al-Badil asked me after writing this 
article: ‚where are you going right now?‛ I answered: ‚we are at the regime's 
end‛. We all saw that something big would happen, but we did not expect it like 
this.1275 
Apart from the call by the new and the traditional media the mobilization of 
thousands of protesters was realized through the organizing activities of political 
movements. There were four political tendencies that prepared for the Day of 
Rage – using the ‚traditional‛ means of face-to-face meetings of activists, 
distribution of pamphlets, and so on. The first tendency consisted of youths of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, who decided to join the demonstration against the wishes 
of the Society’s leadership.1276  
 The second group was the so-called New Left, composed of young and active 
members of ‚old‛ parties such as Tagammu and the ECP, and militants of new 
movements such as HASHD, the RS, and the SRC.1277 Gihan Ibrahim recalled:  
I went to a meeting, the Thursday before the Tuesday and there was a 
representative basically from each group that was taking part in the protest. We 
agreed on the final places, the locations, the time< What will we do, if we GET to 
Tahrir, what will happen, and so on [laughs]. We normally do this anyways, even 
before 25 January: we did it for the 21 September protest that was in Abdeen 
Square, for example. We were used to hold these kind of meetings for protests 
against the emergency law thing, or in favor of the minimum wage, or against high 
prices, and so on.1278 
The supporters of Muhammad al-Baradei and al-Gabha (Democratic Front) party 
constituted a third faction:  
<a medley of individuals, ranging from liberals to progressive Islamists to a 
handful of leftists, some affiliated with political parties, notably the Democratic 
Front, and many freelancers. One of the main spokesmen of this group was the son 
of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a high-profile cleric; others were young entrepreneurs and 
corporate executives.1279  
A fourth type of people who organized the protests ‚on the ground‛ were human 
rights activists, some of whom also belonged to the New Left or 6 April 
Movement umbrellas.1280 For example, human right activist and 6 April member 
Asmaa Mahfuz distributed tens of thousands of leaflets in informal 
neighborhoods in Cairo the day before the protests.1281 
 A last and unlikely group of apolitical organizers were the ‚Ultras‛: a 
movement of hardcore football fans that was formed in 2005. Like many other 
independent civil society groups, the Ultras had been repressed by the security 
forces, which tightly controlled football matches and stadiums. Before the first 
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protests of 25 January, the Ultras reassured the demonstrators that they would 
protect them against the police.1282 
 The demands of the organizers were relatively modest and reiterated the 
standard, reformist aims of the civil-democratic movement: ‚the sacking of the 
country's interior minister, the cancelling of Egypt's perpetual emergency law, which 
suspends basic civil liberties, and a new term limit on the presidency that would bring to 
an end the 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak.‛1283 
25 January 
No one expected the demonstrations to attract tens of thousands of ordinary 
Egyptians, let alone be the harbinger of revolution. ‚We wanted to challenge the cops 
by protesting that day. A lot of people were surprised to see that we had more than 25,000 
people at Tahrir that day and things escalated from there,‛1284 shrugged youth activist 
Ahmed al-Gourd. ‚Before the revolution it was a success to have 100 people 
demonstrating in the street. So we were laughing: tomorrow we will have a 
revolution,‛1285 leftist journalist and member of the UESY Haisam Hassan recalled 
jokingly. 
So I went to the street as a journalist to cover what would happen. I discovered 
hundreds of people walking in the street and this was unusual for Egypt< I was 
walking in the streets when I heard a voice shouting. I just got out of the metro, so 
I saw the most< I haven’t ever seen these numbers of police in the streets. No one 
was in Tahrir. Where was the people? So I went back to the newspaper and then I 
heard shouts; I saw hundreds of youth walking in the streets and calling ‚the 
people want to end the regime‛. It was marvelous and I started to follow the youth 
in the street. We went from Talaat Harb Square until we reached Tahrir Square 
and then there were police officers and soldiers stopping us. The same happened in 
all streets near Tahrir Square. I couldn’t go to Tahrir and I thought that these were 
the only numbers of the revolution in the streets. I thought: ‚I can’t leave them‛, 
because I didn’t know that there were thousands outside. So I went back with them 
from the streets to the square and through another street without soldiers, which 
led to the square. We were running as if thinking: if we get through this street 
without soldiers we will get our freedom. I was excited and I ran to be in the first 
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line of the running youth and I saw Tahrir Square before them and I saw, oh my 
God, thousands! <It was marvelous.1286  
The political cartoonist Salah Abd al-Azim had originally planned his wedding 
on 22 January. When he heard of the protest organized on the 25th, he decided to 
delay his marriage to the 26th, so he could participate in the demonstration. 
I imagined it would only be one day of protests as usual. So I delayed my wedding 
to 26 January. So on 25 January we went to the protests. No one of my guests 
could make it to my wedding on the 26th, because half of them was protesting and 
the other half was escaping the police. [laughs]1287 
‚The reason why 25 January became a mass protest was that it started from below, from 
the popular neighborhoods,‛1288 claimed leftist activist Wael Tawfiq. The tactic to 
start the mobilization for a big protest from the poor areas was already developed 
during the anti-war demonstrations of 2003.1289 This enabled activists to gather a 
critical mass of protesters before they arrived at Tahrir Square, as groups of only 
tens of demonstrators would get arrested easily by the police.1290 The security 
apparatus was surprised by the massive turn-out and followed the events rather 
passively, at first.1291 Already at noon it was clear to some participants that the 
massive demonstrations could be ‚an opportunity to bring down the Mubarak 
regime‛1292.  In the afternoon Central Security forces tried to break up the protests 
with water cannons, sound bombs, batons, rubber bullets, and tear gas, and the 
peaceful demonstrations turned violent as protesters retaliated with rocks and 
bricks. 1293  ‚We stayed for the evening in the streets and the image of the Tunisian 
revolution was in our mind.‛1294 Central Cairo became a war zone with continuous 
street battles between police forces and tens of thousands of demonstrators. 
Protesters gathered on Tahrir Square, where they planned to make a stand 
against the riot police. During the late evening and night they were dispersed by 
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Central Security Forces, however. Access to mobile phone networks and internet 
was gradually blocked. 1295  
 The protests in Cairo sparked off massive demonstrations in Alexandria and in 
major cities in the Delta, the Canal Zone and Upper Egypt. In Suez the protests 
were brutally repressed, leading to a fierce confrontation with the police. Labor 
leader Saud Omar emotionally recalled that: ‚At 25 January there were three killed, 
at 26 January two, at 28 January there were eighteen youth killed. Between 25 January 
and 28 January it was relatively quiet in the whole country except for Suez, who had all 
these people killed.‛1296 
The Tension Builds 
The morning after 25 January, downtown Cairo was empty of protesters.1297 The 
Interior Ministry deployed thousands of riot police ‚<on bridges across the Nile, at 
major intersections and squares as well as outside key installations like the State TV 
building and the headquarters of Mubarak’s ruling National democratic Party in central 
Cairo.‛1298 As the 25th had been a holiday, the Ministry expected fewer protesters 
on Wednesday and was determined to forcefully crush any mobilizations of the 
activist ‚vanguard‛. At noon, individual youth and small groups of 
demonstrators were rounded up in Tahrir.1299 As the number of protesters swelled 
during the afternoon and the evening, the violence of the police and plainclothes 
State Security forces increased commensurably.1300  
 Throughout the evening and the night, small rallies of a few hundreds of 
demonstrators were repetitively charged and broken up by police and 
plainclothes, only to regroup at another location and continue their protests.1301 
Mobile phone networks, internet access and landlines were completely cut off. 
The websites of al-Dostour and al-Badil were taken down. In Asyut and Mahalla 
al-Kubra protests were swiftly disbanded, but in Suez ‚<an angry crowd of about 
1,000 people gathered outside the city’s morgue demanding to take possession and bury 
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the body of one of three protesters who died in clashes on Tuesday‛1302. Violent clashes 
between the police and the population of the Canal Zone city ensued. Several 
civilians were killed and in retaliation protesters set fire to the police station and 
the local NDP headquarters.1303 With both pride and grief Saud Omar recollected 
that: ‚There are five police stations in Suez, we burned three of them. We burned a lot of 
police trucks< We burned the firemen station, because they were using the firemen trucks 
to transport weapons and kill protesters.‛1304 
 On the second day of the protests, the Egyptian political opposition started to 
voice its demands. Al-Sayyid al-Badawi, chairman of the Wafd, demanded a 
national unity government, the dissolution of parliament and new, fair elections – 
remaining completely silent on the spontaneously emerged aim of the movement: 
the removal of Mubarak and a complete end to the regime. Conversely, the 
National Association for Change, led by Muhammad al-Baradei, called on the 
President to step down and demanded that his son Gamal should not be allowed 
to run for president. Other groups stressed the demand to increase the national 
minimum wage and/or to fire the Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly.1305  
 The morning of 27 January saw a return of calm in Cairo, as most activists 
prepared for a massive mobilization after the Friday afternoon prayers.1306 New, 
spontaneous protests of hundreds of protesters took place in Suez, Ismailia and 
Alexandria.1307 Thursday also saw the formal entrance of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the protest movement, as Muhammad Morsi declared the participation of the 
Society in the demonstrations planned on Friday.1308 The official statement read:  
The movement of the Egyptian people that began January 25 and has been peaceful, 
mature and civilised must continue against corruption, oppression and injustice 
until its legitimate demands for reform are met. We are not pushing this 
movement, but we are moving with it. We don't wish to lead it but we want to be 
part of it.1309 
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In the evening Muhammad al-Baradei arrived in Cairo, pledging his active 
participation in the protests of Friday. Yet the fact that he waited for three days 
after the first protests to return to Egypt gathered a lot of criticism in the streets: 
‚Only a smattering of well-wishers made it down to greet ElBaradei, a far cry from the 
scenes last February when the former UN nuclear weapons chief was met by more than a 
thousand supporters at the beginning of his triumphant return.‛1310 
Friday of Anger 
One of the main reasons for the success of the first demonstrations on 25 January 
was that their mobilization had started from working class neighborhoods. This 
tactic was repeated on the Friday of Anger, which became a pivotal moment for the 
revolution. Leftist activist Wael Tawfiq recollected the ‚snowball effect‛ of 
mobilizing in the working class areas: 
We agreed to meet in a place in Imbaba. Before we got there we ran into several, six 
or seven, youth who came out of a small mosque, using slogans such as ‚the people 
want to end the regime‛. Our number reached twenty as we started to demonstrate 
in a poor neighborhood. The most important thing was the attitude of the normal 
people, demanding their rights, and continually asking others to participate. The 
demonstration in the poor neighborhood attracted thousands. When we reached the 
Kit Kat Square we found a huge number coming from the famous Mustafa 
Mahmud Mosque. I took my group and went to the square.1311 
The Egyptian regime took the call for renewed protests on Friday 28 January 
seriously and prepared for the worst. From Thursday night on, all major ISPs 
were shut down and some 88 percent of Egyptian Internet connections were 
effectively blocked.1312 Security forces and plainclothes police were mobilized on a 
massive scale: ‚there were thousands of police on the streets, hundreds on every corner 
and they have been recruiting young men to help quell protesters.‛1313 As soon as the 
Friday prayers were finished, security forces launched a pre-emptive strike 
against (potential) protesters, using teargas, water cannons, and sound bombs.1314 
This time, many activists were prepared for a confrontation with the police, 
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however, thanks to their experience on 25 January. Some of them had gotten 
advice from Tunisian revolutionaries: ‚<a Tunisian friend concluded that we could 
make a revolution on Friday and he sent us advice on what to do if they started to us tear 
gas: using cola and vinegar and onions.‛1315 
 Thousands of demonstrators started to clash with the police, not only in Cairo, 
but also in Alexandria, Beni Suef, Minya, Asyut, Ismailiya, Port Said, and al-
Arish.1316 In the Delta city of Mansura some 40,000 protesters destroyed the NDP 
headquarters. The NDP offices in Damietta followed suit.1317 In Suez ‚<there were 
80,000 people on the streets< in a region like Suez! There are half a million people in 
Suez, so there was twenty percent of the population in the streets.‛1318 The police station 
in the al-Arbain neighborhood was taken over and detained demonstrators were 
freed. Security forces seemed to have withdrawn from the city, as al-Jazeera 
reporter Jamal al-Shayyal claimed: ‚The police has been quite comprehensively 
defeated by the power of the people.‛1319 Al-Jazeera reporter Rawya Rageh observed 
protesters ‚arresting‛ police officers and beating some of them with their own 
batons.1320 Peter Bouckaert of Human Rights Watch described how in Alexandria 
the police just gave up fighting: 
 The clashes lasted for nearly two hours. Then a much larger crowd of protesters 
came from another direction. They were packed in four blocks deep. Police tried to 
hold them back with teargas and rubber bullets, but they were finally 
overwhelmed< It is a very festive atmosphere. Women in veils, old men, children, 
I even saw a blind man being led. And there are no police anywhere.1321 
Central Cairo, however, was turned into a warzone between tens of thousands of 
protesters, who were trying to march on Tahrir Square, and the riot police who 
were attempting to block roads and bridges and to disperse the demonstrators 
with tear gas and rubber bullets.1322 Wael Tawfiq evoked a telling scene: 
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I encountered a huge number of people who were injured and who came from the 
Mustafa Mahmud Mosque, the gathering place from where also a lot of Mubarak 
supporters started their demonstrations. I noticed a lot of political activists. We 
began to walk in the Corniche. The police started to shoot on us and we went to the 
side streets. With every step we got more numbers from the streets. At 6 October 
Bridge we encountered a huge number of police, with a huge number of gas 
grenades. Then we went back to the Arab League street, Gama’t al-Dawwal. We 
found huge numbers, tens of thousands gathered there. At this moment the people 
pushed the police away from the streets. The policemen tried to block the roads to 
Tahrir Square. There were a lot of clashes. The most important clash was the one 
on the 6 October Bridge. We tried to go back to the square through al-Gal’a Bridge. 
On the way to Gal’a bridge we found another huge number of people. At this 
moment in my opinion we reached 100,000. We found some 5,000 people clashing 
with the police on the bridge. We told the policemen: ‚stop and surrender‛. We 
told them: ‚we will not hit you‛. The police leaders took their forces and withdrew 
and even left two trucks, and the people attacked the empty trucks. From al-Gal’a 
Bridge to Qasr al-Nil Bridge, the Opera neighborhood had a huge number of 
protesters. The policemen started to watch the side streets. Some of us were 
thinking about attacking the policemen, but most of us shouted ‚peaceful, 
peaceful!‛ In the entrance of the Qasr al-Nil square there were a lot of trucks 
awaiting us with gas grenades. The number of protesters was huge, which made 
the effect of the grenades more effective, because there was no room to retreat. The 
police tried to push the people back. Every one or two minutes a policeman was 
throwing four or five bombs, and then the people threw them back. I was afraid that 
with all these people the bridge could collapse. There was a continuous game of 
going forth and back between the police and the people. This is an important image 
in the revolution – the most important image in this day that made me realize that 
the regime was going down. We did not know what was happening at the other 
side, at Tahrir, but we were hearing a lot of grenades and noise and we were afraid 
that a lot of people were dying at the other side. And we thought that the number 
at the other side was less than ours. We had some 150,000 people on the bridge so 
there HAD to be less people in Tahrir. So we started to think that we had to make a 
lot of noise, making the police concerned about our number, and draw them to us. 
So they would stop shooting the other side. This mood made me realize that the 
regime was falling. I was afraid and the ordinary people were also afraid, but still 
they spontaneously took this decision. This lasted for twenty minutes and the 
people insisted on going to Tahrir and save the others. We went to the NDP 
headquarters. At this moment the most violent clashes started at the bridge.1323  
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The NDP headquarters near Tahrir were set on fire.1324 A curfew was ordered in 
the whole country, but it was largely ignored by the protesters.1325 Ahmed al-
Gourd, a youth activist, explained how the protesters defeated the security 
apparatus: 
Usually the police tried to disperse the people in order to surround the smaller 
groups. That’s what we did. We used their own tactics against them. We organized 
different focal points in different areas of the city, and most of these people marched 
on Tahrir. Some people did not even go to Tahrir, they had like their own shit 
going on in their own neighborhood. All the poor neighborhoods basically had their 
own huge protests, for example in Matareyya. So I can remember two main routes, 
one from Nasr City all the way walking, all the way along the Salah Selim road to 
Abasseyya to Ramsis Square to Tahrir. From the other, western side: Giza, 
Mohandiseen, Haram, Doqqi and even Helwan, they all converged on Qasr al-Nil 
bridge, entering Tahrir from that area. I was in front of the Ramses Hilton and we 
got everybody out in that neighborhood and started to push the cops back. The 
police in Downtown basically got surrounded and dispersed in a lot of different 
areas and they got pinned. And when they got pinned they unleashed all they got 
on the protesters.1326 
The police themselves began to lose consciousness because of the smog of tear gas 
in the streets and started to defect.1327 Throughout the afternoon, it became more 
and more clear that the Ministry of Interior was not able to stem the revolutionary 
tide, as Hazem Kandil noted: ‚Coming together from different assembly points, and 
gathering steam as they marched towards Tahrir Square, crowds snowballing to some 
80,000-strong were now ready to take on the police. Caught off-balance by the size and 
persistence of the demonstrators, the police were finally overwhelmed.‛1328 By 17h, the 
police were defeated.1329 Wael Tawfiq agreed that this moment was a turning 
point for the protesters in their street battle with the police:  
After a lot of people were killed with trucks, and after the people who came from 
Ramsis and other streets had regrouped, there was the biggest demonstration of 
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that day. This was the moment the police chose to surrender and go back to... we 
still don't know yet. [laughs]1330 
Because of the defeat of police and Central Security forces in the streets, Mubarak 
had to call on the army to restore order.1331 Tanks and APCs rolled into the centre 
of Alexandria, Cairo and Suez, where they were welcomed by demonstrators who 
hoped that the army would side with them against the police.1332 This episode 
evoked a moment in the story of that other great revolution:  
Soon the police disappeared altogether – that is, begin to act secretively. Then the 
soldiers appeared – bayonets lowered. Anxiously the workers ask them: ‚Comrades, 
you haven’t come to help the police?‛ <The police are fierce, implacable, hated and 
hating foes. To win them over is out of the question. Beat them up and kill them. It 
is different with the soldiers: the crowd makes every effort to avoid hostile 
encounters with them; on the contrary, seeks ways to dispose them in its favour, 
convince, attract, fraternise, merge them in itself.1333  
In general, the military did not intervene in clashes between protesters and police. 
They did, however, disperse a group of protesters who tried to storm the 
Maspero state television building, sealed off access to parliament and cabinet 
buildings, and took control over Tahrir Square.1334  Wael Tawfiq recalled this 
episode: 
There was a victorious mood when the army came to the square, but I did not trust 
them< The invasion of the square started. I was going to Maspero television 
building and thought about occupying it, but the army had already occupied it< 
The call to occupy the Maspero building was not successful, so I returned to Tahrir 
square where I saw that people were starting a sit-in, making homes in the square, 
and the main slogan was ‚the people want to end the regime‛.1335 
At around midnight President Hosni Mubarak appeared on Nile TV, declaring 
that he would fire the government and appoint a new one on Saturday. In the 
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same breath, he warned the Egyptians that he would not condone any more chaos 
in the streets.1336 
 Even though the army called on the population to respect the curfew, 
thousands continued to protest throughout Saturday 29 January in Cairo, 
Alexandria, Ismailiya, Suez and Damanhur.1337 After the withdrawal of police 
forces from the streets, the revolutionary masses faced a new threat: criminal 
gangs, some of them escaped/released prisoners, and ‚thugs‛ who terrorized 
neighborhoods and looted houses, shops, and supermarkets.1338  These attacks 
were widely covered by state television and framed as a consequence of the anti-
regime protests.1339 Blogger Issandr al-Amrani, however, criticized this type of 
coverage: 
There is a discourse of army vs. police that is emerging. I don't fully buy it — the 
police was pulled out to create this situation of chaos, and it's very probable that 
agent provocateurs are operating among the looters, although of course there is also 
real criminal gangs and neighborhoods toughs operating too.1340 
 Ad hoc vigilante groups were established during the evening and night in order 
to protect neighborhoods from the attackers.1341 The people, both in popular and 
wealthy areas, organized themselves to maintain order ‚<while plain clothes 
policeman *sic+ try to create the impression of anarchy.‛1342 At around 17h30, Mubarak 
appointed intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as vice-president and Ahmed Shafiq, 
a former air force commander and civil aviation minister, as prime minister.1343 
This move did not placate the masses, who continued their protests throughout 
the evening and the following day. Most banks, offices and shops remained 
closed.1344 
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One Million March 
At noon on Sunday, new tanks rolled into Tahrir Square, fortifying the salient 
military presence in the heart of the revolution where some 20,000 protesters were 
still gathered, chanting slogans against the President and the regime. 1345 
Reporting from Tahrir Square, Peter Beaumont, a journalist from The Observer, 
declared that: "The mood amongst the people, who were very positive towards the army, 
does seem to be changing. People are very very suspicious of the army now. They want to 
know why a squadron of Egypt's best tanks is sitting in the entrance to square.‛1346  
 In a ploy to divide the revolutionary movement, Mubarak blamed the Muslim 
Brotherhood for the chaos and looting, and warned Egyptians that the Society 
was taking advantage of their genuine economic and political grievances. 1347 
Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood and four other opposition movements 
called for a temporary ‚national salvation government‛, headed by al-Baradei, 
which would organize an orderly transition towards democracy. 1348  In the 
evening al-Baradei arrived at Tahrir Square, where he got a mixed response. 
‚There were waves of excitement and optimism as he arrived. But a notable number 
chanted anti-al-Baradei slogans, asking 'how can you steal our revolution now?‛1349 At 
around midnight senior judges and scholars from al-Azhar University visited the 
dwindling number of demonstrators in Tahrir Square.1350  
 On Monday 31 January most government offices, private businesses, banks, 
schools, and the stock market remained closed. 1351  Some 200 protesters had 
remained on Tahrir, occupying the square, while chanting and reading poetry.1352 
By the afternoon, the ‚hard core‛ of occupiers at Tahrir Square were again joined 
by tens of thousands of protesters, including women and children.1353 Al-Jazeera 
estimated the number of protesters at 250,000. 1354  In Alexandria, Mahalla al-
Kubra, Tanta, Kafr al-Zayat, and Fayum the revolutionary mobilization continued 
                                                          
1345 Ibid. 
1346 Peter Beaumont in Guardian.co.uk 2011f. 
1347 Guardian.co.uk 2011g. 
1348 Guardian.co.uk 2011f. 
1349 Jack Shenker in Guardian.co.uk 2011f. 
1350 Guardian.co.uk 2011f. 
1351 Guardian.co.uk 2011g. 
1352 Blogs.aljazeera.net 2011d. 
1353 Guardian.co.uk 2011g. 
1354  Blogs.aljazeera.net 2011d. A general caveat: such numbers were highly speculative 
estimations. 
395 
 
as well, with thousands protesting. In Suez popular committees effectively 
controlled the city, organizing traffic and protecting neighborhoods.1355 
 In the evening, a surprising statement came from the army, which pledged not 
to shoot at civilians staging protests against the President, although it warned 
that it would not tolerate violence and chaos.1356 Vice President Omar Suleiman 
addressed the nation on state television, acknowledging the need for dialogue 
with the opposition, constitutional reform, fighting corruption and 
unemployment and an investigation into the November 2010 parliamentary 
elections.1357 Suleiman’s speech had little impact on the protests: ‚The consensus 
seems to be that Suleiman's appearance was intended for USA consumption.‛ 1358 
Activists called for a ‚one million march‛ on Tuesday and fixed Friday as a 
deadline for Mubarak’s departure, or they would march on the presidential 
palace in Heliopolis.1359 
 Late in the evening, the first attempt of the regime to organize opposition in the 
streets against the mass movement produced but a feeble crowd of around 300 
demonstrators outside the Information Ministry. State television, however, paid a 
lot of attention to the event and claimed that the pro-Mubarak protesters 
numbered thousands. 1360  During the night, the last of Egypt’s main Internet 
providers, Noor, was shut down.1361  
 In the morning of Tuesday 1 February, the army closed main roads and train 
services to Cairo ‚<to prevent protesters from reaching mass protests today.‛1362 State 
television tried to play on ‚<fears that today’s protest could lead to violence, 
insecurity, and looting like what happened on Friday. Again they are trying to convince 
people not to join protests.‛1363 Moreover, in order to create a semblance of societal 
polarization: ‚The state owned television and the police are ordering their employees to 
stage pro-Mubarak protests and about a few hundred are now engaging in pro-Mubarak 
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demonstrations outside the state owned TV building.‛ 1364  Nevertheless, tens of 
thousands of protesters made their way to Tahrir Square until more than one 
million people were occupying Tahrir Square and its surrounding areas.1365 The 
original plan of marching on the presidential palace, however, was abandoned. 
‚There are a lot of people who are against that because it's too far. And there is also a fear 
that if they leave the square, riot police will reoccupy it.‛ 1366 Some activists began 
preparing for a continuous occupation: ‚<erecting tent [sic], bringing in blankets, 
food is being distributed, either for free or at discounted prices, music is being played< 
people are arranging entertainment to keep them occupied during the protest - a football 
tournament will be starting soon.‛1367 Anthropologist Samuli Schielke described the 
moving atmosphere at Tahrir:  
This day was one of the most amazing things I have ever experienced. It was 
perfectly peaceful, perfectly organised by spontaneous volunteers who took care of 
order, security, cleanliness. The people behaved in a very peaceful and reasonable 
way, and there was an amazing shared sense of dignity and power... Such pride, 
such determination, such sense of dignity, such sense of power, and such joy 
prevailed today in the centre of Cairo that I cannot write about it tonight without 
becoming very emotional. Not a moment for detached analysis.1368 
Huge protests also took place in Alexandria, Suez, Ismailiya, Mansura, Damietta, 
Tanta, Kafr al-Shaykh, and Mahalla al-Kubra. Most people hoped that the 
massive scale and continuity of the demonstrations would be enough to force 
Mubarak to resign.1369  
 At around 23h the President addressed the nation in ‚<a rambling speech in 
which Mubarak tried to show empathy with the protesters but at the same time suggested 
that they have been manipulated by political forces (perhaps trying to implicate the 
Muslim Brotherhood, whose role has been minimal).‛1370 Mubarak promised not to run 
again for president, which did not at all satisfy the disappointed crowd in Tahrir. 
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‚’Erhal erhal’, meaning ‘leave leave’, the crowd in Tahrir Square continue to chant after 
Mubarak said that he will see out his current term.‛1371 
 Amr Moussa, secretary general of the Arab League and one of the leaders of 
the opposition, called on the political forces to study Mubarak’s offer carefully, 
whereas a majority of parties and movements, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, rejected the proposal.1372 In Alexandria protesters clashed with pro-
Mubarak supporters, a foreshadowing of the coming counter-revolutionary 
violence throughout the next two days.1373 
Battle of the Camel 
On Wednesday morning, some twenty pro-Mubarak supporters clashed with the 
1,000 protesters who had remained at Tahrir Square. ‚People were becoming tired 
and there were few numbers in the square compared to other days,‛ Wael Tawfiq 
remembered.1374 A few hours later a few thousand pro-Mubarak demonstrators 
gathered at the Mustafa Mahmud Mosque in Muhandiseen and near the Maspero 
television building, chanting slogans in support of the President.1375 Meanwhile, 
the army made a statement calling on the protesters to end their demonstrations 
as Mubarak had granted them important concessions. 1376  Internet services 
returned, al-Jazeera became available again, and the regime seemed bent on 
‚normalizing‛ economic life after a week of protests. 
 At midday, Peter Beaumont observed that: ‚Thousands and thousands of pro-
Murabak demonstrators are now pouring into the square< It seems to have been heavily 
choreographed‛1377. The army stood by and allowed armed Mubarak supporters to 
enter the square.1378 Initially, the Tahrir occupiers were able to form a human 
chain, pushing back the pro-Mubarak ‚demonstrators‛ in a peaceful way. But 
then, by midday, the occupiers were suddenly attacked with rocks, Molotov 
cocktails, and knives.1379 In a bizarre scene, some pro-regime forces charged with 
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riding horses and camels into the Tahrir occupiers: ‚At one point, a small contingent 
of pro-Mubarak forces on horseback and camels rushed into the anti-Mubarak crowds, 
swinging whips and sticks to beat people. Protesters retaliated, dragging some from their 
mounts, throwing them to the ground and beating their faces bloody.‛1380  Guardian 
journalist Jack Shenker commented: "People continue to run away from the square. 
Many of them have got blood wounds. I could saw one man just brush past me carrying a 
child ... there appeared to blood on his chest."1381  
 Within the ranks of the pro-regime protesters operated a well organized and 
violent counter-revolutionary force with the single aim of sowing fear and terror 
among the Tahrir occupiers.1382 According to Samah Selim: ‚The world is watching 
in awe - and anxiety - because, in these rare moments of unmediated and massive social 
upheaval, the naked power of the national security state is on show for all to see, in all its 
violence and unmitigated brutality.‛1383 Egyptian blogger Sharif Abd al-Kouddous 
remarked that:  
These were not the same kinds of protesters that have occupied Tahrir for the last 
few days. These crowds were made up mostly of men, in between 20 and 45 years 
old. Many wore thick leather jackets with sweaters underneath. They chanted 
angrily in support of Mubarak and against the pro-democracy movement. They 
were hostile and intimidating.1384 
Guardian journalist Jack Shenker identified them as: ‚<government-employed 
thugs and ex-prisoners <, alongside plainclothes policemen - though it would be 
misleading to suggest that these are the only people making up that side of these 
increasingly-violent rival demonstrations.‛1385 New York Times columnist Nicholas 
Kristof, who was present during the infamous ‚Battle of the Camel‛1386, wrote 
that:  
In my area of Tahrir, the thugs were armed with machetes, straight razors, clubs 
and stones. And they all had the same chants, the same slogans and the same 
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hostility to journalists. They clearly had been organized and briefed. So the idea 
that this is some spontaneous outpouring of pro-Mubarak supporters, both in 
Cairo and in Alexandria, who happen to end up clashing with other side — that is 
preposterous. It's difficult to know what is happening, and I'm only one observer, 
but to me these seem to be organized thugs sent in to crack heads, chase out 
journalists, intimidate the pro-democracy forces and perhaps create a pretext for an 
even harsher crackdown.1387 
Later, many of the pro-Mubarak forces were shown to be plainclothes Central 
Security police and rank-and-file NDP members.1388 Nonetheless, some popular 
layers of the counter-revolution consisted of protesters who had switched sides 
after the President’s speech on Tuesday night, arguing that the people’s demands 
were met and that life should now return to normal:1389  
They were happy that Mubarak has promised not to run for presidency and 
confident that there is going to be democracy and new parliamentary elections. 
They thought that Mubarak has heard the voice of the people, and that he shouldn’t 
go immediately but there should be a period of well-ordered transition, and people 
should stop demonstrating and everybody should go back to work.1390 
Despite the assault of the ‚thugs‛ or baltageyya, the anti-regime forces held their 
ground: 
Even though they were terrorized by the attack, there was a big resistance< After 
18h we were gaining the upper hand and people were feeling stronger again. 
People felt that victory was near. After sustaining a lot of injuries, the attackers 
locked the streets to Tahrir square, and the defenders were on their own.1391 
By midnight the battle shifted towards the streets surrounding Tahrir Square and 
the area around the Egyptian Museum.1392 ‚Mubarak's "thugs" tried to torch the 
national museum so they can claim it was the protesters. The scheme failed miserably as 
the protesters defended the museum and reclaimed it by way of protecting it.‛1393 A force 
of 2,000 anti-regime protesters succeeded in securing the area around Tahrir and 
the Museum, putting up barricades and stamping out fires from the regime 
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supporters’ petrol bombs.1394 Yet throughout the night the battle continued to 
rage, with pro-Mubarak snipers and gunmen terrorizing the protesters.1395 
 Tensions ran high in Alexandria as well, with supporters of the regime 
challenging the anti-Mubarak protesters, but ‚<it's been threatening and ugly but 
nothing on the scale of civil war that seems to be erupting in central Cairo. People here are 
now extremely fearful and anxious; no one knows what the coming days will bring.‛1396 
Thursday morning, Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq apologized for the violence in 
Tahrir and promised an investigation into the events, but: ‚One thing was clear 
after a night of fighting that left over 1,000 injured and several dead from gunshot 
wounds. That is that despite the denials of Egypt's government and interior ministry who 
claimed these events were not state-orchestrated, all the evidence strongly suggested 
otherwise.‛1397 A meeting between Vice President Omar Suleiman, Prime Minister 
Ahmed Shafiq and opposition leaders was boycotted by most political forces, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood.1398 Suleiman vacillated between describing 
the protesters as ‚youth with genuine demands‛ and ‚foreign infiltrators wishing 
to destabilize the nation‛.1399  
 After the government spread the rumor that there were Israeli spies among the 
foreigners in Egypt, journalists – especially from al-Jazeera – were harassed by 
pro-regime supporters and then rounded up by the military ‚for their own 
safety‛.1400  Others were arrested by agents of the Ministry of Interior.1401  The 
offices of HMLC and ECESR were raided and their directors, Ahmed Sayf al-
Islam and Khaled Ali, were arrested by military police. ‚The people were being 
beaten and the street had been told they were ‘Iranian and Hamas agents come to 
destabilise Egypt’ so the street was chanting against them.‛1402 In Alexandria, Harriet 
Sherwood reported that: ‚The situation here in Alexandria is now very difficult for 
journalists. Egyptian national TV has been broadcasting that there are Israeli spies 
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disguised as western journalists, and people on the street are very suspicious.‛1403 On the 
other hand, some cracks appeared in the state media as figures such as Shahira 
Amin from Nile TV resigned in protest of the regime violence:1404 ‚I quit my job 
because I don't want to be part of the state propaganda regime, I am with the people. I feel 
liberated and relieved. I have quit my job and joined the people in Tahrir Square.‛1405 
 Although the army began to clear the area around Tahrir of the 1,000 or so 
Mubarak supporters in the morning,1406 around midday the pro-Mubarak forces 
started to throw stones at the 4,000 strong occupiers, without any intervention 
from the army.1407 During the afternoon, however, it became clear that the Tahrir 
occupiers, whose numbers swelled to about 50,000 to 100,000, were routing the 
pro-Mubarak forces. ‚Anti-government protesters are saying that if they survive 
tonight, the demonstration tomorrow will be massive. They are calling it departure day, 
the day Mubarak will be kicked out of office. Everything hinges on the next 24 hours.‛1408 
Meanwhile, in an exclusive interview with ABC news, Mubarak indicated that, 
eventually, he would leave his post as president, but ‚if I resign today there will be 
chaos.‛1409 Ironically, at the same moment, ABC journalists were carjacked and 
chased by pro-regime supporters.1410  
The Time of the Pharaohs is Over 
On Friday 4 February protesters hoped to force an outcome in the stand-off 
through the mobilization of the masses after the midday prayers. The slow 
withdrawal of international support for Mubarak, combined with the President’s 
expressed desire to stand down ‚eventually‛, and their own victory in the Battle 
of the Camel, emboldened the revolutionary forces.1411 Already in the morning 
people started queuing with thousands to get into Tahrir Square. By around 
midday, hundreds of thousands were gathered in Tahrir, with Muslims, Copts, 
and Catholics praying together. A sermon by Yussef al-Qaradawi, the exiled 
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Islamist preacher, was broadcast: ‚O Pharaoh, the time of the Pharaohs is over< 
Millions of people don’t want you. As long as this man is there, Egypt will not be 
stable.‛1412 Opposition leaders such as Muhammad al-Baradei and Ayman Nur 
called on Mubarak to resign immediately.1413 Amr Moussa was more cautious and 
expected the President to remain in his post until presidential elections in 
September. 1414  The atmosphere in the square was defiant, but festive. 1415 
Journalists and foreigners, however, were blocked from entering the square and 
continued to be harassed by military police and NDP members.1416 In Alexandria 
and Damanhur, more than 100,000 people were protesting.1417 
 At this point in the protests, specific democratic demands were raised by youth 
activists who wanted to concretize the spontaneous and abstract popular aim of 
the ‚fall of the regime‛ and shape a vision of a political future after Mubarak:  
 The resignation of the entire ruling party, including the new Vice-President 
Omar Suleiman, whom the Obama administration believes is best placed to 
oversee a transition of power: 
  A broad-based transitional government appointed by a 14-strong 
committee, made up of senior judges, youth leaders and members of the 
military. 
 The election of a founding council of 40 public intellectuals and 
constitutional experts, who will draw up a new constitution under the 
supervision of the transitional government, then put it to the people in a 
referendum. Fresh elections would then be held at a local and national level. 
 The end of the country's emergency law. 
 The dismantling of the state security apparatus. 
 The trial of key regime leaders, including Mubarak.1418 
Meanwhile, between a ‚rightist‛ faction of the political opposition, dubbed ‚the 
Council of Wise Men‛, and a pragmatic group within the State, a consensus was 
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emerging on a ‚transition of power‛, which entailed that Vice President Omar 
Suleiman would take over all presidential powers, while Mubarak kept the 
symbolic office of president for constitutional reasons until new elections.1419 In 
the next two days, talks between Vice President Omar Suleiman and opposition 
groups resulted in some concessions from the regime, such as the promise of the 
freedom of press, of the release of political prisoners, and of the formation of a 
constitutional reform committee.1420 However, main opposition figures such as 
Muhammad al-Baradei and Ayman Nur criticized the meeting, and groups such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood declared that the first condition for any negotiation 
was the resignation of Mubarak and free democratic elections.1421 Various youth 
groups operating in Tahrir Square rejected both the legitimacy and the outcome 
of the negotiations.1422 By Sunday 6 February, many observers agreed that the 
Mubarak-era was almost finished, but that ‚<the spirit of his rule, the essence of his 
regime, and the methods of his era are far from over.‛1423 
The Week of Steadfastness 
Even though the hopes of the masses for the swift resignation of Mubarak were 
dashed, they continued to occupy Tahrir Square, which was slowly transformed 
into a quasi autonomous ‚city of tents‛.1424 New York Times reporter Anthony 
Shadid observed that: ‚Protesters have called this "the Week of Steadfastness," and 
there is plenty here. But there is a sense of siege, too, with a lurking fear that the optimism 
of the people here may eventually succumb to grimmer realities.‛ 1425  An al-Jazeera 
reporter in Alexandria noted the bewilderment of people faced with the 
President’s stubbornness: ‚Some people are scratching their heads, wondering what 
more they need to do to make it clear to the president that they don't want him.‛1426 
 Despite the rainy and relatively cold weather, rumors of a forced evacuation of 
Tahrir drew in thousands of anti-regime protesters on Saturday 5 February, 
                                                          
1419 Guardian.co.uk 2011l. 
1420 Guardian.co.uk 2011m. 
1421 Ibid. 
1422 Ibid. 
1423 Nabil Shawkat in Guardian.co.uk 2011n. 
1424 Guardian.co.uk 2011m. 
1425 Anthony Shadid in Guardian.co.uk 2011n. 
1426 Blogs.aljazeera.net 2011i. 
404 
 
strengthening the continuous occupation of the square. 1427  The government 
promised negotiations and did its best to steer the street back to ‚normality‛. On 
Sunday morning 6 February, banks re-opened for business. 1428  Protesters, 
however, tried to convince civil servants working near Tahrir to strike and join 
the occupation. 1429  Vice President Omar Suleiman held a meeting with 
Muhammad al-Baradei, Naguib Sawiris, and representatives of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Wafd, Tagammu, and a number of youth groups.1430 However, the 
negotiations only yielded vague promises.1431 Throughout the night thousands 
continued to camp out in Tahrir.1432 
 On the afternoon of Monday 7 February, the regime promised public sector 
employees a raise in salaries and pensions of fifteen percent.1433 More concessions 
followed the next day, as Vice President Omar Suleiman claimed to have a 
roadmap for the transition of power. He also promised that protesters would not 
be persecuted.1434 The number of Tahrir occupiers had dwindled to a mere 1,000, 
and activists called for a new mass demonstration. Guardian journalist Chris 
McGreal commented:  
It is the first one since the government tried to get Egypt back to normality. It is 
another million man march as they like to call them. What is likely to bring people 
out is that the government is trying to pretend that the protests in Tahrir Square 
are no longer relevant and that the process has moved on to political 
negotiations.1435 
Tuesday 8 February saw the return of hundreds of thousands to Tahrir.1436 Some 
of the protesters visited the square for the first time. Jack Shenker observed:  
As the streets appear safer and security more guaranteed, the numbers of those 
joining queues to enter Tahrir is growing, not falling - dozens told me today they 
were here for the first time. Politicking at the top may give the impression that the 
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uprising has lost momentum, but clearly for many in Egypt it's only just getting 
started.1437 
In addition, the release of online activist Wael Ghoneim, one of the administrators 
of the Khaled Said Facebook group, on Monday 7 February, and his subsequent 
emotional appearance on Dream TV, galvanized new layers of youth, 
encouraging them to come to the square. 1438  Cairo University professors and 
students joined the protesters.1439 Extending the mid-term break, Egypt’s schools 
and universities remained closed in the following week.1440 The cracks in the State 
propaganda machinery seemed to widen, with journalists from the pro-regime 
Rose al-Yusef striking against their editor.1441 Even former Minister of Transport, 
Essam Sharaf, came to Tahrir Square.1442 
 Protests were not confined to Tahrir Square, but demonstrations also took 
place near government buildings, the People’s Assembly, and the Shura Council. 
Moreover, in Alexandria, thousands of people protested in front of the Ibrahim 
Mosque.1443 In regional cities such as Ismailia, Asyut, and Mahalla al-Kubra, mass 
actions were organized as well.1444 In Suez, Port Said, and Ismailia, over 6,000 
workers from the Suez Canal Company began an open-ended sit in. 1445 
Thousands of employees of Telecom Egypt started to protest as well, demanding 
a ten percent pay rise and the resignation of the head manager.1446 In the New 
Valley area, some 500 kilometers south of Cairo, 3,000 protesters went on the 
streets and clashed with security forces.1447 In Asyut, 8,000 people, a majority of 
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them farmers, set up barricades of flaming palm trees, blocking the main highway 
and railway to Cairo, contesting bread shortages.1448 Even in remote areas, such as 
the desert oasis of Kharga, protesters confronted the CSF, attacking government 
buildings and police headquarters, and demanding the resignation of the 
provincial security chief.1449 
 In the face of renewed mass protests and emerging strikes in the whole of 
Egypt, Vice President Omar Suleiman warned of the possibility of a coup if the 
current crisis continued. An end to the regime and the immediate resignation of 
the President was out of the question.1450 However, youth movements such as 6 
April and opposition groups remained adamant in demanding the instant 
removal of Mubarak. 1451  Even the ‚complacent‛ Council of Wise Men 
acknowledged that: ‚The regime's strategy has been just to play for time and stall with 
negotiations. They don't really want to talk to anyone. At the start of this week they were 
convinced that the protests were going to fade away.‛1452 
Day of Departure 
Even though Thursday 10 February was considered by many activists to be a 
calm day in anticipation of the – by now ‚traditional‛ – massive demonstrations 
after Friday prayers, thousands were still occupying Tahrir Square.1453  About 
1,000 doctors in white coats joined the protests in Tahrir, while 3,000 lawyers 
gathered near Abdeen Palace, from where they marched to the square.1454 
 Faced with the stubborn continuation of protests the army made its entrance as 
a direct power in the public sphere under the opaque shape of the ‚Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces‛ (SCAF). In an ominous1455 ‚Communiqué no. 1‛, the 
SCAF reassured the protesters that they were in control of the situation and that 
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all their legitimate demands would be met.1456 The significance of the first SCAF 
meeting should not be underestimated, as Hazem Kandil explained:  
The Council is theoretically convened when the country is at war. So it was called 
into session in 1967 and 1973, each time chaired by the President as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces—that is, Nasser in the first case and 
Sadat in the second. So when the Council convened on February 10 without 
Mubarak, and a military analyst explained on television that it had met of its own 
accord, without an invitation of the Commander-in-Chief, or his presence, it was 
equivalent to a mutiny, announcing that the Mubarak regime was over.1457 
Even though Mubarak had not yet formally resigned, the President had been 
sidelined and political decision making at the top level had, in practice, already 
shifted to the military. 
 State television radically changed its tone and coverage, showing the masses in 
Tahrir Square and accusing former ministers of corruption.1458 Swiftly rumors 
spread that Mubarak would be announcing his resignation in the evening, or at 
least a transfer of power to Vice President Omar Suleiman.1459 Triumph mixed 
with anxiety gripped the demonstrators in Tahrir as the prospect of Mubarak’s 
removal from power was tainted with the fear of a military coup.1460 
 At around 22h45, Hosni Mubarak addressed the nation. He repeated his 
commitment not to participate in presidential elections and he promised the 
eventual abolishment of emergency law. Yet he did not step down as President:  
Satisfied with what I have offered the nation in more than 60 years, I have 
announced I will stay with this post and that I will continue to shoulder my 
responsibilities< I never sought false power or popularity. I am certain that the 
majority of people are aware who Hosni Mubarak is.1461  
At the Square, anticipation transformed into anger, as demonstrators waved their 
shoes at the giant screen where the President’s speech was projected.1462 After 
Mubarak’s speech the words of Vice President Omar Suleiman did little to 
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appease the masses: ‚I call upon the young people and heroes of Egypt, go back to your 
houses, go back to your work.‛1463 Groups of protesters marched towards the state 
television headquarters at Maspero and towards the presidential palace.1464 In 
Alexandria thousands of people rallied to the military base.1465 The 6 April Youth 
Movement called for ‚an all out general strike‛ on Friday.1466 
 Friday morning 11 February, the SCAF, in a second communiqué, again 
reassured the protesters that it would supervise a democratic transition, but it 
remained silent on the fate of the President.1467 Meanwhile, Tahrir Square was 
filling up even before the start of prayer. Activists hoped to use this numerical 
advantage to mobilize people towards occupying and/or blocking other strategic 
locations in Cairo.1468 At least 3,000 protesters gathered at the presidential palace, 
which was heavily guarded by the President’s Republican Guard.1469  Tens of 
thousands of people rallied at Maspero.1470 In Alexandria the streets were packed 
with hundreds of thousands of protesters. 1471  Tens of thousands surrounded 
government buildings in Suez, declaring that they would not leave until Mubarak 
stepped down.1472 There were also mass demonstrations in Mansura, Damanhur, 
Tanta, Mahalla al-Kubra, Asyut, Sohag, Beni Suef, Port Said, Damietta, Qena, and 
al-Arish.1473 
 In the afternoon, Egyptian streets buzzed with the news brought by state 
television that a new ‚statement from the presidency‛ was to be expected in the 
evening. 1474  At 18h, a surprisingly brief declaration followed, given by Vice 
President Omar Suleiman: ‚In these difficult circumstances that the country is passing 
through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to leave the position of the presidency. He 
has commissioned the armed forces council to direct the issues of the state.‛ 1475  The 
accumulated anger and anxiety of the Egyptian masses suddenly metamorphosed 
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into exhilaration and joy. On its Live Blog, Al-Jazeera dryly remarked: ‚No point 
any of our presenters trying to speak over the roar of Egyptians celebrating< Mubarak 
steps down. Brought to you live on Al Jazeera.‛1476 Jack Shenker participated in the 
celebrations at the Square:  
There was a complete eruption of humanity, I have never seen anything like it. The 
world's biggest street party has really kicked off here. There are huge huge crowds 
of people jumping up and down suddenly as one. Suddenly everyone rushed into 
the road. I'm being slapped in happiness and bounced around.1477 
At around 20h30, in its third communiqué, the SCAF acknowledged the 
resignation of Mubarak as President and committed itself to supervising a 
transition of power.1478 The political intervention of the military was positively 
received among many activists. Wael Ghonim, for example, declared in a tweet 
that: ‚The military statement is great. I trust our Egyptian Army.‛1479 The ‚soft coup‛ 
was also explicitly sanctioned by the USA. President Obama praised the Egyptian 
army: ‚The military has served patriotically and responsibly as a caretaker to the state 
and will now have to ensure a transition that is credible in the eyes of the Egyptian 
people.‛1480 
Continuation of Protests 
Thousands of euphoric protesters remained overnight in the Square to celebrate 
Mubarak’s departure. On Saturday morning, however, the question arose as to 
whether the occupation of Tahrir should continue until there was more clarity 
about the promised transition to democracy.1481 The ‚hard core‛ of protesters 
argued that they should remain in Tahrir in order to pressure the SCAF for real 
reforms.1482 The main democratic demands that had emerged from the movement 
were the end of emergency law, the release of political prisoners, the formation of 
a presidential committee dominated by civilians, and of a constitutional 
committee, in addition to full freedoms for the press, syndicates, trade unions, 
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and political parties.1483 Others were more confident in the people’s power to 
mobilize and ‚check‛ the army, as pharmacist Ghada al-Masalmy claims: ‚Now 
we know our place, whenever there is injustice, we will come to Tahrir Square.‛1484 
 On Sunday afternoon 13 February, in its fourth communiqué, the SCAF 
declared that parliament was dissolved and the constitution suspended and that 
it would run the country until presidential and parliamentary elections were 
held.1485 It also called upon the population ‚<to head back to work, and stop the 
strikes that have disrupted Egypt’s economy.‛1486 
 The army started to forcefully clear the Square in order to allow traffic to flow 
through the heart of Cairo. Only 2,000 protesters remained in Tahrir, but 
thousands of demonstrators headed back to the Square when they heard that 
their comrades were treated violently by the military and that the Mubarak-
appointed cabinet would remain in power.1487 People spontaneously began to 
clean the streets, restore the broken pavements, and even paint the 6 October 
Bridge.1488 
 The discussion within the revolutionary movement about whether to continue 
protesting or not, and the demobilization of a large part of the demonstrators and 
Tahrir-occupiers, showed that the first phase of the 25 January Revolution had 
ended. The direct, almost tactile goal of the mass movement – i.e. the removal of 
President Hosni Mubarak – had been completed. It was less clear, however, how 
the much more general-abstract demand for the end of al-nizam – the ‚regime‛, 
‚power‛, or ‚system‛ – could be realized. Many protesters trusted the SCAF as 
transitory caretakers until elections would call a new constitution, civilian 
government, and parliament into being. Other demonstrators, mostly organized 
activists, were suspicious of the military’s intentions – was the army not the main 
pillar of the regime? – and/or its capacities to successfully oversee a democratic 
transition. Already during the days of the uprising human rights activists had 
revealed the systematic detention and torture of political protesters by the 
military.1489 
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 Furthermore, as the mass demonstrations seemed to subside, strike actions 
multiplied, creating another division in the revolutionary movement: between 
those who advocated far-reaching economic reforms along democratic changes; 
and others who saw an offensive workers’ movement as a force of destabilization 
in a fledgling democracy. Lastly, the experience of Tahrir had shown many 
demonstrators and ‚occupiers‛ the vision of a democratic and just society that 
had organically emerged ‚from below‛. The blogger Sandmonkey mused: ‚What 
if we create a democracy model similar to Tahrir, based on social engagment [sic] and 
collaboration without forcing anything on anyone?‛1490  
 Hossam al-Hamalawy warned that: ‚The war hasn’t ended. The first battle of the 
revolution ended with Mubarak's stepping down from power, but the revolution hasn't 
been completed.‛1491 Throughout 2011 and 2012 democratic and economic protests 
would continue to shake the Egyptian nation, while different societal forces began 
to (re)build themselves, (re)articulating their political and economic projects, and 
fighting for hegemony in the spaces that opened up in civil and political society 
after Mubarak’s removal.  
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CHAPTER 22 
A Revolutionary Project 
The history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into the 
realm of rulership over their own destiny.  
Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (2001: 18) 
Protest or Revolution? 
At the 2011 Middle East Studies Association Conference, there was ample 
discussion on the nature of the ‚Arab Spring‛ and the recent events in Egypt in 
particular. One of the issues that often haunted panel sessions was whether to 
label these events as a ‚revolution‛ or not – a question that was hastily banished 
from the conference room, because such an arcane debate would detract from the 
much more interesting analysis of what really happened on the ground. There is, 
of course, some justification for this attitude, as what matters is the process itself 
and not idle discussions on terminology. Yet, it was not academics or social 
scientists who first categorized the Tunisian and Egyptian chain of events as 
‚revolutions‛, but the protagonists themselves. ‚Revolution‛ was not a concept 
introduced from ‚without‛ by passive observers, but it emerged from ‚within‛, 
by actors who tried to make sense of their own mass activity. This indicates that a 
debate on the concept of revolution is important in understanding these events, if 
only to comprehend the agents’ mobilization and usage of this term. One could 
say that definitions become truly important when people begin to define 
themselves. 
 The resistance against the categorization of the Egyptian mass protests as a 
‚revolution‛ was also rooted in the Skocpolian tradition, which requires a 
revolution to entail not only ‚<class-based revolts from below<‛ 1492  but also 
‚<rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures<‛ 1493  of the 
social formation. At first sight, this definition seems satisfying because it 
emphasizes the dual nature of a revolution as a process of, on the one hand, 
sudden political and social change and transformation, and, on the other, the 
intervention of mass agency. Some social scientists were hesitant (or cynical) to 
categorize the 25 January protests as a revolution, because of the absence of any 
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structural change. However, this approach poses a methodological problem as it 
turns a particular outcome of the process – ‚<rapid, basic transformations<‛ – into 
a determining parameter to characterize the entire process. If structural, political, 
and social change is a prerequisite for calling a modern revolution a revolution, 
this would mean that the character of a revolution could only be established post 
factum. For some social scientists, their patient could be suffering from revolution, 
but this diagnosis can only be proven when he either recovers or dies. Moreover, 
the widespread notion of a ‚failed‛ revolution becomes problematic. For 
example, the outcome of the Russian Revolution of 1905 was clearly a failure – the 
establishment of the Duma was a cosmetic rather than a structural change – yet 
among historians the event is generally accepted as a revolution. What is lost is 
the understanding that a certain process of ‚<class-based revolts from below<‛  
may contain the potentiality or will to ‚<rapid, basic transformations of a society’s 
state and class structures<‛ without actually being able to realize it. Goldstone 
subtly corrects Theda Skocpol’s definition of ‚<rapid, basic transformations<‛ into 
‚<an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political 
authority in society<‛1494 In my opinion, this nuance rightly shifts the attention 
from whatever outcomes a revolution may have to the process of revolution itself: 
the transformations in activity and consciousness that occur within the movement 
of the masses. Irrespective of its success or failure, the 1905 events in Russia 
constituted a revolution, because of the spontaneous mobilization of the masses 
and the structures of self-determination (soviets) that emerged from this 
movement. Insurrection, mass strikes, ‚occupations‛, the conquest of State 
power, and/or the transformation of the social formation, are but moments within 
this broad process. Trotsky’s concept of revolution1495 stressed the development of 
human self-determination through mass mobilization, organization, and 
politicization: 
The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct interference of the masses 
in historic events< the masses< break over the barriers excluding them from the 
political arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and create by their 
own interference the initial groundwork for a new régime. The history of a 
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revolution is for us first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into 
the realm of rulership over their own destiny.1496 
The substance of revolution is the collective and collaborative activity of the 
popular masses, and how this activity acquires, step by step, self-direction and 
self-organization. The power of such a concept lies in its emancipatory 
appreciation of the power of human agency and self-liberation, as it places the 
activity of the revolutionary Subject at the heart of its analysis.  
 The ‚proof‛ of the Egyptian 25 January Revolution lies then in its salient mass 
mobilizations, its immanent political will – its ‚<effort to transform the political 
institutions and the justifications for political authority in society<‛ – and its 
spontaneous neoformations: citizen committees, the Republic of Tahrir, 
revolutionary parties, and independent trade unions. Mona al-Ghobashy asserted 
that: ‚The uprising restored the meaning of politics, if by that term is understood the 
making of collective claims on government. It revalued the people, revealing them in all 
their complexity<‛1497 
The Revolutionary Subject 
During the days of insurrection, Paul Amar criticized the three dominant ways in 
which the revolution was being framed in the media: 
There are three prominent binary models out there and each one carries its own 
baggage:  (1) People versus Dictatorship: This perspective leads to liberal naïveté 
and confusion about the active role of military and elites in this uprising. (2) 
Seculars versus Islamists: This model leads to a 1980s-style call for ‚stability‛ and 
Islamophobic fears about the containment of the supposedly extremist ‚Arab 
street.‛ Or, (3) Old Guard versus Frustrated Youth: This lens imposes a 1960s-
style romance on the protests but cannot begin to explain the structural and 
institutional dynamics driving the uprising, nor account for the key roles played 
by many 70-year-old Nasser-era figures.1498 
These three binary models attempt to offer an analysis of the main protagonists 
and antagonists of the revolutionary process. They point towards an answer to 
the questions of which groups of the population were in the streets and for what 
reasons. To put it differently: who are the participants of the revolutionary project 
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that emerged from the 25 January protests? And as what social Subject did these 
actors constitute and define themselves? 
 The third frame was rooted strongly in discourses produced by both 
revolutionary and regime actors, who cast the youth as the prime mover of the 25 
January Revolution. These discourses were grounded in the reality that it was 
indeed young men and women who initiated and spearheaded the protests.1499 
But, as Amar observed, their important role did not define the process as a ‚youth 
revolution‛. Objectively, the protests were joined by young and old people, men 
and women, rich and poor, Christians and Muslims. Blogger Hossam al-
Hamalawy noted that: 
All social classes in Egypt participated in the uprising from the first stages. Hosni 
Mubarak's regime succeeded in creating a state of alienation between it and all the 
social classes, with no exceptions. Even among the Egyptian elite except for those 
businessmen who surrounded HM [=Hosni Mubarak], were relieved when he 
resigned.1500 
The sociologist Muhammad Bamyeh also stressed the diverse social composition 
of the revolutionaries: 
While the youth were the driving force in the earlier days, the revolution quickly 
became national in every sense; over the days I saw an increasing demographic mix 
in demonstrations, where people from all age groups, social classes, men and 
women, Muslims and Christians, urban people and peasants—virtually all sectors 
of society, acting in large numbers and with a determination rarely seen before.1501 
Moreover, the saliency of the diversity of the participants in the emerging 
revolutionary activity-system was expressed subjectively. The protesters swiftly 
recognized themselves as ‚the people‛, and this consciousness was expressed, for 
example, in the by now familiar slogan of ‚al-sha’b yurid isqat al-nizam‛ – the 
people want the fall of the regime. Defining the revolution as a movement of the 
youth narrows its scope and undermines its legitimacy as a broad, popular 
activity-system, Jessica Winegar warned:  
<transitional government figures have started referring to the uprising as a 
‚youth‛ uprising and the demands of the people as demands of the ‚youth‛ in a 
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familiar paternalistic way that diminishes not only the importance of what has 
happened, but also the demands that the vast majority of Egyptians, no matter 
their age, have of the post-Mubarak government.1502 
Such a concept depoliticizes the movement and ‚<also makes it vague and gives it a 
certain color something that has become fashionable today, to give revolution a certain 
color, so there are orange, purple, jasmine revolutions and so on.‛1503 Furthermore, ‚the 
youth‛ is not a homogenous sociological category, as Rabab al-Mahdi pointed 
out:  
In this construct, the media and academic analysts lump together the contradictory 
and often conflictual interests of ‘yuppies’ (young, urban, professionals of the 
aforementioned connections and backgrounds) with those of the unemployed, who 
live under the poverty line in rural areas and slum-areas. Under this banner of 
‚youth‛ the ‚yuppies‛ and upper middle-class young people are portrayed as the 
quintessential representative of this uprising.1504 
The idealtype of the Egyptian revolutionary became a particular youth, such as 
the Google employee Wael Ghoneim, who, perhaps, reflected more the 
predominant social composition of the international media than that of the 
revolutionary actors. 
 The second frame of secularists versus Islamists has no roots whatsoever in the 
25 January protests: it only became relevant with the referendum on the 
constitutional amendments on 19 March 2011, the parliamentary elections of the 
same year, and the presidential elections of 2012. The prevalent discourse, 
saliently expressed in slogans, graffiti and cartoons, during the days of 
insurrection was one of popular unity and against religious sectarianism. The 
symbol of the Crescent-and-Cross was omnipresent, representing unity between 
believers.1505 Whereas religious activity played a small role in the mobilization of 
the masses – for example via the mass gatherings after midday Friday prayers or 
the rallying calls by some preachers – the social Subject that arose out of the 
protests did not put forward any religious or cultural demand. An a-religious 
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notion of the legitimate will of ‚the people‛ was the main means of recognition of 
the masses. 
 This brings me to the first of the bipolar models that Paul Amar criticized; that 
of the ‚good people‛ versus the ‚bad dictator‛. Amar was right to deconstruct 
both categories, as the people and the dictatorship are not homogeneous and 
static entities. Structurally, the ‚regime‛ not only consisted of different and often 
opposing factions, it also incorporated the various scales of dictatorship, ranging 
from the lowly bureaucrat to the regional governor, from the NDP worker to the 
GFETU representative, from the policeman in the street to the chief of staff, from 
the corrupt factory manager to international capital, from Cairo to Washington.1506 
Is a soldier who fraternizes with the protesters or an NDP worker who 
participates in a strike during the revolution, part of al-sha’b or al-nizam? The 
category of ‚the people‛ as well implies a heterogeneous gathering of actors from 
different social, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds and from distinct 
age, sex, and belief groups. Moreover, ‚the revolutionary people‛ was far from 
being a stable, homogeneous category during the development of the revolution: 
its numbers increased and decreased with the ebb and flow of the mobilizations; 
and the allegiance of individuals shifted sometimes from participating in the 
protests to supporting Mubarak and vice versa. While there was a mass 
contestation of the regime, the population was not consistently and continuously 
united against the dictator. For example, in the Week of Steadfastness Schielke saw 
‚the people‛ divided into three broad groups: 
One camp firmly supports the president, be it out of personal interest, out of belief 
in strong leaders, or out of fear of chaos. Another camp is critical of the president 
and the system but optimistic and ready to accept the concessions the government 
offered. Which way this camp turns in the next days and weeks will be decisive. 
And one camp, the revolutionary camp, either supports the demonstrators on 
Tahrir Square, or is standing there right now.1507 
                                                          
1506 In his critique of the Stalinist Soviet Union, Leon Trotsky acknowledged that the ‚regime‛ 
was not simply the sum of the State and the ruling classes, but that ‚bureaucratism‛ entailed 
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See Trotsky 1991. 
1507 Schielke 2011. 
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In contradistinction to the relatively small ‚hard core‛ of thousands of protesters 
whose revolutionary activity was incessant and relentless, the real mass base of 
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators was constantly in flux.  
 Instead of considering al-sha’b as an objective category synonymous to the 
population, I suggest that a subjective approach is more fruitful: al-sha’b as a 
developing activity-system or collaborative Project. Rather than a fixed historical 
agent that produces revolution, ‚the people‛ was constructed as a concrete 
political actor, as a social Subject, through its revolutionary activity. Alan Shandro 
sharply observed that: ‚The forces of revolution are assembled only on the field of battle, 
in the course of hostilities, from whatever elements present themselves, drawn often from 
the ranks of opposing forces.‛1508 The self-recognition of the actors who participated 
in the revolutionary activity-system as ‚the people‛ was not just a mechanistic 
reflection of its diverse and representative social composition – the ‚population‛ 
or the people an sich – it also constituted a re-appropriation and redefinition of the 
concept of al-sha’b. As Sherene Seikaly and Pascale Ghazaleh explained, the 
category of ‚the people‛ has changed throughout Arab history: ‚The sha’b has gone 
from being a subject of idealization to an object of derision. The Arab people, in European 
and North American as well as Arab intellectual discourse, are passive, dormant, 
apathetic, and dependent on a strong leader. They are childlike.‛1509 One of the biggest 
achievements of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions then is that they 
(re)constructed ‚the people‛ as a self-determining social Subject instead of a mere 
Object of authoritarian regime policies or traditionalist practices.  
 Just as the concepts of ‚the revolution‛ and ‚the regime‛ were not introduced 
from without, the notion of ‚the people‛ emerged spontaneously from the 
activity-system itself, which tried to grasp the nature of its own mass agency. For 
the protesters gathered in Midan Tahrir on the Friday of Anger, hearing more 
than a million people shouting ‚al-sha’b yurid isqat al-nizam‛1510 was the concrete 
development and construction of ‚<an unmistakably obvious popular wil‛1511; and 
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the realization of ‚<the profound, almost spiritual, implication of the notion of ‚the 
people‛ as a whole being on the move.‛1512  
 The 25 January Revolution was a system of activity becoming conscious of 
itself, a social Subject that asserted itself as ‚the people‛.1513 Solidary participation 
in this activity-system created a specific Subjectivity of ‚being a revolutionary‛, 
turning participants into revolutionaries. An understanding of the revolution and 
the formation of a revolutionary Project requires an analysis of the developmental 
process of the 25 January protests. 
Revolution in Development 
Protest and Guerrilla 
Even though the seeds of this revolutionary Project were planted during the last 
decade by the civil-democratic and workers’ movement – in the form of the 
production of intellectuals, discourses, traditions and practices of resistance – its 
growth and development was immeasurably accelerated during the 25 January 
protests: ‚Before the revolution nothing happens and then during the revolution 
everything happens all the time.‛1514 As Trotsky noted with regard to the Russian 
Revolution of 1917: ‚The dynamic of revolutionary events is directly determined by 
swift, intense and passionate changes in the psychology of classes which have already 
formed themselves before the revolution.‛1515 The mass activity that develops in a 
SSoD of revolution does not follow a predetermined path, but is the outcome of a 
highly contingent collective and collaborative learning process: 
The fundamental political process of the revolution thus consists in the 
gradual comprehension by a class of the problems arising from the social 
crisis – the active orientation of the masses by a method of successive 
approximations. The different stages of a revolutionary process, certified by a 
change of parties in which the more extreme always supersedes the less, express the 
growing pressure to the left of the masses – so long as the swing of the 
movement does not run into objective obstacles. When it does, there begins a 
reaction: disappointments of the different layers of the revolutionary class, growth 
                                                          
1512 Bamyeh 2011. 
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issued a challenge to those popular layers who remained at their homes, interpellating them to 
join the demonstrations and protests as part of ‚al-sha’b‛. 
1514 Interview with Sabry Zaky, Cairo, 10 March 2011. 
1515 Trotsky 2001: 18. Emphasis in original. 
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of indifferentism, and therewith a strengthening of the position of the counter-
revolutionary forces.1516 
A revolution is first and foremost a collective learning experience, whereby an 
emerging social Subject has to create those neoformations that allow it to 
overcome, step by step, through trial and error, the predicaments it faces. As 
Trotsky remarked, the capacity of learning and development of the masses within 
a certain phase of the revolution is not absolute. Every phase of the revolution has 
its own Zone of Proximal Development. The failure, at a certain point in its 
trajectory, to develop a suitable neoformation to deal with a specific situation 
limits its entire development. The movement runs into ‚objective obstacles‛ – 
although what is ‚objective‛ is not purely external to the activity-system, but 
rather the Subject’s (temporarily) inability to negate this predicament.  
 As a developing activity-system, the 25 January Revolution consisted of 
different phases. In a way, the very first phase was the slow formation of street 
and class politics in Egypt through the civil-democratic and workers’ movements 
of the last decade. These developments and experiences in practices and 
discourses of protest paved the way for the revolutionary mass mobilizations of 
January and February 2011. With the advantage of hindsight, most leftist activists 
stressed the importance of this drawn out, preparatory phase. Fatma Ramadan, 
for example, emphasized that she was ‚<not analyzing the revolution since 25 
January, but since 2000, since the anti-imperialist movements and the social movements 
and the strikes. All the worker strikes, the continuous strikes since 2006 were an 
introduction to the revolution.‛1517  
 However, the revolution as a Project of the popular masses really took off on 25 
January 2011. Tuesday was a national holiday, so the following working day the 
social Subject already bumped into its first predicament: the continued 
mobilization of working families. The movement of revolutionary actors in the 
streets transformed from mass demonstrations into a game of cat and mouse 
between small groups of hundreds or thousands of demonstrators and the police. 
While this transformation was born out of an ‚objective‛ weakness – the 
decreased capacity for mobilization during working days – its guerrilla 
neoformation of constant, decentralized attacks and retreats played an important 
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part in the softening up of the security forces, which began to suffer from fatigue 
and overextension: ‚What shifted the balance away from the regime were four 
continuous days of street fighting, January 25-28, that pitted the people against the police 
all over the country.‛1518  
 The Central Security Forces especially were organized for a massive, but short-
term deployment, striking hard at a single point of resistance. They had the 
advantage of numbers and were used to surrounding and choking the localized, 
small-scale protests of the last decade. The uprising in Mahalla on 6 April 2008, 
for example, could be defeated as long as the protests remained confined to this 
one city. The massive demonstrations that happened in the whole of Egypt on 
Tuesday 25 January surprised the security forces and they were not able to simply 
‚surround‛ and subdue them, as Eliott Colla observed: ‚In 2004, when Kefaya 
began their first public demonstrations, the protesters were usually outnumbered 30 to 
one by Central Security Forces. Now the number has reversed—and multiplied.‛1519 But 
neither were they prepared for the activity of protracted ‚urban warfare‛, which 
followed the mass mobilization of 25 January and which lasted until the Friday of 
Anger. The unemployed youth in Suez probably constituted the vanguard of this 
moment in the revolutionary process.1520 
 Friday 28 January was a key moment in the development of the Egyptian 
Revolution, because of the salient reassertion of its popular mass character and 
the spontaneously emerging consensus that not reform, but the fall of al-nizam 
was the aim of the movement. The guerrilla neoformation of Wednesday and 
Thursday had kept the activity-system alive and operational, and its heroic and 
defiant prolepsis instructed the masses to return to the streets on Friday. From the 
revolutionary activity, a pattern would emerge, which established Tuesdays and 
Fridays as moments of mass mobilization and demonstration, while in between 
the movement was sustained by the occupation of Tahrir and other symbolic 
sites, and guerrilla warfare in the streets and neighborhoods.  
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Subjectness 
The midday Friday prayers became a logical point of mass mobilization, since the 
masses were already ‚mobilized‛ on the streets at that moment. The power of the 
revolutionary call consisted in transforming these traditional religious gatherings 
into political activities. The redeployment, by millions, of the masses in the 
Egyptian streets had a profound impact on the consciousness of the participants. 
At that point most protesters realized that they really had the capacity to emulate 
the Tunisian experience and dispose of their dictator. They had already showed 
themselves as an implicit revolutionary force in-itself since 25 January, but now 
they became a bold and explicit power for-themselves. Even though some 
activists had hoped that the 25 January protests would be the harbinger of 
Mubarak’s fall, most participants in the first demonstrations ‚<didn’t think they 
could do this to Mubarak. At first the protest movement went to the streets to demand the 
resignation of Habib al-Adly of the Ministry of Interior. And then everything went as you 
know.‛1521 Muhammad Bamyeh commented that:  
Removing Mubarak was in fact not anyone’s serious demand on January 25, when 
the relevant slogans condemned the possible candidacy of his son, and called on 
Mubarak himself only not to run again. But by the end of the day on January 28, 
the immediate removal of Mubarak from office had become an unwavering 
principle, and indeed it seemed then that it was about to happen. 1522 
The Friday of Anger was the point when people realized they were making a 
revolution. 1523 Leftist journalist Haisam Hassan recalled that: 
We realized that this was a revolution when the people started to shout ‚we want 
an end to the regime‛, while Rifaat al-Said and the political parties were saying 
‚this government should go away‛. What the hell. We want to destroy the regime 
and you are talking about the government and Ahmed Nazif?! He was talking like 
Mubarak. And until Mubarak said that he would go away, Rifaat al-Said and a lot 
of political figures and parties said that this was not a revolution.1524 
It is clear that the original object of the activity-system did not determine the 
development of the Project, but that it was rather the other way around: from the 
concrete development of the activity-system emerged its own goal. It was not the 
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organizers who chanted for the first time ‚the people want the fall of the regime‛, 
but the non-organized protesters – who often participated for the first time in 
political protest – with the fresh and powerful image of the Tunisian Revolution 
in their minds.1525 Guardian journalist Jack Shenker, who had been covering social 
and political protests in Egypt since a few years, was impressed by the sudden 
quantitative and qualitative development of the mass movement: 
Amid all this carnival atmosphere and euphoria, it's really easy to forget that this 
time 10 days [sic] it was really surprising to see anything more than 50 protesters 
on the streets chanting Mubarak slogans. Now by all accounts you have close to a 
million on the streets, holding up phenomenal placards, chanting that they want 
their president to go. It is such an incredible transformation.1526 
At this point in the development of the revolutionary Project, the participants 
constructed themselves as ‚the people‛ against ‚the regime‛, a social Subject with 
its own will and self-determination. This discourse was rooted in the salient 
presence of millions in the streets and constituted a semiotic battering ram against 
the legitimacy of al-nizam. The Mubarak State could no longer assert that it 
defended the ‚common good‛ and the ‚population in general‛ when its 
constituency was massively and explicitly out in the streets against its very 
existence. The last vestiges of hegemony were obliterated in the Friday of Anger 
protests, and the only options left for the regime were repression or structural 
change.  
 However, the avenues for repression became increasingly limited, because of 
the sound defeat of the security forces during the Friday of Anger by the masses. 
The army, which gradually replaced the police and CSF, was reluctant to 
forcefully repress the mass movement because of the effect of this course of action 
on its own troops. Moreover, it was one of the only State institutions left that still 
had an aura of legitimacy in the eyes of most protesters. The transformation of the 
military dictatorship into a police State under Sadat and Mubarak had gradually 
banned the army from the commanding heights of politics and the national 
economy, which, ironically, inoculated it against a direct association with al-nizam 
by the masses. By most participants, the army was seen as a force outside of the 
regime. This attitude would have dire consequences for the further development 
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of the revolution, but I will return to the position of the army in Chapter 25 The 
Counter-revolution. 
The Regime’s Whip 
From Saturday 29 January on, the withdrawal of the police from the streets, the 
release of prisoners, and the semi-organized looting, violence and vandalism, 
constituted a new predicament for the revolutionary masses. Firstly, the 
intimidation of families and the vandalization of homes meant that the activity of 
the popular Subject was directed from ‚demonstrating in the streets‛ to ‚securing 
their neighborhoods‛. Secondly, the substance of the concept of revolution as a 
righteous and popular upheaval – a meaning that had emerged from the mass 
movement – was threatened by the regime-promoted interpretant of fitna: societal 
chaos. The neoformation that overcame this predicament in the revolution’s 
trajectory was the establishment of grassroots popular or civil committees, which 
were organized to protect families, homes, and neighborhoods. In themselves, 
these committees are neither ‚progressive‛ nor ‚reactionary‛ and their role 
varied from city to city and from area to area. The character of civil committees 
established in rich neighborhoods in Cairo such as Zamalek or Maadi was 
different from those in popular neighborhoods such as Imbaba, or in working 
class cities such as Mahalla al-Kubra and Suez. But as a general rule, those 
committees of which the activity was connected in one way or another to the 
broader Project of popular revolution constituted a continuation and 
neoformation of the revolutionary process. In fact, by withdrawing the police and 
forcing people to govern their own neighborhoods, they reinforced the 
Subjectness of the people as a self-directing force. Youth protester Ahmed al-
Gourd candidly remembered this episode: 
We were happy, trust me, we did not miss the police. Actually, that whole civilian 
neighborhood watch thing< a lot of people actually enjoyed that. Like: you live in 
a house and you don’t know your neighbors and suddenly you know everyone from 
your street. Not only your own building, but the entire block. You meet people 
living in your own building, living in the building next to you, people living along 
the whole street, you start to get to know people, calling them to see if they are 
alright, you know. It was actually a way for people to get to know each other and it 
worked pretty good. And I think it was actually an awesome display of how people 
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were self-aware of things like safety, there was no vandalism, no looting, people 
protected the library of Alexandria, people protected the Egyptian museum.1527 
These small anecdotes showed that ‚<the forcible entrance of the masses into the 
realm of rulership over their own destiny‛1528 was not only a political activity-system, 
but also entailed ‚authentic‛ – i.e. less alienated and humanist – forms of living. 
The experience of the ‚Republic of Tahrir‛ constituted the high-point of this 
process, and will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 Wednesday 2 February became another key moment in the development of the 
revolution. After the mass mobilizations on Tuesday 1 February, Mubarak had 
promised some concessions to the protesters. Whilst the vanguard of the 
movement derided the President’s move, some protesters were satisfied by the 
concessions, or wanted to return back to ‚normalcy‛. This moment had the 
potential to split the mass movement into a ‚moderate‛ and a ‚radical‛ wing. 
Political scientist Sabry Zaky claimed that Mubarak: 
<had a chance to stay in power until September. In this case all the people would 
have called him the patron of democracy. After Tuesday when he made his speech 
that he wouldn’t stay in power after September, and after the statement of the 
military, I thought that< if Mubarak is intelligent enough, he will give us our 
freedom , saying that: ‚I see people are still in the Square and I will give your 
freedom to decide if I stay in power until September or if I leave now‛. And I am 
sure he would have won. Because, in every society, the majority of 60 percent are 
fence sitters, all the time, and the 20 percent are the ones who make the revolution. 
He would have gotten 70 percent who said yes, continue until September. But 
thank God he was stupid enough. [laughs] He was stupid! I think it was not only a 
matter of stupidity but also of policy. The policies he used during his rule were the 
same policies that brought him down. He used to, all the time, to deal with 
demonstrations through the Interior Ministry, State Security and the Intelligence 
Service. The revolution began as a reform movement, not a revolution, so he 
ordered State Security and the Ministry of Interior to deal with it. When they 
failed he said I will deal with this issue. If you remember he didn’t deliver any 
speech until the fourth day. So, oh my God, security has failed, I have to deal with 
it myself< The security was in control and when they failed he stepped in. This 
same policy brought him down, because he left everything to the security apparatus 
until the reform movement turned into a revolution. So the ceiling of the demands 
became higher and higher and at the same time he had an opportunity when he 
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gave his speech and said: ‚I am not intending to remain in power after 
September‛< I have seen many people in Tahrir cry when he talked about being 
buried on Egyptian ground. *laughs+ My sister cried and asked me: ‚what do you 
want from him? Leave him alone.‛ <But we are lucky he didn’t address the 
Egyptian people, if he had addressed them he would have made a referendum and 
he would have won it for sure.1529 
Although it is doubtful that Mubarak in this phase of the revolution would have 
won a genuine referendum on his continuation of the presidency, or that the 
mobilization in the streets would have ended by such a maneuver, Zaky’s 
analysis showed the doubt and confusion that held many participants in its grip 
at this juncture. Relatively large pro-Mubarak protests were held to discredit the 
powerful claim of the revolutionaries that they were ‚the people‛, sowing 
additional confusion in the ranks of the less politicized protesters. If the regime 
had restrained itself, temporarily exchanging the stick for the carrot, it would 
have considerably weakened the revolutionary activity-system. 
 However, at this very moment, the Ministry of Interior decided to organize a 
clampdown on the ‚hard core‛ or vanguard of protesters who had camped in 
Tahrir on Wednesday. Instead of further atomizing the movement, the attack on 
Tahrir by plainclothes and baltageyya in the surreal episode of the Battle of the 
Camel, reunited al-sha’b in its relentless opposition against al-nizam. 1530  In 
addition, paramilitary snipers connected to the Ministry of Interior began to 
terrorize the occupiers. 1531  People who had been hesitating to continue their 
participation in the protests were appalled by the violence and felt ‚stabbed in 
the back.‛1532  
 This episode is reminiscent of Marx’s alleged aphorism that ‚<a revolution 
needs from time to time the whip of the counter-revolution.‛1533 A Vygotskian reading 
of this epigram emphasizes that a predicament is not merely an obstacle in the 
life-process of a social Subject, but a crucial part of its trajectory, as it forces the 
Subject to create forms of mediation to overcome it, which in turn drives its entire 
development forward. If the Battle of the Camel established one thing in the 
consciousness of the masses, it was the necessity of struggling until the end of the 
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Mubarak ‚regime‛, because its oppressive existence could not be tolerated any 
longer. From Wednesday until Thursday the revolutionary vanguard stubbornly 
kept the activity-system alive, as Jack Shenker observed:  
<we shouldn't lose sight of one basic and incredible fact – for the ninth night 
running, ordinary Egyptians are on the streets in their thousands, still bound 
together with remarkable social solidarity, still battling their three-decade-old 
dictatorial regime, still holding their ground even as it is rained on by rocks and 
molotov cocktails. 
Downtown Cairo is aflame tonight, its streets playing host to block-by-block, roof-
by-roof, corner-by-corner urban warfare – but it's the bravery behind those 
fighting that battle that should really be leaving people open-mouthed.1534 
The Will and the Means 
Friday 5 February was dubbed the Friday of Departure, as an ultimatum to 
Mubarak. This episode expressed both the strength and the weakness of the 
revolutionary Project at that moment. Whereas the movement had been able to 
set its own concrete timetable and demands, it had not yet developed the means 
to enforce them. The original prolepsis of Tunisia, which had been instructive in 
the maturation of the 25 January protests, now became a brake on the activity-
system, as its participants hoped that Mubarak would just leave, like Ben Ali, in 
the face of mass mobilizations alone. State institutions were paralyzed and 
disorganized due to the demonstrations and sit-ins, but they were not captured 
and transformed. What the movement lacked was a directive ‚center‛, a ‚Prince‛, 
which could instruct the activity-system towards the conquest of State power. 
‚Without a guiding organization the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not 
enclosed in a piston-box,‛1535 Trotsky claimed. Schielke contemplated that: 
The lack of organisation hat [sic] for a long time been the main asset of the 
movement because it could not be stopped by arresting or shooting its leaders – 
there are no leaders, and many of the people in Tahrir do not want leaders. They 
want power to the people. They want leaders elected in free parliamentary election. 
This grass-roots dynamics means, however, that while the demonstrators are well 
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able to clean the garbage, to keep order, and to defend themselves – all actions that 
make immediate sense – they are not good at making tactical manoeuvres [sic].1536 
From the first Friday of Anger on, there were activists who tried to rally and 
direct people towards occupying not only the symbolic location of Tahrir, but also 
‚real‛ spaces of State power such as the Maspero television and radio building, 
the Parliament, the Presidential Palace, and the army barracks. During the Friday 
of Departure there was a renewed attempt to orient the masses towards a march 
on the Presidential Palace, but this call did not materialize.1537 
 Without an offensive move from the revolutionary masses, its protests 
acquired the character of a war of attrition. In fact, this had been the strategy of 
the army since it appeared in the streets after the Friday of Anger. Instead of 
engaging the protesters headfirst, the military dug itself into ‚urban trenches‛ 
around key political and economic sites, such as the Maspero building, the 
Parliament, the Presidential Palace, roads, oil companies, and the Suez Canal. As 
long as these sites were firmly controlled by the State apparatus, it could endure 
the protests and wear down the demonstrators’ physical and mental constitution. 
Joshua Stacher noticed the fatigue that started to seep into the protesters’ ranks: 
People are tired of being cooped up in their apartments, made anxious as their 
stockpiles of food and money decrease, and they are ready for a sense of "normalcy" 
to return. Ironically, the normalcy they pine for resembles the police state so many 
tried to banish just thirteen days ago. This method of wearing down the non-
protesting public seems just as strategic as the violence employed on those airing 
their grievances in the streets.1538  
Shandro claimed that:  
<there can be no revolution without the threat of violence and the risk of terror, of 
panic and irresolution, of miscalculation and of crime< But the real danger in the 
logic of revolution and counter-revolution is that violence and coercion, hunger 
and fear, ambition and distrust would sap the nascent roots of proletarian-popular 
community.1539 
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In order to successfully challenge, capture, and destroy those levels of State 
power that are nationally and centrally organized; the popular Project struggled 
to overcome what was – and still is at the moment of writing – its most pertinent 
predicament: the fragmented nature of its self-directing activity. Whereas the 
majority of protesters remained stuck in the ‚Tahrir occupation strategy‛, from 
Tuesday 8 February onwards some sections of the activity-system tried to 
develop a ‚second front‛ of occupation near the People’s Assembly. 1540  In 
addition, workers opened up a new dimension in the struggle by organizing 
strikes, while peasants mobilized in the countryside, dealing blows to the 
economic pillars of the regime.1541  The entrance of these new actors into the 
revolution and their often local fights in the economic sphere of the Egyptian 
social formation reinforced the political protests and opened up new lines of 
development and potential trajectories for the revolutionary Subject: 
Not all of these micro-dramas are explicitly political, and few of them will make 
headlines on their own. But they all add up to a growing sense that something 
fundamental is shifting in Egypt: people are no longer willing to accept the status 
quo power dynamics between themselves and their overlords, be they in the 
presidential palace or in the boss's office next door.1542 
These ‚economic‛ protests buttressed the ‚political‛ demonstrations and sit-ins, 
and fortified the revolutionary camp in its war of attrition. 
 The paralyzing effect of increasing strikes, occupations, and road blockades put 
an immense pressure on the State to enforce a swift solution to its own 
predicament. At this moment, the SCAF began to operate openly as a power 
independent from the presidency through the first of its ‚communiqués‛. In his 
speech on Thursday 10 February, Mubarak, however, still refused to step down, 
even though he had implicitly handed power over to Vice President Omar 
Suleiman. This stubbornness in the face of mass mobilization pushed the 
revolutionary Project towards a resolution of the deadlock. Jack Shenker 
described this episode vividly: 
At one point Mubarak made a reference to being a young man and understanding 
the young men of Egypt – basically the people who are here – and at that moment 
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the whole square erupted in anger< The way that Mubarak is comparing himself 
to the people on the ground infuriated them. 
And when it became clear that< Mubarak intended to stay on until September, 
the square shook with fury. "We are not going until he goes," they chanted. 
There is real anger and real fury and people are not quite sure in which direction to 
channel it. As I speak to you now, one man is holding a banner next to me which 
says: "Freedom or I die here." Tears are running down some people's faces. They 
really thought he was going to go. 
There is a feeling that people want to get on the move now. I can hear this chant: 
"We'll go to the palace and tear him out.1543 
That last sentence is crucial as it shows the consciousness of the people that 
staying in Tahrir would not lead to a breakthrough in the stand-off between al-
sha’b and al-nizam. The mobilization towards key sites of State power and 
legitimacy – in particular the Palace and the Parliament – and the explosion of 
strikes, prompted the military to intervene in the process. The only way open for 
the survival of the ruling classes was that the military placed itself at the head of 
the revolution, in order to defeat it. Before the laconic statement of Omar 
Suleiman that spelled the end of Mubarak’s presidency, soldiers and officers were 
joining protesters at Tahrir, whilst people in the Square chanted that the army 
and the people were one.1544 The confusion about the role of the army in Egyptian 
society among a majority of protesters, and the lack of a ‚center‛ of the activity-
system, allowed the SCAF to step in and rescue those networks and institutions of 
al-nizam that served its interests. From the fall of Mubarak onwards, the 
intervention of the military ‚Savior-Ruler‛ constituted the main predicament of 
the revolutionary Subject, because it undermined the agency and self-
determination of al-sha’b vis-à-vis al-nizam. Even though the majority of protesters 
were demobilized after the military’s ‚soft coup‛, they still carried in them an 
awareness of their collective and collaborative capacity to bring down the 
Pharaoh – in Marx’s words: ‚For a moment active heroes of the revolutionary drama, 
they could no longer be forced back into the inactive and spineless role of the chorus.‛1545 
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 The two main developmental challenges after the fall of Mubarak for the 
revolutionary Project were, firstly, the unification of the civil-democratic and 
workers’ movements – i.e. the political revolution and the Mass Strike – and 
secondly, the objectification and centralization of the revolutionary Project into 
committees, parties, trade unions, and so on – i.e. the formation of a subaltern 
counter-hegemonic apparatus that could wage the inevitable battle for hegemony. 
I discuss this phase of ‚institutionalization‛ in more detail in Chapter 26 The 
Revolutionary Prince. 
“Spontaneity” and Autoprolepis 
One of the features of the revolutionary activity-system most celebrated by 
activists, journalists and political scientists alike, was its ‚spontaneity‛. 
Muhammad Bameyh claimed that: 
<spontaneity was responsible, it seems, for the increasing ceiling of the goals of 
the uprising, from basic reform demands on January 25, to changing the entire 
regime three days later, to rejecting all concessions made by the regime while 
Mubarak was in office, to putting Mubarak on trial< Here one found out what 
was possible through spontaneous movement rather than a fixed program, 
organization or leadership. Spontaneity thus became the compass of the Revolution 
and the way by which it found its way to what turned out to be its radical 
destination.1546 
As Rosa Luxemburg posited with regard to the Russian Revolution of 1905, the 
notion of spontaneity is crucial to an understanding of the revolutionary process 
‚<because revolutions do not allow anyone to play the schoolmaster with them.‛1547 It is 
from the masses themselves that springs, in Trotsky’s words, ‚<that leaping 
movement of ideas and passions which seems to the police mind a mere result of the 
activities of ‚demagogues‛.‛ 1548  A popular revolution is not engineered by 
demagogues, parties or activists, but it is the spontaneous activity of the people 
itself. 
 However, there is a tendency among some activists to oppose ‚spontaneity‛ to 
‚organization‛ or ‚centralization‛. This is a mystification of the concept, as 
spontaneity does not exclude organization or centralization: it rather addresses 
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the origins of organization, coherence, and systematicity. Spontaneity then means 
organization from below, organically emerging from its own ranks, as Bamyeh 
illustrated:  
<popular committees in the neighborhood, with their rudimentary weapons and 
total absence of illusions, represented what society had already become with this 
revolution: a real body, controlling its present with its own hands, and learning 
that it could likewise make a future itself, in the present and from below. At this 
moment, out of the dead weight of decades of inwardness and self-contempt, there 
emerged spontaneous order out of chaos.1549 
Schielke shared this view: 
The spontaneous organisation of Egyptians in demonstrations and in residential 
areas alike is for me the most powerful proof that Egyptians are capable of having a 
democratic rule. It is really amazing, and many people I speak with are extremely 
proud of this. Garbage is continuously collected at the demonstration and on the 
main streets by volunteers in a country that until now has been full of garbage 
anywhere you turn. People are guarding the streets where until recently they were 
dependent on and subject to a brutal and inefficient police force. If this momentum 
can be held, and turned into a constant dynamic, it will radically change Egypt.1550 
‚Spontaneity‛ refers to the immanence of organizational capacities in the popular 
masses who construct themselves as a social Subject. The popular Subject 
develops its own organizational competences through its revolutionary 
performances. Spontaneous structures are neoformations that arise in the 
processes of overcoming certain concrete predicaments:  
<for example governing how to communicate, what to do the next day, what to 
call that day, how to evacuate the injured, how to repulse baltagiyya assaults, and 
even how to formulate demands—emerged in the field directly and continued to 
develop in response to new situations.1551 
Revolutionary activity produced its own organic directive, technical, and cultural 
intellectuals. It created its own division of labor, rules, relations, artifacts and 
signs. In other words it acquired systematicity and coherence and became an 
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activity-system.1552 The performances of this activity-system projected the image of 
a new, just and democratic society of self-governance: 
I saw patriotism expressed everywhere as collective pride in the realization that 
people who did not know each other could act together, intentionally and with a 
purpose. During the ensuing week and a half, millions converged on the streets 
almost everywhere in Egypt, and one could empirically see how noble ethics—
community and solidarity, care for others, respect for the dignity of all, feeling of 
personal responsibility for everyone--emerge precisely out of the disappearance of 
government.1553 
This was the autoproletic instruction of the revolutionary activity-system: ‚being 
revolutionary‛ was not only an instrumental activity oriented towards the 
overthrow of the regime, it was also a powerful foreshadowing of the possibility 
of direct and participative democracy and ‚authentic‛ life.  
 From this perspective, leadership and organizational centralization are not 
antithetical to the spontaneous self-determination of the masses, but rather a 
higher, more elaborate phase in the development of its systemic activity. The fact 
that the movement lacked a ‚center‛ 1554  was, in its early phase, rather a 
springboard than an obstacle. Without a center it was much more difficult for the 
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435 
 
State to defeat or recuperate the masses. However, when the SSoD of the activity-
system required it to strike a decisive blow against al-nizam, this advantage 
turned into a disadvantage, as Sabry Zaky argued: 
This revolutionary process began without a leader. It is a kind of leaderless 
organization. It is like a starfish organization. When you cut any hand of the 
starfish it brings out another hand, if you cut it in half it becomes two starfish. 
This was very important at that time, to have a leaderless organization, because 
Mubarak failed to find someone to talk to. This was very important at that time. If 
he found someone he would have been able to buy time or to strengthen his 
position, but the strength of the revolution at that time was to be a leaderless 
organization. If you cut it from any side it brings back that side and swells all the 
time. But this is not alright now. Something that is an advantage at a certain 
moment can become a disadvantage at another time. In the beginning it was an 
advantage.1555 
Like many other actors, Khaled al-Balshy shared Zaky’s concerns: 
It will not be a revolution if things stay as they are now. What happened in Egypt 
in the revolution was that we did not have a leadership so there could not be 
negotiations with the regime to end the protests, which made the people stay in the 
square until Mubarak resigned. But this was also a bad thing, because we do not 
have a leadership to direct the movement and put forward a program for the future 
of Egypt.1556 
The autoproletic instruction of the masses by their own activity was a crucial – 
but not the only – factor in the development of the revolutionary Project. Other 
actors assisted the popular activity-system in various ways.   
Heteroleptic Instruction 
Journalists and activists who engaged with the popular activity-system in a 
solidary way, played an important part in the development of the revolutionary 
Project. As explained in Chapter 21 Story of a Revolution, leftist journalists, 
Facebook and Twitter users, and civil-democratic activists initiated the Project by 
their call for protest on 25 January. Journalist and RS leader Mustafa Bassiouny, 
for example, remembered that: 
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We tried to mobilize towards 25 January as we had mobilized towards the labor 
strikes and the protests against the torture of Khaled Said. We hoped that 25 
January would become a big day of protest, because of the Tunisian Revolution, 
and that it would be the seed of the Egyptian revolution. We organized a 
demonstration in front of the Ministry of Interior and after the successful 
mobilizations of 25 January we started to organize ourselves for the revolution. On 
28 January we realized the movement was taking the shape of a revolution.1557 
There was a reciprocal relation between the ‚real‛, physical mobilization in the 
streets and the virtual reproduction and dissemination of these actions, 
producing and reinforcing a ‚feeling‛ among the diverse participants in the 
emerging revolutionary activity-system that they ‚controlled the streets‛.1558 Even 
when the internet was shut down, when the independent media were repressed, 
and when the battle was primarily waged in the streets,1559 progressive journalists 
and ‚virtual‛ activists played a role, as they were forced to go to the streets and 
support the masses there. Khaled al-Balshy, chief editor of al-Badil, recalled the 
participation of progressive journalists in the movement: 
A lot of journalists were involved from the first day, 25 January. But there are two 
types of media: the one who supported the revolution and the one who resisted, the 
counter-revolutionary media. A lot of independent journalists were split. Dostour 
and al-Badil supported the revolution since the first day. The government blocked 
our sites< The newspapers and websites like al-Dostour and al-Badil played a big 
and good role, not only with news coverage, but they were helping to organize the 
revolution: where can we meet etc< 
Within 24 hours after blocking our websites all our journalists were in the square, 
where we encountered other journalists of the opposition. The government 
transformed journalists into activists during the revolution by arresting 
journalists. On the first day in the square five journalists of al-Badil were arrested. 
So we were not only Egyptian citizens supporting the revolution, but also 
journalists supporting our colleagues, demanding their release. The government 
also transformed journalists into activists by attacking newspaper buildings< 
A lot of journalists were participating in the revolution, even those of al-Ahram – 
which is a national [= governmental] newspaper – made a strike, occupying the 
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chief editor's office and changing the policy of the newspaper after the Friday of 
Anger.1560 
Fatma Ramadan, leader in the SRC, asserted that leftist activists played a role 
during the revolution: 
Like all other forces the Left took part in the revolution. The Left had a big role in 
the youth alliance, the media and it had a role in the square, especially in 
establishing the stages. Like all other forces it played a role. We were also the ones 
who called for the protests in Imbaba and Giza.1561 
Gihan Shabeen of the SRC concurred: 
We had also a small journal from the beginning of the protests and our office was 
near of Tahrir Square and it became like the Mecca of the revolutionaries. This is 
how a very small group like ours can play a big role.1562 
Tagammu leader Husayn Abd al-Razik admitted that the party leadership in Cairo 
had cut itself from the revolution, but that their youth had mobilized 
independently: 
Tagammu took the decision not to take part in the demonstration on 25 January 
but it allowed any member to take part in the protests. From the beginning, our 
youth organization, all of them, decided to take part and went to Tahrir Square and 
played a role in forming one of the alliances in Midan Tahrir. There were about 
three or four alliances, in one of them our youth organization took part and 
assisted them. Most of our members outside Cairo were the leaders of the 
demonstrations.1563 
Journalist and Tagammu youth activist Haisam Hassan recalled that: 
Rifaat al-Said said that we shouldn’t go, because it was the feast of the police and 
there were police killed defending Egypt in 1952. So make it at 26 etc. The youth 
were refusing all his words, and in the other parties as well. We insisted at opening 
the party’s building on the 25th and on Friday. We were inside the building, 
refusing to close it< 
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The first field hospital in Tahrir and mid-town was in Tagammu, in the youth 
union, with one of the doctors of the party, we made a room in the party itself and 
the first people who came to be treated were the soldiers themselves< 
A lot of people in the streets did not have any consciousness. Without these actions 
and publications from Tagammu and other parties and the Ikhwan the people 
would have left the square after Mubarak said that he would fire the government. 
But it was not acceptable because he left the regime intact. Without these 
statements, this spontaneous organization, we would not have been effective in the 
streets. So we did play a role, an organized role of the party.1564 
RS leader Hisham Fouad summarized the role of the Left: 
Who made the initiative to begin the first demonstrations. In this regard the Left 
played an important role, together with other groups. They played a role in the 
start of the revolution, but after Friday 28, it is a very broad movement and the 
Left was much too small to affect the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood with its 
one million members< The Left cannot affect it strongly. The revolution belonged 
to the people, there were no political groups that became leaders of the movement. 
All political organizations, left or right, were unable to catch the movement of the 
people in the streets, which went very fast. They constantly ran behind the events. 
All Leftists groups, however, participated in the movement.1565 
Already on the first Tuesday of Revolt, political activists distributed pamphlets 
that developed the demands of the popular masses. These texts shaped the 
consciousness of the emerging activity-system and offered it concrete objectives 
and methodologies. Firstly, they presented a generalizing expression to the 
shared experience and potential agency of the masses, in such phrases as: "We 
have started an uprising with the will of the people, the people who have suffered for thirty 
years under oppression, injustice and poverty< Egyptians have proven today that they 
are capable of taking freedom by force and destroying despotism." 1566  These slogans 
instructed the social Subject, ‚the people‛, about its political and economic 
predicament and its capacity to overcome it. Secondly, activists put forward 
concrete demands, for example the immediate removal of Mubarak and the 
government. Thirdly, they recommended instruments and methods to achieve 
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these objectives: continuous strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations. 1567  Fourthly, 
activists distributed leaflets with practical and tactical advice for demonstrators, 
for example what to do when being attacked by tear gas.1568  
 Those intellectuals who supported the popular activity-system in solidarity 
had to prove their sincerity by standing side by side with the protesters, who 
were suspicious of any form of ‚party politics‛: ‚We made a presence in the square 
with Tagammu, not by our words, but by sleeping in the streets, and so on.‛ 1569 They 
quickly became part of the organic division of labor of the activity-system: ‚Hani 
knows a lot about media and mixing sounds, so he will do this. Haisam knows about 
publishing papers and leaflets and talking about demands, so he will do that.‛1570 This 
shared activity-system was governed by a dialectical pedagogy, as both the 
masses and the activists learned from each other, instructed each other, and 
developed each other as social Subjects.  
Art as Political Instruction 
Apart from these forms of instruction by the already existing ‚intellectuals‛ of the 
civil-democratic movement, artists, musicians, and especially cartoonists played 
an important part in expressing and interpellating the development of the 
revolutionary Project. Actor Muhammad Zaky Murat even claimed that: ‚Art is 
the most effective tool in the whole world, because it is the easiest and fastest means to 
determinate the feelings of the people and to push them in the right way, in my 
opinion.‛1571 Salah Abd al-Azim, one of the caricaturists and artists who provided 
Tahrir with some of its most salient cartoons, described the role of art during the 
revolution: 
I chose the middle of the Square to paint my cartoons, but the government of the 
Square< chose to put all my cartoons at the entrances of the Square. To make it 
visible for everyone coming to the Square. After taking Qasr al-Ayni streets and 
occupying the streets around the parliament and the Shura Council, we put one of 
the cartoons on the doors of the parliament.  
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The Egyptians had this emotion about Mubarak as the father of the nation for 
thirty years. This was so effective. After seeing these cartoons and these symbols, 
they are tearing down the idols inside themselves. The art and the cartoon is the 
most important shortcut to speeches, and articles and newspapers and opinions, to 
all of this...1572 
This is an important insight: art is not only a reflection of the development of the 
activity-system; it is a form of mediation of the social Subject, a ‚shortcut‛ that 
elucidates, discloses or unpacks complex narratives.1573 Furthermore, art was not 
only introduced from without in the activity-system, by ‚cultural intellectuals‛, 
but artistic forms emerged from the movement itself. Classic songs of Fuad Negm 
and Shaykh Imam, such as ‚I am the People‛ and ‚I call on you‛ were sung and 
performed by protesters, alongside new and spontaneous creations. 1574  In his 
analysis of the poetry of the revolution, Eliott Colla concluded: 
For the most part, these poems are composed in a colloquial, not classical, register 
and they are extremely catchy and easy to sing. The genre also has real potential 
for humor and play—and remind us of the fact that revolution is also a time for 
celebration and laughter< 
Likewise, the act of singing invective that satirizes feared public figures has an 
immediate impact that cannot be explained in terms of language, for learning to 
laugh at one’s oppressor is a key part of unlearning fear. Indeed, witnesses to the 
revolt have consistently commented that in the early hours of the revolt—when 
invective was most ascendant—protesters began to lose their fear< 
This poetry is not an ornament to the uprising—it is its soundtrack and also 
composes a significant part of the action itself.1575 
The fundamental role of art and the carnivalesque evokes Lenin’s appreciation of 
the creative potential of a revolution: 
Revolutions are the festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no other time 
are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of 
a new social order as at a time of revolution. At such times the people are capable of 
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performing miracles, if judged by the narrow, philistine scale of gradual 
progress.1576  
However, he also added: 
But the leaders of the revolutionary parties must also make their aims more 
comprehensive and bold at such a time, so that their slogans shall always be in 
advance of the revolutionary initiative of the masses, serve as a beacon, reveal to 
them our democratic and socialist ideal in all its magnitude and splendour and 
show them the shortest and most direct route to complete, absolute and decisive 
victory.1577 
As the political activists were too weak and fragmented to guide an activity-
system of millions of protesters, and the spontaneous forms of self-organization 
were only slowly developing, the revolutionary movement lacked a center that 
could direct its actions to ‚complete, absolute and decisive victory‛. Especially 
during the last week, the frustration of activists and observers with regard to the 
incapacity of the activity-system to move towards the capture of key State 
institutions became apparent. Schielke wrote that: 
The revolutionary movement must be able to occupy the government media. That 
the television centre in Maspiro has remained firmly in the hands of the 
government has left a key instrument of power in the system’s hands. Actually the 
demonstrators in Alexandria even sent a message to Cairo, suggesting that the 
Tahrir demonstrators should occupy the TV centre. But to occupy it (it is less than 
a kilometre away) would require a carefully and secretly planned attack, and the 
pro-democracy demonstrators are both too peaceful and too spontaneous to take 
part in such an attack.1578 
Jack Shenker observed that: 
 There is no one leader; it has been a leaderless movement from the start and it still 
a leaderless movement here in the square. A huge amount of energy but not much 
of an outlet at the moment as to where it should be taken next.1579 
Personally, I recall myself shouting at the television screen that showed al-Jazeera 
footage of Tahrir during the first Day of Departure: ‚Go, go now to the parliament 
                                                          
1576 Lenin 1969: 125-6. 
1577 Ibid. 
1578 Schielke 2011. 
1579 Jack Shenker in Guardian.co.uk 2011h. 
442 
 
and the palace!‛ There was a general sense of urgency that the Tuesday and Friday 
momentum of mass mobilization should not be allowed to evaporate, but 
channeled in a march on the State’s institutions. As Samuli Schielke noted, 
however, the protesters – understandably – lacked the will for a confrontation 
with the entrenched military. The anger that gripped the protesters in the second 
Friday of Departure, when Mubarak refused to step down, opened up the 
possibility of a concerted move towards the capture of key State sites. Because of 
the weakness of political activists, cultural intellectuals were able to play a 
crucially directive role at this juncture. Salah Abd al-Azim explained to me that: 
Within the days in which Mubarak insisted in staying in the presidential chair we 
said to everyone: ‚today he’ll leave, or tomorrow‛. So I made a cartoon of Mubarak 
sitting in his chair and a lot of spiders climbing on it. As a symbol to say: ‚stay in 
your palace, don’t move, and we will come to you‛. I made a lot of copies, small 
and big ones. Mubarak didn’t resign in the first days. After the speech of Mubarak 
when he said I will remain in the chair, a lot of people carried small copies of the 
cartoon in a demonstration to Mubarak’s palace. The biggest one is four to three 
meters, they carried it on a car and people wrote on it: don’t leave, we’re coming to 
you...1580  
Then, my translator, the leftist activist and journalist Haisam Hassan, chipped in: 
When the audience saw the cartoons and pictures in the Square the people said: 
‚yes that is what we wanted to say, he describes our feelings and our demands.‛ A 
cartoon like: ‚don’t leave we are coming‛ was like a message for all the people: 
‚this is the time to do this, this is a good idea.‛ When they saw this<.1581  
‚<It made them move,‛ Salah Abd al-Azim finished Haisam’s sentence.1582 The lack 
of a directive center during the last days of the insurrection against Mubarak was 
temporarily overcome through the prolepsis of art, which literally imagined the 
next step in the development of the revolutionary Project. Massive 
demonstrations made their way to the Palace and the Parliament, and the only 
intervention that could interrupt their movement was the statement that Mubarak 
had resigned as President.  
                                                          
1580 Interview with Salah Abd al-Azim, Cairo, 22 March 2011. 
1581 Ibid. 
1582 Ibid. 
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The Shape of Things to Come 
Revolution is not merely an instrument to accomplish societal change: it is the 
movement itself towards a transformation of society. The future social formation 
is not an object external to the revolutionary process, lying in wait until the 
masses finally ‚capture‛ it, but it is immanent to the revolutionary activity-
system itself. The forms of self-organization, democracy, and authentic living that 
arise during the mass mobilizations and protests are anticipations of a fully 
matured society based on the self-determination and self-governance of the 
people. Bamyeh highlighted this discovery of authentic human relations and 
governance in the revolution: 
 Everyone I talked to echoed similar transformative themes: they highlighted a 
sense of wonder at how they discovered their neighbor again, how they never knew 
that they lived in ‚society‛ or the meaning of the word, until this event, and how 
everyone who yesterday had appeared so distant is now so close< 
As the Revolution took longer and longer to accomplish the mission of bringing 
down the regime, protestors themselves began to spend more time highlighting 
other accomplishments, such as how new ethics were emerging precisely amidst 
chaos. Those evidenced themselves in a broadly shared sense of personal 
responsibility for civilization—voluntary street cleaning, standing in line, the 
complete disappearance of harassment of women in public, returning stolen and 
found objects, and countless other ethical decisions that had usually been ignored 
or left for others to worry about.1583 
The interiorization of the revolution also entailed a psychological struggle. The 
artist Salah Abd al-Azim poetically referred to this as ‚<tearing down the idols in 
themselves<‛1584 Guardian journalist Harriet Sherwood observed that:  
People are eloquent about the reasons for their uprising. Many speak of economic 
hardship, lack of democracy, the desire for freedom. One of the most memorable 
comments in a day, a week, of memorable conversations comes from a guy who tells 
me he has come "to fight the fear inside me".‛1585 
Muhammad Bamyeh noticed that: 
                                                          
1583 Bamyeh 2011. 
1584 Interview with Salah Abd al-Azim, Cairo, 22 March 2011. 
1585 Harriet Sherwood in Guardian.co.uk 2011m. 
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...spontaneity played a therapeutic and not simply organizational or ideological 
role. More than one participant mentioned to me how the revolution was 
psychologically liberating, because all the repression that they had internalized as 
self-criticism and perception of inborn weakness, was in the revolutionary climate 
turned outwards as positive energy and a discovery of self-worth, real rather than 
superficial connectedness to others, and limitless power to change frozen reality. I 
heard the term ‚awakening‛ being used endlessly to describe the movement as a 
whole as a sort of spontaneous emergence out of a condition of deep slumber, which 
no party program could shake off before.1586 
Even during the first days of demonstrations, there were already subtle changes 
in the slogans of this vanguard of protesters, which pointed towards a 
development in the consciousness of the actors with regard to their own agency. 
Instead of chanting ‚we want change‛, protesters declared: ‚we are change‛.1587 
While this may seem trivial, it pointed to a crucial shift in the Subjectness of the 
activity-system: the slogan ‚we want change‛ implicitly addressed another actor 
who could achieve change for the masses. The aim expressed the formation of a 
popular Will – the people as wanting something – but not yet the agency of al-
sha’b. This slogan could still be a part of the old Arab nationalist paradigm of 
corporatism and a moral economy, whereby the people demanded its negotiated 
rights from the Pharaoh. ‚We are change‛, however, forcefully rejects the 
mediation of the Ruler in the emancipation of the people.1588 ‚Change‛ is no 
longer an object external to the activity of the people, that can be demanded and 
granted by another power: ‚change‛ is the self-directing activity of the masses. 
The realization that the people organized in the streets is the solution to its own 
problems is the realization of its political agency as a people: ‚we don't need 
politicians, this is the people's revolution!‛1589  
                                                          
1586 Bamyeh 2011. 
1587 Guardian.co.uk 2011d. 
1588  After Mubarak’s speech on Wednesday 2 February, Samuli Schielke contemplated the 
tendency towards liberation from the deeply rooted patron-client relation from a Freudian 
perspective: ‚This is a recourse to a social ideology of patriarchal rule where the father is to be respected 
even in disagreement. This is a shrewd strategy that employs some deeply rooted sentiments among the 
people, but the sentiments of many Egyptians have changed in a strikingly Oedipal manner. M. says that 
this revolution is really a Freudian father murder par excellence. By symbolically killing the authoritarian 
father of the nation, people are gaining their independence as full persons.‛ (Schielke 2011) 
1589 In Schielke 2011. 
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 In a famous aphorism, Marx stressed that: ‚To be radical is to grasp things by the 
root.‛1590 However, the revolutionary consciousness of a new society remained 
largely an intuition or ‚good sense‛, which tried to grasp and make sense of the 
developing experience of self-emancipation. The ‚idea‛ of self-governance was 
taking shape in articulation with the prolepsis of the revolutionary activity-
system and the development of a critique of al-nizam. During the 25 January 
insurrection days, al-nizam came to express all that was structurally wrong with 
the Egyptian social formation, but this was still a ‚pseudoconcept‛ – a listing of 
the undesired properties and attributes of the system: corruption; violence; 
authoritarianism; poverty; and so on. A true concept of al-nizam, of the political 
economy that governed them for decades, allowed the masses to aspire societal 
change that was not merely cosmetic, but radical. Moreover, a true concept of its 
own revolutionary activity permitted al-sha’b to act as a self-governing body.  
 The articulation of a ‚theory‛, or ‚philosophy‛ of the Egyptian revolution 
required the building of a Revolutionary Prince. Even though the formation of 
this Prince became more explicit after the fall of Mubarak – in the shape of the 
practico-critical activity of new popular parties, trade unions, and centers – its 
development was already rooted in, on the one hand, the civil-democratic and 
workers’ movement of the last decade, and, on the other, the neoformations that 
emerged from the revolutionary Project itself: civil and strike committees, and the 
‚republic‛ of Tahrir. During the days of insurrection, the most powerful prolepsis 
of the ‚shape of things to come‛ emerged from the self-organization in Tahrir, of 
which the salient image continuously attracted and interpellated fresh layers to 
the social Subject of ‚the people‛. I discuss the dynamic of Tahrir as the vanguard 
of the revolutionary process, a Project within a Project, in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1590 Marx 1992: 251. 
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CHAPTER 23 
The Republic of Tahrir 
The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon 
us from their work-worn figures. 
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: Private Property and Labor (1992: 365) 
The Activity of Tahrir 
During the first days of protest, Midan Tahrir turned into a stronghold for the 
revolutionaries, the site where they entrenched themselves to collectively 
withstand the attacks of the riot police. The centrality of this particular square in 
the revolutionary process was ‚overdetermined‛ by its symbolic and spatial 
characteristics. Firstly, ‚Liberation Square‛ referred to the 1919 uprising against 
the British, which secured partial independence. Thus it became a favorite 
gathering place for national events: ‚Egyptians have poured into Tahrir to celebrate 
soccer victories, to mourn the passing of national icons, and to protest injustice.‛1591 In 
2003 it became the symbolic locale of political mobilization, when demonstrators 
occupied the square for ten hours in protest against the war in Iraq. Secondly, the 
midan constituted ‚<a major transport hub surrounded by vital elements of the state 
apparatus: the parliament, several ministerial buildings, and the imposing 
Mogamma’<‛1592 
 Ahmed Shokr observed that: ‚When protesters arrived at Tahrir on January 29, 
they did not come with the intention of creating a radical utopia< As the revolution 
unfolded, Tahrir was elevated from a rally site to a model for an alternative society.‛1593 
Apart from being a mere site of mass protests, Tahrir also increasingly morphed 
into an activity-system in its own right: a ‚freed zone‛1594 within the belly of the 
dictatorship. Through its self-governance and authentic life, Tahrir became the 
practical negation of al-nizam and a ‚microcosm‛ of the whole revolutionary 
Project. Its salient activity not only defied the regime, but projected an alternative 
to the current social formation. 
                                                          
1591 Shokr 2012: 41. 
1592 Rashed 2011: 23. 
1593 Shokr 2012: 42. 
1594 As declared by the occupiers themselves. (Rashed 2011: 34) 
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 Roughly four ‚leading activities‛ developed the Square into the Republic of 
Tahrir, of which the importance continuously changed according to the 
circumstances: demonstration; occupation; festival; and governance. 
Demonstration or protest was the first mode of activity that emerged in the 
Square on 25 January. It involved people walking towards Tahrir chanting 
slogans and songs, and carrying home-made placards and signs. Even though 
this activity was explicitly directed outwards, against the regime, it presumed a 
degree of internal, ‚spontaneous‛ organization. The confrontation of protesters 
with security forces that tried to clear the Square precipitated the activity of 
occupation, which, in turn, produced forms of living and governance. 
Independent leftist activist Wael Tawfiq described the transformation of the 
Square during the Battle of the Camel: 
In the first five or six days it was a fresh movement and it became a normal 
attitude to be in the square< Before the camel battle people were eating, sleeping 
and working in the square. The Egyptian media represented us as an isolated 
group, as a closed community inside the square. The camel battle transformed the 
atmosphere and attitude inside the square. It started at 14h and it lasted until 18h. 
It came after the first statement of Mubarak. At that point some people were still 
sympathetic towards Mubarak: he is an ill and feeble man, he will retire 
eventually, etc. People were becoming tired and there were few numbers in the 
square compared to other days. Even though they were terrorized by the attack, 
there was a big resistance. It was revealed that being in the square was effective, 
after six days of little change. After 18h we were gaining the upper hand and 
people were feeling stronger again. People felt that the end victory was nearby. 
After sustaining a lot of injuries, the attackers locked the streets to Tahrir square, 
and the defenders were on their own. The most important image of this day was 
that the square transformed into organized working groups. Everyone in the 
square was organized. Girls, women, even the girls with a niqab. All of them were 
united without thinking about ideology or religion. Everyone did what he could to 
his ability. I had a broken arm so I started to break rocks to help others. The women 
with the niqab were carrying the rocks. A lot of people removed their jackets to 
carry rocks, even if they got cold. We established a group for military planning< 
The camel battle changed the atmosphere. Before the attack when a man was 
injured he went to hospital and stayed at home. But now people who were injured 
immediately returned to the square after seeing a doctor. We started to make a civil 
449 
 
prison of the revolution. In the first days when we arrested a policeman we handed 
them over to the army, but they released them. So now we made a prison. 1595  
The predicament of the attacks interpellated a spontaneous social division of 
labor within the occupying activity of Tahrir. Firstly, the ‚borders‛ of the Square 
– the Front1596 – had to be defended. Secondly, occupation implied that protesters 
not only had to develop tactics to ‚militarily‛ secure the ‚free zone‛, but also a 
daily life routine: securing food and shelter, treating the wounded, washing 
clothes, setting up stations for mobile charging, et cetera.1597 This autonomous 
survival and life in the Square was realized through a continuous exchange of 
solidarity with the revolutionary Project ‚outside‛ Tahrir:  
Many of those arriving brought fresh bread, water, fruit and other supplies, and 
the atmosphere was relaxed. Long lines formed at tables of people handing out tea 
and bread. Around the square were makeshift clinics, set up in the entranceways of 
stores, including a KFC. At one, a man received an injection in his arm. Above 
another was the sign of an interlocking crescent and cross.1598 
Guardian journalist Jack Shenker observed that this solidarity created a festive 
awareness of participation in the same revolutionary Project: ‚As fresh waves of 
protesters broke through police cordons to join the throng in Tahrir, a festival atmosphere 
took hold – groups were cheered as they arrived carrying blankets and food, and 
demonstrators pooled money together to buy water and other supplies.‛ 1599  Drawing 
from his own expertise and experience, Samuli Schielke claimed that: 
As an anthropologist who has long worked on festive culture, I noticed a strikingly 
festive aspect to the revolutionary space of Tahrir Square. It is not just a protest 
against an oppressive regime and a demand for freedom. In itself, it is freedom. It is 
a real, actual, lived moment of the freedom and dignity that the pro-democracy 
movement demands.1600 
Even though the objective of the revolution, the overthrow of the Mubarak 
regime, was grim, the liberating feeling among Tahrir occupiers that they could 
organize their own lives independent of the system, and that they were part of a 
                                                          
1595 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 8 March 2011. 
1596 Rashed 2011: 25. 
1597 Guardian.co.uk 2011m. 
1598 Associated Press in Guardian.co.uk 2011k. 
1599 Jack Shenker in Guardian.co.uk 2011a. 
1600 Schielke 2011. 
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system of solidarity, allowed for the ‚festival of the oppressed and exploited‛1601. The 
occupation of Tahrir did not only develop strategies for survival, but also ways of 
enjoying life. 1602  People sang, discussed, prayed, told jokes, fell in love, got 
married, and spent their honeymoon in the Square.1603 On Tuesday 8 February, 
Jack Shenker vividly described life at the Square: 
It's so difficult to convey the atmosphere of this place through words or images; 
Tahrir may have dropped down the international media agenda somewhat in recent 
days, but honestly if you go down there and just stare around you - at the 
picnicking families, the raucous flag-wavers, the volunteer tea suppliers, the cheery 
human security cordons, the slumbering bodies curled up in the metal treads of the 
army's tanks, the pro-change graffiti that adorns every placard, every tent, every 
wall space in vision - it's impossible not to feel as moved as we all did in the very 
first days of this ongoing revolution.1604 
As collective life requires governance in one way or another. As the State was 
forcefully driven away from the space of Midan Tahrir, forms of self-governing 
emerged organically from the activity of occupation: ‚Daily struggles to hold the 
space and feed its inhabitants, without the disciplined mechanisms of an organized state, 
were exercises in democratic process. It was through these everyday practices that Tahrir 
became a truly radical space.‛1605 Apart from the daily administration of the Square, 
occupiers ‚<break over the barriers excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside 
their traditional representatives, and create by their own interference the initial 
groundwork for a new régime.‛1606  British actor Khaled Abdallah, who was among 
the protesters in Tahrir, declared that:  
Midan Tahrir has a system that works, it has borders that it can protect, it has its 
ways of feeding itself, it has ways to sleep, it has ways to bring people in and out 
safely. It has now become like a mini state that works and will function as long as 
it needs to in order to get what this country deserves.1607 
Blogger and activist Omar Robert Hamilton described the grassroots political 
dynamic of the ‚Republic of Tahrir‛: 
                                                          
1601 See Lenin 1969 in the previous chapter. 
1602 See Rashed 2011. 
1603 Guardian.co.uk 2011m. 
1604 Guardian.co.uk 2011p. 
1605 Shokr 2012: 44. 
1606 Trotsky 2001: 17. 
1607 Khaled Abdallah in Guardian.co.uk 2011m. 
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A revolutionary, organic, engaged, democaratic [sic] space has emerged in Tahrir 
Square. Numbers swell and fall throughout the day, people come and go, but 
intense and sophisticated political engagement remains a fixture. From debates 
about the relative merits of parliamentary vs presidential systems, to proposals 
about consititutional [sic] reforms, to suggested programmes of poltical [sic] 
transition, there is only one thing on everyone's mind. Some debates are held 
around the numerous microphones, with crowds cheering or booing the speaker's 
proposals. Some are held in small circles on the ground that attract passers by [sic] 
eager to listen or voice an opinion, all are open to everyone to participate. 
< whatever happens, for the first time in decades, there is a space in Egypt that is 
home to total freedom of thought and expression and political creativity< A new 
society has taken root in Tahrir, and it wont [sic] be driven out until the people 
have won their freedom.1608 
Amina al-Bendary emphasized that the significance of the governance of Tahrir 
was not only its self-administration, but also the vision, the imagining of an 
alternative to al-nizam, which it entailed:1609 
<they agree that together they are Egypt, and they agree that they imagine and 
demand a better future for themselves and their offspring, and they agree that 
better means free. The protestors in Liberation Square are not fighting for limited, 
direct demands — higher salaries, fewer taxes, more perks. They are fighting for 
values such as freedom and dignity. And they understand this to mean self-rule, 
democratic representative government, human rights, a dignified life.1610 
Self-governance was interiorized as a new ethics by participants of the Project. 
For example, as Gihan Ibrahim of the RS explained, the experience of the Square 
transformed people’s attitude towards sexual harassment: 
People changed through the experience of being in Tahrir or being part of the 
revolution. Really, of the 18 days I was in Tahrir I felt no harassment whatsoever. I 
was among strangers and people I never seen in my life, of all walks of life, poor, 
rich, elites, middle-class, upper-class, different religions, all age groups, it didn’t 
matter. I never felt safer, I didn’t get harassed. Before, I was getting harassed daily 
when just walking down the street. Any woman goes through it in Egypt. It was 
through the collective struggle and this experience of fighting in Tahrir Square 
together that shed away all these stereotypes and dogmas that we are being trained 
                                                          
1608 Omar Robert Hamilton in Guardian.co.uk 2011o. 
1609 Also see Rashed 2011. 
1610 Al-Bendary 2011a. 
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to think. And it was out of this experience that people changed the ways in which 
they think. Because the day that Mubarak stepped down and people came to visit or 
came to look and see Tahrir for the first time, that’s when sexual harassment 
towards women was there again. It was because it was being done by other people. 
Those who had gone through the experience of the revolution, of the awakening of 
consciousness of equality between age, or class or religion. They didn’t experience 
that. They were still back in the Mubarak days basically. People were changed 
through the experience.1611 
Nawla Darwish of the NWF acknowledged the emergence of a revolutionary 
ethics towards women, 1612  and Fatma Ramadan of the SRC saw in the joint 
struggle of men and women a proleptic instruction of gender equality:  
Women played a big role, just like the men in the revolution. One look at the 
Square proves it. Women from all tendencies, leftists, politicized, non-politicized, 
even al-Ikhwan or the Salafists women, were present. It did not only have an 
impact on the consciousness of women, but also on that of the men. During the 
days of the revolution in the Square, they were together, close together, in the 
Square, and there were no cases of harassment. One of the Salafi leaders came on 
the stage and said: ‚I apologize for the women who are not wearing the veil‛, 
because he thought that they were bad women, but after he talked and discussed a 
lot with them, he apologized because he found that they had a high political 
consciousness. That was great.1613 
Revolution is not an abstract, mystifying force that liberates women; it is the 
concrete shared activity of men and women, coming together in struggle, 
solidarity, and self-governance, which has a strong emancipatory potential, 
because it confronts and instructs the participants as essentially human persons. 
Intellectuals of the Square 
The logic of the occupation demanded the creation of certain functions that 
secured the continued existence of life in the Square. Muhammad Zaky Murat 
summarized the various directive, cultural, and technical functions that were 
developed to answer the needs of the activity-system: 
                                                          
1611 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
1612 Conversation with Nawla Darwish, Cairo, 8 March 2011. 
1613 Interview with Fatma Ramadan, Cairo, 15 March 2011; See also Rashed 2011: 24. 
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This continuous presence made it necessary for us to create a substitution for life 
and society in the square. In order to hear each other within the millions we had to 
create a sound system, so we needed specialists with expertise in sound systems. 
They were using electricity from the State without permission because they stated 
that they owned the country and its electricity as well. So if there was an 
electricity engineer in the Square he played his role as an electricity engineer. 
While the thugs attacked the people in the Square we moved a lot of vehicles to the 
boundaries of the square and we couldn’t do this without a lot of mechanic 
engineers who showed us how to do it. A lot of times the people in the Square 
panicked and all the artists in the Square played the role of continuing the spirit of 
the revolution by songs and poems, and the role of entertaining the people in 
Tahrir Square. For example, the role of musicians, in addition to the cartoonists. 
We didn’t know them but we saw their works in the Square. They increased 
awareness inside the people and created a lot of new symbols and ideas by their 
drawings. Within the life of the Square we needed security. The only security 
means we had was the media. We had to give the media a message every day. So 
the artists inside the Square made a new art, a new shape, which was to write the 
demands and symbols in the soil, the land, the rocks, the stones. This was a 
message, not only to the media, but also to the people outside and inside the Square 
in order to change the Square into the real society we were dreaming of. The most 
important practical thing we all agreed about was the security and the cleaning of 
the Square. And the healing of the injured. Of course the doctors played an 
important role. This is a brief overview of the life in the Square.1614 
In order to address an audience, the Square needed a sound system. In order to 
heal the wounded, the Square needed doctors. ‚Traditional‛ intellectuals who 
possessed the relevant know-how and who participated in the activity-system 
became technical intellectuals of the revolutionary Project. On the other hand, the 
Square produced its own ‚organic‛ technical intellectuals in the shape of cleaners, 
security, et cetera. The festival of revolt was supported by established artists who 
joined the protests, and amateur cartoonists, actors, and singers who emerged 
from the activity of Tahrir itself. These cultural intellectuals not only provided 
entertainment, but also reflected and refracted the revolutionary Project in 
particular semiotic objectifications that were interiorized ‚back into‛ the 
developing social Subject. The art of the Square was its material consciousness 
and constituted an articulation as well as an active shaper of political awareness. 
Menal Khaled of the cinema workers union, recalled that: ‚We were supporting the 
                                                          
1614 Interview with Muhammad Zaky Murat, Cairo, 30 March 2011. 
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popular movement that was a real revolution. We created two stages in the square. One 
for the actors, the other for the professional workers, we were supporting popular people’s 
consciousness.‛1615 
 In addition, the Republic of Tahrir interpellated its own directive intellectuals: 
Every political power in the Square made its own stage in the Square to distribute 
its ideas and ideologies. These stages were named after the political forces. But the 
artists and actors and musicians made a big stage in the Square and called it the 
Revolution Stage in order to produce this artistic message in the revolution. The 
one who wants to give a speech about his son who was killed in the Square will do 
this in the Revolution Stage. Everyone was allowed to participate on this Stage.1616  
Intellectuals giving leadership and direction to the movement consisted of both 
those activists who had been a part of the political community before the 
revolution, and the leaders who materialized spontaneously within the ranks of 
protesters.  
 The Republic of Tahrir brought together political activists, artists and the 
masses in a shared system of solidary activity. There was a dialectical pedagogy 
of activists and artists becoming part of ‚the people‛, and the people becoming 
involved in politics and artistic production. The cartoonist Salah Abd al-Azim 
contemplated that:  
The Egyptian artists had a big problem in connecting with the people. Most 
Egyptians didn’t see any art or knew any artists and for many Egyptians it was 
the first time to see artists in action, and for artists it was the first time to have a 
mass feedback and audience through the Square.1617 
Projecting Change 
The activity of Tahrir not only entailed a collaborative project, in the sense of 
people coming together and working towards a self-defined goal, but also a 
collaborative projection, meaning that the revolutionary activity of the Square was 
a form of proleptic instruction for the whole revolutionary process. Occupiers 
themselves were conscious of their instructive role in the revolution and the 
                                                          
1615 Interview with Menal Khaled, Cairo, 25 March 2011. 
1616 Interview with Muhammad Zaky Murat, Cairo, 30 March 2011. 
1617 Interview with Salah Abd al-Azim, Cairo, 22 March 2011. 
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importance of their ‚leading activity‛ for the rest of the movement. Even after the 
first day of protest, Tuesday 25 January, activist Ahmed Salah claimed that: 
We must hold Tahrir through the night and tomorrow, so that every corner of 
Egypt can take us as an inspiration and rise up in revolt< It's a matter of life and 
death now – what happens over the next 24 hours will be vital to the history of this 
country. It's a very emotional moment for me.1618 
With regard to the Battle of the Camel, Wael Tawfiq, observed that: ‚The resistance 
and organization of Tahrir influenced the whole of Egypt and transformed the meaning of 
Mubarak's speech.‛1619 
 As the vanguard of the revolutionary movement, Tahrir called to it 
representatives from local activity-systems of resistance in Cairo neighborhoods 
and other Egyptian cities and regions. In Tahrir they enjoyed the freedom to 
debate the strategy of the movement and the future of Egypt.1620 They carried this 
experience of direct democracy and self-governance with them when they 
returned back to the local sites of protests, sharing and diffusing the prolepsis of 
Tahrir. 
 Tahrir captured not only the imagination of Egyptians, but through al-Jazeera 
and other international media its projection reached the living rooms of the global 
community. Schielke pondered: 
<if this revolution has taught me one thing is that the people of Egypt do not need 
to look up to Europe or America to imagine a better future. They have shown 
themselves capable of imagining a better future of their own making (with some 
important help from Tunisia). Compared to our governments with their lip service 
to democracy and appeasement of dictators, Egyptians have given the world an 
example in freedom and courage that we all should look up to as an example. This 
sense of admiration and respect is what has drawn so many foreigners to Tahrir 
Square in the past days, including myself.1621 
The Iraqi poet Sinan Antoon compared the significance of the Republic of Tahrir 
to the Paris Commune: 
                                                          
1618 Ahmed Salah in Guardian.co.uk 2011a. 
1619 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 8 March 2011. 
1620 Omar Robert Hamilton in Guardian.co.uk 2011o. 
1621 Schielke 2011. 
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The Paris Commune lasted for 71 days and didn’t end in victory, but it became a 
potent symbol and produced a new political form. Al-Tahrir, too, was "working, 
thinking, fighting, bleeding -- almost forgetful, in its incubation of a new society, 
of the cannibals at its gates -- radiant in the enthusiasm of its historical initiative.‛ 
Those heros *sic+ in Cairo ‚were ready to storm the heavens.‛ The earth they shook 
will suffice for now as they stand at the heart of (l)iberation, surrounded by 
millions.1622 
And just like the Paris Commune, the prolepsis of Tahrir inspired movements 
globally, from the Indignados, over Occupy Wall Street and workers’ strikes in 
Wisconsin, to student demonstrations in the UK and the Greek protests on the 
square of Syntagma, to ‚fight like an Egyptian‛.1623 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1622 Antoon 2011c. 
1623 Shihade, Flesher, and Cox 2012: 5. 
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CHAPTER 24 
Workers and the Revolution 
Gansch het raderwerk staat stil, als uw machtige arm het wil 
(The entire wheelwork will stand still, if your mighty arm will) 
Albert Hahn, Great Dutch Railway Strike Poster, 1903 
Anticipating Revolution 
Gihan Ibrahim of HASHD and the RS asserted that the 25 January Revolution was 
fuelled by a strong undercurrent of class struggle: 
<it has always stemmed from a class struggle, but in addition to the class struggle 
there was the obvious repression and corruption that everybody faced no matter 
what class, age, or sex or background or location< everybody faced the corruption 
of the Mubarak regime and this was a main drive for the revolution. But the class 
struggle has always existed in the background. You saw it in Mahalla, in the 
working class throughout the whole of Egyptian history.1624 
RS leader Mustafa Bassiouny concurred and stressed the importance of the 6 
April 2008 uprising in Mahalla as an anticipation of the 25 January insurrection:  
We cannot separate the event of 25 January from what happened with the whole 
labor struggle since the last ten years. The first uprising was on 6 April and this 
had a labor background. The great number of worker strikes from 2006 had a big 
impact on the social consciousness in Egypt.1625 
Political analyst Sabry Zaky claimed that:  
<workers played a key role in this with their strikes in their work-places. During 
this period they ignited this revolution and it is very important to talk about the 
economic indicators that led to this revolution. The government of Ahmed Nazif in 
2004 led a kind of privatization that privatized many companies and factories and 
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led off many workers. This helped a lot during the last six years to ignite the 
revolution.1626 
Workers resisted the neoliberal accumulation strategy that constituted the 
economic dimension of Mubarak’s passive revolution. Through their spontaneous 
strike activity-systems they spread a practical critique of Egypt’s political 
economy and a ‚good sense‛ of overcoming this predicament through 
solidarity.1627 With regard to the gradual and implicit ‚preparatory phase‛ of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, Trotsky detected a similar process: 
At the same time that the official society, all that many-storied superstructure of 
ruling classes, layers, groups, parties and cliques, lived from day to day by inertia 
and automatism, nourishing themselves with the relics of worn-out ideas, deaf to 
the inexorable demands of evolution, flattering themselves with phantoms and 
foreseeing nothing – at the same time, in the working masses there was taking 
place an independent and deep process of growth, not only hatred for the rulers, 
but a critical understanding of their impotence, an accumulation of experience and 
creative consciousness which the revolutionary insurrection and its victory only 
completed.1628 
At the eve of the 25 January Revolution, the Egyptian workers’ movement was 
trying to overcome its fragmentation and prepare for a new wave of protests. 
Following the example of the RETAU, other grassroots workplace committees 
planned to establish independent trade unions. Teacher leader Abd al-Hafiz 
recalled that: ‚<before the revolution we took a decision that we were going to have a 
trade union. We were planning to have a general strike in education by the end of this 
year and then announce the trade union. The strikes started with the revolution.‛1629 Suez 
labor leader Saud Omar explained how the revolutionary explosion in his home 
town was directly linked to the precarious economic situation of its working 
class. Since the devastations of the 1973 October War the State had channeled 
little investment to the Canal Zone city. ‚Suez has the highest number of unemployed 
youth. It is number five with regard to crime. It is number two with regard to 
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divorces.‛ 1630  The neoliberal passive revolution even worsened the economic 
predicament of the Suez population. The expansion of temporary contracts,  the 
increased pollution of the petrochemical industries, and the hiring of (extremely) 
low-paid foreign workers, in particular, put pressure on the wages, the well-
being, and the livelihoods of the city’s population. ‚The biggest problem in Suez was 
the unemployed youth and the desire to work in the government buildings and factories< 
and suddenly you are talking about bringing in foreign workers?‛ 1631 The rejection of 
the workers’ grievances by the city governor and the Ministry of Manpower, 
angered the Suez citizens, who rose up in protest during the November 2010 
parliamentary elections. Omar saw these violent street clashes as a general 
repetition for the city’s vanguard role during the 25 January insurrection: ‚This 
protest in the elections showed the anger of the citizens in Suez. It was like an experiment 
for the revolution in my opinion.‛ 1632   
 However, throughout 2010, workers’ outbursts remained largely fragmented, 
ad hoc, and leaderless. Khaled al-Balshy remembered that:  
At the start of 2010 we were preparing ourselves for a new protest wave, but 
looking back we now realize the reasons of its failure: we didn't have a leadership< 
A lot of people were asking where is the connection between the workers' leaders 
and their demands and the political leadership in order to collect these movements 
and start a new wave of struggle. But no one could imagine that it would happen 
like what happened in 25 January<1633 
The development of the workers’ movement had provided the 25 January 
Revolution with a strong impetus, but – unlike the 1905 and 1917 Russian 
Revolution, and more in tune with the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, for example 
– the uprising did not begin as an explicit class protest. Since 2000, the political 
and economic struggles against the passive revolution of the neoliberal bloc had 
continuously subsumed each other as moments within a broad process of 
accumulating popular revolt. If 2005 represented the high point of the civil-
democratic ‚political‛ moment (and its subsequent collapse), the Mahalla 
uprising of 2008 expressed the culmination of the ‚economic‛ class struggle (and 
its ensuing re-fragmentation). With the 25 January uprising, the movement’s 
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moment shifted back to the ‚political‛, but enriched with the class struggles of 
the previous decade. 
Workers as Demonstrators 
In the opening chapters of this dissertation I made a crucial methodological 
distinction between the study of a ‚person‛ and of a Subjectivity. A Subjectivity is 
the participation of an individual body in a social Subject / system of activity / 
collaborative Project. A person is a microcosm of Subjectivities, a social formation 
wrapped into an individual body. Being a wage laborer ‚objectively‛ does not 
mean that the individual engaged in wage laborer automatically acquires a 
proletarian Subjectivity. As I argued, class formation is the immanent result of the 
active struggle against the predicament of wage labor, and is not the passive 
reflection of relations and conditions in the workplace. With this in mind, one 
could plainly see many wage laborers participating in the 25 January uprising, 
but it took a while before these persons intervened in the revolutionary process as 
workers. Workers first participated as citizens – as a part of the broad, popular 
revolutionary Project – before they differentiated themselves as class actors: ‚In 
the part played by workers in the movement, demonstrations came before strikes< Strikes 
came later, four days before Mubarak fell.‛1634 Hossam al-Hamalawy observed that: 
From day 1 of our uprising, the working class has been taking part in the protests. 
Who do you think were the protesters in Mahalla, Suez and Kafr el-Dawwar for 
example? However, the workers were taking part as ‚demonstrators‛ and not 
necessarily as ‚workers‛– meaning, they were not moving independently.1635 
Fatma Ramadan concurred: 
When the revolution started workers were in the streets as individuals, not as an 
organized working class. You cannot imagine the three cities Suez, Mahalla and 
Alexandria, Suez; they had a million demonstrating, Alexandria too, and the 
workers were the biggest number, but they were not organized as a class.1636 
Why did workers not immediately participate as class actors in the revolutionary 
process?  
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Number one, because this was an uprising and all of them were there in the street; 
number two, because the government was staging a capital strike, so the workers 
weren't congregating in factories because the whole time the workers were either in 
the street or in the popular committees that were protecting the neighborhoods.1637   
The return of workers to their workplaces stimulated the development of class 
activity-systems of resistance.  
Workers as Class Actors 
As soon as the government reopened businesses from 7 February onwards, 
workers took the revolution to their workplaces and started to strike or 
demonstrate as class actors.1638 ‚Within the last three days before Mubarak left, there 
were mass strikes in the whole of Egypt.‛ 1639 On Tuesday 8 February, over 6,000 
workers of the Suez Canal company in Suez, Port Said, and Ismailia began an 
open-ended sit-in.1640 Also in Suez some 13,000 steel workers went on strike. 1641 
Cairo public transport and telecom workers Cairo also began to protest. 1642 
Wednesday 9 February saw the emergence of: ‚Strikes everywhere‛1643. The strike 
wave encouraged workers from all sections, layers, and regions to engage in 
work-stoppages, sit-ins, demonstrations, road-blockages, and other protests: 
thousands of factory workers in Mahalla, and Helwan;1644 5,000 workers of textile, 
medicine bottle, and ship repair companies in Suez;1645 court workers in Cairo and 
Helwan; 1646 thousands of workers in the Luxor tourism industry; more than 2,000 
workers in Qena; some 5,000 unemployed youth in Aswan; 1647  three public 
transportation garages in Cairo; 1648 thousands of workers in front of the Cairo 
Petroleum Ministry;1649  sanitation workers in Dokki (Cairo); 1650  3,000 Egyptian 
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National Railways workers;1651 railway technicians in Beni Suef;1652 state electricity 
staff;1653service technicians at the Suez Canal company;1654 workers of at least one 
hospital; 1655  employees of a factory of beverages; 1656  more than a hundred 
journalists of al-Ahram; 1657  the Armed Forces’ music corps; 1658  et cetera. On 
Thursday 10 February the bus drivers went on strike, paralyzing transport, and 
adding to the general disorganization of the State.1659 Reuters observed that: ‚If the 
strikes spread across the country, and paralyse key sectors, it could push Egypt's army to 
take sides, after trying to maintain an appearance of neutrality.‛ 1660  Hossam al-
Hamalawy claimed that:  
History has shown us that the industrial working class are normally last social 
class to join a revolt, and yet their intervention is usually the most crucial. We saw 
that in Iran, and in Tunisia; when the working-class enter the arena with mass 
strikes, that's when the regime is finished. Today the working-class has officially 
entered the battle.1661 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1650 New York Times in Guardian.co.uk 2011q. 
1651 Al-Masry Al-Youm in Guardian.co.uk 2011q. 
1652 Guardian.co.uk 2011q. 
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1654 Ibid. 
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1658 Interview with Khaled al-Balshy, Cairo, 14 March 2011. 
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But the workers, if they strike, it's "game over."  The game is over.  It's finished, because the machine 
won't work. There's no money coming in.  No trains are moving. No buses are moving. No factories are 
working. No ships are moving. No ports are operating. It's "game over"—finished. (Hossam al-
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Indeed, as Fatma Ramadan emphasized, the impact of the strikes on the 
unfolding of the uprising could hardly be overestimated: ‚This is one of the 
important reasons for Mubarak to resign and it was the introduction for a general strike 
in Egypt.‛1662 Gihan Shabeen was of the same opinion: ‚But during the last three 
days there were major strikes in major factories, even military factories. And I think that 
it was a major force in ousting Mubarak.‛1663 Wael Tawfiq posited that: 
The movement of the workers was more effective in bringing down the regime than 
Tahrir was. The support of the workers was clear, for example in Helwan the 
workers had a sign saying that the workers supported the revolution. This support 
was the main reason for the success of the revolution.1664 
Gihan Ibrahim stressed that: 
It was only on February 9 when all the workers went on strike, calling for a 
general strike, that toppled Mubarak. Really. Because it started to hurt the elites 
pockets and it created enough pressure for Mubarak to leave. It wasn’t Wael 
Ghoneim, you know. [laughs] Sorry. Yes he brought solidarity for more people to 
come to Tahrir, but that didn’t make Mubarak to step down. Yes, it was part of the 
pressure. But it was only two days after the call [for general strike] that Mubarak 
left.1665 
Political analyst Sabry Zaky agreed: 
The army itself is a big business tycoon in Egypt. It is not only an army, I call it 
the first businessman in Egypt. They have many companies, many factories and 
seashore resorts, they work with billions of dollars. They are very interested in 
keeping the workers outside these gains. So when the workers started to strike, they 
were afraid that it would become a very fierce revolution. That’s why I think it was 
important.1666 
Hisham Fouad added that ‚<the movement of the workers<‛ presented ‚<a danger 
to the capitalist system.‛1667 Even liberal youth activists such as Ahmed al-Gourd 
acknowledged the crucial part that workers played in bringing Mubarak down: 
‚<workers< made a huge contribution to the revolution. They started with strikes on 8 
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February all the way to 11 February. Strikes in basically every sector I can think of: 
energy, steel, textile, everywhere.‛1668 Muhammad Abbas, a Muslim Brother youth 
leader also recognized the importance of workers’ actions: ‚The threat to strike or 
the strikes themselves made Mubarak resign faster in Egypt. It was the last step that we 
had to make.‛1669 
 However, Saud Omar, far from diminishing the role of the strikes, drew 
attention to the convergence of two processes that led to Mubarak’s fall: on the 
one hand, the powerful entrance of the workers as class actors in the revolution; 
and on the other, the tendency of the revolutionary masses in Tahrir to move 
from mere ‚occupation‛ to the ‚assault‛ of State institutions: ‚The people marching 
on Europa palace in Cairo and calling labor strikes in Suez had an equal impact on the 
outcome of the revolution. These two were revolutionary actions that put pressure on the 
president to resign.‛1670 
 It is exactly the specter of the increasing interpenetration of the political and 
economic moments of the revolution that frightened the SCAF and led them to 
dispose of Mubarak as the leader of the neoliberal bloc. Rather than representing 
the pinacle of the uprising, the mass strikes initiated a new, protracted phase of 
the 25 January Revolution: ‚From the beginning of the revolution the slogan was: 
Change, Liberty, and Social Justice. From the beginning. So we cannot stop right 
now.‛1671 
The Mass Strike 
It has been argued by Anne Alexander, 1672  by Sameh Naguib, 1673  by Michael 
Schwartz,1674  and by myself, 1675  that the ‚movement‛ of the Egyptian worker 
Subject in the revolutionary process could be understood through Rosa 
Luxemburg’s concept of the ‚Mass Strike‛.1676 As I have already explained the 
notion of the Mass Strike in Chapter 4 Proletarian Sociogenesis, here I only 
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summarize its broad outlines. Processing the experience of the Russian 
Revolution of 1905, Luxemburg approached the numerous strikes that happened 
throughout the revolutionary process not as a loose collection of protests, but as a 
Gestalt: the Mass Strike, or: ‚...the method of motion of the proletarian mass, the 
phenomenal form of the proletarian struggle in the revolution.‛ 1677  During the 
preceding decade, the Mass Strike was anticipated by local, partial ‚economic‛ 
struggles. At this point in its trajectory, the Strike was still fragmented and 
depoliticized. The prolepsis of popular revolution, however, radically 
transformed the quantity and quality of the Strike: ‚Only in the sultry air of the 
period of revolution can any partial little conflict between labor and capital grow into a 
general explosion.‛1678 The revolution offered strikes a shared system of activity in 
which they became contemporaneous. The participation of workers as ‚strikers‛ 
– i.e. class actors – in the revolution stimulated an interpenetration of political and 
economic demands and forms of organization.  
 With regard to Egypt, the Strike developed in a similar manner. Throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s workers were waging ‚partial little conflicts‛ against their 
local and particular forms of exploitation and domination. From 2006 onwards, 
the vanguard of the workers’ movement took on a trade unionist shape, but the 
working class at large remained ‚stuck‛ within its economic-corporate 
predicament. The 25 January Revolution ‚<for the first time awoke class feeling and 
class consciousness in millions upon millions as if by an electric shock‛,1679 forcefully 
interpellating all layers and sections of the Egyptian workforce as workers. From 8 
February on, Egyptian workers began to protest on a massive scale. Their 
demands were largely ‚economic‛, such as wage increases, but ‚<in the present 
crisis there is little doubt they are timed to support the pro-democracy movement.‛ 1680  
 For workers, the most efficient way they could support the revolutionary 
Project was by striking: ‚<once the uprising had begun, any strike acquired a political 
force and gave momentum to the revolt.‛1681 Even though most strikes had initially a 
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‚particularist‛ character, 1682  because of their participation within the broad 
revolutionary Project, they increasingly came to share social and political 
demands. Saud Omar explained that: 
The workers had to get out to get their social demands, which were not directly 
related to the revolution, but so important to them. These demands were a change 
in the social demands of the worker struggle. New changes because they called for 
democracy and independent trade-union committees.1683 
Fatma Ramadan added that: 
The workers had one main demand in the revolution: to fire their corrupt and bad 
company management. The demands did not came from the revolution, but already 
developed before, since 2000. The main social demands were the minimum wage, 
employment of temporary workers, return privatized companies back to the state 
and to reinstate workers who were fired because of their strikes, and equal pay for 
workers, e.g. in the petroleum industry. Every group in the working class has its 
own demands, but these were shared. Every group added his secondary 
demands.1684 
Hossam al-Hamalawy concluded that:  
The strikes waged by the workers this week were both economic and political fused 
together. In some of the locations the workers did not list the regime’s fall among 
their demands, but they used the same slogans as those protesting in Tahrir and in 
many cases, at least those I managed to learn about and I’m sure there are others, 
the workers put forward a list of political demands in solidarity with the 
revolution.1685 
As Kamal Abbas explained, there was a strong ‚good sense‛ in the sudden strike 
surge: ‚Workers were motivated to strike when they heard about how many billions the 
Mubarak family was worth< They said: 'How much longer should we be silent?‛1686 In 
an undeveloped and spontaneous way, workers began to connect their own 
particular exploitation with the general framework of al-nizam.  
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 Conversely, the participation of workers as a collective agent in the 
revolutionary Project brought about an immanent economic dimension to the 
movement’s goal:  
<the alliance of different social and political groups mobilised for change did not 
make a breakthrough until the revolution crossed from the political to the social 
domain, going from the streets into the workplaces and rousing workers to take 
collective action, fusing their own demands with the wider goals of the 
movement.1687   
Teacher leader Abd al-Hafiz, for example, explained how students’ and teachers’ 
became entwined: ‚When teachers defend their rights to better working conditions they 
are indirectly giving their students the best pedagogical lesson. Secondary school students 
went to Tahrir square< And they were marching: ‘left-right: we are going to reform 
education’.‛ 1688 Within this collaborative Project a dialectical pedagogy between 
teachers and students emerged, in which the role of educator and educated 
continuously shifted.  
 The interpenetration of the political and economic struggle elevated the 
working class from its economic-corporate moment and hailed the workers as a 
social and political force.1689 As Luxemburg explained: ‚The economic struggle is the 
transmitter from one political center to another; the political struggle is the periodic 
fertilization of the soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change 
places< their unity is precisely the mass strike.‛1690 Whereas the political mobilization 
of the masses quickly ran out of breath after the fall of Mubarak, the strike 
movement expanded and intensified until early March: ‚Those workers and others 
have understood from very early on that they cannot assume that their basic requirements 
will be met by the revolutionary process. The SCAF implored them to stop striking and 
protesting and return to work to restore economic growth. Nonetheless, strikes have 
persisted almost daily.‚1691 With regard to the 1905 Russian Revolution, Luxemburg 
explained that: 
The economic struggle was not here really a decay, a dissipation of action, but 
merely change of front, a sudden and natural alteration of the first general 
                                                          
1687 Alexander 2011a. 
1688 Interview with Abd al-Hafiz, Cairo, 21 March 2011. 
1689 However, this was far from a homogeneous and linear process. (Mackell 2012a: 19) 
1690 Luxemburg 1970: 185. 
1691 Beinin 2011b. 
468 
 
engagement with absolutism, in a general reckoning with capital, which in keeping 
with its character, assumed the form of individual, scattered wage struggles. 
Political class action was not broken in January by the decay of the general strike 
into economic strikes, rather the reverse; after the possible content of political 
action in the given situation and at the given stage of the revolution was 
exhausted, it broke, or rather changed, into economic action.1692 
In Egypt, workers particularized the general revolutionary attack on the Pharaoh, 
and turned against their own ‚little Mubaraks‛ in the companies and factories.1693 
For example, on 16 February 20,000 Mahalla workers went on strike. They closed 
the factory gates and demanded the dismissal of the factory manager, and the 
application of a national minimum wage that was in accordance with inflation. 
The Armed Forces negotiated directly with the strikers and agreed to replace the 
manager and to increase their wages.1694  
 From March until August the total number of protests decreased to an average 
of 65,000 strikers per month.1695 In September a new strike wave shook Egypt, 
with at least half a million workers protesting. This represented both a 
quantitative and qualitative development of the Strike. Even though there were 
fewer ‚instances‛ of class struggle, ‚<the increased numbers participating points to 
the consolidation of the strike wave into fewer, coordinated disputes.‛1696 This reflected 
the gradual overcoming of the worker Subject’s fragmented condition. From a 
situation of mere contemporaneity and solidarity, worker activity-systems moved 
towards collaboration, as Alexander observed:  
<the process can be seen as an organic one, with strike organisation running up 
against the limits imposed by the individual workplace, logically pushing workers 
towards coordination between workplaces and therefore developing forms of 
organisation which express the energy and anger from the base upwards and hold 
elected officials accountable.1697 
Generalist demands focused on tathir: the revolutionary removal of feloul, 
remnants of al-nizam: ‚<pushing out regime cronies and reclaiming institutions like 
the professional syndicates and university departments that have long been 
                                                          
1692 Luxemburg 1970: 172. 
1693 Alexander 2012. 
1694 Bocchialini and al-Gawzy 2012. 
1695 Alexander 2012. 
1696 Ibid. 
1697 Ibid. 
469 
 
commandeered by the state.‛1698 Tathir was the undeveloped form of the workers’ 
critique of Egypt’s neoliberal bloc. In addition, workers demanded the 
renationalization of privatized companies, an abolition of temporary contracts, 
and a fair national minimum wage; aims that directly challenged the neoliberal 
strategy of accumulation.1699 
Proletarian Neoformations 
Before the 25 January Revolution, the development of the Strike had already 
spawned four independent trade unions, established by the real estate tax 
workers; the pensioners; the health technicians; and the teachers. Ahmed al-
Sayyid of the health technician union proudly asserted that: 
These four trade unions were already made before the revolution: they didn’t use 
the revolution as a springboard to become independent trade unions. We 
announced the trade union by the end of 2009. Those four trade unions were 
working as a seed of the revolution, under pressure of the regime and the police. 1700 
Other movements, such as the Voice of the Nurses, also moved towards 
establishing their own, independent unions. However, at the eve of the 25 
January Revolution, the Egyptian working class as a whole was still struggling to 
overcome its economic-corporate predicament. Its trade unionist neoformations 
‚<were too small in relation to the scale of the movement for their presence as an 
organised force to shape the overall outcome of the uprising, or even influence its 
direction much.‛1701 
 Independent trade unions, autonomous strike committees, and individual 
worker leaders and leftist activists played a role in organizing some political 
strikes in solidarity with the insurrection, but they could not direct the 
spontaneous development of the Strike as a Mass Strike. At this point in the 
trajectory of the Mass Strike there was no coordination, but only a 
contemporaneity of the worker protests, which, nevertheless, stimulated 
solidarity between particular activity-systems and the horizontal transference of 
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demands and methods. The trade unionist vanguard was but a drop in the ocean 
of thousands of spontaneously striking workers. 
 However, the revolution also presented an opportunity for the vanguard of the 
workers’ movement to consolidate and expand the leading trade unionist 
neoformation. In Tahrir Square representatives of the four independent unions  
decided to constitute the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU) as a potential center for the workers’ movement.1702 They formulated a 
class program that was based on demands that had emerged spontaneously from 
the Strike since 2006, including: a national minimum and maximum wage; the 
right to establish independent trade unions and the abolition of the GFETU; the 
right to strike and protest; the renationalization of privatized companies; the 
cleansing of the public sector of corrupt managers; improved healthcare; and the 
abolition of temporary contracts.1703 The disciplined and politicized presence of 
EFITU militants in the Square – one of the discrete activity-systems within the 
broad collaborative Project of Tahrir – directly instructed workers and their 
leaders from other sectors and governorates to form their own independent 
unions when they returned to their homes and workplaces.1704 
 After the fall of Mubarak, the revolutionary collaborative Project fell apart; or 
rather, its various participating activity-systems differentiated and crystallized 
themselves as they struggled to develop a critique of al-nizam and a self-concept. 
Workers returning to their workplaces particularized and transposed their 
revolutionary experience to their predicament as wage laborers. Feeling 
empowered by the Mass Strike, they began to set up their own trade unionist 
neoformations vis-à-vis the factory management and the structures of the GFETU: 
‚A lot of people are now coming to us to ask for advice to make their own independent 
unions and to join our independent union. We haven’t enough time to answer all 
applications for new unions and jobs< The only future for unions in Egypt is the 
independent union.‛1705  
 In order to defend their rights, workers had to overcome the obstacle of the 
State trade unions. The development of the Strike thus followed a dual path of 
                                                          
1702 Interview with Fatma Ramadan, Cairo, 15 March 2011; Interview with Kamal Abu al-Eita, 
Giza, 20 March 2011. 
1703 Alexander 2012; Interview with Saud Omar, Suez, 18 March 2011. 
1704 Alexander 2012. 
1705 Interview with Kamal Abu al-Eita, Giza, 20 March 2011. 
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resistance against both capitalist exploitation and State domination. The 
‚political‛ demand for the right to establish independent and democratic trade 
unions was immediately interwoven with their direct, ‚economic‛ struggle.1706 
Some of the popular committees that spontaneously emerged from the 
revolutionary process – e.g. in Port Said – developed trade unionist practices and 
demands, engaging with the social dimension of the uprising.1707 Gihan Ibrahim 
observed that: 
The regime still exists: those institutions have been corrupted to the core for 
decades. We can’t assume that after a couple of weeks, after the revolution, that 
they will be gone or cleansed. Even Husayn Megawer is still the head of the 
federation of workers. The head is still in place. There is no possible way that we 
can be democratic within the state corrupted system of unions.1708 
The entanglement of economic and political emancipation meant that the 
workers’ struggle shifted from a struggle against the ‚little Mubaraks‛ in their 
local and particular workplace and community, to the regional and national 
institutions of the State. 1709  The September 2011 strike wave represented a 
growing generalization of the workers’ coordination and consciousness. Firstly, in 
contradistinction to the ‚spontaneous‛1710  worker protests in the period from 
February until March 2011, these strikes were planned and organized by the 
independent unions that had emerged since February. Conversely, the September 
strikes instructed other workers to coordinate their protests and form trade 
unionist organizations themselves.1711 Trade unionism also reached out to layers 
of the working class that hitherto had remained relatively passive:  
<social layers which have little tradition of identification with the workers’ 
movement adds to the richness of the picture. Hospital doctors, mosque imams, 
fishermen, Tuk-Tuk drivers, skilled craftsmen, intellectual property rights 
consultants, daily-paid labourers and the operators of the ‚scarab boats‛ that take 
                                                          
1706 Al-Hamalawy 2011a; 2011b. 
1707 Interview with Abd al-Hafiz, Cairo, 21 March 2011. 
1708 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
1709 Alexander 2012. 
1710 As I explained in Chapter 22 A Revolutionary Project, the adjective ‚spontaneous‛ does not 
exclude organization. Every protest is organized in some way by the organic leaders of the 
activity-system. It emphasizes, however, the ad hoc, unplanned, decentralized, and uncoordinated 
character of the activity. 
1711 Alexander 2012. 
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tourists on Nile river trips are among those who have been drawn into the orbit of 
the workers’ movement, adopting forms of collective action and organisation 
shaped by the strike wave.1712 
By 2012, the EFITU had become the largest national independent trade union 
federation, coordinating the activities of some 200 unions, which gathered around 
two million workers. 1713  Whereas the workplace ‚strike committee‛ was the 
leading neoformation of the workers’ movement between 2006-2010, from 2011 
onwards, trade unionist forms increasingly overcame the local and sectoral 
fragmentation of the proletarian Subject: ‚Although new and fragile, the independent 
unions are no longer simply growing out of strike action; they are leading strikes and 
developing mechanisms of inter-union and inter-workplace coordination<‛ 1714 A 
qualitative step was taken to overcome the workers’ economic-corporate 
predicament, but, even by 2012, Hossam al-Hamalawy observed that: 
[there is still no] machine or a structure that can mobilize the working class, 
articulate their demands, and claim there [sic] representation< The industrial 
upturn, which has witnessed millions of Egyptian workers going on strikes or 
staging protests since 2006, is still lacking a national leadership that can 
coordinate the strikes, claim class representations, and raise political demands on 
behalf of the workers in the current political arena.1715 
Expansion of the Worker ZPD 
Before the 25 January Revolution, worker leaders and leftist activists were 
discussing the boundaries of the Zone of Proximal Development of the workers’ 
                                                          
1712 Alexander 2012. This echoed Luxemburg’s vivid description of the Mass Strike: ‚This is a 
gigantic, many-colored picture of a general arrangement of labor and capital which reflects all the 
complexity of social organization and of the political consciousness of every section and of every district; 
and the whole long scale runs from the regular trade-union struggle of a picked and tested troop of the 
proletariat drawn from large-scale industry, to the formless protest of a handful of rural proletarians, and 
to the first slight stirrings of an agitated military garrison, from the well-educated and elegant revolt in 
cuffs and white collars in the counting house of a bank to the shy-bold murmurings of a clumsy meeting of 
dissatisfied policemen in a smoke-grimed dark and dirty guardroom.‛( Luxemburg 1970: 171) 
1713  Al-Hamalawy 2012; Mackell 2012b: 30. Some of the State unions tried to break the 
independent trade-union movement by ‚< supporting the workers and attacking the government and 
defending the minimum wage. They were waging fake struggles for workers’ rights. They are trying to 
create chaos in every case. This is their last chance,‛ RETAU leader Kamal Abu al-Eita explained. 
(Interview with Kamal Abu al-Eita, Giza, 20 March 2011)  
1714 Alexander 2012. 
1715 Al-Hamalawy 2012. 
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movement. Mubarak’s neoliberal passive revolution determined the Egyptian 
workers’ general Social Situation of Development. In order to overcome their 
economic-corporate predicament, workers had to move against hostile State 
institutions such as the GFETU and the Interior Ministry, public sector managers, 
and/or State-supported private capitalists. Due to the repressive and 
unaccommodating character of the Mubarak dictatorship from the 1990s 
onwards, the workers’ economic struggle almost automatically – yet often not 
explicitly – acquired a political dimension. Within the boundaries of political 
dictatorship, for many worker leaders and leftist activists, independent trade 
unionism was impossible.  
 The 25 January Revolution forcefully solved the question. Workers were 
(partially and incompletely) emancipated from dictatorship by mediation of the 
popular collaborative Project, and, in turn, assisted in the (partial and incomplete) 
political emancipation of al-sha’b. The revolution was a ‚...living political 
school<‛1716 that instructed the workers and developed their activity-systems. The 
rise of the Mass Strike, the disorganization of the State and the subsequent 
political hegemonic struggle, heightened the ‚upper limit‛ of the workers’ ZPD: 
‚The Egyptian revolution was for us a safe place, a safe haven against the repression of the 
Mubarak regime and the state syndicate.‛1717 Trade unionism was no longer a future 
moment in the trajectory of the worker Subject, it became the actual line of 
development. The new Minister of Manpower, Ahmed al-Borai, even granted 
independent unions a framework to conduct their activities legally.1718  
 ‚Yet at the same time the new government has drafted a law criminalizing strikes, 
protests, demonstrations and sit-ins that interrupt private or state-owned businesses or 
affect the economy, as long as the emergency laws remain in force,‛1719 Hazem Kandil 
noted. The military ‚transition regime‛ dealt with the workers’ movement by a 
combination of repression and concession. Hisham Fouad explained that: 
                                                          
1716 Luxemburg 1970: 172 
1717 Interview with Kamal Abu al-Eita, Giza, 20 March 2011. 
1718 Interview with Ahmed al-Sayyid, Cairo, 23 March 2011; Interview with Fatma Ramadan, 
Cairo, 15 March 2011; Interview with Kamal Abu al-Eita, Giza, 20 March 2011. Although many 
contentious issues remained unsolved, for example the right of the GFETU to cut the union’s 
membership fee from the workers’ wages. 
1719 Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
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The Minister for Manpower said that he will recognize any independent trade-
union. So there is no longer any obstacle for the workers, and also for the peasants. 
This is a great victory for the workers. The Prime Minister spoke about the 
minimum wage and he will raise it to about 900 for the highly educated workers 
and 600 for minimal educated workers and 500 for the non-educated. It is not 
enough but it will give the workers the courage to push for other reforms and they 
will be successful in this, I think. But on the other hand, they attacked workers who 
organized strikes and sit-ins and they say that this is the main danger in Egypt 
now: the protest of workers. This expresses their fear that the democratic revolution 
transforms into a social revolution. They try to stop the revolution of the workers 
in various ways, including the use of military force and the detainment of workers 
to stop these protests.1720 
Rather than appeasing the workers, the few concessions that the SCAF granted 
rather encouraged them to continue and expand their protests.1721  
 During the Russian Revolution of 1905 and 1917, the workers had almost 
entirely ‚skipped‛ the trade unionist moment, moving immediately from an 
economic-corporate condition to organs of self-governance: the soviets. Within 
the 25 January Revolution Egyptian workers had not produced such novel 
neoformations, but they objectified themselves as a social Subject through 
mediation of the seeds of trade unionism that already existed from the previous 
decade. For leftists seeking to assist the proletarian Subject in its development, the 
primary question became the capacity of the working class to become a political 
and hegemonic force: ‚<it started all over the place without our coordination... Now it 
is our role to connect it all and facilitate it...‛1722 Alexander asserted that: 
<two conditions for this happening have already been met: the workers’ 
movement has begun to gain enough mastery over its constituent parts to be able 
to use its social power in battle with the state, while the demands that are now 
being raised by this movement cannot be satisfied within the limits of neoliberal 
capitalism in the context of intensifying economic crisis at a local and global 
level.1723 
                                                          
1720 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 13 March 2011. 
1721 Ibid. 
1722 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
1723 Alexander 2012. 
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Although politicized worker leaders and leftist activists noticed the presence of a 
spontaneous good sense that moved towards political consciousness, 1724  most 
trade unions and strike committees refrained from elaborating an explicit political 
program. Hossam al-Hamalawy noted that:  
As long as the most militant sections of the current strike—those who are leading 
the mass strikes in sectors in direct confrontation with the military—are not 
organized into a political party, you can expect the workers’ voice to continue to be 
absent in the current political process.1725 
Unsurprisingly, most labor leaders had a pragmatic ‚first things first‛ attitude: 
‚*a workers’ party+ <will be positive in the future, but right now we should focus on 
developing the trade-unions and the federation and we use up a lot of energy in 
organizing this.‛1726 
 Even though it was the negation of the workers’ economic-corporate condition, 
trade unionism already showed signs of becoming a future obstacle for the 
further development of the worker Subject. The more or less stable neoformations 
of the working class – the ‚practico-inert‛ objectifications of proletarian praxis, in 
Sartre’s language1727 – had to be continuously brought into an organic relation 
with the workers themselves, lest organizational ‚bureaucratism‛ and ideological 
‚economism‛ colonized or commodified the worker Subject.1728 Eventually, trade 
unions would develop from instruments to obstacles for proletarian 
emancipation, as they only expressed a partial emancipation of the working class 
within the boundaries of the capitalist mode of production and its integral State.  
                                                          
1724 ‚If you talk to a lot of workers, they are very politicized, even if they don’t know it, they are very 
politicized, they are not only for a higher wage, they are asking for the head of this corrupted institution, or 
syndicate or factory to be removed. This is a very political demand because who has put this guy in charge? 
Mubarak or his cronies and so on.‛ (Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011) 
1725 Al-Hamalawy 2012. 
1726 Interview with Kamal Abbas, Cairo, 27 March 2011. 
1727 Sartre 2000. 
1728 Sartre equates objectification with alienation, and has a negative view on the process of 
institutionalization of a social movement (the ‚fused group‛). However, rather than excluding 
each other, movement mobilization and organizational institutionalization are logically entwined 
(Beinin and Vairel 2011: 9), and presuppose each other. Bureaucratism is not a consequence of 
institutionalization, but the result of the lack of a democratic, organic and reciprocal relation 
between the ‚masses‛ and their ‚intellectuals‛; i.e. the lack of a dialectical pedagogy. A strike 
meeting, committee, facebook discussion, et cetera, are already objectified and mediating forms 
of institutionalization of the ‚movement‛. 
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 Another, more immediate problem was a general drop in the militancy of the 
workers’ movement by February 2012. The cosmetically reformed GFETU 
continued to challenge the authority and prestige of the fledgling independent 
trade unions, presenting itself as a more capable, effective, and powerful 
instrument of collective bargaining. 1729  Likewise, many workers continued to 
struggle through these distorted – but traditional and established – mass 
organizations. 
Popular or Proletarian Revolution? 
As a process, the 25 January Revolution was – and at the moment of writing still 
is – the interpenetration of the civil-democratic and class struggles since the 
1990s. The uprising of 25 January brought a collection of social Subjects together 
in a collaborative Project which pitted them as the abstract category of al-sha’b 
against the concrete Pharaoh who embodied the similarly abstract concept of al-
nizam. 1730  Because of the late entrance of the workers as workers in the 
insurrection, the broad counter-bloc of social forces, and the nature of the 
demands, the character of this phase was clearly popular and democratic. Casting 
the 25 January Revolution in Lenin’s appraisal of the Paris Commune: 
<it was undoubtedly a "real people's" revolution, since the mass of the people, 
their majority, the very lowest social groups, crushed by oppression and 
exploitation, rose independently and stamped on the entire course of the revolution 
the imprint of their own demands, their attempt to build in their own way a new 
society in place of the old society that was being destroyed.1731  
Trotsky stressed that every revolution constitutes a Project of subaltern nation-
building: ‚It is understood that every great revolution is a people’s or a national 
revolution, in the sense that it unites around the revolutionary class all the virile and 
creative forces of the nation and reconstructs the nation around a new core.‛1732 
 The fall of the Mubarak spelled the end of the collaborative Project as there was 
no concrete and shared concept of al-nizam beyond the figure of the President. 
The ‚people’s revolution‛ dissolved into its constituting activity-systems – 
                                                          
1729 Mackell 2012: 19. 
1730 See Sallam, Stacher and Toensing 2011. 
1731 Lenin 1964: 416. 
1732 Trotsky 1931 [MIA]. 
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although it had thoroughly transformed many of its participants. The form of the 
popular Project survived its real collaborative activity in the shape of a nationalist 
meta-narrative. However, bereft of its real content of collaborative activity, this 
Project was appropriated and colonized by each of the political forces involved in 
the post-Mubarak hegemonic struggle: ‚The revolution was a group work. But now 
everyone is talking about the revolution as if he owns it.‛1733  
 Gramsci pointed out that a class acquires hegemony when it is able to 
demonstrate its particular interests as the interests of the whole society. Aiming to 
present themselves as a directive force in post-Mubarak Egypt, each established 
class fraction appropriated the nationalist narrative and claimed to be the true 
defenders of the national good. On 14 February, the SCAF demanded that worker 
leaders stop their strikes.1734 Right-wing nationalist, Islamist, military, liberal, and 
even leftist 1735  forces concurred and rejected workers’ protests as being 
‚parochialist‛, counter-revolutionary, and against the national good. 1736  Even 
independent media outlets such as al-Masry al-Youm shed the continuation of the 
strike movement in a negative light.1737 This narrative started to affect the ranks of 
non-proletarian revolutionary youth: 
Now there is a split within the ranks of the revolutionaries between the youth of 
the middle classes and their youth organizations, who announced their confidence 
in the armed forces, their opposition to the continuing rallies in al-Tahrir 
Square and announced that they were against the strikes, and called it class-based 
strikes, on the basis that those who are taking part in them were classes with 
limited interests that primarily concerned them and weren't of concern to the rest 
of the classes in society, from their point of view.  There was a situation of hostility 
between the workers and middle class youth.1738 
Workers were no longer recognized as legitimate, solidary assistants in the 
popular revolutionary Project. Hisham Fouad asserted that:  
                                                          
1733 Interview with Saud Omar, Suez, 18 March 2011. 
1734 Guardian.co.uk 2011x. 
1735 Especially the ‚civil-democratic‛ Left. Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 13 March 2011. 
1736 Clément 2011; al-Hamalawy 2011a ; Sallam 2011c; Interview with Fatma Ramadan, Cairo, 15 
March 2011; Naguib 2011. 
1737 Interview with Fatma Ramadan, Cairo, 15 March 2011; Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 
20 March 2011; Interview with Mustafa Bassiouny, Giza, 17 March 2011; Interview with Saud 
Omar, Suez, 18 March 2011. 
1738 Hossam al-Hamalawy in Haddad 2011b. 
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<the media concentrated on political movements and youth movements and they 
tried to make an impression that these youth and political movements led the 
revolution and that their demands are the basic demands of the revolution. These 
demands speak about the liberal and democratic ideas: they are not social demands 
from workers and peasants. This is the plan of the State, to separate between these 
two types of demands and to concentrate on the groups which only focus on 
political demands. 
<when the workers entered, they rapidly raised other demands connected to the 
mode of production, redistribution of wealth, and so on, and this did not agree with 
the capitalist classes. So they thought: we have to enter rapidly to stop this 
movement and concentrate on political demands only and avoid social demands 
and so on.1739  
Within the post-Mubarak hegemonic struggle, a coalition of economically right-
wing forces aimed to exclude the workers from any reconfiguration of the 
neoliberal historical bloc, and to re-fragment the proletarian Subject into an 
economic-corporate condition. The differentiation and crystallization of class 
forces within the hegemonic struggle, reveals the objective end of the popular 
phase of the 25 January Revolution, although its subjective existence continues in 
the form of its formal representation by different social Subjects. Saba Mahmood 
asked if:  
[Egyptian elites will] accommodate the demands of the poor, the unemployed, and 
the workers who have so far been equal partners in their struggle against political 
corruption and autocracy? Will the protestors in Tahrir Square continue to fight 
for economic justice even as they gain political and civil rights in the months to 
come?1740 
                                                          
1739 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 13 March 2011. See also Walter Ambrust (2011a): ‚The 
notion that the economy is in ruins — tourists staying away, investor confidence shattered, employment in 
the construction sector at a standstill, many industries and businesses operating at far less than full 
capacity — could well be the single most dangerous rationale for imposing cosmetic reforms that leave the 
incestuous relation between governance and business intact. Or worse, if the pro-democracy movement lets 
itself be stampeded by the ‚economic ruin‛ narrative, structures could be put in place by ‚technocrats‛ 
under the aegis of the military transitional government that would tie the eventual civilian government 
into actually quickening the pace of privatization. Ideologues, including those of the neoliberal stripe, are 
prone to a witchcraft mode of thinking: if the spell does not work, it is not the fault of the magic, but rather 
the fault of the shaman who performed the spell. In other words, the logic could be that it was not 
neoliberalism that ruined Mubarak’s Egypt, but the faulty application of neoliberalism‛‛ 
1740 Mahmood 2011a. 
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As an answer, Saud Omar stressed that: ‚The most important benefit of the revolution 
is this image: the alliance between the regime and capital.‛1741 If the substance of the 25 
January Revolution is a war of movement against neoliberalism’s passive 
revolution, then it cannot only but succeed by destroying the domestic and 
transnational class alliances and the accumulation strategy of the neoliberal 
bloc.1742 As such, the proletarian and democratic moments of the revolutionary 
process are entwined. Among politicized subaltern actors, this notion is 
expressed by their call for a ‚continuation‛ of the revolution, or even a ‚new‛ 
revolution.1743 For example, Mustafa Bassiouny stressed that: 
At this moment we are still in the process of revolution... After the resignation of 
Mubarak, the RS realized that this revolution was not finished, the police state was 
still there, and this opened the door to another revolution. The capitalist class still 
exists and rules the country through the army. The revolution did not touch upon 
the power base of the capitalists. Shafiq and other government figures still adhere 
to the free market. Even small reforms, such as the minimum wage and fair taxes, 
are not discussed by the government. The popular movement in the streets will not 
stop until they realized a social change< The people demands social reforms, so the 
revolution will be permanent. This opens the door for a new wave, a social 
revolution which may lead to a socialist revolution.1744 
The democratic revolution cannot succeed except by a reconfiguration of the 
economic structure, and the economic structure cannot be transformed unless 
political power is captured and appropriated by a subaltern counter-bloc. 
Alternatively, the current ruling classes may reconfigure the neoliberal bloc to 
exclude old forces and include new ones, and to reinstate some form of ‚moral 
economy‛. The consolidation of such a formation would imply the end of the 
revolutionary process. However, Egypt’s debt cycle and the interests of foreign 
and transnational capital – which continues to push for neoliberal reforms – 
severely limit the political and economic space for such a ‚defensive‛ passive 
revolution.1745  
 
 
                                                          
1741 Interview with Saud Omar, Suez, 18 March 2011. 
1742 Maher 2011. 
1743 Interview with Sabry Zaky, Cairo, 10 March 2011. 
1744 Interview with Mustafa Bassiouny, Giza, 17 March 2011. 
1745 Maher 2011. 
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CHAPTER 25 
The Counter-Revolution 
The gun doesn’t know the way to democracy. 
Saud Omar, Suez labor leader 
Al-Nizam in the Face of Revolution 
Even though the 25 January protesters constructed their goal as the 
straightforward overthrow of the unequivocal evil that Mubarak’s reign 
represented, in reality they faced a multi-tentacled monster. The Egyptian nizam – 
the neoliberal bloc and its integral State – was vertically and horizontally layered. 
As the ruling classes, especially in a complex capitalist society, cannot rule 
directly, they create forms of mediation to dominate and oppress the subaltern 
classes. These mediations often acquire a logic and agency of their own, and 
sometimes attain a far-reaching autonomy vis-à-vis their original, constituting 
classes – as happened during Nasser’s reign. Every so often State elites are even 
able to establish themselves as a ruling class in their own right. This process has 
been described in previous chapters as ‚state capitalism in reverse‛, whereby, 
during the 1970s and 1980s, elite bureaucrats, officials, and officers were 
transformed into a new capitalist class.  
 At the eve of the 25 January Revolution, the main structures of class rule were 
the military, the NDP, the Ministry of Interior with the police and the CSF, and 
the GFETU leadership. 1746  I consider parliament, the cabinet, ministries, 
universities, the office of the Grand Mufti, et cetera, as secondary sources of class 
rule, because they were more or less directly supervised, infiltrated, and 
subjugated by the institutions above. A third category is the most contended 
spaces of class rule: the professional syndicates, the GFETU factory committees, 
the media, the legal parties, the Church, the Sufi Orders, et cetera. These 
institutions often acted as sites of State coercion and consent as well as spaces of 
political and economic resistance. 
  
                                                          
1746 I have elaborated upon the role of the GFETU and the NDP in previous chapters. 
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Military State Power 
Since the coup of the Free Officers in 1952, the army played a crucial role in 
Egyptian politics. Through the military Caesarism of the Nasser era, the State was 
transformed and acquired a formidable autonomy vis-à-vis the old ruling classes, 
especially landowners and domestic and foreign commercial and financial capital 
groups. The State first acted as the caretaker and nurturer of a passive industrial 
bourgeoisie, and during the 1960s it increasingly acted as the primary capitalist 
force through a massive expansion of the public sector. Being the ruling stratum 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the military became a ‚state within a state‛ – or rather a 
patchwork of semi-autonomous spaces within the integral State. The Armed 
Forces consisted of various contending power structures – the Army, Air Defense, 
Air Force, Navy, Intelligence Services, Republican Guard, Ministry of Defense, et 
cetera – which were ruled by their generals as small fiefdoms. Nasser himself 
tried to limit the autonomous power of the military – embodied in such 
independent figures as Chief-of-Staff Abd al-Hakim Amer – within the ensemble 
of State structures through the formation of ‚civil‛ forces such as the GFETU and 
the ASU. After the Six Day War in 1967, Nasser began to sidetrack the role and 
position of the Armed Forces in political society, moving towards a dictatorship 
of the police rather than the military.1747 
 Sadat’s passive revolution in the 1970s continued the trend to demilitarize the 
State. With the rise of the Infitah bourgeoisie, the political autonomy, power and 
influence of the Armed Forces decreased in exchange for economic and military 
rents from the USA. As Paul Amar explained, their retreat from the political 
sphere and focus on economic activities reconstructed the generals into a class of 
‚national capitalists‛.1748 Sabry Zaky stressed that the USA helped to transform 
the post-Nasserist Armed Forces into a State structure that it could directly 
domesticate and contain through military aid.1749 Yet, even though the generals 
were financially and militarily tied to the USA, their consciousness became that of 
a national capitalist class, which turned the rentier relation of dependence into a 
feeling of deep resentment towards their foreign donors.1750 Additionally, since 
the 1980s, the position and prestige of the military in Egyptian society was 
                                                          
1747 Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
1748 Amar 2011a. 
1749 Interview with Sabry Zaky, Cairo, 10 March 2011. 
1750 Amar 2011a; Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
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crumbling, while the NDP and the Interior Ministry emerged as the primary 
sources of State power.1751 The Armed Forces were appalled by the shameful 
brutality and violence of the police forces, which had superseded the military as 
the main coercive force in Egyptian society.1752 Moreover, in the 1990s and 2000s 
their economic power was overshadowed by the rise of the neoliberal capitalists 
surrounding Gamal Mubarak, who were perceived by the generals as ‚crony 
capitalists‛ and greedy plunderers of the nation’s wealth. 1753  Hazem Kandil 
emphasized that the economic profits of the Armed Forces were modest 
compared to those of the ‚civil‛ State elites: 
<they were given projects that would provide profits which could fund a decent 
life for officers: a car, a flat, a vacation house, and so on. But this is no economic 
empire on the scale the Turkish army has built up, for example. It is a much more 
modest enterprise. Military facilities are quite shabby compared with what is on 
offer in the wealthy districts of Cairo. Officers have not grossly enriched 
themselves. What you gain in the army or air force pales in comparison to what 
you can get as a senior police officer or member of the ruling party. Under 
Mubarak, the Minister of the Interior stashed over $1 billion in his bank account. 
The Minister of Defence could not dream of that kind of money.1754 
This explains why, when the 25 January protests turned into a revolution, the 
Armed Forces were not inclined to save their ‚competitors‛: the Interior Ministry 
and the NDP. Some of the generals probably saw the revolution as a means to 
weaken or even destroy the power bases of these competitors.1755 In the end, the 
generals were not against ‚neoliberal‛ reform in itself, but against the fact that 
they weren’t the main beneficiaries of the process of ‚state capitalism in reverse‛. 
Walter Ambrust claimed that: 
The generals may well prefer a new round of neoliberal witchcraft. More 
privatization will simply free up assets and rents that only the politically 
connected (including the generals) can acquire. Fixing a failed neoliberal state by 
                                                          
1751 Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
1752 Amar 2011a. 
1753 Ibid. 
1754 Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
1755 Interview with Sabry Zaky, Cairo, 10 March 2011. 
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more stringent applications of neoliberalism could be the surest way for them to 
preserve their privileges.1756 
Civil State Power 
Under Mubarak’s rule, the power of the Interior Ministry expanded. At the eve of 
the 25 January Revolution, the Interior Ministry controlled all aspects of law 
enforcement, criminal investigations and repression through its various 
departments: State Security Investigations Service (SSI), Public Security, 
Municipal Police, Special Police, General Security and Central Security Forces 
(CSF), Traffic Police, Tourism and Antiquities Police, et cetera.  
 The hated SSI or Amn al-Dawla, counting some 3,000 officers,1757 infiltrated, 
controlled and terrorized political opposition groups and thus constituted the 
first line of defense of the State, preventing protest movements rather than 
containing them. When political or social protest did emerge, the CSF was 
mobilized to quickly and brutally subdue it. After the assassination of Sadat, the 
number of CSF troops grew to 100,000, consisting mostly of conscripts who failed 
the standards for military conscription. The CSF uprising of 1986 called the 
Armed Forces back into the streets, showing that the military pillar of al-nizam 
was not completely eroded. Yet by the 2000s the number of CSF conscripts had 
increased to 300,000 à 350,000, rivaling the number of military troops, and acting 
as Mubarak’s private army.1758 The Amn al-Markazi was equipped with APCs, 
rubber bullets, water cannons, and tear gas canisters.1759 From the end of the 1980s 
onwards, the CSF enjoyed the back-up of informal plainclothes police, or 
baltageyya: ‚<a million and a half< hired thugs or informers without uniform or ranks, 
often people with a criminal record who had cut deals with the authorities.‛1760  
 In contradistinction to the Armed Forces, the CSF and its plainclothes 
counterpart were an apolitical, disloyal and undisciplined force. Because of its 
low morale and morality, this blunt instrument was only effective if it could be 
mobilized in great numbers, surrounding and overrunning any opposition, as 
happened in the Mahalla uprising of 6 April 2008. Failure to execute this simple 
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tactic would result in demoralization and retreat, as happened in the first Friday 
of Anger on 28 January 2011. 
 Apart from the direct and centrally coordinated repression by the SSI and CSF, 
the terror through which the State governed was also rooted in everyday, 
decentralized, and local forms of violence. Police forces engaged in independent 
activities of exploitation, oppression and domination of ordinary civilians: 
<police stations gained relative autonomy during the past decades. In certain 
police stations this autonomy took the form of the adoption of a militant ideology or 
moral mission; or some Vice Police stations have taken up drug running; or some 
ran protection rackets that squeezed local small businesses. The political 
dependability of the police, from a bottom-up perspective, is not high. Police grew 
to be quite self-interested and entrepreneurial on a station-by-station level.1761  
Whereas political activists, students and workers were confronted during their 
protests with the organized coercive power of the State in the shape of the CSF, 
ordinary, politically inactive Egyptian citizens were terrorized daily by these 
‚little Mubaraks‛. For them, Mubarak was the generalization of the particular 
little Mubarak who controlled their neighborhood and workplace; and al-nizam 
was the generalization of the particular forms of exploitation, oppression, and 
domination they suffered. In opposition to the conscripts of the CSF, these State-
sanctioned mafia groups had much to lose in a confrontation with the people 
organizing themselves as a social Subject in neighborhood and workplace 
committees.  
Against the Revolution 
Classic Tactics 
When the 25 January protests began, the State adopted its usual tactics: mass 
mobilization of police forces. However, the large number of protesters and 
widespread nature of the revolt rendered a swift repression by a concentrated 
force impossible. Between 25 and 28 January a protracted guerrilla battle between 
protesters and CSF ensued. The fight in the streets was complemented by an 
offensive in cyberspace, as the regime ‚<did not choose merely to target a handful of 
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the major social networking sites, but rather the internet as a whole in addition to mobile 
phone networks<‚1762 
 The urban guerrilla exhausted the security apparatus and cleared the way for 
the massive mobilizations of Friday 28 January, when the masses were able to use 
their numbers to surround, overrun and defeat the CSF. According to Paul Amar, 
the crucial power shift from the Interior Ministry to the Armed Forces already 
happened at this juncture: ‚President Hosni Mubarak lost his political power on 
Friday, 28 January. On that night the Egyptian military let Mubarak’s ruling party 
headquarters burn down and ordered the police brigades attacking protesters to return to 
their barracks.‛1763 
 On Saturday, the Armed Forces physically entered the spaces of revolution 
with tanks, APCs, and soldiers. In opposition to the police forces, it avoided an 
open and explicitly violent confrontation with the protesters, seemingly 
contenting itself with occupying key State sites, separating police and protesters, 
and almost gently removing occupiers from Tahrir. However, the Ministry of 
Interior was either a sore loser, or, more likely, did not give up easily. It not only 
withdrew the CSF, but all police units, including those involved in more 
‚innocent‛ activities such as traffic. The initiative went to the baltageyya, including 
plainclothes police and security officers, NDP members, and released criminal 
elements and looters.1764 
 As Sabry Zaky remarked, the failure to defeat the multi-headed, widespread 
monster of the revolution prompted the security apparatus to decentralize 
itself.1765 If the regime could not defeat the revolution in the streets, it would 
demobilize and atomize the protesters by calling them back to their homes and 
neighborhoods that were under attack. 1766  I discussed in Chapter 22 A 
Revolutionary Project how this counter-revolutionary tactic backfired, as people 
began to organize themselves in the shape of civil committees to protect their 
families and neighborhoods, bringing the revolution into the space of their home, 
instead of allowing the revolution to be ‚domesticated‛. 
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Armed Forces vs. Interior Ministry 
 Also on Saturday, Mubarak appointed a new cabinet, headed by Ahmed Shafiq 
and a Vice-President, Omar Suleiman. Suleiman had been the regime’s favored 
candidate for the position of vice-president for two years. 1767  He headed the 
General Intelligence Services, which were directly dependent on foreign funding 
and worked closely with the USA and Israel, and which were distrusted by the 
general public.1768 With the nomination of Suleiman, Mubarak hoped to gain the 
support of the USA in his controlled ‚un-transition‛1769 of power. Ahmed Shafiq, 
for his part, had been a Chief of Staff of the Air Force, which together with the 
Republican Guard constituted the two elite branches of the Armed Forces and 
those sections of the military that were closest to Mubarak. The revolution did not 
only amplify the existing contradictions between the Armed Forces and the 
Interior Ministry, it also deepened the rifts within the military, between the 
‚national capitalists‛ and those who profited from neoliberal reforms and foreign 
rents; and between the small circle of Mubarak protégés and those who had been 
politically sidelined. Rather than an intentional ‚good cop / bad cop‛ strategy, the 
contradictory attitudes of the army towards the protests expressed a real schism, 
Paul Amar claimed: 
This explains why you can have the contradictory display of the General Chief of 
the Armed Forces, Muhammad Tantawi, wading in among the protesters to show 
support on 30 January, while at the same time the chief of the Air Force was named 
Mubarak’s new Prime Minister and sent planes to strafe the same protesters. This 
also explains why the Presidential Guard protected the Radio/Television Building 
and fought against protesters on 28 January rather than siding with them.1770 
With regard to the hesitant defense of protesters by soldiers during the infamous 
Battle of the Camel, Paul Amar explained that: ‚The military were trying as best they 
could to battle the police/thugs, but Suleiman had taken away their bullets for fear the 
military would side with the protesters and use the ammunition to overthrow him.‛1771 
Ahmed al-Gourd recalled that:  
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At first the army was not on our side. At the very beginning the presidential guard 
gave ammo to the police. At the beginning. So we burned two APC, two armored 
cars. We basically surrounded the cars, we got the soldiers out and set the whole 
thing on fire. After that, suddenly, the army became neutral. It did not actually 
support it, but it tried to push both us and cops back<. basically they wanted to 
safeguard a lot of key centers of Cairo and break off the clash between the cops and 
the protesters.1772 
In addition to the swings in the revolutionary atmosphere, the contradictory 
actions of soldiers and officers vis-à-vis the protesters – sometimes protecting 
them against the police and baltageyya, sometimes siding with the Interior 
Ministry against the demonstrators and occupiers – were determined by their 
discrete loyalties to particular departments and interest groups within the Armed 
Forces. Through its course, the revolutionary process also constructed the 
military as a more or less unitary force with a ‚center‛: the SCAF, which 
expressed the outcome of an internal power struggle where the Chief of Staff, 
Muhammad Tantawi, came out on top. In the end even the Republican Guard 
sided with the SCAF and not the President.1773 
Divide et Impera 
 In the week following the first Friday of Anger, the State changed tactics. 
Firstly, through a ‚capital strike‛ the government closed the banks and some 
shops.1774 ‚People are tired of being cooped up in their apartments, made anxious as their 
stockpiles of food and money decrease, and they are ready for a sense of "normalcy" to 
return,‛1775 Joshua Stacher noted. This war of attrition against the masses was 
combined with a selective war of terror against individual participants. By the 
end of the second week of protests, some 10,000 people had been arrested in 
Cairo alone.1776 Whereas the military, in general, exercised restraint in confronting 
the masses, it engaged in the systematic detainment and torture of individual 
protesters ‚<for no more than carrying a political flyer, attending the demonstrations or 
even the way they look.‛1777 Hossam Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for 
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Personal Rights in Cairo, emphasized that the Armed Forces were, in addition to 
intimidating ordinary demonstrators, specifically targeting those whom they 
considered as agitators or instigators of the movement.1778 Either the military had 
no real understanding of the spontaneous process of revolution and its officers 
feverishly tried to cut the ‚hidden hands‛ behind the protests, or it consciously 
attempted to behead and weaken the revolutionary hydra, by targeting the 
organized political and human rights activists – i.e. the organic and traditional 
intellectuals of the movement. Probably both. 
 Secondly, the State mobilized its social reserves, especially NDP members, 
pouring them into the streets as politicized pro-Mubarak supporters. On Monday 
31 January the first pro-Mubarak demonstration was staged outside the 
Information Ministry, rallying some 300 demonstrators. State television focused 
on these first signs of ‚division‛ among the popular masses. Tuesday 1 February 
saw an increasing number of pro-Mubarak protests. The military for its part, 
continued to avoid a direct confrontation with the protesters, but closed off roads 
and train services to sabotage the mobilization of the masses. In the evening 
Mubarak made his defiant speech, while the army called on the masses to end 
their protests and return to a situation of normalcy.  
 This episode served to discredit the main idea of the revolutionary movement, 
expressed in the slogan of ‚the people want the fall of the regime‛. The 
mobilization of thousands of plainclothes pro-Mubarak forces saliently 
challenged the notion that the struggle was between ‚the people‛ and ‚the 
regime‛, but implied that the protesters only represented particularist and partial 
demands. The President could then present himself as the arbiter of the conflict 
between different factions within al-sha’b, agreeing with some, but not all 
demands of the protesters in order to promote the ‚common good‛ of the nation. 
As discussed before, this tactic had a big impact on the less politicized layers of 
the movement. Schielke described the discordant mood among protesters: 
The Pro-Mubarak demonstration was clearly organised by the government, with 
trucks with loudspeakers and pictures of Mubarak riding through the streets and 
distributing photocopied paper sheets in handwriting saying ‚Yes to Mubarak, no 
to destruction.‛ But it gained genuine popular support and there were really a lot 
of people spontaneously joining the march for Mubarak. But the people I talked to 
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were also positively peaceful, they were out for the return of peace, and it was clear 
that they had no intention to go to attack the anti-government demonstrators. 
However, as I walked down Talaat Harb street down to Tahrir, the demonstrators 
there were much more aggressive and much more organised than the crowd who 
spontaneously joined the big marches<1779 
Sabry Zaky explained that, if Mubarak had proceeded in this mock-conciliatory 
fashion he probably would have been able to separate the political vanguard from 
the popular masses and diffuse the movement.1780 At the very least he would have 
won precious time to reorganize the counter-revolutionary forces and re-establish 
the power of the enfeebled Ministry of Interior vis-à-vis the Armed Forces.  
 However, the increasing clashes between pro-Mubarak supporters and 
revolutionary protesters, culminating in the Battle of the Camel on Wednesday 2 
February, destroyed any wishful thinking about the President’s sincerity among 
the masses: ‚<the short pro-Mubarak euphoria had again given way to a more critical 
albeit by no means unified mood.‛1781 After the Battle of the Camel, the regime more 
or less had to accept the presence of protesters in the streets. The Ministry of 
Interior had failed to defeat the masses through ‚formal‛ police repression and 
‚informal‛ terror, whereas the Armed Forces were careful not to engage in open 
conflict with the masses: ‚<dislodging protesters by force from Cairo's central Tahrir 
Square, epicentre of the demonstrations, would portray the military in the same light as 
the widely hated police, risking a popular backlash that could taint its carefully guarded 
reputation as protector of the people.‛1782 
Isolation 
 Even though the generals were reluctant to save the power triad of the NDP, 
the Interior Ministry and the Gamal Mubarak clique, they needed to secure and 
reinforce their position in al-nizam vis-à-vis the democratic aspirations of the 
masses. Thus Omar Suleiman and Ahmed Shafiq engaged in a double tactic of 
cooptation and isolation. They tried, on the one hand, to co-opt the most 
moderate wing of the movement through negotiations; and, on the other, to 
isolate the demonstrators from the rest of society. Much to the frustration of 
Omar Suleiman and Ahmed Shafiq, the first tactic was unsuccessful, as those 
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groups that participated in the negotiations either swiftly withdrew under 
pressure from the mass movement, such as al-Baradei and the Muslim Brothers, 
or did not represent any real force on the ground, such as Amr Moussa and the 
Council of Wise Men. Suleiman even warned of a coup if the protests and 
negotiations dragged on, either by the military to enforce a solution, or by some 
other group.1783   
 The second tactic of isolation could have been successful if not for the role of 
the workers’ movement. In previous chapters I discussed the lack of a directing 
‚center‛ in the revolutionary activity-system, which created a stalemate between 
protesters occupying Tahrir and soldiers defending key State institutions. The 
decision of the government to reopen businesses on 7 February was primarily 
aimed to insulate Egyptian society at large from the pockets of resistance. Yet, the 
regime’s capital strike was replaced with workers’ strikes that spread the 
revolution to workplaces in the whole country. In addition, the continued 
defiance of Mubarak in the face of the slow disintegration of al-nizam prompted 
the revolutionary masses to start moving towards a confrontation with the 
military forces occupying key State spaces. The escalating strikes and the inability 
of the State to deal with the uprising alienated previously loyal factions of the 
ruling class from the Mubarak regime. As Jack Shenker observed, on 9 February 
important Egyptian companies were: 
<explicitly distancing themselves from the Mubarak regime< The intimate 
connections between Egypt's political and business elite are probably the defining 
feature of Mubarak's three decades in power, and the source of much resentment 
amongst ordinary Egyptians - if key business figures now see fit to disassociate 
themselves from a governing clique that served them so well for so long, that can't 
be a good sign for Omar Suleiman and those around him.1784 
The disorganization of al-nizam put pressure on the Armed Forces to find a way 
out of the regime’s crisis. When it became obvious that the masses would not 
even accept an honorary exit for the President, who already had lost all his real 
power to the military clique,1785 both Mubarak and the constitutional base of the 
regime had to be sacrificed on the altar of the counter-revolution. Omar 
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Suleiman’s laconic statement that Mubarak had resigned, not only signified the 
end of his presidency, it also established the SCAF as the sole supra-constitutional 
ruling power. Formally, Egypt was once more an explicit military dictatorship, 
although, for the time being, the hands of the generals were somewhat tied to the 
revolutionary masses who catapulted them into power. 
A New Caesarism?1786 
On Thursday 10 February, for the first time since the 25 January protests, the 
military constructed itself as an explicitly autonomous participant in the 
revolutionary process through its ‚center‛ of the ‚Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces‛, an actor issuing ‚communiqués‛ on behalf of itself. The SCAF was 
composed of: 
<the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff, the heads of the five services, of the five 
military districts into which the country is divided, and the heads of each of the 
specialized departments—intelligence, legal and so on. But we can be sure it is the 
first twelve who call the shots. 1787  
The SCAF remained in permanent session in the Ministry of Defense, which 
symbolically represented the power shift from the Ministry of Interior to the 
military. The mere fact that the SCAF convened independently from Mubarak 
was proof of the ‚silent coup‛ that was taking place behind the curtains of al-
nizam. CNN quoted an anonymous senior Egyptian official that: "It's not a coup, 
it's a consensus."1788 The emerging consensus among Egypt’s ruling classes and 
foreign allies, such as the USA, was that Mubarak’s days were numbered and that 
the military was the only State structure able to contain the revolutionary flood. 
The more or less stable ensemble of ruling State structures and capitalist classes – 
the ‚Mubarak regime‛ – had collapsed. The balance of power, which began to 
shift from the Ministry of Interior and the NDP to the Armed Forces after the first 
Friday of Anger, had now swung decisively in the favor of the military. As they 
were ‚national capitalists‛ the political and economic interests of the generals did 
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not fully coincide with the ‚crony capitalists‛,1789 but neither did they correspond 
with those of the revolutionary masses. The civil-democratic demands not only 
threatened the power base of the Interior Ministry and the NDP, but also the 
tradition of the ‚military presidency‛ and the independent budget and politics of 
the Ministry of Defense. The turmoil caused by the strikes, which also hit military 
factories, showed the generals the dangers of an expansion of the revolution in 
the economic sphere.  
 Since the late 1970s the Armed Forces had been nurtured by the USA to play 
the role of ‚stabilizer‛ within Egyptian politics.1790 It supplied the USA with a 
relatively reliable structure that could survive any individual ruler and provide 
continuity in defending its geopolitical interests in the region. The military, as a 
State institution, has been, through its entire history, an essentially counter-
revolutionary force, in the sense that it never allowed the self-organization and 
self-determination of al-sha’b. Between 1952 and 1967 it had been a transformative 
or revolutionizing power, but its execution of increasingly radical changes to the 
Egyptian social formations was meant to prevent the development of an 
autonomous popular Subject, rather than encouraging it.1791 Facing the organic 
crisis of the 1940s, the only way for the Free Officers to fight feudalism and 
imperialism – and at the same time halt the revolutionary Project that was taking 
shape – was to become the leader of the revolutionary process, and substitute its 
own populist agency for the popular Subjectness of the mass movement.  
 Ironically, in the 25 January Revolution, the Armed Forces were able to play 
the part of the Savior-Ruler because of their forced retreat from political society, 
which inoculated the military from the popular criticisms of the escalated 
domination, oppression, and exploitation during the last two decades. Simply 
put, the Armed Forces were, in the eyes of the general audience, no longer a 
salient pillar of al-nizam. On the contrary, in contradistinction to the civil 
institutions of the Mubarak regime, the Egyptian military had retained an aura of 
being a national and popular social force. Already on Saturday 29 January, the 
people called on the army to pick a side in the conflict by the slogan ‚the people 
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and the army: one hand‛. A joint statement of youth activists in Tahrir declared 
that: 
We the people and the youth of Egypt demand that our brothers in the national 
armed forces clearly define their stance by either lining up with the real legitimacy 
provided by millions of Egyptians on strike on the streets, or standing in the camp 
of the regime that has killed our people, terrorized them and stole from them.1792 
Such slogans and statements could be read as merely naiveté from the part of the 
protesters. But the military does not constitute a simple Object that lies in wait to 
be passively recognized for what it ‚really is‛ by the revolutionary Subject. The 
relation between the protesters and the Armed Forces throughout the revolution 
has been much more complex. The recognition of ‚our brothers in the national 
armed forces‛ as a potential revolutionary ally is an interpellation of the ordinary 
soldiers as being a part of al-sha’b against al-nizam. The protesters were anxious 
when the Armed Forces entered the physical spaces of the revolution, since they 
recognized the decisive role of the military for the fate of the uprising. In their 
slogans, but also in their actions of embracing and kissing soldiers, giving them 
flowers, food and drink, discussing with them, et cetera, the protesters 
spontaneously tried to draw the ‚Armed Forces‛ in their revolutionary activity-
system, encouraging them to assist the popular Subject in a solidary way: ‚’Where 
is the army? Come and see what the police is doing to us. We want the army. We want the 
army,’ the protesters in one area of central Cairo shouted, shortly before police fired 
teargas on them.‚1793 
 The spontaneous instruction of the Armed Forces by protesters was always 
directed ‚horizontally: at the soldiers as potential participants in the popular 
Project, and not at the military as a State structure. Walter Ambrust remarked 
that: ‚Pro-democracy demonstrators and their sympathizers often repeated the slogans 
‚the army and the people are one hand,‛ and ‚the army is from us.‛ They had the 
conscripts in mind, and many were unaware of how stark differences were between the 
interests of the soldiers and the generals.‛ 1794 For example, when al-Baradei called 
upon the ‚Armed Forces‛ to ‚save the country now‛ or it ‚will explode‛,1795 it 
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was not clear whether he addressed rank-and-file soldiers to join the side of the 
revolution as participants of the popular Subject, or the SCAF to take power as a 
military institution. The first interpellation posited the popular activity-system as 
the primary and leading Subject of the revolution, whereas the second subjugated 
the agency of the mass movement to that of the generals. The SCAF profited from 
this confusion about the nature of the Armed Forces, seen as both a potentially 
liberating force through its soldiers-developing-towards-solidarity and as one of 
the pillars of al-nizam. Taking the lead in the revolutionary process seemed to 
agree with the dominant sentiment among protesters that the ‚Armed Forces‛ 
were on their side. Conversely, the generals were pressured to act because of this 
interpellation of ‚the people and the army: one hand‛, which started to affect the 
rank-and-file soldiers. Khaled al-Balshy recalled that: 
There were lots of clashes within the army itself, especially among the petty officers 
and soldiers. The army is a reflection of society. There is also corruption from the 
military leaders. The petty officers and soldiers will be the referees in the next 
battle. Even in the army there were two strikes during the revolutionary days. [for 
example]: the army's music corps. The leadership of the military music corps was 
fired because of the strike and some soldiers to. It shows that there is also anger in 
the army<1796 
 The generals could not command their troops to open fire on the protesters 
because that would have broken the spell that conjured the image of the Armed 
Forces as the defenders of the national popular interest. In order to prevent a 
spontaneous solidary mode of assistance with the revolutionary Subject from the 
part of the soldiers, the SCAF had to initiate a colonizing mode of assistance 
towards the mass movement, which, at face value, satisfied the expectations of 
both popular masses and soldiers.1797 
 For the SCAF, a Caesarist intervention was necessary, because, just as in 1952, 
the best way to halt the independent development of the revolutionary process 
was to lead and thus control it. A Caesarist intervention was possible, because, just 
as in 1952, the Armed Forces were perceived as a national force defending the 
general good, instead of a State structure with particular interests of its own.1798 
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 However, the political and economic circumstances of the Caesarist 
intervention of 2011 differed fundamentally from those of 1952. Firstly, the Free 
Officers had – or at least quickly developed – a political and economic vision of 
fighting feudalism and imperialism, establishing some form of social justice, and 
developing the country. This ethico-political dimension lent their Caesarist 
intervention a progressive and qualitative character. It was progressive because it 
strengthened the position of subaltern classes and groups – peasants, workers, 
women, students, et cetera – vis-à-vis foreign and domestic capital groups. It was 
qualitative because it transformed political and economic structures more strongly 
than the neocolonial elites ever dared, could, or wanted.1799  
 The SCAF, however, did not arrive at the scene of revolution with noble 
intentions, but was pushed in its role of revolutionary, and reluctantly played the 
part of Savior-Ruler only to save its own particular interests. Menal Khaled, ex-
member of the RS and a leader of the cinema workers, explained that: 
A lot of people who were not participating in the revolution, who remained at 
home, are thinking that the army is protecting the revolution, but that is not right, 
the army was forced to protect the revolution and forced to go the way of the 
people. Not the other way around. It is unconstitutional for the army to take over 
power after the president resigns, but the army used the mobilization of the people 
in the streets to legitimate its leadership. 1800 
The Caesarist intervention of the SCAF was neither progressive, nor qualitative. 
The generals were already a part of al-nizam, and they didn’t carry out a coup 
against themselves. Al-Badil editor Khaled al-Balshy pondered that: 
We were forced to deal with this organization [the military] in Egypt because it 
was the only stable organization within the ex-regime< Not because they are 
heroes. Now we are forced into negotiations with the army for the benefit of the 
people, which is ironical because the majority of the leadership of the army is part 
of the ex-regime. A revolution where we should negotiate our rights is in my 
opinion not a revolution at all. What happened in Egypt until now is only 
replacing the existing dictatorship with the rule of the army.1801 
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By sacrificing the Mubarak clan and some elements of the police dictatorship, the 
SCAF hoped to protect the political and economic status quo, but with themselves 
reaping the fruits of neoliberal reform instead of their erstwhile competitors. Thus 
the Caesarist intervention of 2011 was essentially ‚reactionary‛ and 
‚quantitative‛.1802 
 Secondly, the 25 January Revolution had developed itself more fully as a 
revolutionary activity-system than the ‚riots‛ that enticed the Free Officers to 
take power. Whereas Nasser’s coup took place in a period of disorganization of 
both the State and the mass movements, the SCAF intervention was timed at the 
high point of the revolutionary process and faced a self-confident and militant 
popular Subject. For most of the protesters who accepted the SCAF’s role as 
guardian of the ‚democratic transition process‛ this supervising role was but 
temporarily and conditionally. For example, Alaa Abd al-Fattah, a youth activist, 
claimed that: "The military are the custodians of this particular stage in the process, and 
we're fine with that, but it has to be temporary.‛1803 
 People often expressed their confidence in their own collective agency to keep 
the SCAF in check and claimed that they knew now that they could and would 
return to the streets when something did not work out as they wanted it to be. 
Regardless of the practical truth of this sentiment, it pointed towards an intuition 
among demobilized protesters that the post-Mubarak relations of power were not 
yet consolidated, and that they, rather than being defeated by the counter-
revolution, were merely giving the SCAF a mandate to realize their demands. The 
balance of power between masses and the SCAF was not established by the fall of 
Mubarak, but it was determined by the struggle for hegemony and domination 
that followed the moment of uprising in the protracted revolutionary process. 
Winners and Losers 
When Mubarak left the presidency on 11 February, the power structure of al-
nizam had been reconfigured. The post-Mubarak era counted ‚losers‛ and 
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‚winners‛ among the forces of the neo-liberal bloc. In the political domain, the 
networks and structures of the NDP and the Ministry of Interior were superseded 
by those of the SCAF. The physical burning of the NDP headquarters in Cairo 
during the uprising symbolically anticipated the collapse of this State structure. 
On 5 February top NDP leaders, including Gamal Mubarak, resigned, but the 
new ‚liberal‛ chairman, Hossam Badrawi, could not stop the disintegration of the 
State party. Within a week he left the NDP as well, and a large number of 
members and officials followed in his wake, until the party was formally 
dissolved on 16 April 2011 by court order. The defeat of the police forces after the 
first Friday of Anger shook the psychological foundations of the Ministry of 
Interior – a devastating blow to the morale of the police apparatus from which it 
still had not recovered a year after Mubarak’s fall.1804 It took two months before 
the police dared to show its face again on the streets, and even then it still did not 
command any respect or fear from the population.1805 The buildings of the hated 
SSI were attacked and raided by protesters during the 25 January uprising and 
also on 4 and 5 March, when angry demonstrators got hold of sensitive 
documents.1806 Under pressure of the street movement, the Ministry of Interior 
disbanded the SSI on 15 March 2011, replacing the structure with the ‚Egyptian 
Homeland Security‛. 
 Yet unlike the NDP, the apparatus of the Interior Ministry remained largely 
intact, because it was still a useful and necessary instrument of coercion. The 
military had little interest in ruling Egypt directly, firstly because it was unfit to 
deal with domestic ‚crowd control‛; and secondly because it rather wished to 
elevate itself above civil and political society, playing the part of arbiter between 
different political and economic factions of the ruling classes. Hazem Kandil 
argued that: 
The officer corps is often content, as in Turkey or Latin America, with setting up a 
political process in which there are competing parties, and then stepping back to 
act as the guardian of the system it has just created—intervening only when 
necessary through warnings or limited ‘corrective’ coups.1807 
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However, the relative weight of the Interior Ministry in the ensemble of power 
relations and structures that make up the Egyptian State declined significantly.1808  
 In the economic field, the neoliberal clique surrounding Gamal Mubarak had to 
make way for the military and civil ‚national capitalists‛: 
You have to separate between two kinds of businessmen. The nationalist ones, like 
the army for example, like Naguib Sawiris, or Hossam al-Badrawy, <this kind of 
nationalist businessmen were against the businessmen around Gamal Mubarak, 
because they sold Egyptian lands and many assets and give priority to foreign 
investors, not national investors, so there was a great conflict of interests between 
them. The army tried to get rid of these businessmen and Gamal Mubarak himself, 
this is very important.1809 
Jack Shenker claimed that: "Behind the scenes many business leaders have been furious 
with the regime for years over the hurdles placed in their way when they wanted to 
expand. A lot of people you might think are in bed with Mubarak have privately lost 
patience with it for some time."1810 Some analysts, such as Paul Amar, saw in the 
construction activities of national capitalists such as Sawiris a form of 
‚developmentalism‛ that was opposed to the cronyism and corruption of the 
neoliberal faction. 1811  However, through the process of State-sponsored 
subcontracting, the construction sector had been a client of rent distribution as 
well. Regardless of their ‚national‛ ideology, military and civil capitalists were 
primarily interested in getting their share of the rent producing machine that 
Egyptian state capitalism had degenerated into. Medhat al-Zahed concluded that 
the root problem of the neoliberal capitalists was that their corruption and 
monopolization of economic resources threatened ‚<the strategic interests of the 
class as a whole<‛ 1812  Not the process of privatization, liberalization, and 
subcontracting an sich, but the distribution of its benefits among a small clique 
had led to misgivings about the Mubarak ‚regime‛ within the property-owning 
classes. As I discussed previously, because of the process of ‚state capitalism in 
reverse‛, the State increasingly lost its position as a ‚universal capitalist‛ and had 
become the particular tool of a fraction of the ruling classes. Even though the 
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SCAF moved in to protect its own particular interests, at least its intervention 
reinforced the State as the defender of the ‚common good‛.  
 Framing the post-Mubarak economic struggle as a battle between corrupt, 
neoliberal ‚crony capitalists‛ and military and civil developmentalist ‚national 
capitalists‛ obscures, in my opinion, the more fundamental clash between 
workers and capitalists. Walter Ambrust summarized the problem of the concept 
of corruption succinctly:  
To describe blatant exploitation of the political system for personal gain as 
corruption misses the forest for the trees. Such exploitation is surely an outrage 
against Egyptian citizens, but calling it corruption suggests that the problem 
amounts to aberrant behavior from a system that would otherwise function 
smoothly.1813 
The partial cleansing of the political and economic apparatus from ‚corrupt‛ 
bureaucrats and ‚neoliberal‛ businessmen – tathir – diverted the attention of the 
public away from the activities of the Armed Forces, and weakened the military’s 
competitors. The SCAF had no interest in reinforcing the public sector, which 
became evident in the opposition of the SCAF against court rulings in favor of 
workers wanting to renationalize some of the privatized companies, such as 
Omar Effendi, Ghazl Shebeen, Tanta for Linen, El-Nasr for Steam Boilers and El-
Nile for Cotton Ginning. Conversely, economic concessions to the poor and 
working classes should be seen as a political tactic of dealing with these social 
movements, rather than evidence of a fundamentally new economic policy.1814  
One of the less obvious losers of the revolution was the Coptic Church, as Sabry 
Zaky explained: 
It is a sensitive issue, I know that. I’m not speaking about Copts, but the Church as 
an institute. The Church fears the rise of the Islamists, the Church responds to 
events, it doesn’t have the initiative because of this fear. If you are afraid you do 
not have the ability to take the initiative. The Church itself didn’t try to participate 
in the events. Shenouda himself did not say anything about the revolution. During 
the revolution he called upon the people to go home and after< Mubarak [stepped 
down+ he didn’t say anything even during the Sunday address of the Church... So 
the Church and Shenouda are afraid of the rise of the Islamists, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and there is something else. During the last ten years the Church 
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tried the whole time to bring back [the millet] system. According to this system the 
Church will govern its own people. It has its own law and tries to get court cases 
and rulings, like this. This was very clear during the last couple of years. 
Shenouda< asked all the time to revert court cases if it was against the Church, 
with regard to marriage for example. There was a case, for example, of a Christian 
man who wanted to divorce, who went to court to marry again. Shenouda tried to 
appeal this ruling. The Church wanted to bring back the millet system. The 
revolution will destroy his dreams. Actually I’m against this. I want all Christians 
and Copts to be like Muslims, in the sense that we are all Egyptian nationals, 
citizens, participating in political life, not to be inside the Church and taking 
orders from Shenouda or anyone else. [laughs] 
This kind of system tries to bring back the situation before the 1919 revolution. In 
1919 there was the slogan of Christians and Muslims are one hand. That was years 
ago< Some businessmen of the NDP, together with the Ministry of Interior and 
with the sanction of the Church ignited the current clashes between Muslims and 
Christians, this sectarian strife. 1815 
From the 1980s onwards the Coptic Church supported Mubarak as its guardian 
and protector vis-à-vis the growing influence of radical and puritanical Islam. 
Fear of losing its already feeble position in Egyptian society drove the institution 
into the arms of the counter-revolution, which, in turn, weakened its legitimacy in 
the post-Mubarak era. Both the projects of an Islamic and civil State were 
opposed to its sectarian goal of ruling its own religious subjects. 
Brothers or Comrades? 
The intricate role of the Armed Forces in the revolutionary process shows that the 
distinction between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces is not always 
straightforward and static. Pressure from the mass movement (or their own rank-
and-file) can force agents into a political role they play reluctantly. They may 
develop a position of assistance, be it often in a colonizing or commodifying way. 
To a certain extent the trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood reflected that of the 
military during the 25 January uprising. The Society’s leadership was anxious of 
the regime’s repression should it join the 25 January protests, and suspicious of 
the development of the popular Subject as a self-determining and self-organizing 
force, but it participated in the revolutionary activity-system because, on the one 
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hand, it was pushed by its enthusiastic membership,1816 and, on the other, it 
realized that the insurrection constituted an opportunity to swing the balance of 
power in its favor. 
 Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood leadership refused to participate in the 
planned protests on 25 January, many of its youth members played an important 
role in organizing the first demonstrations. Muhammad Abbas, an Ikhwan youth 
leader claimed that: 
The Guidance Bureau said that they gave the freedom to their members in the 
governorates to protest. For example, in October City, the chairman of the Bureau 
there, uploaded a video before 25 January to call on people to participate. They gave 
freedom for members to participate. Those who want to participate individually are 
allowed. This was a message in one of the most stressful periods of the Brotherhood. 
If you read the situation politically you will see that they implicitly called for 
participation. Should they have said ‚don't participate‛, people would not have 
participated. From the first moment of this invitation, large groups of Ikhwan 
organized together with other tendencies such as 6 April, leftists, al-Baradei 
supporters, al-Gabha militants. We contacted them before the 25th and we agreed 
on how to protest on the 25th and after it. We had a plan. 1817  
The participation of Ikhwan youth activists from the very beginning of the 
revolution was generally recognized by other revolutionary actors. Gihan 
Shabeen of the SRC asserted that: 
They participated in the revolution. They had a major role in the revolution. On 
the 25th the organization refused to be on the streets, but the youth group – and I 
know this because I was close to them – they were part of the Alliance who 
organized the demos on the 25th. 1818  
Mustafa Bassiouny of the RS emphasized that: 
During the first days of the revolution the Ikhwan said that they would not 
participate in the protests, but later, from the Friday of Anger on, they began to 
participate in an open and clear way. On 28 January there was the prayer at noon, 
led by a famous Ikhwan leader. From then on the Ikhwan were clearly in the 
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streets. Even though they didn’t show their signs, their organization was clearly 
present in the square. 1819  
Sabry Zaky acknowledged that the Muslim Brotherhood was pressured by its 
youth organization, first to allow its activists to participate in the 25 January 
protests, and then to join in the protests on Friday 28 January.1820 Muhammad Ali, 
an Ikhwan teacher recalled that on Friday 28 January the Society formally 
participated in the protests ‚<from the Murshid to the lowest members, including me, 
one of the lowest members of the Muslim Brotherhood.‛ 1821  Muhammad Abbas 
explained that Brotherhood members, when they entered into the revolutionary 
activity-system, did not try to colonize or commodify the movement, but 
supported the popular Project through genuine solidarity: 
The role of the Ikhwan was very clear in the square. They were a concrete force 
which stayed and slept in the square< 
During the revolution, in the square, the leaders of Ikhwan were in the square with 
the youth coalition. There was no decision which was not taken by the youth of the 
coalition, the youth of Ikhwan took the decision up to our leaders and they had to 
agree. We had a decision that the icons of the Ikhwan should not appear during the 
revolution< When they appeared they did not appear as members of Ikhwan, but 
as parliamentarians or committee members. The entrances and exits of the square 
were organized and controlled by the Ikhwan. The largest political enemy for 
Ikhwan said that if there were no Ikhwan in the square people would have been 
killed and executed.1822 
Gihan Shabeen conceded that ‚<Wednesday 2 February, during the camel battle, and 
the evening with the molotovs and bullets< they played a major role in protecting Tahrir. 
They have the ‚staff‛ to do this.‛ 1823  Genuine solidarity is focused on the 
development and the emancipation of the other Subject. Substituting oneself for 
the movement was a form of colonization that the Brotherhood was not guilty of. 
Even with its formidable ‚staff‛ of relatively loyal, organized activists, the 
Brotherhood would not, and could not, lead protests of millions.1824 For most 
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secular activists and observers this was a reassuring fact, as its presence in the 
revolution had conjured images of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  
 On the other hand, solidary instruction and assistance only pushes the 
development of a Subject forward when it is proleptic: when it helps to develop 
the forms of thought and activity to a higher level. The Society’s reluctance to 
organize and direct the masses also weakened the movement. Gihan Ibrahim of 
the RS gave the example of the indecisiveness of Said al-Husayni, the Ikhwan MP 
in Mahalla: 
I was telling him that this is your time, your moment, your call for strike in 
Mahalla and do that and so on. And he told me, well< you do it. You know. I’m 
like what do you mean, this is what you’ve been waiting for. This is the moment 
you can actually lead and take charge of these masses. You have the masses, so 
move the masses, mobilize the masses. [laughs] 1825  
Although the Brothers did not lead the protests, this did not mean that there were 
no frictions between them and other revolutionary actors over slogans, 
pamphlets, the use of megaphones, et cetera. 1826  These small conflicts are 
reminiscent of the cooperation between Brothers, socialists, liberals and 
nationalists during the civil-democratic movement of the last decade.1827  
 During the insurrectionary phase of the 25 January Revolution, in general, 
Muslim Brothers stood side by side with the other protesters and were often the 
most militant and resilient demonstrators and occupiers. After the fall of 
Mubarak, the attitude of the leadership changed, however, as it cautiously 
supported the ‚soft coup‛ – much to the anger of radical liberals, socialists, and 
nationalists.1828 Whereas the Caesarist intervention constituted an obstacle in the 
trajectory of the revolutionary Subject, it was an opportunity for the Brotherhood 
leadership to assert itself as a hegemonic force: a social power able to lead 
Egyptian society. As an organization, the Society moved from a revolutionary to a 
counter-revolutionary position, calling upon the protesters to leave Tahrir Square 
and start negotiations with the SCAF.1829 In March 2011, Hisham Fouad of the RS 
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was still careful in his analysis of the position of the Brotherhood in the 
revolution: 
There is a dialogue [between the SCAF and the MB]. This does not mean that they 
are against the people with regard to all demands. They will fight to abolish the 
emergency law. They will fight for a lot of things. But they will avoid fighting the 
regime directly. They also want stability in the factories and their members in the 
factories are trying to convince the workers to wait, to be calm< They play a role 
to bring back ‚stability‛ but we cannot say they are completely against the 
revolution.1830 
Mustafa Bassiouny noted that: 
After Mubarak retired, the Ikhwan established a good relation with the regime. The 
constitutional amendments, the attacks on the strikes and the call to bring back the 
police render this connection obvious. The coming days will render this connection 
between the Ikhwan and the regime even more explicit.1831 
Gihan Ibrahim shrugged: 
This is what they always stood for... They only came< when there will be 
elections, or towards the end of the revolution, when it became clear that Mubarak 
is going< They are professionals, they are elites, they are businessmen, 
economically, their interests lie strongly with the old regime. It is not surprisingly 
that they are now pushing to protect those interests, and using the religion factor 
to mobilize the masses like they have always done. If you look at their agenda they 
are a very neoliberal, conservative force. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is as much a part of the old regime as anything else. They 
have constantly been utilized and coopted by the regime and they are what they are 
because of the regime.1832 
With regard to the worker strikes, which had been welcomed as part of the 
democratic revolution, after the fall of Mubarak the Brotherhood condemned 
them as destabilizing and particularist. 1833  Essam al-Erian explicitly said that 
‚<the workers’ strikes are not an expression of the revolutionary demand of social 
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justice.‛ 1834  Because of their weak presence in the independent trade union 
movement: 
The Ikhwan changed their own policies. Now they are saying they want to kick out 
all the old regime leaders in the state unions and syndicates, but the workers refuse 
this strategy because they know that the Ikhwan want to occupy these positions for 
themselves. The Ikhwan want new elections because they are the ones who would 
reap the benefits from these elections.1835 
The collapse of the NDP left a political vacuum which neither the SCAF nor the 
existing ‚opposition‛ parties could fill. The Brotherhood leadership was 
conscious of its potential to play the part of power broker between the generals 
and the popular masses: ‚The Brotherhood leadership has made strenuous efforts to 
present itself to the military as a valuable partner based partly on its ability to mobilise 
and demobilize popular protest.‛ 1836  Playing its traditional game of balancing 
between opposition and ruling groups it hoped to become a political force 
incontournable in the post-Mubarak era and the main representation of the 
common good: ‚Ikhwan should represent society from the head to the toe: workers, 
doctors... The interests of the Ikhwan are the interests of the whole people.‛1837  Sabry 
Zaky vividly portrayed the Society’s pragmatic politics: 
The Muslim Brotherhood plays all the time two roles, they stand with one leg in 
the regime and with the other in the opposition< And they believe that, if you 
stand like this [stands with feet adjacent to each other], anyone can push you. But 
if you stand like this [stands with feet wide apart], no one can push you. [laughs] 
So, they are keeping all the time one leg here and one leg there.1838 
Ironically, the Brothers’ ‚Islamization‛ of the 19 March constitutional referendum 
may have won them the vote, but, as Hisham Sallam pointed out:  
<the configuration of support for and against the constitutional amendments 
reinforced traditional ideological divisions within Egypt’s political arena, with 
Islamist-oriented groups along with salafi leaders supporting the yes vote, while 
most non-Islamist groups and the Coptic Orthodox Church favored a no vote. The 
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salience of these divisions in post-Mubarak politics has been increasing since the 
constitutional referendum.1839 
The sectarianization of political society, (re-)added the layer of ‚Islamists‛ versus 
‚seculars‛ on top of the more profound revolutionary contradictions between, 
put simply: democracy and authoritarianism; political and social revolution; 
direct and representative politics. Even though this sectarianization may have 
steered the political debate into a domain dominated by Muslim Brothers and 
Salafists, it also made it much more difficult for those forces to present themselves 
as the universal expressions of the national, Egyptian interest. 
 Does all of this make the Brotherhood a counter-revolutionary force? With 
regard to the Society as an institution, I am inclined to say yes, because, much like 
the SCAF, the Brotherhood presented itself as a Savior-Ruler instead of assisting 
al-sha’b in the development of its own self-emancipating neoformations. 
Democratizing and changing some of al-nizam’s aspects on behalf of the people 
makes the Society a revolutionizing but not a revolutionary force as it reinforces its 
own position and substitutes its own agency for that of the popular activity-
system. Furthermore, ‚<there is nothing in the group’s ideology which opposes private 
property or the profit motive per se – and its policies are essentially continuous with the 
liberalisations of Mubarak’s government, not least because key Brotherhood leaders are 
themselves businessmen.‛1840Whereas the Ikhwan may reform some of the political 
aspects of the State apparatus, it is not principally opposed to the neoliberal 
strategy of accumulation. The Brotherhood’s desired reconfiguration of the 
Mubarak neoliberal bloc entails a reversal of the relations of domination within 
the domestic ‚private‛ capitalist classes: a substitution of the clique around 
Gamal Mubarak and Ahmed Ezz – which was ousted from the commanding 
heights of political society – with its own capitalist leaders such as Khayrat al-
Shater. Neither the role of the Armed Forces nor the position of foreign capital in 
the Egyptian economy is challenged by the Society’s leadership. As such its class 
interests are objectively in opposition to the completion of the revolutionary 
Project. 
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 On the other hand, youth members and reformist leaders increasingly revolted 
against the counter-revolutionary course of the leadership. Already in March 
2011, Sabry Zaky prophesized that: 
<this organization has many different kinds of people who have many different 
kinds of interests. So there is a kind of conflict of interests in this organization. 
There are the businessmen in the organization, and they are with the military 
because they know that the military is a nationalist middle class businessmen and 
they deal with them in the same way. This wing will try to be with the army, but 
the youth itself within the organization will think in a different way. They want to 
join the civil movement. 1841 
Ikhwan youth leader Muhammad Abbas voiced a discourse of nationalism, rather 
than Islamism, and hoped that the Brotherhood could become the main force in a 
national, civil-democratic bloc: 
Now the face of the Brotherhood is the face of Tahrir. In the next period we will 
forge a relation of confidence with society in order to go through this period. 
One of the effects of the revolution was that the drops of rain in different places and 
in different times, the alliances which happened, were united. Before the revolution 
there were already coalitions around certain demands. The revolution brought all 
the Egyptian people together and put the ideologies aside. 
Until now we haven't finished the revolution< In the first elections however I 
want all popular forces to go in the same direction to achieve our demands< We 
should first finish the program which we were united around.1842 
When I met Abbas he was still firmly of the opinion that the Society could contain 
its centrifugal forces: ‚ <there will be some differences, but no conflicts. We all work on 
the same base, but our strategies are different. We are all under the umbrella of Ikhwan 
and a part of the movement. And we will not work outside the organization.‛1843 Yet a 
few months later, he was working outside the Brotherhood, as a leader in the 
Islamic-leftist Egyptian Current Party.  
 Ex-Brotherhood member and historian Muhammad al-Hamy estimated that a 
year after Mubarak’s fall, half of the Society’s political youth members had left the 
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organization. 1844  Some became politically inactive; others joined new Islamist 
parties or movements to the right or the left of the Brotherhood’s own Freedom 
and Justice Party.1845 With regard to the strikes, some individual leaders such as 
Yosry Bayumi continued to support the workers’ movement independently from 
the Brothers’ ‚party line‛.1846 Muhammad Abbas claimed: 
We agree with the rights of workers and we are also against the law of stopping the 
strikes< It is not logical that the government which came from the revolution now 
criminalizes the revolution. [laughs] But the change must come from the top. These 
figures must be kicked out. These are our demands. The demand for stability will 
kill the revolution.1847 
In a way, the 25 January Revolution more forcefully interpellated civil-democratic 
Subjectivities among the Muslim Brothers than the Society was able to impose its 
Islamist project on the popular activity-system. From the perspective of the 
development of the revolutionary activity-system as a social Subject, the main 
divide in the Society was between those members who primarily saw the 
revolution as a spring-board for the Islamist project – i.e. the colonizing view – 
and those who saw the Islamist project as a pillar of support for the popular 
revolution – i.e. the solidary perspective. Being a huge movement consisting of 
various and contradicting social layers and projects, the Brotherhood was turned 
upside down by revolutionary events, leading to individuals and factions 
splitting away. However, the instruction of the revolutionary Project diminished 
as its participants were demobilized and their demands mediated by the SCAF 
and ‚professional‛ politicians. Even when thousands of activists left the 
Brotherhood, the core still remained a mass movement of hundreds of thousands 
of members and sympathizers.1848  
The Struggle for/against Normalization 
With hindsight, the decade before 2011 could be grasped as the preparatory phase 
of the 25 January Revolution. The civil-democratic and workers’ movement laid 
the foundations of the networks, practices, discourses and traditions of struggle 
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that resurfaced in the mass protests of January and February 2011. The concept of 
al-sha’b and al-nizam, the main players of the revolutionary drama, matured 
through these preparatory fights. The protests of 25 January initiated a second 
phase in the revolution, the uprising or insurrection, whereby the revolution 
developed from a dormant Subject-in-itself towards a Subject-for-itself. The 
popular Subjectivity became explicit and concrete through its activity in the 
streets. The generalization and systematization of this activity gave the empty 
signifier of al-sha’b a social body, just as the actions of the counter-revolutionary 
forces directed against the self-organizing and self-determining popular 
movement – the police, the baltageyya, the State media, Mubarak, Suleiman, the 
vacillating Western governments, et cetera – constructed those powers as the real, 
social body of al-nizam. Even though, when deconstructed in thought, ‚the 
regime‛ was but an aggregate of heterogeneous and contradictory forces, this 
imagery was interpellated, constructed, and materialized by the discourses and 
practices of the mass movement during the 25 January Revolution.  
 After the fall of Mubarak the revolution entered a phase of disintegration of the 
popular Subject, the differentiation and crystallization of the different opposition 
and regime forces, and a struggle for social/civil and political hegemony. In 
political society, the SCAF, Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, secular liberals and 
nationalists, and the Left did their best to prove that they were the most capable 
force to defend the Egyptian ‚national good‛. In civil society, it was confronted 
with the ebb and flow of spontaneous civil-democratic and class movements 
which either tried to influence the existing political powers, construct their own 
hegemonic apparatuses, or ignore ‚party politics‛ altogether. Hisham Fouad 
claimed that: 
The state tries to organize itself again, and the revolutionaries try to organize 
themselves. It is a battle. We forced the State to dispel Ahmed Shafiq and bring in 
Essam Sharaf and we won this battle. We said that we are against the referendum 
and against the constitutional amendments and that we want a new constitution. 
Who will win this battle? We will see. The State tries to put pressure on the 
workers and peasants not to strike and to protest, but the workers continue their 
strikes and this is another battle. We will see in these transitional months a lot of 
battles<1849 
                                                          
1849 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 13 March 2011. 
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The fall of Mubarak, the salient face of al-nizam, opened up a period of small-scale 
battles with more specific demands, whereby the revolutionary Project tried to 
redefine itself and its object of activity. The continuation of mass strikes and 
clashes between the ‚street‛ and the ‚transition regime‛ from below stood in 
stark contrast to the normalization and consolidation of political society from 
above. The drive for ‚normalization‛ was spearheaded by the SCAF and 
supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. The goal of 
normalization was putting an end to ‚chaos‛ and creating a stable political and 
economic platform from which the ‚transition process‛ could take off.  
 The substance of normalization was the demobilization and atomization of the 
popular Subject. From the perspective of the development of the masses into a 
self-determining Subject, ‚normalization‛ was the label of the post-Mubarak 
counter-revolution. The dual character of the revolution, with its roots in the civil-
democratic and class struggles of the 2000s, also entailed a dual normalization or 
counter-revolutionary process.  
 The first mode of normalization entailed the demobilization of the masses, an 
end to the occupation of Tahrir Square and the reassertion of representative 
politics, i.e. external-colonial mediation of the popular Subject: ‚There were those 
who said that the revolution was great and started on the 25th and ended on the 11th and 
that now it is the time to go home and celebrate the event each year, but that the 
revolution is in the past.‛1850 The essence of political counter-revolution was the 
active reversal of the spontaneous process whereby the masses ‚<break over the 
barriers excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside their traditional 
representatives, and create by their own interference the initial groundwork for a new 
régime.‛1851  
 The second mode was directed against the mass strikes. This form of counter-
revolution was less subtle, as often the legitimacy of workers as a social Subject 
was simply brushed aside. Workers’ strikes were portrayed as unpatriotic, 
parochialist, selfish and against the national interest. I have already discussed this 
process in Chapter 24 Workers and the Revolution. 
 The past and present of the revolution were rewritten: some revolutionary 
actors were excluded as genuine participants in the activity-system of al-sha’b, 
                                                          
1850 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
1851 Trotsky 2001: 17. 
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such as striking workers, whilst, other, counter-revolutionary forces were 
included.1852 After the fall of Mubarak everyone claimed to be part of the national-
popular Subject and some powers that had supported the regime throughout the 
25 January insurrection now hid, sometimes literally, behind the Egyptian flag. 
Mobinil and Vodaphone set up giant billboards in the national colors with the 
slogan ‚We are all Egyptians‛. Shops like ADIDAS painted their windows as 
Egyptian flags in order to prevent people from smashing them. Disjoined from its 
concrete activity in the streets, the abstract character of al-sha’b became a 
nationalistic meta-narrative, an empty signifier, which could easily be ‚filled‛ by 
any political or economic force seeking legitimacy. 
 The military Caesarism of the SCAF spilled over to a civil Caesarism in the 
form of controlled representative politics. 1853  The outcome of the 19 March 
referendum in 2011 on the constitutional amendments and the subsequent 
parliamentary elections reflected a growing ‚Islamist‛ 1854 and ‚parliamentary‛1855 
consensus in political society, which seemed to separate itself from the continued 
mobilization in the workplaces and streets in civil society. Within political society 
there emerged a situation of ‚dual power‛ between the Islamist-dominated 
parliament and the Ministry of Defense. The Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafists – which had argued for swift parliamentary elections in order to cash in 
on their organizational and discursive advantage vis-à-vis other opposition forces 
– now realized their victory was a pyrrhic one, as parliament was still governed 
by the old constitution that did not even grant them the right to form a cabinet of 
their own choice. A race began between parliament, which established a 
                                                          
1852 Sallam 2011c. 
1853 Many analysts stressed that the SCAF genuinely wanted a swift ‚transition of power‛ in order 
to continue their primary economic and military activities. However, Joshua Stacher observed 
that: ‚One should not< mistake the army’s reluctance to govern for aversion to rule.‛ (Stacher 2011b) 
Whereas the SCAF desired to get rid of formal rule, they aimed to reinforce their position within 
the neoliberal bloc. The politically motivated dissolution of the newly elected and Islamist-
dominated parliament in June 2012 showed that the military was reluctant to loosen its grasp 
over political society. 
1854  I suggest that the victories of the Brotherhood and the Salafists in the referendum and 
parliamentary elections expressed the perception among the population-as-voters that these 
forces, at that specific juncture, were best equipped to politically lead society, rather than a call 
for the religious-ideological Islamization of the revolution. 
1855 The idea that the crisis of Egyptian society could be solved through the ballot-box and 
representative politics, rather than continued mass mobilizations and grassroots interventions of 
al-sha’b in the reshaping of al-nizam. 
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committee to write a new constitution that would expand its powers, and the 
executive – i.e. the SCAF – which began legal proceedings to contest the 
constitutionality of parliament. On 14 June 2012 the High Constitutional Court 
dissolved Parliament, and the SCAF took over legislative powers – preparing the 
outcome of the final round of the presidential elections that were held on 
Saturday 16 and Sunday 17 June 2012.  
 Ironically, it was exactly the divide between the ‚parliamentary‛ fight and the 
struggle in the streets and workplaces that weakened the opposition parties vis-à-
vis the SCAF-dominated political society. Gihan Shabeen of the SRC criticized the 
Brotherhood for abandoning the mass movement in favor of an uneasy alliance 
with the SCAF: 
You can say that there is some alliance now between them and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It is not a permanent alliance. This is why the reformists are crazy in 
my point of view. Whenever the pressure of the people will weaken, the first thing 
the SCAF will do is putting the Muslim Brothers in jail. It is this way all the time. 
Reformists cannot see the power of the people.1856 
In addition, the stronger the Islamist parties became, the more the SCAF was able 
to play up fears among secular liberal, nationalist, and leftist opposition forces 
about the danger of an imminent Islamization of society. Without the will or 
ability to mobilize a social base against the Islamists, the secular parties could not 
but look for protection among the military against the ‚threat‛ of Islamism.1857  
 In conclusion, the main challenge posed by the SCAF and other political forces 
to the popular Subject was their colonization of the revolution: the assertion that 
the popular Subject could only liberate itself through external mediation instead 
of its own objectifications. In order to overcome this obstacle, the popular Subject 
had to construct for itself the capacity to lead society, to develop its own 
hegemonic center, apparatus, and pedagogy – a revolutionary Prince. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1856 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
1857 This episode strongly mirrored the ‚secular alliance‛ that Mubarak initiated in the 1990s and 
which led parties such as Tagammu into a politics of disengagement with the street. See Chapter 12 
The Civil-Democratic Movement, Chapter 18 Roads to Counter-Hegemony, and Chapter 26 The 
Revolutionary Prince. 
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CHAPTER 26 
The Revolutionary Prince 
<the left today< is in a very critical and pivotal moment where we can completely lead and take a 
strong stand, or completely be buried and face another decade of mobilizing at a minimum level like we 
have been doing for decades. 
Gihan ‚Gigi‛ Ibrahim, Interview, Cairo, 20 March 2011 
The Left, the People, and the Prince 
Although the popular activity-system had manifested itself concretely as a social 
Subject through its revolutionary activity – most explicitly in the Republic of 
Tahrir – its forms of self-mediation and self-consciousness were still in an 
embryonic state. The Project’s spontaneous objectifications lacked coherence, 
stability and systematization, and it merely developed an abstract consciousness 
of itself as ‚the people‛, and of its antagonist as ‚the regime‛: it did not mature a 
true self-concept and a political-economic critique of the neoliberal bloc.   
 The Caesarist intervention cut short the popular developmental process 
towards Subjectness, or rather, it inserted obstacles on the pathway of the 
revolutionary Subject, which had to be overcome through the development of 
suitable neoformations. As I discussed in Chapter 22 A Revolutionary Project, the 
popular Subject lacked a directive center that would enable it to capture and 
transform the upper and centralized echelons of State power: ‚Now, in 2011 we 
had a real popular revolution, but the army is still in power. Why? We had nothing. We 
had not a single organization that could take the power.‛1858  
 Some intellectuals rejected any directive role for themselves in this 
revolutionary episode. The cartoonist Salah Abd al-Azim, for example, posited 
that: 
The Egyptian society tasted the fire, I think we should leave them for one year and 
not direct them to any directions, to see and discuss and learn from their mistakes 
and so on< I do not want to influence the people. The political consciousness of 
the people is growing up these days, we shouldn’t interfere with this, we should 
stand by the people and support them in developing all these new attitudes, then 
                                                          
1858 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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we can involve them< Even if the people took a wrong decision they can fix it in a 
short period. 
But the people can’t go back to the past. They have broken all the idols of the 
dictatorship, they won’t accept any new dictatorship< With this environment and 
attitude of the people, there won’t be a new dictatorship. The army in this 
atmosphere cannot take control over everything, the Ikhwan used religious 
propaganda to direct the people, but the people won’t take these wrong ideas again 
and won’t obey any new dictatorship, military or religious.1859 
This attitude was born out of, on the one hand, a genuine fear of colonizing the 
popular Subject, and, on the other, a quasi religious reverence for the autonomous 
agency of al-sha’b. Ironically, often those intellectuals who had underestimated 
the capacity of the people to overthrow the regime, now overestimated its 
Subjectness.  
 Most leftist intellectuals, however, argued that ‚<there is a leftist tendency in the 
revolution. Perhaps it is not clear, but we can see the tendency through the huge masses 
on the streets, who were in the street by millions and millions<‛1860 The task of the Left 
was to help developing this tendency into a hegemonic force. However, the 
dissolution of the collaborative activity of the popular Subject, and its 
differentiation into a variety of opposing Projects, divided and fragmented the 
Left on fundamental ideological, tactical, and strategic questions. 
Revolutionary Tactics 
To Occupy or Not to Occupy 
After the fall of Mubarak, there was a discussion within the revolutionary 
movement if protesters should continue occupying Midan Tahrir or not. Gihan 
Shabeen explained that: 
There are people who think that we cannot stop now and that we have to continue 
this revolution... In another way, even the minimal democratic demands we cannot 
realize these demands unless the mobilization of the masses. There are those people 
who want to demobilize the people and there are those who want the mobilization 
to continue and to let the people feel that there is a change in their life.1861 
                                                          
1859 Interview with Salah Abd al-Azim, Cairo, 22 March 2011. 
1860 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
1861 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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Tahrir had become not only the salient symbol of revolutionary resistance, it had 
also developed into a strategy of al-sha’b to transform al-nizam, and into a discrete 
activity-system that projected the capability of popular self-governance. Tahrir 
was the soul of the revolution, and to abandon this liberated space would 
jeopardize the entire revolutionary process. Organized and experienced political 
activists realized that the Caesarist intervention was just another obstacle in the 
development of the revolution, and they pushed for a continued occupation of 
the Square in order to achieve a transformation of al-nizam: ‚Now the demand for a 
constituent assembly is crucial. It is not the military or technocrats who should decide the 
new constitution but a democratic assembly composed of recognised delegates from the 
people.‛1862 The role of political activists and intellectuals was ‚<pushing people to 
collect themselves again in the Square on Fridays and stop this normalization of 
revolutionary activity.‛1863  
 The Tahrir mobilizations still had an effect after the fall of Mubarak. For 
example, protesters succeeded in putting enough pressure on the SCAF to fire 
Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq on 3 March and replace him with Essam Sharaf 
who had a better standing with the masses, because he had participated in the 25 
January protests – even though he had served as Minister of Transportation in 
2004 and 2005. Under pressure of the Tahrir occupiers, Sharaf reshuffled his 
cabinet, removing many figures who were perceived as too close to the old 
regime. After March, Tahrir still welcomed tens of thousands of protesters and 
occupiers, for example during the Friday of Cleaning on 8 April 2011, the Second 
Friday of Anger on 27 May 2011, throughout July, the Friday of Correcting the 
Path on 9 September 2011, and at the eve of the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 
presidential elections. Those protesting were increasingly disappointed with the 
lack of real change and the counter-revolutionary role of the SCAF.1864 
 However, it became more and more clear that the Caesarist intervention had 
succeeded in demobilizing and pacifying the majority of protesters. Already in 
March 2011, Menal Khaled confided in me that: ‚<I don’t love Tahrir anymore. I 
went to Tahrir and I found people as if they were going to the zoo with their children, 
taking photos of the tents, and so on.‛1865 Apart from a space for ritualistic protest, 
                                                          
1862 6 April activists in Guardian.co.uk 2011t. 
1863 Interview with Muhammad Zaky Murat, 30 March 2011. 
1864 Muhammad Waked in Bassam and Abu-Rish 2011. 
1865 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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Midan Tahrir had become a touristic site of commemoration of the revolutionary 
uprising where t-shirts and souvenirs were sold – already celebrating the past of 
the revolt instead of its presence or future. Sabry Zaky moved that: 
Now, staying in Tahrir is an old game. I think it has brought many successes and 
gains for us, but we have to be creative, because a revolution by definition is a 
creative thing... It is not ONLY Tahrir Square, we can do this, sure, but at the 
same time we have to think about other venues and other ways to spread this 
revolution. 1866  
Menal Khaled agreed: ‚Being in the Square now is only a symbolic movement. You 
should be in the neighborhoods. Conscious actors and artists should go to the 
neighborhoods, especially the poor neighborhoods, to raise consciousness, and through 
their work and movies they should raise awareness.‛ 1867 Gihan Shabeen explicated 
that: 
<there are people who participated in the revolution, who were part of the marches 
and the sit-in in Tahrir. They went back to home but they want to continue their 
activity and there is no party to organize them, because the parties are weak. So 
they only have the committees that were organized in the revolution itself. Maybe 
through the influence of some activists they can continue their struggle in their 
neighborhood, dealing with local problems and so on. I think this will continue 
until these people will find another way to become a part of the political life. 1868 
New Systems of Activity 
Let us conceive of the revolution as a protracted collective learning process. The 
first, preparatory phase, which slowly built up since the 2000s, only engaged 
small numbers of political activists and a minority of workers – even though the 
civil-democratic and class mobilizations were bigger than any movement since 
the 1970s and perhaps even the 1940s. The moment of the uprising, that phase 
which began with the 25 January protests and ended with the fall of Mubarak and 
which is often identified with the ‚revolution‛ in a narrow sense, drew in, at its 
high point, millions of ordinary Egyptians. But even the street politics of the 
revolutionary uprising could not suddenly instruct the whole population. 
Although thousands continued to protest and occupy Tahrir, the real masses, the 
                                                          
1866 Interview with Sabry Zaky, Cairo, 10 March 2011. 
1867 Interview with Menal Khaled, Cairo, 25 March 2011. 
1868 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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millions who had poured into the streets during the uprising, returned to their 
homes after the Caesarist intervention, implicitly granting the SCAF a mandate 
for its emancipation and, explicitly voting for the most conservative and 
bourgeois political forces in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 
respectively 2011 and 2012. 
 In the eyes of many leftists, the offspring of the revolution seemed monstrous. 
SCAF-organized referenda and elections appeared as a counter-revolutionary 
attack in a civil-democratic shape. Gihan Ibrahim rejected ‚<these huge 
assumptions that< because now the people are in favor of revolution they will never vote 
for someone who is part of the old regime, or the NDP, which is nonsense in my 
view<‛1869 With regard to the similar anticlimactic outcome of the 1917 February 
Revolution, Trotsky had offered some comfort: ‚But in voting for them they created 
a partition-wall between themselves and their own aims. They could not now move 
forward at all without bumping into this wall erected by themselves, and knocking it 
over.‛1870 In the same manner, Gihan Ibrahim claimed that: 
Within the working class, the Muslim Brotherhood< they either will lose ground 
based on economic and social issues, or they will have to reform and become more 
what the workers, or the masses want, the masses they belong to or the masses that 
belong to them.1871 
Khaled al-Balshy optimistically claimed that: 
In my opinion the majority is understanding what happens in Egypt, but they are 
weak and frustrated. They lost a lot of energy in the revolution. When they regain 
energy we can continue the revolution< When the people notice a return to the 
days of the ex-regime, they will explode again. As long as they see reforms they 
will remain demobilized. I hope that the army has a stupid desire to return to the 
ex-regime days, because then there will be a new revolution, even bigger than the 
last one and maybe we'll have socialism in Egypt then.1872 
For the revolutionary Project, not the ‚inherent‛ conservatism of the ‚silent 
majority‛ was the main obstacle – it had been overcome in the praxis of struggle 
and it could be overcome again – but the practical divide between ‚the masses‛ 
                                                          
1869 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
1870 Trotsky 2001: 192. 
1871 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
1872 Interview with Khaled al-Balshy, Cairo 14 March 2011. 
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and ‚the vanguard‛. The soft coup had cut off the vanguard from its mass base. 
As Trotsky explained with regard to the 1917 February Revolution: 
A minority of the revolutionary class actually participates in the insurrection, but 
the strength of that minority lies in the support, or at least sympathy, of the 
majority. The active and militant minority inevitably puts forward under fire from 
the enemy its more revolutionary and self-sacrificing element< But the situation 
changes the moment the victory is won and its political fortification begins. The 
elections to the organs and institutions of the victorious revolution attract and 
challenge infinitely broader masses than those who battled with arms in their 
hands.1873 
The first task for leftists wanting to assist in the development of the popular 
Subject was to reconnect the vanguard to its mass basis and reconstitute the 
revolutionary activity-system. While opinions within the Left differed strongly on 
the validity and usefulness of participating in elections, most organized leftists in 
the RS, SRC, and UESY realized that, if the vanguard could not mobilize the 
masses into the streets, it would have to go to the masses and bring the ‚spirit of 
Tahrir‛ to the popular neighborhoods and workplaces: ‚But if this still-potential 
vanguard role does not speedily acquire organizational form, memories of Tahrir are likely 
to fade away.‛1874 ‚We have to take Tahrir to the factories now,‛ exclaimed blogger and 
RS activist Hossam al-Hamalawy. 1875  Likewise, Gihan Ibrahim asserted that: 
‚<our battles are not in parliament, but in the factories, in the unions, in setting up the 
workers’ party, in using these strikes and workers’ power into a political weapon.‛1876 
 Firstly, the mobilization of the masses had to be complemented and reinforced 
with their organization into stable, coherent activity-systems. These organizational 
forms had not to be ‚invented‛ by leftists, as the revolution itself had spawned 
two spontaneous neoformations of self-organization: the popular or civil 
committees, and the strike committees. Independent leftist activist Wael Tawfiq 
stressed that:  
For the Left, at this moment, the most important thing is the formation of popular 
committees in the neighborhoods, but it is difficult< The most important thing is 
to organize the people themselves, not only the leftists. We should create groups 
                                                          
1873 Trotsky 2001: 186. 
1874 Hazem Kandil in NLR 2011. 
1875 Al-Hamalawy 2011a. 
1876 Interview with Gihan Ibrahim, Cairo, 20 March 2011. 
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from the popular committees to protect the people’s demands. Furthermore, we 
should organize the workers in independent unions. A lot of groups are organizing 
independent unions. This is the most important step in this phase of the 
revolution.1877 
Secondly, the development of local revolutionary activity-systems had to be 
accompanied by the construction of national structures: subaltern political parties 
and trade union federations. 
Revolutionary Neoformations 
Each revolution produces its own neoformations in accordance with its SSoD. In 
the Russian Revolution of 1905 and 1917, the soviets – workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils – were the logical products of proletarian uprisings against the 
disastrous war efforts of czarism. In Egypt, these organic neoformations were the 
popular committees, the youth movements, and the independent trade unions.  
 The popular committees were established in response to the withdrawal of 
police forces from the streets. Because of their vertical and ‚spatial‛1878 – rather 
than horizontal and ‚class‛ – character, their social composition was much more 
heterogeneous than that of the Russian soviets. Gihan Shabeen explained: 
<some of them are radical, some of them are not. It depends on the location, if they 
are in Suez or Mahalla, they will be effective, in a poor place in Cairo or 
Zamalek< You can find committees in al-Ma’adi, in Zamalek and Mohandiseen 
having police officers, judges and businessmen in the committee. This is not the 
right committee that I prefer. I prefer committees built on a class basis. But, why 
not? We had thirty years without any form of organization, so it is a good start 
that the Egyptian people is no longer atomized.1879 
The civil committees, taken as a whole, expressed the diverse class basis of the 
whole revolutionary Project. The Republic of Tahrir could be perceived as the 
biggest and most developed ‚committee‛ of them all, produced by the logic of 
                                                          
1877 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
1878  In the sense that they were first and foremost neighborhood committees, primarily 
representing a coherent spatio-social unit. Logically, particular spatial units articulated particular 
social compositions. A ‚rich‛ neighborhood mobilized upper and upper-middle class 
constituencies; and a ‚poor‛ neighborhood was mainly composed of working class people. 
1879 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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occupation and demonstration. Sinan’s comparison of Tahrir with the Paris 
Commune was probably quite apt.1880  
 After the fall of Mubarak, activists within the RS, SRC, and UESY tried to 
consolidate those popular committees with subaltern roots and transform them 
into committees for the defense of the revolution: ‚We hope that these attempts 
succeed, because this is crucial to the success of the revolution. Even if we only speak 
about the democratic revolution. Because there is a counter-revolutionary going on, so it 
is important for the people to be organized in these types of committees.‛1881 
 A distrust and disdain for ‚party politics‛, especially among new layers of 
activists, were instrumental in the formation of various ‚youth movements‛. 
Most of these had their roots in pre-revolutionary political activities, such as the 6 
April Youth Movement, but others were born in the Republic of Tahrir and other 
‚subsystems‛ of revolutionary activity, such as the Coalition of (the) Youth (of 
the) Revolution (CYR). These youth movements were horizontally organized and 
constituted a loose collection of discrete groups and networks.1882 They played an 
important role in the continued mobilization of protesters after the fall of 
Mubarak, but they were unable or unwilling to construct themselves as a more 
coherent and centralized political force. 
 The absence of workers as a social Subject in the first two weeks of the 25 
January uprising worried leftists with a class perspective on the revolution. Wael 
Tawfiq recalled:  
The most important question for the Left was: where is the working class and how 
can we organize it. We began to connect with the worker leaders in many areas and 
we got a positive reaction from the workers. We encouraged them to become active 
in the revolution. We distributed this statement in all the big factories in Egypt. 
This statement made the workers move.1883 
                                                          
1880 See Chapter 23 The Republic of Tahrir. 
1881 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 13 March 2011. 
1882 For example, the CYR claimed to be composed of the Young Muslim Brotherhood, the Youth 
Movement for Justice and Freedom, the April 6 Youth, the Young People’s Campaign to Support 
ElBaradei, the Youth of the National Assembly to Change, the Youth Party of Dignity, the Party 
Youth Delegation, the Youth Party Tomorrow, the Youth Rally, along with independent youths, 
bloggers, and activists. (See Coalition of Youth Revolution Facebook Page: 
https://www.facebook.com/Coalition.Of.Youth.Revolution?sk=info) 
1883 Interview with Wael Tawfiq, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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The role of ‚traditional‛ leftist intellectuals was modest in encouraging the 
workers to mobilize and support the popular Project as workers. The strikes 
during the last days of Mubarak reign were largely spontaneous and interpellated 
by the attempt of the regime to reopen businesses and ‚normalize‛ Egypt’s 
society. But, whereas the working classes and their subaltern allies were 
demobilized as a popular Subject by the Caesarist intervention, they were 
mobilized as a proletarian Subject in their workplaces. The demobilization of the 
democratic protesters in the streets was in inverse proportion to the mobilizations 
of workers in the factories and companies. While the civil committees were facing 
disintegration, the strike committees flourished. Those factions among the Left 
that oriented themselves towards these proletarian neoformations had two goals. 
Firstly, just as during the five years leading up to the revolution, they encouraged 
the development of spontaneous, ad hoc strike committees into independent trade 
union structures. Hisham Fouad clarified that: 
<there are a lot of attempts to organize workers in the factories, under different 
names. These attempts will succeed on many occasions and they will achieve huge 
things: fire their bosses, occupy their factories, and so on. We try to transforms 
these committees into independent unions in the factory< If the leftists and the 
people succeed in creating these committees, it will be a precious instrument in 
winning the revolution.‛1884 
Traditional intellectuals helped their organic counterparts in consolidating and 
institutionalizing their local strike committees ‚<with the lawyers that we have, 
with the people experienced in these fields<‛1885 into trade unions on the level of the 
workplace. This ‚horizontal‛ assistance was complemented with ‚vertical‛ 
instruction, as leftists supported the formation of trade union federations, 
connecting and coordinating isolated instances of class struggle with each other. 
With regard to HASHD and the RS, Gihan Ibrahim elucidated that: 
What we are doing is expanding our work and continuing to do what we did 
already, which is being in urban poor areas, having close ties with workers within 
key factories, coordinating that very well, even though we are not many. We are 
not like 6 April who do have a large base number-wise, however we have, I think, 
an impact in places like Mahalla, like Suez, like Alexandria, like factories in 
                                                          
1884 Interview with Hisham Fouad, Giza, 13 March 2011. 
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Helwan< through our connections and web of coordination , we are able to 
connect all these movements to build a workers’ force that we believe is the key in 
defending the revolution and in continuing the revolution and ultimately having 
the workers to be truly representative in whatever process may come.1886 
Secondly, leftists encouraged a politicization of strike committees and trade 
unions, reinforcing the notion of workers as a political Subject. Strike committees 
and civil committees sometimes entwined and fused into committees for the 
defense of the revolution, as Wael Tawfiq remembered: ‚In the Iron factory in 
Helwan we organized a committee to protect the revolution. We were the first ones to do 
so.‛1887 
Many Princes 
The 25 January Revolution had not destroyed al-nazim. Even though some pillars 
of State power were brought down, or weakened, others withstood the popular 
landslide. The throne of the Pharaoh was – temporarily? – occupied by the SCAF. 
Some leftists – a small minority – had illusions in the role of the Armed Forces. 
Most leftist militants, however, realized that the revolution was all but finished, 
and that the subaltern classes needed to form a counter-bloc. The revolution had 
not automatically solved the ideological and organizational cleavages within the 
Left. As I explained in Chapter 19 Roads to Counter-Hegemony, leftists differed in 
their political methodologies, which entailed, implicitly or explicitly: (1) a critique 
of Egypt’s political economy and a proposal for a reconfiguration of base and 
superstructure relations; (2) a conception of the social force capable of challenging 
the neoliberal bloc and of its possible and necessary allies; (3) a strategy of dealing 
with State power; (4) a methodology of building a hegemonic apparatus. 
However, while these discussions remained largely academic before 2011, the 
revolution made their practical resolution actual and urgent. Simplifying the 
complex discussions, I suggest a classification of the various leftist Projects, based 
on their historical pre-revolutionary roots, into (1) a secular bloc; (2) a civil-
democratic bloc; (3) a subaltern bloc. 
 The secular bloc had been completely – yet temporarily – subsumed under the 
revolutionary Project, which imposed an inclusive, popular Subjectivity – 
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expressed in slogans such as ‚Copts and Muslims: One Hand‛ – on any religious 
or sectarian Subjectivities of its participants. However, the rapprochement 
between the Brotherhood and the SCAF in the early days after the fall of 
Mubarak, the rise of the Salafists as a political movement, and especially the YES 
vote in the Constitutional Referendum, conjured anew the specter of an 
‚Islamist‛ takeover. Especially those leftists from Tagammu or the Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party (ESDP) who were not engaged in grassroots revolutionary 
mobilizations and their neoformations, had placed their hopes in the SCAF-
supervised ‚transition process‛. Their dependence on either the new military 
Savior-Rulers, or ‚progressive‛ allies – such as the economically rightwing Free 
Egyptians Party of the ‚national capitalist‛ Naguib Sawiris – to fight off the 
danger of Islamism, expressed their lack of a real social base. During the 
November 2011 parliamentary elections they joined forces with the Free 
Egyptians Party, creating the Egyptian Bloc, with the explicit goal of defending 
secularism.1888 
 The civil-democratic bloc shared the secular bloc’s emphasis on the creation of 
a civil state, but rather than secularism, the primary goal of the Project was 
democracy. The main danger for the Egyptian revolution was not Islamism, but the 
feloul – remnants of the ‚old regime‛ – and the military’s grip over politics. 
Moderate Islamist formations such as al-Wasat or individuals such as Abd al-
Moneim Abu al-Fotouh were not excluded from the bloc. The immediate battle 
for hegemony was not seen as a struggle between subaltern and ruling classes, 
but between the military ‚State‛ and ‚civil society‛. Sabry Zaky, for example, 
stressed that the transition to democracy was: 
<a long battle so we have to strengthen the political parties in Egypt. All political 
parties in Egypt are just carton parties, up until the revolution and today. So we 
have to have a long term objective, we have to strengthen civil society itself< and 
we have to have new political parties that are able to compete for power. This is the 
first step we ought to do right now.1889 
The goal of leftists was to stimulate the creation of parties, organizations, 
grassroots committees, NGOs, trade unions, syndicates, of whatever class 
composition or political orientation, because the development and multiplication 
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of these organs would constitute a dynamic civil society that would act as a 
counterweight against the State – i.e. the military, the Interior Ministry, et cetera. 
Such an artificial separation between ‚State‛ and ‚civil society‛ was rather a 
liberal than a leftist conception. For leftists, it was also a variation on the stagist 
concept of ‚democracy first‛: even though leftists differed from their rightist 
competitors because of their economic program, they should strive to implement 
democracy before engaging in any far-reaching social reforms. The civil-
democratic Project easily found supporters among progressive liberals, parties 
such as al-Ghad and al-Gabha, al-Baradei supporters, middle class 6 April 
activists, human rights activists, et cetera. It appeared as the most inclusive bloc 
as it articulated the ‚dominant‛ democratic aspect of the 25 January Revolution, 
as Bamyeh explained: 
<a striking development after January 28 was the fact that radical political 
demands were so elevated that that all other grievances—including those 
concerning dismal economic conditions—remained subordinate to them. The 
political demands were more clear that any other kinds of demands; everyone 
agreed on them; and everyone shared the assumption that all other problems could 
be negotiated better once one had a responsible political system in place<1890 
Originally, the Egyptian Bloc acted as the container for all civil-democratic forces 
in run-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections. However, liberal, leftist, nationalist 
and Islamist parties withdrew from the Bloc, either to join the Revolution 
Continues Alliance, or to contest the elections as independent parties. Even 
though (or because?) it represented the broadest revolutionary platform, the civil-
democratic bloc was spread over various parties, movements, and electoral 
alliances.  
A Subaltern Bloc 
A Leftist Party 
Some leftists argued that they should unite and differentiate themselves from 
rightist forces on the basis of their explicitly leftist project, formally expressed in 
its name, program and/or traditions. The relative freedom to create parties meant 
that the Left, for the first time since 1952, could openly establish itself as a 
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socialist, social-democratic, or communist party. Inevitably, the revolution 
spawned a host of leftist groups, and some activists voiced the need for unity 
between the Left in Tagammu, the RS, the ECP, the SRC, Democratic Left, ESDP, et 
cetera. They perceived the fragmentation of the Left as the main obstacle for 
leftists to assist the revolutionary Project in its development: ‚Most groups< are 
waiting for a big leftist party to join it and support it demands. We need a HUGE leftist 
organization to attract these groups and individuals.‚1891 
 Ironically, the project of an explicitly leftist platform encouraged both 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. Leftist actor Muhammad Zaky Murat remarked 
that: ‚In my opinion, there is now a perfect atmosphere to create a truly leftist party in 
Egypt, but it is the Left itself that does not want it.‛1892 Leftists could only constitute a 
counterbalance against liberal, nationalist, Islamist, and military rightist forces by 
uniting themselves in a single fist. This perspective led to tactical discussions 
about the shape of Left unity. Should it be an alliance between different, existing 
leftist groups? Should it be a new, pluralist party with room for different 
platforms, factions and voices? Or should the Left simply join the formation with 
the most resources and authority? Posing these tactical questions already ripped 
the Left apart. No sizeable, organized group was willing to absorb their often 
slowly and painfully built apparatus into another party.  
 For example, at the beginning of March 2011 I was present during the debate in 
Tagammu whether the Left flank should remain in the party, or leave it in order to 
free itself from the bureaucracy and raise its socialist banner high. Haisam 
Hassan, a member of the UESY and of the left tendency, did not agree with 
leaving the party: 
In this meeting they said: if Rifaat al-Said doesn’t resign from the party, we will 
resign ourselves and make a new party. In my opinion, if you can’t fix your home 
you cannot go out and make a new home and say: this is my new home. This is not 
right, you have to stay in Tagammu and prove that you are a leftist member and 
that you are a leader who is able to solve the problems. You cannot surrender with 
the first problem in the party. So we tried to tell them: please stay in the party< 
I think there will be a new leftist party, but it won’t be effective in the streets. I was 
talking to the financial chief editor in al-Ahali. We are making an edition about 
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this problem in the party and the question of a new party. And I see right now< 
my opinion is that all the left forces should come to Tagammu and be undivided to 
work in the elections of parliament and presidential elections; everyone, also the 
Revolutionary Socialists, if they make a party, maybe they will be effective with 
100,000, and Tagammu too, and other parties too, but if they are one party with 
one program, one force, they can really do something in the elections and would 
have the numbers to have a lot of votes in the parliament and then we could agree 
to have one leftist candidate for the presidential elections. So it will not be effective, 
and it will not be a real party, but it will cause a lot of weakness for Tagammu.1893 
Hassan’s argument was straightforward: Tagammu was the historical pluralist 
party of the Left in Egypt; it belonged in principle to the rank-and-file; and leftist 
leaders should remain in the party and fight the bureaucracy to gain control over 
the apparatus’s networks and resources. Leaving Tagammu would strengthen the 
bureaucratic leaders and cause a lot of damage to the Left in Egypt. The masses 
did not know all the exotic leftist groups that had sprung up since the 1990s, but 
they did have a collective memory of Tagammu – a memory that was materially 
entrenched in political spaces in the whole of Egypt as the party was still one of 
the few nationally organized leftist structures, with branches from Aswan to 
Alexandria. 
 For those who, in the end, left Tagammu, the argument was equally clear-cut. 
Firstly, why spend time and energy to fight an internal enemy when you could 
easily establish a democratic organization, reserving all political efforts and 
resources for the battle with the State? Secondly, while Tagammu had been the 
historical party of the Left in Egypt, it was also tainted with its past as the ‚legal 
left‛ and the legacy of the opportunistic secular alliance. Just as other ‚old‛ 
formations, such as the Brotherhood and the Wafd, Tagammu had never been a 
revolutionary party of the masses. Were it not for its disobedient and 
independent activists, Tagammu would have missed the boat of the 25 January 
protests completely. Muhammad Salah, a member of Tagammu’s Trend for 
Change who later joined the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, commented that: 
Any leftist, any socialist, any communist, must bet on the people. Rifaat al-Said 
forgot that there are people in the streets. He only betted on his relation with the 
regime and he could continue his rule in the party through this relation. This is the 
clear reason of the current internal struggle, the political opposition between us 
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and dr. Rifaat al-Said. The revolution revealed the right opinions and 
statements.1894 
The SPAP aimed to be a new ‚house of the Left‛, but its leaders realized that it 
shouldn’t waste too much time on courting the various tendencies: ‚<there are 
still a lot of leftist forces outside it, like Tagammu< like the Egyptian Communist Party, 
which treats Tagammu as its own party, and the Revolutionary Socialists, which 
established the Democratic Labor Party. We do our thing and we’ll see.‛1895 The RS was 
skeptical about the collaborative Project of a unitary leftist party:  
The Socialist Popular Alliance Party wasn’t our initiative, but we participate in its 
meetings. However, collecting all the small leftist groups will not have the same 
impact of that of a good strong party. It is better to orient yourself directly towards 
the people than towards other parties. It is only when the Left is active in the 
streets that the new leftist leadership will become clear. 1896 
Gihan Shabeen of the SRC was of the same opinion:  
<we have to have priorities. We would love to connect to all these organizations. 
But we don’t have the time or the power to do this. If I choose, I choose to go to 
either that factory strike, or to that committee in that neighborhood...1897 
Tagammu Trend for Change leader Muhammad Salah concurred: 
A socialist party should support the people in the streets. Its role in the society is 
related to its relation to the people. As long as it is a mass party with strong 
connections to the street and the people, it will play a big role. If this relation is 
severed it won’t play any role, especially in the Third World.1898 
For most SPAP leaders and activists, leftist unity was a side quest.1899 The real 
challenge was the construction of a revolutionary subaltern bloc against the 
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1897 Interview with Gihan Shabeen, Cairo, 16 March 2011. 
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1899 Because groups such as the Socialist Party of Egypt (SPE) and the RS resisted a merger into 
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However, up until the moment of writing, nothing much concrete developed from this 
collaboration. 
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neoliberal passive revolution. Rather than ‚just‛ civil-democratic or leftist, the 
Subaltern Prince had to be popular and revolutionary. 
Popular or Proletarian Prince? 
Leftists who were engaged in the struggles of subaltern actors since the 1990s 
developed an integral concept of the revolution as a process of both political and 
economic struggle. Just as al-nizam did not only represent political dictatorship, 
but also economic exploitation, the social Subject of al-sha’b had a clear class 
dimension. Workers, farmers, impoverished urban professionals and students, 
slum dwellers, et cetera: these actors constituted ‚the people‛ in a ‚class sense‛. 
The SPAP was established by SRC and ex-Tagammu members as an explicit 
instrument for the continuation of the ‚people’s‛ revolution. Gihan Shabeen 
explained that: 
<we are not talking about a party in the sense of a tool to solve our own problems, 
but as a tool to continue the revolution, that those people have to have a political 
instrument to renew their struggle and to let them work together to transform 
them into the real beneficiaries of the process. Within this new spirit we try to 
create a new party, a broad leftist party, in the sense of a broad leftist party like in 
Europe or Brazil. We started already a month ago. Inside the revolution we had 
our first meetings. This party will be democratic and heterogeneous, people are 
allowed to create their own platforms. We are entering, as the SRC as a platform, 
not an ideological platform, but a political one. We have started working with this 
and I am hoping that it will become another power.1900 
Wael Tawfiq was in agreement: 
In my opinion, the best way is a broad political party with a minimum of social 
demands and with a real popular membership. The social demands should be those 
from below, not imposed from a leftist leadership above. In time the best of all these 
organizations will rise to the surface. In the mean time, all leftists should try to 
organize the workers. The small groups will grow and create a bigger Left<1901 
Note that this discussion reflected the pre-revolutionary debate between left-
nationalists such as al-Karama, the SRC, and the RS on the role of the working 
class in a subaltern bloc. 1902  For left-nationalists workers were an important 
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1902 See Chapter 19 Roads to Counter-Hegemony. 
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participant in the national-popular bloc, but they were not differentiated as a 
class from other subaltern actors such as farmers. For them the emancipatory 
Subject was the national-popular bloc. They did not recognize a difference 
between, on the one hand, the conflict between the subaltern bloc and the ruling 
classes over State power, and, on the other, the struggle for hegemony within the 
subaltern bloc. 
 Even though both the SRC and the RS conceived of the worker Subject as the 
leading actor that could realize both political and human emancipation, i.e. 
socialism, they had a different view on the current ZPD of the workers’ 
movement. The RS positioned itself firmly on the standpoint of the proletariat 
and stressed the historical necessity of the workers’ politicization and 
independence: ‚We want the workers, the true workers, represented and be part of the 
political process that they completely been out of for decades.‛1903 As a leftist formation, 
their role was clear: ‚We have to connect with the workers and we have to help the 
workers to build their party.‛1904 In order to lead the subaltern bloc, the workers 
needed their own, independent structures. Mustafa Bassiouny emphasized that 
the goal of the RS was assisting the workers in creating their own party: ‚We will 
help the workers in developing their own demands, which are not necessarily the demands 
of the RS.‛1905 With the support of some of the leaders of the independent trade 
unions, the RS established the Workers National Democratic Party. The class 
character of the workers’ party was more important than its revolutionary 
credentials or socialist demands. Saud Omar explained that: 
There should be a new labor party because the political parties should be rooted in 
social reality. A lot of leftists say that we need a new Egyptian Communist Party. I 
am not against this, of course. But I think that building a party on a class basis is 
more effective and powerful in society. Having a new labor party without any 
ideology, like communism or something, will grant it a larger influence than a 
communist labor party. It will allow the ‚bearded men‛ to join it, women, 
Christians, poor men, < to join and become involved in this party, and all of the 
people here are asking a share in the wealth and power of Egypt.1906 
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This line of thought was reminiscent of Trotsky’s argument in favor of a 
proletarian organization: 
<of course, 95 percent of the population, if not 98 percent, is exploited by finance 
capital. But this exploitation is organized hierarchically: there are exploiters, there 
are subexploiters, sub-subexploiters, etc. Only thanks to this hierarchy do the 
superexploiters keep in subjection the majority of the nation. In order that the 
nation should indeed be able to reconstruct itself around a new class core, it must 
be reconstructed ideologically and this can be achieved only if the 
proletariat does not dissolve itself into the “people,” into the “nation,” but 
on the contrary develops a program of its proletarian revolution and 
compels the petty bourgeoisie to choose between two regimes.1907 
The subsumption of the worker Subject under the broad Project of the ‚people‛ 
obfuscated the fundamental conflict between labor and capital, and the task of 
overcoming capitalism as a concrete mode of production. The participation of 
leftists in the independent workers’ Project would stimulate the formation of a 
philosophy of praxis: a methodology for the political and human emancipation of 
the proletariat and its subaltern allies. 
 However, for some leftists, the initiative of the WNDP came too soon in 
comparison with the actual developmental level of the workers’ movement. Wael 
Tawfiq moved that: ‚I think we should start from the base, from the unions. We should 
establish strong unions before a workers’ party. Establishing a new workers’ party now 
only brings about a new leadership. 1908  Gihan Shabeen explained that: ‚It is not 
enough for workers to have a party calling itself the workers’ party in order to join it. For 
example there is the Labor Party in England. The most important thing is to let the 
worker feel that the party is a real< alternative for change.‛1909 Ahmed al-Sayyid, the 
leader of the health technicians’ union, was of the same opinion: ‚First we have to 
make solid trade-unions, then we can have a party, but it takes a long time to create it. 
The ex-regime made fake parties, so people are not trusting the parties.‛1910 
 The difference of opinion between the RS and the SRC on the necessity of 
either a workers’ party or a national-popular party mainly concerned the ‚upper 
limit‛ of the proletarian ZPD. Whereas the SRC asserted that first the trade 
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unionist movement had to be developed before there could be any real, mass, 
organic workers’ party, the RS believed in the proleptic role of a ‚high profile‛ 
proletarian party in the politicization of the workers’ movement at large. These 
perspectives also reflected their diverging views on the ‚mode of movement‛ of 
the subaltern bloc in the post-Mubarak period. The ‚transitory‛ national-popular 
strategy of the SRC was based on the perspective of a gradual and protracted 
development of the revolutionary process, in which the workers had to wage a 
‚war of position‛ to consolidate their trade unionist neoformations vis-à-vis the 
military and Islamist forces of the counter-revolution. Conversely, the strategy of 
the RS was much more oriented towards a ‚war of movement‛ of the working 
class, and a high tide of the Mass Strike.1911 In this volatile SSoD, the workers’ 
movement could become quickly politicized, if provided with an effective 
proleptic instruction that projected the proletariat as a hegemonic force. 
Democratic or Social Revolution? 
Stephen Maher claimed that: ‚The Egyptian capitalist class and its international allies 
hope that by enacting mild political reforms, such as the freedom to organize political 
parties and speak more freely, the urban movement can be appeased and more radical 
social transformation and democratization forestalled.‛1912 In Chapter 24 Workers and 
Revolution, it became clear that the fates of democratic and economic 
transformation are entwined. The democratic revolution cannot succeed except 
by a reconfiguration of the economic structure, and the economic structure cannot 
be transformed unless the commanding heights of State power are captured and 
appropriated by a subaltern counter-bloc. This dual predicament is reflected in 
the twin histories of the civil-democratic and class movements that began from 
the 1990s onwards. It also renders the character of the 25 January Revolution as 
neither ‚democratic‛ nor ‚social‛: these are rather alternating moments within 
the broad revolutionary process; they are categories that subsume each other, 
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depending on which activity – street protests, strikes, elections, et cetera – leads 
the development of the popular Subject at a certain point in its trajectory.1913  
 In order to succeed, the subaltern forces have to overcome the sequence of 
particular perspectives that continuously refragment the popular Subject. This 
entails the building of a collaborative Project that allows each participating 
subaltern Subject – workers, farmers, students, women, et cetera – to recognize 
the realization of its own particular interests in the general goal that emerges 
from their shared activity. Such a Project also requires a concrete theory of itself 
as a collective actor, and of  al-nizam as a historical bloc of political and economic 
relations – a theory that ‚<is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close 
connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary 
movement.‛1914 
 Within the process of constituting a subaltern collaborative Project, the 
working class, as a social Subject in its own right, is able to play a central and 
leading part – not due to some mystic and innate quality as an abstract 
emancipatory historical force, but because of its real potential to become 
organized as a powerful social force through the Strike, as I have elaborated both 
theoretically and empirically in this dissertation. Even if in 2012 ‚<the working 
class does not have yet formal entities, organizations, parties, and unions that can claim 
their representation,‛ 1915  the fledgling trade union movement is still the best 
organized subaltern actor, equipped with the formidable weapon of the strike. 
The consolidation, reinforcement, and politicization of these trade unions might 
be the best strategy for a Left seeking to assist the emancipation of al-sha’b from 
the neoliberal bloc: ‚The strikes are the only instrument that will make the revolution 
succeed, even the purely political demands.‛ 1916  Conversely, the trade union 
movement could use the assistance of leftist activists and intellectuals to translate 
and defend its interests in the political sphere.  
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The Prince and the Pharaoh 
“Bildung” of the Egyptian Workers’ Movement 
 A conclusion is always an abstraction of the subject matter, but it is also a 
synthesis enriched with the concrete determinations of the phenomenon. In order 
to answer the research questions I advanced at the very beginning of the 
dissertation, I have constructed a concept of the historical trajectory of the 
Egyptian workers’ movements and ‚their‛ intellectuals. As a conceptual unit of 
analysis I took the workers’ collaborative Project of the Strike, from which new 
forms of social and political mediation were logically – in Part I Methodology – and 
historically – in the rest of the text – derived. The ‚speculative‛ development of 
the Strike was used as a framework of expectations to study the real, empirical 
unfolding of the historical process. This allowed me to discern proletarian lines of 
development that were strengthened, weakened, or blocked by the intervention 
of other actors. The Bildung of the Egyptian workers’ movement appears, on the 
one hand, as a diachronical yet non-linear story of interrupted trajectories, and, 
on the other, as a continuous (struggle against) the external colonization of its 
immanent class Subjectivities. 
  The diachronical story begins with the forceful introduction of the capitalist 
mode of production in the Egyptian social formation by the colonial State, cutting 
off any potential ‚indigenous‛ road to capitalist development. As I explained in 
Colonialism, the colonial intervention both stimulated and blocked the formation 
of a class of modern wage laborers, as both the urban ‚artisanat‛ and the rural 
feudalistic relations remained unchallenged by the few foreign capitalist 
industries and State sectors such as communication and transportation. The 
strikes in this period were rooted in both ‚traditional‛ and ‚modern‛ 
Subjectivities, and their hybrid character was expressed in the first trade union 
organizations such as the MTWU. Other strike neoformations were much more 
representative of an emerging class Subjectivity, such as the CTWU. The 
hybridity of the workers’ movement was further complicated by the nature of its 
antagonist. Despite its domestic agents, the ‚Pharaoh‛ was primarily a foreign 
actor, and capitalist exploitation was correspondingly understood as political 
domination. The concept that the the workers’ movement developed of its 
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predicament was a critique of colonialism and imperialism, and its negation was 
political sovereignty and independent economic development. 
 In Neo-Colonialism, it became clear that, for the workers’ movement, the riddle 
of its exploitation was not simply solved by nationalism. Foreign domination 
continued, but it was complemented and complicated by the feeble attempts of 
domestic capitalists to carve out a niche for themselves in Egypt’s industries. For 
the workers’ movement this period represented an important developmental 
phase. Firstly, the absolute and relative number of wage laborers increased by the 
domestic industrialization efforts, and the military production of the Second 
World Ward. The saliency of modern wage labor differentiated the ‚wage 
laborer‛ conceptually from the artisan and other pre-capitalist types of laborers. 
In a way, the 1930s saw the consolidation of Egyptian wage laborers as a class-in-
itself: i.e. as a potential social Subject subjected to the capitalist mode of 
production. The strikes in this period pushed its development as a class-for-itself. 
The trade unionist line of development – which had its roots in the colonial 
period, but only now became the central neoformation – gradually negated the 
economic-corporate predicament of the workers. Strikes challenged both foreign 
domination and capitalist exploitation. The colonization of trade union 
neoformations by non-proletarian Subjects was slowly overcome by independent 
trade unions led by workers themselves. Whilst the Wafd was able to subsume the 
trade union movement in the early 1920s, by the 1940s it could no longer simply 
dominate the expressions of the proletarian activity-system in the ‚economic‛ 
field. Politically, the worker Subject continued to identify itself with the 
nationalist Project. However, there was a reconfiguration of the relations of 
power within the counter-hegemonic bloc. By the early 1950s the workers’ 
movement had become a leading Subject within the counter-bloc, supporting the 
nationalist Project on its own conditions. There was a – sometimes ambiguous 
and problematic – relation of exchange and solidarity between the worker Subject 
and other social forces. Arguably, at this point, the counter-hegemonic bloc was 
evolving into a real collaborative Project. 
 From a speculative point of view, if the counter-hegemonic bloc had succeeded 
in overthrowing the reactionary monarchy and British domination, the further 
maturation and differentiation of the worker Subject would increasingly have 
brought it into conflict with the class goal of capital accumulation and rent 
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accretion of its bourgeois allies. Furthermore, the inability of the illusive ‚national 
bourgeoisie‛ to develop the Egyptian economic structure independently from the 
rural feudalistic and foreign capitalist actors with whom its interests are 
entangled, opens up the political space for the workers’ movement to assert itself 
as a directive, i.e. hegemonic, force. In this manner, the Egyptian ‚distortion 
along nationalist lines‛ of the archetypical development of the worker Subject 
would, at the same time, become its organic solution: the subsumption of 
workers’ emancipation under the Project of nationalist emancipation would be 
reversed, and turned into the realization of nationalist sovereignty through 
proletarian hegemony. 
 However, the Gordian knot was forcefully resolved by the sword. The 
Nasserist Caesarist intervention aimed to solve the colonial question by the top-
down construction of a nationalist Subject that fragmented and subsumed all 
other activity-systems in political and civil society. From the perspective of the 
maturation of the working class as a social Subject, this episode constituted a 
deeper developmental pathology than the ‚nationalist‛ distortion of the previous 
decades. Firstly, its independent trade unionist neoformations were subsumed 
under the State, losing their organicity as historical mediations of the Strike, and 
becoming the ‚practico-inert‛ objectifications of the working class. This did not 
mean that workers could no longer negotiate wages and working conditions 
through these structures: it signaled the end of these institutions as forces in the 
development of a proletarian Project. Most worker actions happened outside the 
framework of the GFETU. Secondly, the ‚octroyal socialism‛ and corporatism of 
the State transformed the existing and potential political-economic critique of 
property relations into a moral-economic consciousness of reciprocal rights and 
duties between workers and the Pharaoh. The dominant shape of the Strike – a 
brief ‚work-in‛ instead of a protracted ‚work stoppage‛ – generally prevented 
the organic development of new trade unionist neoformations. Nasserism then 
appears as the authoritarian and ‚peripheral‛ version of the Western Fordist 
consensus, and the bureaucratization of the trade union movement as the top-
down reflection of the ‚organic‛ reformism of its European and American 
counterparts.  
 Similarly to the pact between Western capital, the State, and the working class, 
the Nasserist consensus could only endure as long as the ruling classes were able 
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and willing to share a sizeable fraction of the surplus with the subaltern classes. 
The global shift towards a neoliberal strategy for accumulation from the 1970s 
onwards, iniated a new line of development for the global workers’ movement. In 
the Egyptian social formation, the neoliberal passive revolution was stalled by the 
contingent emergence of a rentier economy, which enabled the ruling classes to 
continue its ‚populist consumption policy‛ in a ‚post-populist‛ way: 
neoliberalism without a coherent or consolidated neoliberal strategy for 
accumulation. The GFETU was able to operate as the redistributive middle-man 
between workers and the State, deflecting major contradictions and their 
contestations. As such, the working class, despite a few militant strikes in the 
1970s and 1980s, remained in its economic-corporate state. 
 The debt and financial crisis of the second half of the 1980s forced the ruling 
stratum to turn the passive revolution back to its offensive moment. The demise 
of State corporatism and the ‚moral economy‛ constituted a deeping of the 
workers’ predicament. Their social situation of development consisted of the 
objective factor of the increased rate of exploitation, and the subjective element of 
their fragmentation and the practico-inert presence of the GFETU, which blocked 
the path of an organic trade unionist development. Although elements of 
historical Subjectness found their way into the strikes of the 1990s and 2000s – in 
the shape of elderly activists, organizations, texts, and memories – for the most 
part, the workers’ movement had to reinvent and reinstruct itself as a social 
Subject. The Mahalla strikes constituted both the conceptual and historical ‚jump-
start‛ of novel trade unionist neoformations and a new line of proletarian 
development. The protracted and militant work stoppages of the Mahalla 
workers inspired the tax collectors strikes, which led to the first independent 
trade union, and, in turn, stimulated the teachers, pensioners, and health 
technicians to form such structures of their own.  
 Within the SSoD of the Mubarak dictatorship, the trade unionist development 
was gradual and fragile. The 25 January Revolution and the disorganization of 
the State accelerated the formation of trade unionist structures and forms of 
consciousness. The future of trade unionism and worker emancipation is 
interwoven with the development of the revolutionary counter-bloc. If workers 
and other subaltern actors jointly participate in a genuine collaborative Project, 
the development of trade unionism is reinforced by political emancipation, and 
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political emancipation by the agency of a strong trade union movement. Within 
the instructive process of political emancipation and the maturation of its own 
trade union neoformations, the worker Subject may recognize the means of a 
universal, human emancipation in the development of its own, particular 
emancipation from capital. However, if workers and their potential subaltern 
allies fail to constitute such a Prince, their political Subjectivities will be either 
obliterated or colonized by a new Pharaoh, regardless of the faction – the military, 
USA imperialism, the Ikhwan, the ‚national bourgeoisie‛, or the neoliberal 
capitalists – that dominates the ruling bloc. 
The Road to Solidarity 
Throughout its developmental trajectories, the Egyptian workers’ movement has 
enjoyed, as well as suffered, the intervention of non-proletarian actors in its 
activity-systems. Because of its salient class activities, the workers’ movement 
attracts the attention of other class forces, and of the intellectuals that have been 
organically produced alongside these classes. In Egypt, during the colonial and 
neocolonial episodes, the nationalist movement understood the potential of the 
workers as a social force – probably before the workers themselves. Actors such 
as the National Party assisted workers to set up their first ‚economic‛ structures – 
the MTWU, for example. However, they supported the workers in a colonizing 
way: instead of stimulating the organic and independent development of trade 
unions, they controlled and dominated these mediations. Conversely, the worker 
Subject recognized itself as a trade union Subject via the paternalist mediations of 
the nationalist movement.  
 After the First World War, there was a brief struggle between the Wafd and the 
fledgling communist movement over the trade union movement. The Wafd easily 
came out on top and subsumed the existing trade unions under its control by 
means of the GFLU. Again, the economic-corporate condition of the Egyptian 
workers was artificially transcended by the intervention of an external mediation. 
Both economically and politically workers recognized their interests through the 
Wafd. Between 1930 and 1935 Prince Halim took over the Wafd’s colonization of 
the trade unions, but his ‚Caesarist‛ NFTUE constituted a transition phase for the 
workers’ movement, as organic proletarian intellectuals began to replace the 
Wafdist non-proletarian leaders.  
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 After Halim’s fall, the Wafd could no longer colonize the trade unionist 
neoformations of the worker Subject. Workers no longer recognized their 
economic interests – i.e. themselves as a trade union Subject – through the 
mediation of the Wafd. However, they continued to identify themselves politically 
with the Wafdist Project. The shared activity between the workers’ movement 
and the Wafd took on the dominant form of commodification: in exchange for 
economic concessions, the workers recognized the Wafd as the directive counter-
hegemonic force. Meanwhile, other actors sought to intervene in the workers’ 
movement – mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and the communists. The Ikhwan, 
however, did not court the industrial core of the new wage laborers, but rallied 
the embattled urban artisanat and the new ‚middle classes‛ that emerged in the 
wake of colonialism. The communists – and left-nationalists – for their part, 
supported the independent trade union movement in a solidary way. However, 
just as the Wafdists, they encouraged the workers to recognize their political 
interests through the mediation of a collaborative nationalist Project. Moreover, 
the national, political fight against imperialism took precedence over the 
‚economic‛ struggle and the development of independent trade unionism. 
Communists engaged in a hybrid mode of assistance, in which political 
colonization remained the dominant form of support. 
 The confusion among leftists about the nature of Nasserism and their own 
liquidation as an organized tendency spelled the end of their support for the 
workers’ movement. When they re-emerged in the 1970s, their mode of assistance 
remained largely entangled in the previous hybrid mode of assistance, calling on 
the workers to unite with a phantom progressive bourgeoisie. During the 1980s 
the leftist movement proved incapable of offering the workers’ movement any 
coherent and centralized directive, cultural, or technical assistance, and it 
collapsed. Grassroots leftist activists and intellectuals continued to support the 
workers struggles in genuine and solidary ways, but were unwilling or unable to 
instruct the workers’ movement as a potential social force.  
 From the 1990s onwards, a New Left re-engaged with street, community, and 
workplace politics. In the first years of the 21st century spontaneous grassroots 
civil-democratic activity-systems emerged and proliferated. However, it was the 
demise of the civil-democratic movement and the rise of the workers’ movement 
in the mid-2000s that brought many non-proletarian actors ‚back to class‛. I have 
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discussed the various types and modes of assistance towards the Mahalla strikes 
in detail and I won’t retell those chapters here. Suffice to say that also for leftists it 
was tempting to treat the workers’ movement in a colonizing or commodifying 
way: as a springboard for political emancipation, or as a shortcut to a mass leftist 
party. The defeat of the 6 April uprising in 2008 serves as an exemplum of the 
damage that some forms of assistance can cause to the workers’ struggle. 
Nevertheless, thanks to the internal development of the worker Subject – e.g. the 
formation of the RETAU – and the proleptic and solidary assistance of some non-
proletarian actors, the workers’ movement gradually matured independent trade 
union neoformations. 
 The 25 January Revolution first subsumed the workers’ movement under its 
grand construct of al-sha’b, but then the class differentiated itself from other actors 
by its strike activities: the best manner in which workers could assist the further 
development of the revolutionary Project was as an organized and militant social 
Subject. The Caesarist intervention of the SCAF ended the uprising, but not the 
revolution. Whereas the Republic of Tahrir was unable to expand itself to the 
whole Egyptian social formation, the seeds of trade unionism were relatively free 
to grow. The challenge for leftists is to see the means of their own emancipation in 
the building of the worker Subject – but according to its own tempo and needs. 
Assistance leads development, but only if its instruction does not move ahead or 
behind the ZPD of the workers’ movement at a given moment in its trajectory. 
Despite the revolutionary character of the current period, trade unionism is still 
the leading neoformation of the working class. However, within the womb of 
revolution, the development of an independent, democratic, and militant trade 
union movement could swiftly mature into the formation of a proletarian Prince. 
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A CHAT with Gramsci 
Immanent Agency 
I hope that, for some of you, reading this dissertation has been like the experience 
of a trip to an unknown and slightly foreboding destination, only to be warmly 
welcomed by an enthusiast host. Eyebrows and suspicions were probably raised 
when Hegel and Vygotsky made their appearance. Was this going to be one of 
those narratives that proclaimed the triumphant march of the proletariat towards 
utopia? Wouldn’t all this spielerei with obscure Soviet psychologists simply 
amount to a ‚psychologization‛ of ‚collective‛ social and political phenomena? 
The Scylla and Charybdis of Hegelian teleologism and psychological 
reductionism loomed over the text.  
 At the beginning of the dissertation I wrote that I wanted to contribute to the 
development of an emancipatory theory of the Subject. If we understand genuine 
emancipation as self-emancipation, then the means of emancipation must be 
found within the actor itself. Probably Marx’s greatest humanist achievement was 
that he saw the ragtag industrial proletariat of his age not merely as a collection of 
dejected and tormented beings that had to be ‚saved‛ from the ills of capitalism, 
but as powerful saviors in their own right. Where the humanitarians only saw the 
suffering of the wretched of the earth, he saw their agency as the ‚gravediggers of 
capitalism‛. However, Marx never elaborated in detail the process of proletarian 
class formation or sociogenesis. Andy Blunden’s non-teleological and 
emancipatory appropriation of Hegel – ‚reverse engineered‛ through Marx – 
pointed the way to an understanding of ‚Subjectness‛ that is dynamic, 
multidimensional, and, above all, immanent. Whereas a teleological approach 
enslaves the Subject to a fixed and external purpose, the concept of immanence 
places the development of goals and objectives in the agent’s own hands.  
 Vygotsky’s accomplishment was to render the philosophical concept of 
immanent development concrete – yet in the domain of ontogenesis. His 
revolutionary understanding of the social situation of development as a 
predicament that the child has to overcome by creating the necessary psychological 
functions, immediately drew my attention as a key insight. Obviously, as I 
stressed in Part I Methodology, his ontogenetic insights could not simply be 
transposed to the development of the workers’ movement. At that moment I 
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decided that it was time to have a ‚CHAT‛ with Gramsci. The cross-fertilization 
between Gramsci and cultural historical activity theory – in particular Vygotsky – 
would solve, in one stroke, my two main methodological problems: the 
development of (1) a concept of ‚proletarian sociogenesis‛ as self-emancipation; 
and (2) an ethico-political understanding of genuine and productive non-
proletarian assistance. 
A Typology of Assistance 
Whereas Vygotsky showed that ontogenetic development is always a 
development from a predicament, Gramsci explained that the general 
predicament of the working class is its ‚economic-corporate‛ condition. This 
fragmented state became the logical and historical starting point of my analysis of 
worker sociogenesis. The ‚classic‛ concept of the working class as a Subject-in-
itself was grasped as a the specific activity-system of wage labor, produced by 
historical processes of proletarianization and capital accumulation. However, 
workers cannot find the means to emancipate themselves in the activity of wage 
labor – which is externally enforced upon them – but through the Strike. 
Vygotsky’s concepts of neoformations, lines of development, and leading 
activities elucidated the mechanisms behind the formation of a worker activity-
system. By transposing Vygotsky’s insight of ‚ingrowth‛ to proletarian 
sociogenesis, it became clear that workers’ objectifications that emerge 
throughout the Strike activity not only constitute forms of mediation with factory 
management, capitalist owners, and /or the State, but that they also turn 
‚inward‛, developing the internal coherence of the fledgling proletarian Subject. 
If the Strike is allowed to develop – i.e. run its ‚logical‛ course – its horizontal 
and vertical expansion lead to ‚trade unionism‛, which, in turn opens up avenues 
for political Subjectivities.1917  
 Vygotsky stressed that instruction must lead development – that it must be 
‚proleptic‛. Combined with Gramsci’s notions of ‚intellectuals‛ and ‚dialectical 
                                                          
1917 Of course, the real, historical development of ‚strikes‛ did not neatly follow the conceptual 
unfolding of the Strike – just as Marx’s description of the maturation of the commodity relation 
into the capital relation did not reflect the historical path of capitalism. In order to understand a 
phenomenon one cannot be content with just describing a sequence of events: scientific 
knowledge is the confrontation of the logical with the historical unfolding of a process. See Part I 
Methodology. 
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pedagogy‛, this insight offered a framework to understand the mechanisms of 
both intra-class and inter-class assistance in development. Firstly, the concept of 
‚intellectuals‛ engaged with the reality of the social division of labor, both within 
and without the worker Subject.  
 Secondly, the division between ‚organic‛ and ‚traditional‛ intellectuals made 
clear that: (1) the worker Subject was fully capable of producing its ‚own‛ 
intellectuals through the Strike; and (2) non-proletarian intellectuals could still 
play a role in proletarian sociogenesis.  
 Thirdly, Gramsci observed that intellectuals engaged in different types of 
activities – directive, cultural, and technical – which I connected with Vygotsky’s 
understanding of the role of ‚peers‛ and ‚teachers‛ in instruction. In order to 
productively assist a Subject in its development, instruction must imagine the 
Subject in a more advanced state of its potential trajectory. I mobilized 
Meshcheryakov’s ontogenetic distinction between ‚autoprolepsis‛ and 
‚heterolepsis‛ for an understanding of intra-class and inter-class forms of 
proleptic instruction.  
 Fourthly, Vygotsky stressed that not all ‚imaginations‛ were reasonable: 
despite the sometimes ‚punctuated‛ nature of ontogenetic development, the 
child’s ability to accelerate its learning through assistance is not absolute. 
Vygotsky’s notion of the Zone of Proximal Development helped me to appreciate 
the ‚upper‛ and ‚lower‛ boundaries of assistance in proletarian sociogenesis. For 
example, the 6 April 2008 ‚general strike‛ clearly showed a transgression of the 
upper boundaries of the worker Subject’s potential development at that particular 
point in its trajectory. The ZPD offers a scientific understanding of the cliché – or 
is it a form of ‚good sense‛? – among leftists that their instruction has to be 
always ‚one step ahead of the movement‛.  
 Fifthly, with the history of leftist paternalism and substitutionalism in mind, 
there was clearly an ethico-political dimension to assistance. The hierarchical 
teacher-student relation could not be a model for a mode of assistance that 
stimulates self-emancipation. Gramsci’s concept of ‚dialectical pedagogy‛ 
tentatively pointed towards such a ‚deontology‛. Blunden’s appropriation of 
Hegel’s ‚modes of recognition‛ suggested an ethico-political typology of 
assistance as either colonization, commodification, solidarity, and collaboration – 
the latter being the sublation of the ‚externality‛ of the assistant to the assisted. 
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Solidarity and collaboration offer a concrete way to overcome the dichotomy 
between the social division of labor and the principle of self-emancipation – the 
original problematic of this dissertation. It presents leftists with an ethico-political 
deontology of assistance that does not encroach on the autonomy of the worker 
Subject. 
 Lastly, through a combination of the Gramscian and Vygotskian notion of the 
interpenetration of the developmental lines of good sense / everyday concepts 
and philosophy of praxis / scientific concepts, the divide between ‚false 
consciousness‛ and ‚scientific socialism‛ could be overcome: the emergence of 
‚critique‛ and ‚class consciousness‛ were situated firmly within a dialectical 
pedagogy. 
 The interdisciplinary encounter between Vygotsky and Gramsci might well be 
the single most important theoretical innovation of this dissertation. For 
researchers working in the CHAT tradition, my methodology shows how ‚their‛ 
concepts of activity, learning, and instruction can be applied to social and political 
movements without reducing sociogenesis to ontogenesis. Conversely, political 
scientists might appreciate the Vygotskian insights into the mechanisms of 
learning and instruction that operate within emancipatory movements. To leftist 
activists and critical thinkers it offers an ethico-political mode of assisting in the 
unfolding workers’ collaborative Project, and a conception of the social Subject 
that is neither fragmented nor authoritarian, but coherent and emancipatory. 
 
 
 
 
.  
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A Self-Reflecting Note 
Modes of Research 
Instead of treating the problematic of this dissertation, worker emancipation, in a 
(neo)Kantian way – as a mere object of knowledge waiting to be disclosed by the 
external agency of the researcher – I aimed to present workers as a social Subject 
in the process of realizing its own emancipation: a subject matter that ‚comes 
alive‛. The Substance of the ‚social sciences‛ is not composed of inanimate and 
inert objects, but of real, living human actors, their activities, and their forms of 
ideational and material mediation. Simply put: the Objects of social science are 
also Subjects in their own right.  
 Just as the workers’ movement was present at its own becoming – to 
paraphrase E.P. Thompson – the social scientist is present at the process of 
investigating and presenting ‚his‛ object of research. The relation between the 
social researcher and his subject matter is not one of ‚objectivity‛, but of 
‚subjectivity‛: it constitutes a mediated relation between Subjects and, possibly, a 
shared system of activity. This means that, from the perspective of the development of 
a subject matter as social Subject, social scientists engage in forms of assistance as 
well. There is a clear ethico-political dimension to the study of emancipatory 
collaborative Projects, and now, at the end of this dissertation, the time has come 
to subjugate my own research activity to the deontology I developed. 
 In the context of the social sciences, non-recognition is simply the non-
recognition of the subject matter as a (potential) social Subject. Workers are mere 
statistics, or the passive objects of economic and political processes. Conversely, 
the researcher does not recognize his own Subjectivity vis-à-vis his object of 
research. Workers do not interpellate him, and he does not interpellate the 
workers. I remember that, when I, as a teenager, first read the Communist 
Manifesto, I did not feel at all interpellated by the word arbeiders (workers) – 
which, in Dutch, has the automatic connotation of blue-collar workers. Why not 
just take ‚the people‛ as the emancipatory Subject? It took a while before I was 
able to recognize ‚workers‛ as a relevant, social force. This recognition was 
mediated by political writings and the direct perception of salient displays of 
agency: strikes and demonstrations. Now I take this immanent agency almost for 
granted, and I have to remind myself that this recognition has been a gradual 
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learning process itself. However, this personal experience has supported my 
understanding of Egyptian civil-democratic actors’ slow and often reluctant 
recognition of the proletarian Project. Without a participation – via the mediation 
of newspapers, television, texts, stories, direct observation, collaboration, et cetera 
– in the Strike, recognition is impossible.  
  Colonization is the subsumption of a Subject under another Subject, and with 
regard to the activity of research this means the subjugation of a Subjectivity to 
another Project, reducing the Subject to a position of subalternity. It’s easy to 
come up with extreme examples of colonizing science, such as the perspectives of 
the ‚white man’s burden‛, modernization theory, orientalism, et cetera. However, 
colonization is much more pervasive and, perhaps, unavoidable than one would 
assume. The instrumentalization of certain Subjects in order to support others, is 
entangled with the politics of research itself, where social reality is not only 
represented, but also ‚refracted‛ – in Voloshinov’s words – according to class and 
other Subjectivities. For example, my historical narrative of the Egyptian social 
formation was written from the perspective of the development of the workers’ 
movement and it ‚colonized‛ other Subjectivities – gender, ethnicity, religion, et 
cetera – for its purpose. Moreover, the personal friendships and relations that I 
built through my fieldwork are suppressed in the text, or pragmatically mobilized 
to tell the story of the worker Subject. 
 The activity of academic research also renders commodification of the subject 
matter inevitable – up to a point. Operating within the field of academia, we not 
only recognize our Subjects as ends-in-themselves, but also as pragmatic means to 
end. Academic prestige and, basically, employment, are important driving forces 
behind our research, transforming Subjects into articles, books, and conferences – 
into commodities, which are exchanged for wages, scholarships, and personal 
status. It reminds me of Marx’s observation that: ‚The criminal produces not only 
crimes but also criminal law, and with this also the professor who gives lectures on 
criminal law and in addition to this the inevitable compendium in which this same 
professor throws his lectures onto the general market as ‘commodities’.‛1918 
 A purely commodifying attitude towards the object of research entails the mere 
extraction of valuable and relevant knowledge from Subjects, and the 
appreciation of these Subjects only on the basis of their being a resource for 
                                                          
1918 Marx and Engels 1988: 306. 
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research. My mode of research contained an unavoidable commodifying 
component, as the writing of this dissertation and not the support of the Egyptian 
leftists and workers was its formal end. Nevertheless, I aimed to integrate this 
necessary commodification into a broader shared activity of solidarity. 
 To the social scientist, the solidary mode of research is oriented towards the 
development of his subject matter into a social Subject. The researcher creates a 
shared system of activity between herself and the ‚subject matter‛ with the 
primary goal of reinforcing the agency of the Subject. This mode describes the 
‚engaged‛ social science of the partisan researcher who is not afraid of ‚taking 
sides‛. Obviously engaged science is not necessarily ‚emancipatory‛ or even 
relevant. For example, studying crime or racism does not require the researcher to 
be ‚in solidarity‛ with her subject matter – on the contrary: perhaps such studies 
deserve a healthy dose of colonization. However, the reverse holds true: research 
that aims to be emancipatory has to contain a strong dimension of solidarity, as 
this mode of assistance strengthens the capacity of a Subject to emancipate itself. 
An engaged researcher soon finds himself drawn into his subject matter, and has 
to make a choice between ‚keeping his distance‛ – i.e. minimize his participation 
in the shared activity-system – becoming a ‚fellow traveler‛ – i.e. become a 
genuine participant in an explicit shared system of solidarity – or fully merging 
with the collaborative Project – i.e becoming one of its ‚democratic philosophers‛.  
Solidarity in Practice 
Due to my own political engagement I have accepted the interpellations by my 
subject matter and moved towards a clear and open position of solidarity. I like to 
think that my research, however modestly, has assisted and will assist Egyptian 
leftists and workers in their emancipatory struggle. Firstly, there have been the 
numerous informal discussions with some of my close respondents, such as 
Haisam Hassan and Wael Tawfiq, which constituted an important reciprocal 
learning process for all of us. Secondly, when I had the opportunity in the Belgian 
media to give an analysis of the Egyptian 25 January uprising, I aimed to tell a 
story that reinforced the perception of the events as an unfolding popular 
revolution and not as ‚chaos‛ or a potential Islamist take-over. Thirdly, when I 
returned to Egypt in March 2011, I brought with me solidarity declarations from 
the Belgian socialist public sector union, which I shared with leaders of the four 
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independent trade unions. Fourthly, I helped to set up a solidarity committee in 
Ghent with the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. Fifthly, I wrote two brief 
pieces for the youth organisation of Tagammu – one before and one after the 
revolution, voicing my opinions on the political tasks of leftists at the time. 
Sixthly, I helped some leftists in establishing contacts with international 
organizations and movements. Lastly, I hope that my dissertation can be of some 
assistance in the construction of a collaborative Project between leftists and 
workers, that focuses on the building of the trade unionmovement as the best 
guarantee for the continuation and deepening of the 25 January Revolution. 
 In conclusion, an emancipatory science does not stand ‚above‛ or ‚outside‛ its 
subject matter: it is an integral part of its development. Hassanein illustrated my 
own position as an engaged social scientists in a humorous cartoon that he drew 
for me, and which now serves as the back cover of this dissertation: the pen as the 
fuse that ignites the bomb of/beneath al-nizam. However, whereas a stance of 
‚objectivity‛ is impossible and undesirable, solidary assistance requires a critical 
and self-reflecting attitude. If ‚trust‛ and ‚honesty‛ are pillars of the solidary 
mode of assistance, then the social scientist should secure this relationship from 
both his respondents and his academic audience. This approach ensures that, even 
though the ethico-political deontology of solidarity may be subjective and partisan, 
it remains critical and scientific. 
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